How Trump's Policies on Russia and Ukraine Are Being Received Across the Post-Soviet Space
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Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.

Hello everyone and welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Maria Snegava and today I'll be recording solo while Max is on the road. I've got two fantastic guests joining me today to discuss how the recent dramatic pivots on US policy towards Russia and Ukraine coming out of the Trump White House are being received across the broader post-Soviet space. Joining me today to discuss the perception of recent events in Eurasia is Tintin Djiparidze. Tintin is an analyst at Eurasia Group where she leads the firm's coverage of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Tintin, welcome back to the show.

Thank you so much for having me. Awesome. Also joining us today is Volodymyr Dubovik. Volodymyr is the non-resident senior fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Volodymyr is also an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and director of the Center for International Studies at the Odessa Ilya Mechnikov National University in Ukraine. Volodymyr, welcome to the podcast.

Hi, good to be here. Thank you for having me, Maria. Awesome. And let's jump right in. I'll start with Vladimir. Of course, recent events on U.S.-Russia foreign policy have been quite dramatic, especially for Ukraine. Some of the largest returns coming out of Washington have been the freezing of military aid shipments to Ukraine, the cessation of U.S. intelligence sharing with Kiev, and the claim from President Trump that Ukraine, rather than Russia, and I quote,

should never have started the current war. Coupled with Trump's assertions that President Zelensky of Ukraine is a dictator, the framework of this war coming out of the White House today is in marked contrast to that of the Biden White House a little over a month ago. So, of course, Vladimir, it's very important to understand today what the Ukrainian society's response to these really pivotal changes has been so far. Is the Ukrainian society today caught off guard by the scale and intensity of the Trump administration

break with the Biden White House on Ukraine? Or had there been long running fears that this sort of policy return might be on the horizon before? Well, yes, the situation is very fluid. And we're just having more and more information about other events and ways that Trump administration is using to influence Ukraine and squeeze Ukraine.

Now, I've heard the news and been reported that the satellite imagery from the US is also now prevented from coming to Ukrainian military. So not only intelligence sharing, but also satellite imagery. And also today, the day that we are typing the podcast, there was some kind of a threatening tweet towards Russia from Trump, where he said that,

Russia should actually, could risk some sanctions if they don't stop attacking Ukraine. But they've been attacking day and night, you know, Ukraine for a long time now. And also, in his appearance later today in the White House, in the Oval Office, he said something different. He reiterated that Putin, he said, didn't want to start the war. Also, he said that he's willing to pursue peace, Putin, I mean.

And therefore, almost cheerfully mentioned that Ukraine has been pounded by Russia. So it's a strange position, of course, but going back to your question, this is hard to answer with just yes or no. I mean, on the one hand, you had a long history of Trump denigrating Ukraine and discarding the significance of support for Ukraine from United States. So in that respect, of course, we've been kind of prepared

perhaps, for this attitude. But on the other hand, a lot of Ukrainians were really tired and angered by Biden's spoon-feeding of Ukraine, all these delays with supply of weapons, all of these limitations on how those weapons can be used, constant fears of escalation from Russia, what if we give Ukraine this or that? How would Russia react? Would there be an escalation? And so on.

So by the time that Biden was leaving the White House, a lot of Ukrainians were psychologically, surprisingly ready for change and hoping that President Trump would be more like unpredictable, unconventional, unorthodox, and maybe his presidency would turn for better for Ukraine. Well, I think you did get unconventional and unorthodox, for sure.

Yeah, yeah, that's right. Well, not for Trump, not if you're Trump. I mean, that's his style, you know, but if you compare him to anyone else. But now we're seeing there is an abrupt change to what the U.S. was doing for a long time as a world power. But Ukrainians watching this, of course, are

very much perplexed by what they're seeing and still couldn't believe that we can have such a degree of backstabbing really from the country which just yesterday supported us. But we're learning, you know, and we're learning that this is their approach now, that the U.S. is not only a neutral country, but it

kind of siding with Russia now. So Ukraine is dealing with pressure from two superpowers or a great power, Russia, which is actually attacking Ukraine, a superpower squeezing Ukraine. And it seems that Trump is not...

hesitating in squeezing Ukraine further because he's saying it seems a quick deal, some kind of a ceasefire. He doesn't care about the quality of the peace. He doesn't care about details. And the Americans say themselves, the devil is in the details. And that's what Ukraine wants to discuss. But we're only hearing like, okay, sign it, go for it.

and things like that. Unfortunately, this is what we have, and Ukrainians are not pleased. By the way, they are indeed coalescing and consolidating around President Zelenskyy now. His ratings are going higher

than usual, because Ukrainians reasonably enough perceive what they're seeing as not an attempt of humiliation of Zelensky personally, but an attempt of humiliation and backstabbing the entire country, the entire nation. So can you comment on that particular issue? How did this affect Zelensky's polls?

