Hanna Notte on What the Israel-Iran War Means for Russia
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Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.

Welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Max Bergman here with my co-host Maria Snegevaya. And today we are speaking with our fantastic colleague in Berlin, Hanna Notte. Hanna is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

and most importantly, a non-resident senior associate within our very own Europe, Russia, Eurasia program here at CSIS. Hanna's work covers many topics, but she's particularly focused on Russian foreign policy in the Middle East in the context of the Iran-Israel conflict. She's had a number of recent pieces out, one in The Atlantic and one in The Financial Times that we'll put in the show notes.

And we're going to discuss today Russia in the Middle East, the fallout of Israel strikes on Iran and what this means for Russia and for Russia's war in Ukraine and its posture in the Middle East. So, Hana, welcome to the show. Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure. Okay, so let's begin today.

with some context. First, let's talk about how the events in the Middle East over the last few weeks, the outbreak of renewed hostilities between Israel and Iran, and then the US strikes on three sites connected to Iran's nuclear program have been understood and viewed in Moscow. How is Russia reacting to Israel strikes, to the US strikes? How are they perceiving events in the Middle East?

Yeah, Max, I think if we take a few steps back and look at the situation really broadly, there are perhaps some benefits here for Russia from this renewed war that were emphasized by Russian commentators early on. And we can talk about this later, but I would say that overall, this is an undesirable situation that is presenting itself to Moscow because Iran, its strategic partner,

has been exposed as very weak and vulnerable. And I want to sort of step a few steps back and put this in context, because I think there was an expectation after the Hamas attack on October 7th, 2023, that Russia could benefit from this turmoil that was ushered in by this attack. And then Israel responded militarily because political attention was diverted from Ukraine to the Middle East.

US military hardware was going to the Middle East last year as we entered this protracted period of Israel taking on Iran and Iran's partners in the axis of resistance, and they responded. And of course, Russia could also tap into notions of hypocrisy of Western double standards when it came to reactions to the war in Ukraine on the one hand, and then to events in the Middle East and particularly the war in Gaza on the other.

And so that seemed to benefit Russia and Russia could continue this anti-Western tilt of its Middle East policy that we've seen since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, nudging closer to Iran, keeping Syria stable without putting too much effort in, keeping Iran at a nuclear threshold status. That was sort of the situation as it presented itself to Russia.

But then I would argue that the dynamics ushered in by October 7th actually proved too intense for Russia to steer in a favorable direction. And they exposed the limitations of Russian power in the Middle East. Last year, as we saw this escalation between Israel on the one hand and Iran and its partners on the other, especially with the direct strikes in April and October of last year,

Russia wasn't really anywhere to be seen. Russia did not come to Iran's support then. And ultimately, these dynamics, they are not the only factor that explains why the Bashar al-Assad regime fell in Syria in December. I think that's a complex story.

But I think Israel decimating Hezbollah was certainly an enabling factor here. And so we're in a situation where if you look at sort of the balance sheet from Russia today,

Assad is gone in Syria. Now Iran has been considerably weakened and we're sort of entering a period where some are talking about Israeli military superiority in the Middle East. And if you look at what just happened in that 12 day war, observers are drawing comparisons between the massive superiority of the Israeli Air Force claiming control of the skies over Tehran and comparing that with what has eluded Russia in three years in Ukraine, which is air superiority over Ukraine.

or drawing comparisons between Ukraine's air defenses and Iranian air defenses. So I think, you know, this is an undesirable picture overall that presents itself to Russia. Russia must worry going forward about the prospects of further strikes, of further confrontation between Israel and Iran, which might only weaken Iran further. And we can talk about what that actually might mean for Russia, you know, what an internal destabilization of Iran means,

let alone regime change might mean. Russia must also worry about the prospects of the decimation or even the dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program. And, you know, my point here, Max, is really that Russia in the Middle East has always looked towards fueling what I would call small fires, right? Calibrated tangents and conflicts

conflict in Iran that is sitting at a nuclear threshold status, but not exceeding it, because that is a situation in which Russia can play. But the moment that you have a big escalation, like we just saw over the last two weeks, Russia doesn't actually have the capacity or the bandwidth

to be really a factor. And I would actually argue that even without the war in Ukraine, it's quite unlikely to me that we would have seen Russia intervene militarily directly into a confrontation between Israel and Ukraine.

