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cover of episode Why Iran’s allies are nowhere to be seen

Why Iran’s allies are nowhere to be seen

2025/6/19
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World in 10

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Christopher Chivas: 我一直怀疑俄罗斯和伊朗之间的关系是否像人们描绘的那么紧密。我认为它被描绘得比实际情况更紧密。我们现在看到的就是这种情况。当然,这并不是说没有任何关系。当然,确实存在一种关系。从俄罗斯的角度来看,如果你考虑一下,一周前的现状实际上对俄罗斯非常有利。伊朗受到制裁,这促使伊朗投入俄罗斯的怀抱,并鼓励他们做一些事情,比如帮助俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争。同时,我们对伊朗实施的制裁也在推高油价,这对俄罗斯的战争机器非常重要。油价越高,俄罗斯就越容易支付其在乌克兰的战争费用。所以情况非常好。现在他们面临的情况更加困难和不确定,并带来许多不同的风险。对俄罗斯来说,目前最大的风险显然是伊朗被彻底推翻,政权更迭,它完全失去了合作伙伴。不过,这似乎不太可能。我怀疑莫斯科是否特别担心这个结果,但是......虽然肯定会因此产生很多混乱。克里姆林宫的问题在于,他们一直在试图拉拢特朗普总统。如果他们在伊朗问题上介入太深,他们可能会失去与特朗普达成任何协议的机会,无论是在乌克兰问题上,还是在他们试图使与美国和欧洲的整个关系正常化的更广泛的情况下。坦率地说,这对他们来说比伊朗本身更重要。克里姆林宫一直在提议进行调解,或许可以促成伊朗和以色列之间的协议。你认为这是俄罗斯向伊朗表明,即使在没有提供具体支持的情况下,他们也是多么好的朋友的一种方式吗?我认为这完全正确。我的意思是,我认为......伊朗保持某种核计划,俄罗斯多年来一直参与这方面的讨论。显然,俄罗斯是特朗普总统在2018年结束的伊朗核协议的签署国。他们再次提出为伊朗保存高浓缩铀,这可能对伊朗有吸引力。所以他们可以在这里做很多不同的事情。当然,最大的问题是,对世界上大多数国家,至少是大多数西方国家来说,俄罗斯是一个完全的贱民。他们一边攻击乌克兰,一边进行谈判的想法似乎非常牵强。也许中国的情况不同,但对俄罗斯来说似乎非常牵强。从中国的角度来看,获得包括伊朗在内的整个地区的能源非常重要。比世界上几乎任何其他国家,当然比任何其他大国都重要。因此,我想象北京的领导人非常重视这一点。他们在该地区也有商业利益。他们一直试图将自己定位为一个可靠的商业伙伴,愿意与任何国家进行贸易,无论其政治立场如何。美国显然在某些情况下没有提供这一点,但它使中国在整个地区发展其商业声誉方面具有一定的优势。此外,正如你指出的,他们一直试图利用这些能源和商业联系,将自己定位为一个政治领导者。一个真正能够充当公正的中间人,帮助解决冲突,捍卫世界和平的国家。例如,在过去几天里,习近平主席在谈到以色列和伊朗之间的局势时,我们听到的正是这些信息。伊朗和朝鲜之间的关系非常隐秘。我们对此了解不多。但我认为可以公平地说,在中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜的这种联盟中,伊朗和朝鲜之间的关系是最薄弱的,也是最不重要的。从历史上看,朝鲜和伊朗之间至少有一些武器转移,但数量有限。它们相距非常遥远。朝鲜资金短缺,受到严厉制裁。它实际上没有太多可以提供给伊朗的东西。因此,如果短期内那里没有太多活动,我不会感到惊讶。这些国家主要是在口头上支持伊朗,并试图利用这个问题来提升自己的合法性,转移人们对其自身问题的注意力,特别是俄罗斯在乌克兰的问题。我能想象这种情况发生变化的唯一情况是乌克兰。如果美国像俄罗斯在乌克兰那样卷入伊朗的地面战争,俄罗斯甚至中国可能会试图给美国和伊朗制造麻烦。俄罗斯尤其希望看到美国重蹈伊拉克战争的覆辙,而且规模更大。总而言之,这种动荡轴心作为一种组合,对西方的威胁是否比人们所描绘的要小?我的意思是,我认为在短期内,这种威胁被夸大了。我们最不希望看到的是这四个大国之间出现更严重的合作。我真正担心的是机会主义协调。例如,由于伊朗战争,如果冲突加剧,俄罗斯或中国可能会决定利用大量美国军队被牵制在中东的机会,去做它们一直想做的事情。俄罗斯可能会威胁波罗的海国家,而中国最有可能对台湾施加更大的军事压力。这不完全是合作,但这种协调将给美国军方带来极大的压力,可能会超出其承受能力。