Did his popularity increase? Yeah, it is affecting tremendously. I mean, he has been leading the polls, but not by far. So it's more than 4% as Trump said. Yeah, a little bit more than 4%, so 40 plus, but 47% more or less.

But the next highest polling candidate, General Zelushny, who is now ambassador of Ukraine in Great Britain, has been polling around 2024, 2025, for instance. But now this is changing quickly because more and more trust towards Zelensky. And again, not because suddenly everyone in Ukraine loves Zelensky and he had a difficult war on his hands.

And that led to a gradual decreasing of his ratings over the last three years from his superstar up in the 90s numbers.

in the early days of Russian full-scale invasion to this '47. But when they saw how Zelensky tried to stand up for Ukraine's interests and talk about meaningful issues that actually matter to Ukraine, like security guarantees, further aid, and that Ukraine should have a place at the negotiation table where the negotiations are happening about its future, and being disrupted and I believe ambushed, you know, and set up in that meeting in the White House.

Ukrainians are infuriated. They're basically saying, okay, now we're dealing with two enemies, really. And very quickly, I think U.S. has passed that position that they're neutral, but they're really siding with Russia more and more. I look at yesterday's statement by Secretary Rubio, where he said that, indeed, this war, it appears, was a proxy war that U.S. was waging against Russia using Ukraine.

That's your typical, one of those typical Russian cliches and narratives you've heard in previous years, but now you're hearing it from Secretary of State, who should know better and who was at one point known for having a much stronger position in defense of U.S. national security interests and being tougher on Russia as a threat, which remains a threat for American interests.

But now it is what it is. You know, we're hearing that it is President Zelensky somehow is the main obstacle towards peace. When he only wants to know, like, how do you think it's going to work? Why would this ceasefire work? So how can we proceed from ceasefire to the peace treaty? Where are the mechanisms? Can it be viable? This is all...

very logical questions, just from common sense point of view, but also in terms of Ukrainian interest in this. And all of a sudden, we are facing this root reaction, and a deal on natural resources, rare earth minerals is also not signed, even though Ukraine was prepared to sign it. So we'll see where it goes, because apparently they're meeting next week.

Ukrainian team and American team in Saudi Arabia. They might be a way to repair relations a little bit, but I'm very pessimistic about the longer term because there is a huge difference in views about the potential peace process in Washington and in Kyiv right now. Thank you. That's very interesting. Perhaps the last question, Volodymyr. Certainly quite frustrating news, but before I switch to Tinatin to see a broader perspective about the region,

I want to ask about the Plan B. It's understandable that the United States is going to probably take much more cautious stance on the issue than before, but it did in the past provide at least the comparable amount of aid that this European Union did. But when it comes to lethal aid in particular, certainly the U.S. is seemingly irreplaceable because Europe just does not have enough lethal weapons. Can you please comment on that? What's the Plan B? Can Europe fully substitute for the loss of the U.S.?

I don't think we're quite liberated to develop the plan B for ourselves. I mean, we've been depending on U.S., no secret. We've been understanding that maybe there'll be changes in Trump's policy towards Ukraine when he got back to the White House. But I don't think anyone in Ukraine anticipated such a quick change of heart.

and quick pressure and pace of moving towards a ceasefire or some kind of peace deal, whatever Trump might call it, because of course, it's not going to be bringing peace to Ukraine if it's not properly thought through. But now we are looking around, trying to understand what we have. What we have is actually about

20% of the weapons that Ukraine is now using has been given to us by United States. That's a high number, one-fifth, but 20%. 25% it seems been reported that Europeans are given to us. So this is interesting because the remaining part is actually what Ukraine produces itself. So Ukraine has been

really successfully moving in the right direction in the sense of producing more weapons of all sorts, missiles, drones, and what have you, that it's using in the war against Russia. It's becoming more and more independent of Western military supplies, but not to the extent, of course, that we can do without it.