Iran, let alone the United States and Iran, because Russia's Middle East policy over the last 10 years has always been geared towards avoiding that kind of escalation. So I think that is sort of broadly the picture as it presents itself to Moscow. It's a more undesirable than desirable situation.

In Russia's relationship with Israel, it's a rather sort of complicated relationship. There's a lot of Russian Israelis. Russia, having intervened in Syria, had kind of established, I guess, a business-like relationship with Israel is maybe how I might characterize it. But that's also evolved with the collapse of Assad and in Russia, sort of having less leverage and influence in the region, right? So what's the Russia-Israel relationship and how would you kind of characterize that presently?

Yeah, you noted a few of its pillars or its dimensions. I agree that it's multilayered and complex. President Putin actually invested quite a bit into that relationship over the last two decades. There's been an economic relationship. There is the large Russian-speaking, not just Russian, but Russian-speaking diaspora in Israel. And if you go to places like Haifa, I think you'll hear almost as much Russian as you'll hear Arabic and Hebrew.

Russia priding itself on playing a role on the Israel-Palestine conflict. That's a longstanding tenet of Russian foreign policy, you know, back in the Middle East quartet, but also later. We had this interesting alignment when Putin first came to power, I think, with an Israeli government, both Russia and Israel bandwagoning with the global war on terror, sort of an alignment between Putin and Ariel Sharon at that time.

And then, yes, after 2015, Russia became what the Israelis like to call our neighbor to the north with Russia's military presence in Syria. And it was then very clear that you had to de-conflict with Russia. And there's always been a longstanding concern also over Russian-Iranian defense cooperation, what Russia might or might not do for Iran.

What we've seen, I would say, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a certain chill in the relationship. Not immediately, by the way. I think, you know, when the invasion started, you had Naftali Bennett still leading the government who tried to mediate. It was a very short-lived effort. But I think the relationship really cooled when Yair Lapid took over from Bennett, I think, that summer. You had a debate in Israel about

over how the country should position itself over the war in Ukraine, I think with some arguing that now was the time to sort of go all in with Israel's Western allies and condemn Russia and stand with Ukraine. But actually, there was a more realist camp, let's call it this, which I think Bibi Netanyahu belongs to, that argued, well, we cannot afford doing that. And this is not our war.

and we are in a dangerous neighborhood and Russia remains in Syria and Russia has a relationship with Iran. So we need to keep talking with the Russians. That argument won out is still prevalent. It still holds. I think what happened after October 7th, Max, is that we've had Russia adopting a more pro-Palestinian posturing on the war in Gaza,

Even if you accept that there was always an affinity for the Palestinian cause in the Soviet and then the Russian foreign ministry, I think previously Russia tried to be a bit more even handed. But that sort of fell by the wayside after October 7th. And we have a certain anti-Semitic rhetoric in Russian media and even among Russian officials.

And certainly, I think that disappointed many in Israel and it caused a cooling in relations or maybe a realization in Israel that this is really the Russia we're dealing with. Now we have sort of no more illusions. Right. But at the same time, also an understanding that this is just what Russia is doing because

Its priority is the war in Ukraine and the confrontation with the West over Ukraine. And it's very interesting to me. I was in Israel earlier this year, had many conversations about the Israel-Russia relationship. And what interlocutors keep emphasizing is Putin is not an anti-Semite.