Deep Dive

Chapters
Despite the perceived close ties, Russia's support for Iran has been limited. This is due to Russia prioritizing its relationship with the US and the potential benefits of the current status quo, where sanctions on Iran benefit Russia's war efforts in Ukraine. Russia's mediation offer is seen as a way to maintain relations with Iran without significant risk.
  • Russia's relationship with Iran is not as strong as it appears.
  • The current situation with Iran benefits Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
  • Russia's mediation offer is a strategic move to maintain relations with Iran without committing significant resources.

Shownotes Transcript

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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. Today with me, Stuart Willey with Alex Dibble. Donald Trump has, according to reports, approved plans to join Israel in hitting Iran, but is said to be waiting to see whether Tehran will give up its nuclear program before making a final decision.

As Israel says it's intensifying strikes on Iran, some think a US attack on Fordow, an underground uranium enrichment facility, could be imminent.

But as Israel enjoys the heavy backing of the United States in this conflict, Iran is seemingly friendless as its allies refuse to come to its aid. Why? Our guest today can answer that question. Christopher Chivas is the director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Chris, we often think of China, Russia and North Korea as being Iran's closest allies. Sometimes we even talk about the axis of upheaval.

But if we talk about Russia first, it's been notable for standing aside as Israel attacks. Why is that? Well, I've been a skeptic of how close the relationship between Russia and Iran has actually been. I think it's been portrayed as much tighter than it actually is. And I think we're seeing that play out right now. It's not to say that there's nothing there, of course. There certainly is a relationship.

But from Russia's perspective, if you think about it, the status quo of a week ago was actually working pretty well for Russia. Iran was under sanctions, and this was pushing Iran into Russia's arms and encouraging them to do things like help Russia with its war on Ukraine.

And at the same time, it was also the sanctions that we had on Iran were also driving up the price of oil, which is very important to Russia's war machine. The higher the price of oil, the easier it is for Russia to foot the bill for its war on Ukraine. So the situation was pretty good.

But now they're posed with a situation which is much more difficult and uncertain for them and carries with it a number of different risks. How could those risks play out for Russia? The biggest risk from Russia's perspective right now is obviously that Iran is completely overthrown, that there is a change of regime and it entirely loses its partner. That doesn't seem very likely, though. I doubt that Moscow is especially worried about that outcome, but...

Although certainly a lot of chaos could come of this. The problem from the Kremlin's perspective is that they have been trying to romance President Trump.

And if they step in too strongly on Iran's side in this conflict, they could cut off the chances of any kind of accommodation that they might hope for out of President Trump, either over Ukraine or potentially in a broader scenario where they attempt to normalize their whole relationship with the United States in Europe. And that's just frankly a more important issue for them than Iran itself. Yeah.

Chris, the Kremlin has been offering to mediate, to perhaps broker a deal between Iran and Israel. Is this a way, do you think, for Russia to say to Iran, you know, look how good a friend we are, even in the absence of offering concrete support? I think that's exactly right. I mean, I think that

Yeah.

Iran to maintain some semblance of a nuclear program, which is something that Russia has been involved in discussions of for many years now. Obviously, Russia was a signatory to the Iran nuclear agreement that President Trump ended back in 2018. They have offered again to

keep highly enriched uranium for Iran, something that was potentially of interest to Iran. So a lot of different things that they could do here. The big problem is, of course, that for most countries in the world, Russia, at least most Western countries, Russia is a total pariah. And the idea that they would negotiate while still attacking Ukraine seems very, very far-fetched. Maybe not the same for China, a different story there, but for Russia seems pretty far-fetched.

