Max and Maria on the Start of U.S.-Russian Negotiations Over the War in Ukraine
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Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.

Hello everyone and welcome back to Russian Roulette. There has been a lot of big headlines this week related to Russia, Ukraine, and U.S. policy towards the region. So this week we're going to do things a little bit differently. Marie and I are going to give our reactions to the recent headlines and provide our take on where things could be headed. We're basically going to try to make sense of a lot of what's happening, some of which doesn't quite make a lot of sense, but we're going to try to do that.

Additionally, we're going to be releasing a bonus episode featuring audio from a recently broadcast CSIS live event examining our team's recent work proposing a new European strategy for containing Russia. Couldn't be more pertinent, especially as Europe is very concerned about where things are headed for European security and for Russia.

So please keep an eye out for that upcoming conversation. But without further ado, let's get into the news. Maria, we are recording on Tuesday, February 18th. Today, there has just been a meeting in Riyadh.

We're Secretary of State Rubio and Mike Waltz. We're leading the U.S. team to negotiate with Sergey Lavrov, the Russian-led team. What is your take on the beginning of the negotiations? Do you think this is leading anywhere? Give us your assessment. Yeah, thank you, Max. I think there are two takeaways so far. There's a lot of noise, to be fair, mixed messaging, contradictory statements coming on all sides of the parties. But the

But the two things that I want to flag, first of all, there's clear commitment of the Trump side to organize some sort of negotiation, some sort of arguably rushed peace deal or settlement for whatever reason. It's not very clear as to why, other than perhaps the promises that he's made during the electoral campaign. Trump is so eager to achieve some sort of settlement so quickly, but the push is there unquestionably. Second point is that, and that may have to do with the first point,

It's clear that Trump's side so far, based on the statements, like they hold actually quite favorable tone towards Putin and Russia. They're interested in some sort of reset, no matter how temporary. And if history teaches us any lessons, is that sort of reset with Russia is unlikely to be lasting.

But nonetheless, the consistent talk about how basically Russia will become, that they can partner with Russia on certain issues, they can reconsider some of the sanctions, they should reestablish the diplomatic presence in the countries has been one of the major takeaways from today's talks in Saudi Arabia. All of that suggests that this is very much on the table and clearly Putin by now, several weeks into, has already achieved something major, that is the end of diplomatic isolation on the Western side.

One can argue to the extent to which it ever existed on the side of the so-called global south. But clearly, the West was reluctant to talk to Vladimir Putin after this unprovoked, horrible invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Now, I think we can definitely claim it's over. My own suspicion is that Trump's team is so eager to sort of draw Russia back into the negotiation process and generally to be able to talk to Russia.

is probably because of China, probably because China remains the major threat to the United States. And this particular team on the Trump side repeatedly said that China is the main problem. Hence, yet another attempt that I think we've witnessed maybe three or four over the last 20 years to appeal Russia of China. Just going to go ahead and say that it is unlikely to succeed. But apparently, the effort to try to do that never ceases. I think one thing we need to be a little careful of is putting kind of

an elaborate strategic motive on the part of many of the Trump administration figures for entering these negotiations. I think in many respects, this is Trump having said that he was going to get peace on day one. I mean, that obviously wasn't going to happen.

but that basically deciding that he wanted to try to end this war. And I think you can pick apart why Trump wants that, but I think that's ultimately what he has said. And now his team, Marco Rubio is a former Russia hawk, or maybe still is a Russia hawk. I think had historically been very skeptical of sitting down and negotiate with the Russians. And I think

very critical of the Obama administration during when it tried to do its reset with Russia, but yet are trying to implement what the president wants. I think my take on today is that it's essentially was a talk about talks, right? They're

laying out a structure perhaps where they can talk more. So I don't quite have a huge problem with that. I think many in the Biden administration as they were leaving and probably Harris administration might have said, okay, let's sort of poke around with the Russian side and see if there's any sort of there there in terms of negotiations. I'm also not totally alarmed by talking over the heads of the Europeans, even Ukrainians. It's something the US has done in the past.