Not at all. There are certain things he would not do to jeopardize the security of the state of Israel. But of course, if he has to use anti-Semitism instrumentally because it serves him in the war in Ukraine, he will do it. You know, so I think that is the reading in Israel.

But the argument that Israel has to retain a modicum of relations with Russia, that argument prevailed. I would say that it even holds now with Russia gone, well, not gone from Syria. The Russians are still in Syria. They are still present at the military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus. And I think that it's even preferable to Israel that the Russians stay because the last thing that Israel wants is a Syria that is very dominated by Turkey.

And I think the Israelis also understand that, you know, even though Russia didn't emerge as Iran's knight in shining armor defending Iran in this round of confrontation, Russia is still a factor when it comes to, you know, Iran's future military capabilities. They still have a defense relationship. And so I think there's this notion if we talk with Russia, if we have a reasonably decent relationship, we

we can at least exercise some influence on the margins. And I think actually the Israelis feel vindicated if they look at what's actually happened, because they will say, well, Russia did not give the Su-35 advanced fighter aircraft to Iran last year or certain other offensive capabilities. And so, you know, I think that's how the Israelis basically look at the relationship today.

Thank you, Hanna. What about Russia's own domestic position on the issue? Russia's permanent resident in the UN, Vasily Nebensia, has openly condemned US strikes against Iran, claiming that they have opened a Pandora's box that would place the whole world on the verge of nuclear catastrophe. But in the meantime, when it comes to actual actions, in response to the Ayatollah's appeal to Moscow for help, Putin...

sent his best wishes to the Iranian leadership, but wasn't really eager to take any concrete action. In your opinion, is this an appropriate reaction for Moscow, given everything that you've described? What would the potential consequences of this current situation be for Russia going forward, especially if the conflict does not just stop here, but escalates further?

Yeah, it's an interesting question, Maria. And let's talk for a moment about the rhetorical reaction, because I think we can then also separately talk about the military reaction and what Russia could have conceivably done before, during or now after this fighting. But as to the rhetorical reaction, I think, I mean, the Russian foreign ministry is

is saying what it needs to say on the UN Security Council and elsewhere, right? I mean, there is the argument that Israel violated international law with this, what the Russians call aggression. And even Putin, when he met with the Iranian foreign minister in Moscow earlier this week, said this was an aggression that was completely unprovoked. So that is kind of the official Russian position that you would expect.

But I find it very interesting and very important that Russia has really not gone overboard with kind of anti-Israeli remarks this time around, especially if you compare it to the Russian rhetoric amid the war in Gaza. So when this fighting started, when Operation Rising Lion started,

On that day, Putin called both the Iranian president as well as Bibi Netanyahu. When he talked in St. Petersburg at the International Economic Forum last week about this conflict, I thought he was trying to be very even-handed in his language. He talked about interests of both sides, you know, Iran's legitimate interest to have civil nuclear energy, but also Israel's need for security and that circle could be squared, that a solution could be found.

He noted the Russian speaking diaspora in Israel when he spoke in St. Petersburg. So it's a more even handed and I would say less Israel critical rhetoric that we're seeing from the Kremlin. And now the question is, why is that? What explains that? I think there's one element here that is just a Russian recognition of Israeli strength and might. That has also come out, I think, in Russian commentary over the last two weeks. You know, this idea that

I think Margarita Simonian sort of tweeted it very early into the conflict, the stronger wins, and Israel is that stronger party. So if we are indeed entering a period in which Israel is sort of so vastly militarily superior in the Middle East, and Iran is very weak, if you're Russia, do you want to sort of go all in with Iran rhetorically? Perhaps that question was thought through in Moscow.

And the other factor here is Trump and the United States. I think, you know, there's been a desire and we can talk more about, you know, how all this relates to the Russian-American relationship. But I think there's been a desire ever since Trump reentered the White House and signaled a desire for a certain rapprochement with Russia. There's been a desire by Russia to be receptive to those overtures.

and to make the conversation about geopolitical dossiers and not about Ukraine. So to signal to the Trump administration that one can talk about the Arctic or Iran, and of course you want to signal that you can be helpful. And that also probably informed the Russian rhetoric over the last two weeks, you know, to kind of point to legitimate interests on all sides and the need to return to diplomacy and the negotiating table and to telegraph a Russian willingness to be helpful.