Certain types of weapons only Americans can give to us, like when it comes to a longer range of fire, when it comes to air defense systems, especially anti-air defense systems. So this is problematic. In the short term, Europe cannot substitute the US in that respect, but Europe can still give a lot of weapons and will give a lot of weapons to Ukraine, it seems.

And also, they can buy weapons elsewhere. The big question, by the way, going forward would be if Europeans would decide to buy American weapons and give it to Ukraine, would Trump allow it or not?

He might say, "No, knowing that it's coming to Ukraine, I don't want this to happen because we're pressuring Ukraine into submission and signing some kind of ceasefire." Or on the contrary, by the way, he might say, "Okay, that's fine. I don't care because we actually need money, so let Europeans buy and pay us money for our weapons and then do whatever they like with those weapons. That would actually be a good

deniability of the responsibility for Trump, because it would be Europeans who are giving these weapons to Ukraine, not Americans directly.

So we'll see, I think both scenarios are open here. And anyhow, it's very important to see that the Europeans can actually provide financial assistance, that's for sure, to Ukraine, and especially if they manage to touch and dare to touch frozen Russian assets and use it to help Ukraine financially. But we've been seeing recent days, several countries are actually giving quite a substantial amount of money to Ukraine in assistance, which is comparable to what is frozen by Trump administration

a little under 4 billion US dollars in the recent few days, countries like Norway, like United Kingdom promised similar amounts of money. So not to mention that European Union has been given a lot. So in that particular respect, financial assistance, I'm not necessarily too worried. Look at what's happening in Germany, where they actually thinking about changing their constitutional rules and spending more on defense and helping Ukraine, and that would not be violating

relations on balancing national budget. But certain weapons in a shorter period of time, we still depend on Americans

Right now, I don't think troops will feel the impact. In the coming months, maybe more of it. But things like sharing intelligence and not giving to Ukrainians, like I've said already, has been reported today, satellite imagery, this is more painful than the actual weapons. Because the weapons that we have already provided to us, we can't quite use it successfully without all this information coming from the U.S. It's been reported that the HIMARS

Operators are blind now in many respects, so that becomes a problem. But that's, by the way, a lot of people spoke about it in recent days, my colleagues, our colleagues, experts. It's a big lesson to a lot of people who might consider buying American weapons going forward. Like, what if they just cut what you need to use them successfully? Do you want to buy? And Europeans are basically thinking about this as well, aloud. And Macron has been saying for a long time now,

that if we allocate some money to buy weapons, then we should buy European weapons and develop European weapons. So we'll see. In the end, I'm afraid not only Ukraine is in danger, but

the U.S. would actually be left without any traditional allies and strong supporters and partners. America first can quickly become America alone. That remains to be seen. Thank you very much. And, of course, very frustrating point about the double-edged sword that hits not also Ukraine, which is already problematic, but also other countries, partners and allies of the United States. On which note, let me turn to Tintin to ask about precisely that same problem

question with application to the rest of the region, specifically the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Obviously, everybody is watching with a lot of attention as to what's happening today in Washington. What is your assessment, Tintin? How do these observers from the region understand the implications of this really U-turn by the US administration on Ukraine in terms of particularly their own relationship with Russia? Tintin Chou: Thank you very much, Maria.

Overall, both in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, broadly speaking, we're observing a shared desire, first and foremost, for peace and regional security, even if realistically, as Volodymyr said, we can only anticipate a weak ceasefire deal without a formal political settlement to the war. And this stems mostly from substantial pressure that these countries have been facing politically and economically over the last few years, especially since

since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia. So until recently, Tbilisi, for example, was by and large aligned with Western interests and values. And this has, of course, changed drastically under the Georgian dream, particularly in the recent years, where we've been seeing this pivot, not just towards Moscow, but more broadly, Eurasia and away from the West, which is very significant. And I

And I think it's very unlikely that we'll be seeing any sort of a major improvement on that front in the near term, regardless of what happens with US foreign policy, with Russia, with Ukraine and so forth. Armenia traditionally was of course aligned with its Eurasian connections, especially Russia, but post-Karabakh, there's been this active pivot in Yerevan towards the West.

and away from Russia. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, arguably the most economically and politically sound among them at the moment,

maintains this degree of independence and isolation, which it can actually afford, bolstered by its energy resources. And let's also not forget its close partnership with Turkey, that's a NATO member. Despite historically good relations with Moscow, the tensions with Russia have risen recently, of course, as we all know. But even so, Baku is economically benefiting from this ongoing rift between the EU and Russia. So at the end of the day,

I don't think that a significant deterioration of relations between Baku and Moscow is necessarily on the horizon. And as long as the relationship between Russia and the EU does not improve anytime soon, any sort of rapprochement between Russia and the United States will really not worry Azerbaijan at all.