Let's turn to China then. Beijing has been voicing pretty strong concern over the conflict, criticising Israel's actions. They have warm relations with Iran and rely on energy imports. What are they doing to keep those links open?

Absolutely right. I mean, you know, from China's perspective, you know, access not just to Iran's energy, but also just more broadly to the energy from the whole region is really, really important. More important potentially than for almost any other country in the world, certainly than for any other great power country.

So this is something that's really very much on the minds, I would imagine, of leaders in Beijing. They also have commercial interests in the region. You know, they have tried to present themselves as a reliable commercial partner willing to trade with any country, you know, regardless of their politics. This is something that the United States obviously has, in some cases for good reason, not offered, but it gives China a certain advantage in

in developing its commercial reputation across the region. And then in addition to that, as you point out, they've tried to build on those energy and commercial ties to try to present themselves as a political leader.

a country that can really act as a neutral intermediary, help to resolve conflicts, stand up for world peace. And these are exactly the messages that we hear coming out of, for example, President Xi over the course of the last few days when he talks about the situation between Israel and Iran. Chris, the final member of this group, this axis of upheaval, North Korea,

has been involved in sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine. But what do you think Kim Jong-un will be thinking right now when it comes to the Israel-Iran conflict?

These are very shadowy relationship between Iran and North Korea. We don't really know a lot about it. But I think it's fair to say that, you know, of the different relationships in this, you know, entente of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, it's the relationship between Iran and North Korea that is the weakest relationship.

and the least significant by far. Historically, there's been some transfers of weapons of a limited amount, at least that I'm aware of, between North Korea and Iran, but it's not very extensive. They're very, very far apart. North Korea is cash-strapped, heavily sanctioned. It doesn't really have a whole lot that it can offer to Iran. So I would be surprised, again, in the near term, if there were much activity there.

You've written in the past that these four countries are less coherent as a bloc. The threats they pose are independent of each other. After the events of this week, are you seeing cracks bigger than you might have imagined?

I think that the countries of this entente are largely behaving as I would have predicted, as we've been discussing, making rhetorical statements in favor of Iran, trying to use the issue to posture and bolster their own legitimacy and distract from their own, the own problems that they're creating, especially Russia's problems in Ukraine. The only situation in which I could imagine this getting, this changing is Ukraine.

if, God forbid, the United States were to get dragged into some kind of a ground war in Iran, the same way that Russia is involved in Ukraine. Under those circumstances, I could see certainly Russia and maybe even China attempting to create problems for the United States and Iran. I think that Russia in particular would love nothing more than to see the United States repeat the mistakes of

of the Iraq war. In this case, it would, of course, be on an even larger scale. But I think that Russia would view that as quite beneficial. To sum up then, is this axis of upheaval less of a threat to the West as a combination than perhaps it has been portrayed? I mean, I think that in the near term, that the threat has been exaggerated.

I don't think it means that there is no threat out there. I think the last thing that we would want to see is to see a more serious kind of cooperation emerge between these four powers. The thing that really concerns me would be something that we call

opportunistic coordination. This would be a situation in which, for example, on account of the war in Iran, say that this conflict deepens, Russia or China decides to take advantage of the fact that large numbers of US forces are occupied in the Middle East.

to try to do things that it's been wanting to do for a long time. In Russia's case, potentially threaten the Baltic states. In China's case, this would most likely mean more military pressure on Taiwan. That's not exactly cooperation, but it is coordination that would be extremely stressful for the American military, probably stretch it beyond its potential.

Okay, Chris, thank you. Christopher Chivas is director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A significant factor in US decision-making at the moment is how Iran could retaliate if the United States does join Israel's attacks.

Listen to yesterday's episode as Professor Lina Khatib explains how it could hit the US at home or abroad. Tomorrow, we'll be analysing what Iran may look like should the regime collapse. Click follow to make sure you don't miss out. For now, though, that's it from us. Thank you for taking 10 minutes to stay on top of the world with the help of The Times. See you tomorrow.

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