Now, there were some concerns also in the Russian rhetoric, those warnings of World War Three and nuclear war. I think those were hyperbolic. And I mean, I must just add that Russian lamentations about attacks on nuclear facilities in Iran and lamentations about Israel and the United States undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime

One can agree with those, but they're pretty rich coming from Russia, right? If you consider that Russia has occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant for more than the last three years. So we've had that. But I think the real concern in Russia has not been about that. It's been about internal unrest in Iran being provoked by this fighting.

all the way leading up to potentially regime change and a very unknown situation in Iran and what that would mean for the future of the relationship. And then what it means regionally. I think there's a longstanding concern in Moscow about unrest in Iran,

conflict with Iran, destabilizing the South Caucasus. I think we've had some reports during the last two weeks of Iranians making it across the border to Armenia. I don't think that those numbers were vast, but these are the kinds of scenarios I think that Russia worries about and that greatly weakened Iran.

will also have implications for the balance of power in the South Caucasus, where already Turkey is quite strong. And this is a region for which Russia has only had so much bandwidth itself over the last three years. So I think these are concerns in Moscow, and they're actually not new. They're longstanding concerns going back at least two decades.

Let's project ahead a little bit. So, the US has struck Iranian nuclear sites. We're recording on June 25th. There was just a press conference at the NATO summit in which President Trump was quite defensive about leaks that came from the Defense Intelligence Agency that basically said that this didn't sort of permanently set back Iran's nuclear program and it may have only set it back months. The president was quite defensive about that saying that, "No, no, no. This sort of really pushed it back further."

It does strike me that where we are now is that Iran's program has been significantly hit

The Israelis, I think, have a problem in that they're not going to be 100% that Iran is not going to be able to rush to get a nuclear weapon. Even if they have tremendous and exquisite intelligence inside of Iran, there's always that paranoia of what don't you know? And this is sort of what in the lead up to the Iraq war, oftentimes it's described as the US lied about the intelligence that it had. Well, the US intelligence community firmly believed that Iraq had WMD.

but it didn't quite have the intel to prove that. And I feel like where we may be heading is a place where the Iranians want to try to engage with the United States, but at the same time,

Rush to basically get a nuclear weapon in order to deter the Israelis now for Russia I would think that Iran rushing to get a nuclear bomb is not in their interest the Russians were part of the JCPOA so projecting forward here

How does Russia then approach this situation in like, let's say, six months, a year from now, the Israelis are on edge, potentially wanting to strike again. Meanwhile, the Iranians are going to try to turn to the Russians to try to rebuild their stockpiles of air defense. I don't know how the Russians are going to be able to meet those needs, given the war in Ukraine.

So how is Russia going to sort of posture itself going forward when it comes to Iran's nuclear program and the potential that this isn't over and that this is sort of stage one and what will be sort of an ongoing conflict over the next few years?

Yeah, you're asking the million dollar questions. Yeah, a lot's in there. You know, I mean, there's so much uncertainty about how all this is going to shake out going forward, whether we will see renewed confrontation, military confrontation, and this isn't over between Israel and Iran. I think that's entirely conceivable, given where we're at, or return to the negotiating table. I believe that Trump also said today that apparently the United States and Iran will meet next week. I

I mean, as a general remark, I don't think that Russia has a whole lot of leverage over how this situation in its entirety will shake out. But let's sort of address it on the political and diplomatic front and then on the military front. I mean, on the political diplomatic front,

Of course, Russia has a long history being involved in the diplomacy on the nuclear file. You mentioned it. It was a party to the JCPOA. It was involved all the way up to the invasion of Ukraine and beyond that in talks to restore a nuclear deal. And then those talks sort of fell through, I think, in fall 2022.