But over the years, Russia's influence in the region has been declining, and we've watched this happen. Most recently, particularly due to the fact that it's been stretched in terms of resources as a direct consequence of the war in Ukraine. But even so, if a deal regarding Ukraine emerges, especially one that is aligned with Putin's vision and terms,

And if there is a form of sort of a normalization between Washington and Moscow, these developments would undeniably be perceived as a significant victory for Putin, both domestically and internationally. And by default, it would naturally enhance Russia's influence and appetite for what Putin still regards as his backyard or the so-called near abroad.

Now, specifically on Central Asia, even though, of course, I'm not a Central Asia specialist, it is very clear that the countries in the region, much like those in the South Caucasus, are seeking transactional alignments with Washington to advance their own interests. So while the relationships between the individual Central Asian states and Moscow are generally going to remain stable, I think,

there are, of course, underlying tensions there. Russia's influence in the region, much like its standing in the South Caucasus, has, of course, waned compared to that of China, for example. But this shift is partly due to Russia's increased nationalism, aggressive policies towards Central Asian migrants, the

decreased financial investments in the region and so on. But even so, I think Central Asian leaders are going to continue to outwardly at least maintain a sort of stable, seemingly compliant relationship with Moscow regardless. And then one last point that I wanted to make is if U.S.-Russia relations do improve, especially with potential sanctions relief as part of the deal, if that is included indeed in the deal from Washington to Moscow,

I think Central Asia could benefit a great deal, both politically and economically, since obviously the imposition of Western sanctions, there's been a lot of discomfort and pressure on Central Asian countries in terms of sanctions evasion. So this normalization would be welcomed regardless, with the hope that it would alleviate some of the war-related tensions in the region. Thank you very much. Excellent review. Good to know that Russia hasn't yet fully benefited from this

tilting in the US policy. Can I ask you maybe to comment more specifically about the situation in Georgia? Since there, of course, we've seen some really dramatic developments in the last months with people protesting in the streets against the policies of the ruling Georgian Dream. And do you have a sense as to what the Georgian response to the Trump's team Ukraine and Russia policies is? Georgian civil society has been protesting nonstop in the last months in the streets.

But then, of course, now that we've had the freezing of the USAID funding, perhaps you do have an impression as to how that may have affected these groups. Absolutely. I think first on how roughly at this point, the Georgian leadership is going to be trying to deal with this. So there's obviously the de facto Georgian government, the Georgian parliament, that is a single party parliament. And then on the other side, we have the opposition coalitions. And I

And I would say that mostly the Georgian dream has taken a calculated risk. And to some extent, it has actually lucked out because for the moment, both serendipity and strategic foresight, I think a little bit of both, have played a role here. So the Georgian regime foresaw that Trump's return to power could provide opportunities for engagement with the new US administration through

mostly ideological perspectives and sort of a transactional approach that we discussed earlier. And this shift was quite visible immediately after Trump's victory as the Georgian Dream started to adjust its global war party rhetoric to align more with Trump's framing of the deep state narrative. The strategy was aimed not only to resonate with the incoming U.S. leadership, but

but to also try to show the Georgian constituents that their, as in the Georgian dream's position, was validated internationally, including in the United States, no less. So they're suddenly attempting to portray themselves not only as a sort of an isolated outlier accommodating Moscow's wishes, but rather as being aligned with Washington's stance, which was definitely not the case before. Now, I do want to emphasize that I personally have significant doubts

that this could actually be effective in terms of a justification.

While the most diehard, or shall we say, ardent supporters of the Georgian Dream regime will, of course, continue to endorse their initiatives regardless of what they come out with, the actual opposition side, the coalitions and the citizens who are boycotting the Georgian Dream will continue to be highly critical regardless. And I think they're starting to already see through this facade regardless of the narrative that is presented by the regime.