We would do it on New START Treaty or other nuclear conversations would be done bilaterally between the United States and Russia. But all of that was leading up to a very big but. This also comes on the heels of the Munich Security Conference of the United States saying that it really wants to pivot away from Europe.

and make European security Europe's responsibility, I think in some ways fair enough. On the other hand, you know, when the United States would talk over the head of its European partners, we would then go and very aggressively and eagerly try to reassure them and say, no, no, no, we're super committed to European security. We're not selling you out. But

But here, it also looks like the United States is not only cutting out the Europeans and Ukrainians, but it looks like we've sort of changed uniforms, that we were on sort of Team Ukraine, maybe not wearing the Ukrainian jersey, but we're in the stands cheering for them. We were buying tickets, we were supporting them. But now it looks like we put on the referee's uniform and are acting more as a neutral arbiter. And that I think should be very concerning to the Europeans and Ukrainians because we

If we're not acting to advance their interests, which the United States would frequently just tell Europeans, no, we're looking out for European security because that's what we do, then I think they have real reason to be alarmed.

And I think that's true for both Kyiv and anyone in European capitals around Europe have sort of equal measure or have equal right to be concerned about being left out of these talks. I agree. I will just flag that just as you pointed out yourself, Max, these are words, the words that are much harsher towards the U.S. historical allies, let's put it this way, than they are towards U.S. enemies, if we call Russia as such.

which is a little bit puzzling to me. I definitely see that happening too, but perhaps it's the sophisticated art of the deal. Maybe I'm yet to find out what the intricate diplomacy underlying these tactics is.

But certainly, we'll have to wait for the policies because talk is talk. And specifically, Trump's first administration was also known for saying things, but it's not necessarily what the policies are going to look like. And I think it's important. Just today, I think Trump mentioned that when it comes to Europe, he is not eager to pull out US troops from Europe. So hopefully, that's good news. Although I know that previously, there were other messaging on the same topic. So I guess it remains to be seen. And it's really difficult at this moment to

to try to navigate through so much noise. I wanted also to talk a little bit about maybe the key takeaways of the Saudi Arabia meeting held earlier today as we're recording this podcast. So one thing that's important, and frankly, if you watched Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov giving his commentary on the negotiations, he looked really exhilarated and excited, which is always painful to watch.

I imagine for many of our allies. But altogether, the key takeaways is that they agreed to eliminate, quote-unquote, irritants in bilateral relations between the two countries, perhaps create some sort of separate teams of negotiators on Ukraine. Hence, this is just, again, talks about talks, nothing major, nothing substantive. Perhaps important for membership of the Russian diaspora, among other people residing abroad, is that there is some intent to restore diplomatic

diplomatic exchanges. And that means that potentially this number of the Russian so-called diplomats, who, as we often know, are spies undercover, will increase in the United States.

One particularly important issue for Ukraine, I'd flag, is the fact that Russia insists on conducting new elections in Ukraine. And the interesting question as to why is it so important for Russia, given that, I think you'd agree, it's very unlikely that a pro-Kremlin candidate will win the new election in Ukraine no matter when it happens. The key issue that many analysts are wondering about is why is Putin so insistent on having that?

And this is where I think we get into the key point of our conversation today. Has Putin's goals in Ukraine ultimately changed? Right. May I ask you, what's your take on that? Yeah, maybe the first part on the elections. It's the only thing that I can really think of there is that Putin thinks that maybe Zelensky will resist having elections because he's, you know, worried about his political position and then won't want to hold them. I mean, part of the reason why they're not holding elections is because, you know,

there's a war on and pulling places and having people congregate wouldn't be safe and

And they don't. Huge number of displaced people, right? Yes. 20% of Ukraine is occupied by Russia. Like who is going to be voting in the election? Right. And so, you know, it's sort of a logistical administrative nightmare and potentially dangerous for many voters. So but I think the cynical take in me would be that Putin thinks Zelensky will say no. And that's then a great thing to sort of wave around to say, look, look, this guy's not some Democratic hero.