But there's a sort of legacy Russian role. And initially, it seemed that President Trump would welcome Russian support in negotiations with Iran. But more recently, he seems to have cooled to that idea, it seems to me. I think he said now on at least two occasions that it's very nice of President Putin to offer to help on Iran, but he should sort of mediate his own conflict first. He should deal with Ukraine first. So that is interesting.

I think from an Iranian perspective, you might be disappointed with what Russia has or hasn't done for you during this phase of active combat. Now, having said that, if you're Iran, you're also Iran.

strategically absolutely isolated and vulnerable right now. So I think you will still want Russia and China involved in multilateral or international diplomacy because you are even less likely to trust the United States after what just happened over the last two weeks. So I think from an Iranian perspective, there's probably a desire for a Russian role. But before we can ask sort of what role Russia can play in any mediation or negotiation or political front, we kind of have to ask,

What are we talking about? Are we talking about sort of diplomacy between the US and Iran on some sort of deal, some kind of post-JCPOA deal? That depends on where the negotiating positions go. Because before this latest war, the problem was that you had

irreconcilable positions between a Trump administration that said zero enrichment and an Iran that sees that as essentially surrender. If that remains the playing field, then I don't really see Russia having a role. The moment you move beyond that and you move towards some sort of

some enrichment diplomacy, that's when Russia can actually play a technical role. If Iran agrees to certain constraints on its enrichment, but doesn't have to forego enrichment entirely because Russia has offered to take the HEU out of Iran to convert it into nuclear fuel for Iran. So then there's a sort of technical role to be played for Russia. But whether we get into that space

Russia has very little influence about this. And then there's the question, Max, over how all of this is shaking out in multilateral diplomacy. We now have the IAEA getting active, wanting to go back into Iran, and Russia is already showing that it wants to shield Iran against pressure at the IAEA. We have the UN Security Council.

where Russia and China and Pakistan have wanted to introduce a resolution, we have the whole issue of UN snapback looming, the October deadline for European countries to snap back sanctions and prior UN resolutions. So it gets kind of complicated. But the moment we move into that multilateral space, there's, of course, a role for Russia to be played, I think, in terms of shielding Iran and taking some pressure off Iran. But that's not going to

I think, be so decisive in terms of how this shakes out. And then on the military front, yes, Iran will conceivably turn to Russia as it is now thinking about reconstituting militarily. I think there's an interesting question to be asked here, which is, how is Iran going to assess

not just what Russia has or hasn't delivered to it last year as it was feeling more and more vulnerable and during this round of active fighting, but also what have those Russian air defenses and radars and Russian, you know, designed radars that Iran had from the past

How have those performed in this latest round of conflict? And will Iran want to go with Russia in the future? Or are there perhaps indications and chatter that we're seeing that Iran wants more from China in the future? I think these are questions. I don't have answers to those questions, but the extent to which Iran will want to sort of reconstitute with Russian help as opposed to some other partners is also going to be interesting to see going forward.

Let me turn to Maria in a second. I just wanted to say quickly, give a plug to Michael Kaufman's podcast, because in his most recent episode, he dissects with some great guests about Iranian air defense and compares that to Ukraine.

You know, it's sort of hard to blame the system when Ukrainians have employed effectively Soviet S-300 air defense in the first two years of the war incredibly effectively. I do think there is this larger question of security of supply that if the Iranians are firing all this S-300 and S-400 systems and interceptors and then they run out and then Russia doesn't have equipment to resupply them, doesn't have the batteries, doesn't have the interceptors.

That, I think, is a huge problem right now for Iran, which is airspace is now completely open to the Israelis and whether, you know, they need to turn to someone else to provide that because, you know, they are completely right now at the mercy, effectively, of Israeli Air Force. And that, I think, is a huge challenge for them militarily.