And that's why I believe that the Georgian dream's already unstable grip on power cannot last indefinitely. I think for the time being, it can, but it's a matter of time. That said, it's mostly because a regime change is unlikely until a strong, charismatic leader emerges from the opposition. And more directly to your question, Maria, regarding your...

US development funds that have been frozen. This situation is indeed causing significant concern. The most immediate issue, of course, is that this greatly enhances not only Russia's grip on the region, but also China's influence.

which severely threatens regional security and stability. Predictably, of course, the Georgian Dream quickly used this aid freeze to further restrict the activities of civil society groups, which includes, of course, the deeply controversial foreign agents law that we have discussed together in the past, which undermines pro-democracy efforts.

It constrains, of course, civil society, independent media, and there's a myriad of other risks as well. And these developments are making it considerably easier for the GD regime to consolidate their power, no matter how weak. And civil society organizations are already experiencing the effects with more to come, unfortunately. And in terms of the narrative, this directly, of course, benefits both the Georgian Dream and the Kremlin, because it

very conveniently supports Moscow's longstanding claim, echoed by the Ivanishvili regime, that countries like Georgia have been abandoned by the West, and that Washington and other Western capitals are simply unreliable partners. And obviously, I'm quoting them.

not the independent Georgian voices. And consequently, there's a stronger justification for GD's proposed multi-pronged foreign policy that has been extremely focused on Eurasia and not just Russia, rather than the West. And naturally, the stark pivot further undermines the confidence in the United States, which I think is very negative for the US going forward, and the broader West, and it erodes trust in democracy as well. And it's...

Somewhat echoing, if I'm not mistaken, correct me if I'm wrong, the multipolar world that Putin has been promoted, right? Of course. In this sense, one cannot, unfortunately, miss this increasing multipolarity of the world, and certainly it will have a lot of consequences for the region. And Volodymyr... Can I say one thing with regard to Georgia? Am I right or not? Did you follow this? Was information that this neutral resolution at the United Nations...

that was offered, presented, submitted by the United States. It was core submitted by Georgia, right? Yes, exactly. Where Russia was not going to be referenced as the successor. And obviously this... I think it's quite telling. If you look at the rhetorics of JG2, they've been talking about the party of the war, the global party of the war. So basically everyone from Orban to Ivanishvili's people to Trump and everyone else, you're hearing...

everyone blaming Ukraine and trying to whitewash Russia. And that's an interesting international of political forces, populist kind of alt-right political forces that you see, with few exceptions, like Meloni, for instance, who is right-wing, friendly to Trump in ideology, but at the same time a strong supporter of Ukraine. So that's interesting. Just today she suggested that Ukraine should be offered Article 5 security guarantees even if it's not invited into NATO.

I thought it's just an interesting across the border example to mention here. Yeah, thank you. Very good point. Thank you, Vladimir, and certainly quite concerning. And actually, on that same point of the alternative, so to speak, leaders perhaps emerging or trying to build some connections with the Trump administration, just a couple of days ago, there was this news about alleged outreach of the members of the Trump administration to other

other political figures within Ukraine, like Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, who I'm sure our audiences remember from back in the day, from some years ago. So what is the perception in Ukraine as to what is going on? Then go in debates about some sort of resumption of democratic elections in Ukraine. To what extent do you think it's feasible? How does the Ukrainian society feel about this effort to perhaps promote some alternative figures and personalities in Ukraine politics?

Well, I must say that first of all, this particular story, representatives of Trump administration reached out to members of Ukraine opposition, major opposition parties. There'd been a little scandal about this in Ukraine. People are trying to get to the bottom of it. Who said what? What they talked about? Did they actually tell American guests that we're not going to be working against Zelensky in this current situation or not? Formally, both parties and public figures and their spokesperson

put forward the press briefings and replies through their spokespersons that they haven't said that they want elections now and everything, and that they are standing with Zelenskyy because, like I said, Zelenskyy's popularity is actually on the rise now. And to speak against him or take part in some kind of subversive operation, political operation against him would be seen not in a positive light by Ukrainian society right now.

So, I wonder why they decided to meet with these MSRs from Washington at all. But I guess they didn't want to turn them down. Who knows? I mean, these people are coming from the President of the United States, so maybe it's polite to meet them if they want to meet you.

depending on what they want to talk about. But right now, of course, going back to the issue of elections, they cannot take place according to Ukraine's constitution. And there is a consensus within the country that they shouldn't take place while the war is still on and there is a martial law on. Most Ukrainians agree with that point of view, not just Zelensky. Most political figures, NGOs, civil society agrees with that too. The first time it was mentioned by some people

from across the ocean that Ukraine should have elections, even despite the war raging. There was a major collective letter signed by basically who is who in Ukrainian civil society and NGO sector saying we shouldn't have these elections for various reasons.