And so there's no deal. Zelensky wouldn't agree to democratic elections.

and to try to make it sort of easier for the United States to effectively walk away from supporting Ukraine. But this gets to the larger question. My cynicism is rooted in my larger sense that I don't think Putin has any interest in negotiating a deal, and especially no interest in negotiating a deal if he thinks that US support for Ukraine is on the wane and unlikely to continue.

And this is where I think the question of time is very important in this whole broader

conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Because on the one hand, you can say time is on Russia's side here. They are winning the war militarily on the ground, or at least they're on the right side of this attritional fight that if the war continues for another year or two years, Ukraine, I think, is in a much tougher shape, particularly if the United States pulls back or stops its military support. And we should remind the audience that

you know as of now there is no more u.s military assistance for ukraine because the money's essentially been all allocated that was passed in the last 2024 april supplemental so that you know putin's on the right side of the current fight so time in the short term is on russia's side you could argue that what putin could do

is agree to a ceasefire, essentially a kind of a stalemate along the lines that existed, you know, 2015 to 2022 in Ukraine. By this time, rebuild his forces, then in five to ten years go at Ukraine for round three.

And all of this is rooted on the fundamental notion that what Putin is actually after is Ukraine, that he hasn't actually shifted from his goals. So that in five to 10 years that you sort of wait out the West, the West gets distracted, stops providing any military support to Ukraine. So Ukraine can't really build up its military as fast as Russia can. And then you work on sort of corrupting Ukrainian politics from the inside. You try to weaken Ukraine's economy. You

and you go at it for round three. I think the problem with that is that Putin will be like 80-ish, you know, five to 10 years. So is time on Putin's side here? I would say maybe not. So actually the present is where you really want to press your advantage. Now the question, Maria, I think, and I'll throw it back to you, am I right in being cynical that Putin's actual war aims here are still the same, which is to take Ukraine? And I think this really gets at the heart of the question,

that really has divided the Russia watcher community for a very long time, which is basically, can we negotiate with them? Is the collapse in relations between Russia and the West, is that Russia's fault or is it the West or is it shared? And there's an argument on the other side that actually, maybe if we handle things differently, there's an ability to negotiate and come to sort of terms that Russia isn't sort of an irrational actor and they're not out for blood that we can have talks. But I just don't really see how Putin, having gotten into this war,

suffered, would want to just stop and just have history look at him as having taken a bit of the Donbass. So I turn it back to you. Yeah, I agree with many of your points, Max. And I'll just flag that

I think that Putin has a little bit of time on his hands. He, after all, is only 72 years old by US politics standards. He's actually young, you can argue. And he's not living anywhere, I'd say. And the key point that many of the analysts are flagging is that Russia is reconstituting its military and its defense industry at accelerated rates. So they may not necessarily need five, 10 years, right? It may actually end up being three to five years. And especially if it's synced with, for example, some unpleasant for

for the United States developments in China, Taiwan.

area. This actually can work out for them. So I agree overall, though, and by reading Russian military analysts, Russian think tankers, you see that, of course, to the extent they also kind of trying to guess where the real line is, but also some anecdotal stories, some conversations with Moscow former colleagues all suggest that the goals of the Kremlin, Putin's goals in Ukraine have remained the same, just as you pointed out. And frankly, what is not to like, right?

Russia socioeconomically is adjusting, not ideally, but it's been able to withhold what seemingly right now looks was the worst.

But the way this is going, it's unlikely so far that things will get much worse for Russia anytime in the near term. And then they're solving the manpower issue. Right now, our colleague Janice Kluge recently reported that actually Russia has been able to pick up recruitment of the new soldiers to the front line by increasing the price tag yet again. And at the same time, while they're doing better, just as you said, the Transatlantic Alliance looks like it's in disarray.