That's right. And just very quickly on that, I mean, we know that Israel's strikes in October at least impaired the Russian S-300 system that the Iranians have. And I don't think we have a good indication that Russia repaired those or, you know, sort of provided new ones precisely for that reason.

So to pick up on that particular topic, we know actually that Russia probably is overstretched and it's not the first time it's kind of moderated its assistance to the

The country is that it would have probably backed under normal circumstances. For example, last year, Russia did nothing to help prevent the toppling of the Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. Now, basically, the pattern has emerged somewhat similar with Iran, where a lot of nice words on Putin's side, but no real action. So, Hanna, I know that you just had a new article come up in Financial Times. Congratulations on that.

The question is, how would this basically moderated action or non-action on the Russian side impact the Iranian support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine? Do you see that it's going to be a potential problem? It may perhaps impede the collaboration between the two countries. Iran has been quite instrumental in assisting Russia in this war with its drones, missiles.

Or do you think at this point it's no longer relevant because basically the situation has changed and Russia perhaps is less dependent on Iran now? Could you please walk us through your argument?

Yeah, I mean, I think, Maria, the bottom line here is that Russia's reliance on Iran reached its peak maybe one year into the war when Russia got both finished Shahed drones from Iran, but also acquired the production technology for those drones. And Russia's reliance has subsided since. And I don't think that Iran being considerably weakened now and having to reconstitute will have a meaningful impact

for Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine. So Russia acquired the drones. It acquired, more importantly, the production technology, the blueprints, the designs. There were Iranian trainers coming to Russia and Russia then localized the production of Shahid drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone near Kazan in Tatarstan. Not just that, but Russia also changed the designs of those drones, you know, the engines,

more sophisticated anti-jamming capabilities, the warheads. It was quite interesting, Ruslan Pukhov, who was one of Russia's well-known military analysts, he had a piece out in Kommersant last week, which made some, I thought, fairly derogatory remarks about Iran as a military defense player. I think he called it a paper tiger and noted that even for Russia to benefit from the Shahid drones,

Russia had to do so much to those systems to transform them into the capable technology that, you know, these drones are today. But that was the most meaningful support that Iran gave to Russia. There was some shells and ammunition, but I don't think that the quantities were so significant.

And then the Iranians delivered, I think about 200 Fatah 360 ballistic missiles to Russia last fall. But what's so interesting about that is that we haven't actually seen any evidence that Russia ever used those missiles on the Ukrainian battlefield, I believe.

So then the question is why? And there might be different answers, but I think at a minimum, it means that Russia cannot have an acute need for Iranian missiles, right? Otherwise we would see them on the battlefield. And so what

What's of course also happened over the last two, two and a half years is that the DPRK emerged as a major supporter of Russia in Ukraine with munitions, with missiles, and then most recently even with troops. And China, of course, in terms of its dual use goods,

and components, probably the most meaningful enabler of Russia's war in Ukraine. And I would say also has become increasingly important to Russia's drone enterprise. So even some of the components for the Shahed drones are coming from China.

Russia and China are working on new drone designs, and some of those have been used in Ukraine already. There's a big Russian-Chinese logistics complex that is built in Alabuga. And I think when President Xi was at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October, he was updated on the progress of the building of that logistics complex. It suggests a growing Chinese role in Russia's domestic drone production going forward. So for these various reasons, I think,

the reliance on Iran for sort of immediate battlefield needs, that reliance has really greatly subsided. I do just quickly want to say, I don't think that means that Russia is just blasé about seeing Iran's missile and drone production capacity being degraded and that there's nothing that Russia would have wanted from Iran. I think there's still...

probably a Russian interest in new drone technology, because Russia will want to adapt its strike packages for Ukraine going forward. You can see if the war in Ukraine continues for a long time, that an interest in Iranian missiles could arise at some point in the future. I still think that this is not a desirable situation for Russia, but I also don't think that it will have a negative impact on the battlefield for them over the upcoming period.