And all those reasons stay. There is still war. There is still a lot of people who are outside of their homes. How do they vote? A lot of people who are refugees, how they vote. What about military? A lot of people in the trenches, how they vote. And safety of the voting process. How can you actually gather people in a

voting station, you know, when missiles are flying and drones are flying. So there are many reasons, not just the, you know, the ban by the Constitution to hold elections during martial law, but common sense reasons not to have elections today. But if we are to have elections, then Zelenskyy now has a very strong position. Thank you to the White House. You know, they did a huge favor to him by doing what they did.

And that's really strange, considering they are talking about him needing to go and resign and everything. And unfortunately, National Security Advisor Waltz said that Zelensky doesn't want peace for his personal reasons or something. Now, that's not true. Zelensky is reflecting consensus within Ukrainian society that we need to understand what are we getting ourselves in with all these suggestions for the ceasefire. That really reinforces his position within Ukraine. Yeah, maybe there is some hidden strategy behind the Trump administration's actions to re-election.

actually boost Zelensky's posture that we don't really quite understand yet. Thank you very much for that, Vladimir. And, Tinatin, back to you. On the broader issue of this vacuum that is apparently emerging in the region, or maybe, shall we say, the opportunity for other actors to fill in, can I ask you to comment on the role of China? Is China watching carefully what's happening? And are there any efforts to fill in the current gap?

gaps that are showing to perhaps become more active actor in the region. We have seen some comments about China maybe wanting to have certain role to play in the peace talks in Ukraine. What about the rest of the region? Have you observed any change? I think China has been very interested in this region and to varying degrees involved

in the different countries in both the South Caucasus and obviously in Central Asia for a while now. Perhaps in terms of countries like Georgia, this interest is more compared to others relatively recent. And I think they're seeing an opportunity there. It also remains to be seen how much of a direct role Russia will be able to play there. And I think there could be a deal that is struck between Russia and China

in terms of, not in the least, the middle corridor, how they could leverage those connections, and also what are Russia's needs and desires going to be vis-a-vis those of China. And there will be some discussions, unless perhaps I'm wrong and they're already being had, between Moscow and Beijing, where they will be determining to try to figure out

what the common interests are, but also where the red lines are for the other side, for them to be able to work out some sort of a deal where both will be able to walk away from this in a very positive and in a very sort of beneficial position. It is a little too early for us to tell in terms of how directly the Chinese will be getting involved. I think it is likely to be more implicit compared to Russia's role. And obviously, Russia has this very long

history. It does have that sort of tradition of forging the relationships with these countries over a long period of time, not just the Soviet period, but also preceding the Soviet period under the empire. So therefore, those imperial desires that Putin still very much harbors are still in place. I don't think they have gone away and are not going away anytime soon. And

And China will know that it has to sort of find its own interests and its own areas where it could be more active without stepping too much on Moscow's toes. But we have seen, not in the least in terms of the Anaklia seaport, a major project where China will be playing a very serious role.

one that was originally reserved for the United States, but obviously the Georgian dream has been able to strike a deal. It's still continuing to work on those negotiations with Beijing. And there will be a lot of commonalities where it'll turn into a little bit of, if you do a little bit for me, I am likely to return the favor tenfold. And we will see that across the board, more so in terms of economic involvement. I think the political slash ideological aspects

will be reserved more directly and more explicitly for Moscow to handle. Volodymyr, the same question to you. Have you seen an increase or any change in China's posture towards Ukraine in view of the recent events or towards the region more broadly?