There's lack of agreement between Europe and the United States. Ukraine on the ground is struggling to solve its own manpower issues. And there is no new Ukraine lethal aid package in sight coming from the United States side.

Meanwhile, the goals of the Kremlin have remained the same. And this is where, as we have discussed before, I think that the new administration was misguided about the intentions, the reasons which drew Putin into this war. The consistent talking points of the Trump's team is that it was all about NATO. And by guaranteeing to Putin that Ukraine is not going to join NATO anytime soon, they're going to be able to basically to give to Putin what he wanted. But the

But the reality is, and I will insist, right, that there's a lot of evidence pointing out that really Putin is after much more than just no NATO membership for Ukraine. He really wants control over Ukraine. It's about spheres of interest, Russia's restoration of its great power, superpower status, you name it.

And no other outcome will be acceptable to Putin as long as he feels that he is actually holding an upper hand, just as you pointed out. So absolutely no reasons to believe that he is giving up his maximalist goals. If anything, he should be feeling very comfortable that he is getting closer to achieving them. And to go back to our previous discussion of why they want a new election in Ukraine, possibly precisely to destabilize Ukraine further.

It may be treated as basically this issue that the Kremlin will use to avoid negotiating, but it also may be approached that

this is the destabilization issue for Ukraine. Many people will not be able to vote if such election was to take place. The results might be questionable. And this is precisely what will give Kremlin the leverage not to push forward their candidate, but maybe at least destabilize Ukraine domestic situation to the extent that it basically, quote unquote, will fall into Putin's arms. And this is certainly concerning, especially in view of the new administration's position on these topics.

and unwillingness to reconsider what the actual motivation of Putin is in this war. Yeah, and Maria, I mean, the kind of counter-narrative is like, look, Russia's economy is now starting to struggle somewhat, and it may be much worse than we think it is, but there's sort of this hope that I think...

Russia's on the economic ropes, casualty rates are high, they would want some sanctions relief, that there's sort of a win-win here to end a disastrous war. And you don't see that impacting Putin's calculation. Based on what we have discussed in this podcast with the respected analysts and economists, Putin has a little bit of time at the very least, right? We keep predicting that the Russian economy and society will be impacted very seriously.

But the reality is that while the impact is certainly there, and I certainly do not want to say that the sanctions do not work, they do. And if anything, there are ways to make them more efficient. There are ways to reinforce them, to really make the Russian economy suffer a bigger blow. They do make the economy more fragile and a major crisis.

The Russian economy will not have basically this rainy day funds savings in order to back it up. So potentially any crisis may result to really, really serious blow up. There are also signs of coming stagflation that is slowing down growth with simultaneous rise in inflation, which is precisely where Putin's Keynesian economic style would have driven him to. But at the same time, none of them is urgent, imminent, coming in the next couple of months, which is our timeframe here.

All of that is within the horizon of maybe several years. And in the meantime, Putin is quite comfortably running this war, even under previous constraints, which now, as we understand, may be actually lifted. Yeah, I think that that, you know, all of the economic sanctions, the economic struggles, the casualties could have all weighed on Putin's decision making if it looked like Western support for Ukraine was indefinite.

and that there was sort of no way to militarily achieve any goals, then I could see Russia coming to the table. But what I see now is that Russia is likely going to engage in a lot of faux negotiations, sort of talks about talks and a real effort to try to point blame at Ukraine for the failure of the negotiations and to try to effectively remove the United States as an actor in support of Ukraine.

Because if you can isolate and separate Ukraine from the United States, then it's much easier military situation for Russia. And you can really start to see the light at the end of the tunnel of this war getting brighter.