A quick follow-up on that, Hannah, thank you for a very explicit explanation. But what about perhaps some other collaboration between Russia and Iran? Is there any significant economic collaboration, perhaps some infrastructural projects that they're working together that may be impeded by the unraveling war effort?

That's a good question. I mean, they have talked a lot about increasing their economic cooperation, investing in transport corridors, the international north-south transport corridor, trade via the Caspian Sea. I'm not sure that that is doing all that much for the Russian economy, to be honest with you, yet. I think it's still...

more aspirational than in the realm of practical impact. But of course, if Iran goes into a period of kind of protracted crisis or even instability, then that would have a negative impact on those kinds of projects, on transport diplomacy, corridor diplomacy. And I think that would not be desirable to Russia.

Maybe lastly, I think one thing we haven't talked about are the impact of oil prices on the Russian economy. And it does strike me that Russia may have been quite excited, at least maybe in the finance ministry and the Russian Central Bank, that, oh, a prolonged war in the Middle East, that could cause oil prices to structurally increase. Oil prices did go from the low $60 range up to the $70-plus range. I think the Russians were probably quite excited about that. But then after...

Even after the Iranian response to the US missile strikes on its facilities, its strikes against US air bases in Qatar and I think in Iraq as well, actually oil prices went down because I think it was instantly seen that that was sort of a performative act by the Iranians.

And then Trump, I guess, tweeted or truth whatever social media platform he used to announce a ceasefire. And so oil prices are back down in the $60 range. So I think if the Russians were hoping to get this big economic kind of jolt in the increase in oil prices,

It may have happened for a little bit, but it doesn't look like that's sustained. And so I think the economic impacts of this on Russia, I think, are rather minimal. And while Russia, I think, might have been able to really take advantage of this in providing Iran with a lot of opportunities

arms and defense industrial equipment. It just can't afford to do that. So this is in some ways a war that normally, I think in normal times, Russia would really be able to take advantage of. It just simply doesn't have the means to, in part because it's so stuck in its Ukraine quagmire. I don't know, Hannah, any last thoughts on that? Yeah, no, I mean, maybe it's sort of a very big, broad thought at the end, which is that

It doesn't seem like this situation is now presenting Putin with an opportunity to engage in great power diplomacy with Trump on an issue that is not Ukraine. That's how it maybe looked like initially, but there seems to be an American aversion to that.

I also think that what has just played out in the Middle East is perhaps encouraging all of us again to rethink this notion of an so-called axis of upheaval out there, by which we mean the partnership between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, because this was just a real test case. What are these partners willing to do for each other when push comes to shove? And I think we've actually seen both Russia and China being real cautious over the last two weeks. And the last thought on this is that I feel like

We're sort of entering this more Hobbesian world in which might seems to make right and the stronger sort of can impose their will. That is sort of an initial reaction to what we see Israel doing in the Middle East, sort of creating fait accomplice. And sort of intuitively, if you think about it, this is perhaps the kind of world that Russia thinks is more amenable to it, the kind of world that Russia likes.

But actually, Russia doesn't have the means to really play in this kind of world, especially while it's still bogged down in an unwinnable war in Ukraine. And so this is maybe like a slightly counterintuitive conclusion from Russia's point of view, but it's really a mixed balance sheet for them, I think.

I think that's a fantastic place to end. That's an incredibly interesting point. Russia has both created the world that it's always wanted, yet it's too weak because it's bogged down in a quagmire of its own making to actually take advantage of it.

Hannah, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you again to our listeners for always tuning in. If you haven't already, please be sure to subscribe to our show and give us a five-star rating. It really helps other people find the podcast. Additionally, if you get the chance, be sure to check out our sister podcast, The Europhile, wherever you get your podcasts. And we will see you next time on Russian Roulette. You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

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