That's an interesting question because the Chinese role was always quite substantial in the last three years through this large-scale invasion of Russia against Ukraine. One might say that without the Chinese support, Russia might have not been able to continue the war. Of course, China never crossed the red line in terms of sending weapons, not to mention troops, to help Russia understand

unlike North Korea, for instance. But they've been helping, offering and helping hand to Russia. And now this is interesting in the light of this idea, which is kind of fashionable in some places in Washington, D.C., that you need to have this strategic outreach towards Russia and partnership because you want to try and...

split Russia away from China and use Russia on the side of US against China. I think it's a very naive idea. It's very, you know, based on illusions and not understanding how it all works in international affairs, specifically between Russia and China. I think that Putin, by the way, who is a very experienced player in that thing, he might

promised that to Trump. I can expect him to tell Trump, "Oh, sure, sure. Just let's deal with Ukraine first, and then we'll talk about China." But strategic partnership between China and Russia is quite strong. I mean, they have their own interests. They maybe have some differences here and there, but objectively and subjectively, their goals in international affairs are still very much aligning.

So China was not going to just let Russia lose the war, even though it probably wasn't happy necessarily with the large-scale war starting. But now it's an interesting situation too, because China is kind of sidelined. I don't think they're worried in Beijing about this rapprochement between Russia and US, this reverse Nixon, they call it. But I think that we are still seeing China not very happy, because they have their own ambitions.

you know, an ego. And all of a sudden, they are not in the center of the whirlwind. They don't have a play. They don't have a role. And they are not happy because of that. They've been saying and hinting that China is going to play a huge role in the peace process.

eventually, when the sites are ready to talk peace, but now it's nowhere to be seen. So that's an interesting situation there. Eventually, still, I think China has something to contribute. And some people hope that when the war is over, hopefully one day that China will be also taking part in the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine, even though it kind of started with Russia. But if they're willing

to do that, then maybe Ukraine will be open to this solution. But the China factor is an interesting factor in this war. I guess in the history textbooks, eventually one day you will see people wrestling with the subject of what the Chinese factor really was. I can't wait to read those history books.

Tintin, one more question about the region, specifically on the role of Armenia, Azerbaijan in all of this. Can you perhaps comment as to what the posture is and whether they are also under effect of the changing great power politics and position of these great power actors vis-a-vis these countries? So as I noted earlier, Maria, I think Azerbaijan find itself in the most advantageous position among the three South Caucasus countries.

particularly after President Aliyev's swift victory in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and his continued consolidation of power ever since. With the new Trump administration, I think the threat of sanctions against Azerbaijan has diminished, although many do see Rubio as very anti-Azerbaijan, very pro-Armenia. But nonetheless, I think it's going to be more of a transactional relationship, which gives Baku greater leverage, of course, to delay any peace settlement efforts with Yerevan.

while seeking even more concessions, such as amending Armenia's constitution, which is a big demand for Baku, or establishing a corridor to Nakhchivan through Armenia's Sunnic region. However, I think Azerbaijan has no immediate need to rush these matters at this point. Any military incursion into Armenia or attempts to forcibly open the so-called Zanguzur corridor

are unlikely for now as they will offer very little benefit if we think about it to Azerbaijan and could create additional challenges and really a headache that Aliyev does not need right now. But who is in a comfortable position,

Aliyev is enjoying pretty high domestic popularity post-Karabakh, and also he's benefiting a great deal from energy sales to Europe. So in the event of another war, I do think that EU sanctions would become likelier, definitely compared to US sanctions, and Aliyev simply does not need to take such a risk. Now, if Putin does gain significant concessions from Ukraine and others, and he feels emboldened again, it

it's highly likely that Russia will renew its focus on the South Caucasus, much like Central Asia. So this renewed interest and this insatiable appetite, I would say, could result in an increased military presence or desire to be more present militarily, not in the least in Armenia, a more assertive diplomatic posture, or even efforts to mediate or dominate peace negotiations between the two sides

And as you know, Baku seems determined for the time being to keep these negotiations in a bilateral context because they can exert even more pressure on Armenia,

particularly given the fact that, of course, Prashinyan is not all that strong domestically. So he will use all of these concessions and all of this pressure to get as much as he can get out of him in a room where it's really just the two of them there and nobody else. Fascinating. Definitely one thing that comes out of this conversation, I think our audiences will agree that the great power politic is very much back and clearly more will be happening as we keep watching.

So, unfortunately, we are going to have to leave it there. Thank you so much, Tinatin and Vladimir, for this important conversation, for bringing the voices from the region to explain to us what is actually happening and the actual consequential impact of the US policy swings on the politics of the region. To our listeners, thank you as always for tuning in. If you haven't already,

please be sure to subscribe to our show and give us a five-star rating. Additionally, please be sure to check our sister podcast, The Eurofile, wherever you get your podcasts. And see you next time. You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

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