And I sort of think about, you know, Putin's in his 70s. He's thinking a lot about history. He wrote that essay in the summer of 2021 and sort of like a lot of old folks that start, you know, getting obsessed with World War II and other things like that. They get a bigger picture. Yeah, they get a bigger picture. But he's been there for 25 years, 25 years. And he's thinking, I think, about what his czar-like legacy is and what the history books are going to say about him and how he made Russia great again.

And what do the history books say if he settles for negotiations that result in maybe a few mineral deals, but a little bit more of the Donbas for this like really costly war? Is that Putin the great? And so I think that's one of the core problems is that we haven't reduced that ambition.

of Vladimir Putin. And so I think that the talks and negotiations are essentially a shadow boxing effort that isn't really going to result in anything significant. Hate to be pessimistic about it, but then maybe just to pivot quickly to the European reaction to everything. And may I just jump in to ask you, Max, precisely,

If we consider the worst case scenario and basically the US leaving this story, it's clear that Ukraine is unlikely to agree to many of the concessions that Putin is asking. What do you think the role of Europe here specifically? Is it able to jump in maybe with purchases of the US weapons? Is Europe able to ultimately sustain its own security basically? Yeah. So I think the answer is somewhat in that we shouldn't underestimate Europe's ability to act.

Well, at the same time, understanding how difficult it is for Europe to act. Europeans are the best at underestimating their own strength. What I would say when it comes to Ukraine is that right now, Europeans are obsessed with this conversation about European boots on the ground in Ukraine to sort of be the guarantors of ceasefire peace agreement to deter Russia from attacking again. It just, you know, we've just had 25 minutes discussing it. We don't think negotiations are going to go anywhere.

But yet all the European debate is about this hypothetical, what do we do if there is a peace agreement? Can we send forces in to then be the guarantor? And I think the answer is, okay, if we get there, then we're in a very different place. But I think what Europe really needs to be doing, and this is to your question, Maria, is preparing for the talks to fail.

and preparing for the United States, unfortunately, to largely walk away and wash its hands of Ukraine. And I just look at Donald Trump's statements about Ukraine, his past history of Ukraine during his first term, where Ukraine was responsible for his first impeachment, and his sort of affinity for Vladimir Putin in trying to make a deal with Russia has always been there. So I think it's very likely the United States effectively walks away from supporting Ukraine militarily.

We've already done it when it comes to development assistance and economically with the collapse of USAID. So this is a question for Europe to really get serious, I think, about its military support. And some of that, I think, may be coming to the US with a foreign military sale request to buy a lot of our 155 production, which we're now successfully really ramping up.

But we need more money from Congress to keep providing that to Ukraine. So maybe Europe comes in, buys some of that production. And that will be a tough pill for Europe to swallow to buy effectively U.S. military aid to Ukraine. But I think, you know, you do what you have to do. And so I could see Europe doing that.

as well as beginning to ramp up its own defense industrial production which still really hasn't ramped up to the level that it needs to and then once you begin to ramp that up you can give away more of your legacy equipment or the equipment you're operating knowing that in two three years time you know ryan metall is going to be producing whatever it's producing for you to backfill so i think europe can do this economically this is not that much of a lift for europe

Despite all the complaints, Europe responded to the energy crisis by immediately bailing out many of its industries that were suddenly about to go bankrupt. And this is like a fraction of the cost. It's just that, you know, this is being done and looked at by defense ministers, by foreign ministers, not by the finance ministers, the economy ministers. And I think that's where the conversation really needs to be integrated. May I ask you, you think that the US would be willing to sell arms to Europe?

I think so. And I think if we weren't willing to do that, that would be even more of a betrayal. That if you can get the Europeans to at least to pay for this, but then you're not willing to sell our XS155 production, I think that that would be a big shock. And it's not out of the realm of possibility, but it's I think that would be a win-win for the Trump administration where they could go to the American taxpayer and say, look, you know, we're finally getting Europeans to step up here. But I think we're going to see where Europe goes. There's about to be an election.

in Germany, which I think European leaders have been really waiting for because Germany holds the fiscal keys to the European kingdom, so to speak. And that, I think, will be really important to see how that election pans out. When there's a new German chancellor, can there be sort of a broad agreement on how Europe can support Ukraine going forward? But I think, Maria, we're at around 25 minutes. Any final thoughts from you about what things that you're looking forward to or looking out for over the next few days, hours, weeks, months? What are you looking forward to next?

Well, first major issue is that, frankly, the Saudi Arabia talks never agreed on the specific details timeline of the meeting between Trump and Putin. And for Putin, the May 9th is coming up. It's the anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the so-called Victory Day, which also this year is 80-year anniversary of the victory.

And for Putin, for a variety of reasons, which our audience can find out in our reporting, the May 9th and the Victory Day in particular has become very important ideological sort of milestone. He builds his legitimacy on the war legacy and the legacy of the Soviet victory in it. So for me, it's really important whether the meeting will be agreed upon and specifically for which dates, because if it's, for example, something that has to do with the specific dates, which are very important for Putin, I think it will be in yet another victory

a small but nonetheless important victory for him. Broadly speaking, this is a short term, but in the broader sense, clearly, we need more details. Right now, there's a lot of talk about talks, but there is little substance, frankly, to build more commentary on. Clearly, we want to see something feasible, something really material coming up from all the conversations. And I just want to repeat the same point that I previously made, where I, Max, remain somewhat of the questionable optimist, which is where we turn the tables.

is that, if anything, the first Trump administration did not radically alter the policies because the U.S. national security interest ultimately remains the same. And I, being realist in that regard, still remain hopeful that the understanding of what the U.S. national security interest constitutes and that stronger Europe and stronger Ukraine is part of that interest very much

I hope it remains on the side, on the back understanding of the US administration. We will see how the specific details unravel and we'll keep watching. Well, it's quite a role reversal. Maria, you're usually the in-house pessimist and I'm the in-house optimist. I think our roles have reversed. Fortunately, your track record on things is much better than mine. So hopefully that's a good sign of things to come. I guess the one thing I'll say, maybe just to close,

is what I'm watching for some indication from the Russians that they're actually seriously willing to sit down with the Ukrainians and talk. And I just don't think we've seen anything. I mean, the fact that Ukrainians aren't even at the table yet, I think is a sign of that. I don't think that was a Trump administration not wanting Ukraine there necessarily, but I think the Russians weren't willing to sit down with them. So I think we need to see some signs from the Russians that they're actually willing

willing to give something up, make some concession. And that, I think, requires the Trump administration to push them. I think the problem is that the US actually doesn't have a lot of leverage here over Russia.

And, you know, we have leverage over Ukraine, but not the other way around. And we're right now willing to use it on Ukraine, but not willing to use the kind of military assistance leverage that we have vis-a-vis Russia. So I'm waiting to see some sign that Russia is looking for a lasting peace. I'll just quickly jump in. There's also sanctions leverage that could potentially be used if the administration wanted that. Yeah. And if the Russians are really eager to have that sanctions alleviation, that would be a good sign if they're then willing to make certain concessions. Yeah.

But with that, Marie, unfortunately, we should probably end things there. Thanks to our listeners again for tuning in and be sure to keep an eye out for upcoming bonus episode discussing a new European strategy for containing Russia. As usual, be sure to subscribe to our show and give us a five star rating. And also please check out our sister podcast, The Europhile, where we're about to go very deep on all things Munich Security Conference and the future of the transatlantic relationship.

I have a new report out looking at the coming transatlantic collisions. I think we need to maybe change the title to say the current transatlantic collisions that are happening right now. But you can check that out at csis.org. So thanks again. And please give us a five-star review wherever you get your podcasts. We'll see you next time. You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon.

Russian Roulette releases new episodes every two weeks on Thursdays and is available wherever you get your podcasts. So please subscribe and share our episodes online. And be sure to check out all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and Eurasia program at csis.org.