Russia and the Middle East in 2025
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Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.

Hello everyone and welcome back to Russian Roulette. Today I'll be recording without Max, but with two fantastic guests to discuss Russian strategy in the Middle East. The first is Hanna Nore. Hanna is the director of the Eurasian Non-Proliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California, and more importantly in our eyes, a Senior Associate Non-Resident Fellow with our very own Europe-Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Hanna is an expert on Russian foreign policy, Russia's nuclear weapon strategy,

And additionally, Moscow's engagement with the Middle East. Hanna, welcome back. Thanks so much for having me, Maria.

Additionally, we are joined today by our other dear colleague, Natasha Hall. Natasha is a senior fellow here at CSIS with the Middle East program. Natasha has worked on a complex set of issues in the region related to conflict resolution, governance, and displacement among others. Natasha is focused in particular on Syria and Russia's involvement in the country. Natasha, welcome to Russian Roulette. We're thrilled to have you on the podcast. Thanks so much for having me, Maria.

Welcome, ladies. So clearly, the last several years have seen a tectonic shift in the strategic balance of forces within the Middle East, which will be full disclosure, the topic of today's podcast.

At the time of recording, a ceasefire and hostage release deal is at the start of its implementation between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, yet the region still appears to be standing on shaky ground. Let's start with Hannah and then Natasha. Why don't each of you begin by assessing the state of the region today? Who is up and who is down? How does Russia view its presence in the Middle East at the start of 2025?

Sure, Maria, happy to start and maybe give a quick balance sheet of where the Russians are at in the Middle East today. And then maybe Natasha can zoom out and look at the broader regional picture. But

Let's start by stating that I think since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, we've seen some shifts in Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, which became increasingly framed, I think, through the prism of confrontation with the West over Ukraine. So if you look at how Russia dealt with the Syrian dossier, with the Iranian nuclear dossier, positioned itself on Israel-Palestine,

including on the latest war in Gaza, I think we've seen Russia formulating its stance, thinking what serves it best in its confrontation over Ukraine. And what that has meant in practice, I think, is somewhat of an abandonment of a balanced strategy that Russia has always had in the Middle East and a growing tilt towards the anti-Western forces in the region, in particular Iran and its partners and proxies in the axis of resistance.

Let me just sort of state that at the outset. Now, I think since the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7th, 2023, there was initially some indication or some reason to believe that the Russians would benefit, not so much in terms of their position in the region, but geopolitically. Why? Because I think there was an expectation that Russia would reap a distraction dividend, not just political attention going away from Ukraine and to the region,

but also US resources. And we've actually seen this over the years since October 7th, the United States sending additional Patriot battalions to the Middle East, drawing from a finite supply of air defenses to send those to the region as Israel embarked on a war. And there was worry, I think, in Ukraine that Ukraine would therefore suffer.

There was also an expectation that the Russians would benefit, I think, in a more diffuse fashion, because for as long as the war in Gaza remained unresolved and tensions continued to spiral in the Middle East, and there was an accusation of Western double standards and hypocrisy when it comes to the positioning on the war in Gaza, this is something that the Russians could keep rubbing in. These arguments about Western hypocrisy, Western double standards, whether it's in the media campaign or at the United Nations,

And so Russia sort of benefiting from the West's travails in the Middle East without actually having to do very much. I think this was a certain expectation at the beginning of 2022. Now, I think what we've actually seen over the last year, though, is that too much upheaval in the Middle East, which has been generated by October 7th and then the subsequent Israeli campaign against Hamas in Gaza, against Hezbollah in Lebanon, has actually turned into, I think, more of a strategic headache for Russia.

Because we got into a situation in 2024 where first of all, Syria was increasingly in the crosshairs of an expanded Israeli campaign against the so-called Axis of Resistance that made Russia nervous last year. Russia stepped up its patrols in the Golan Heights. It signaled to the Assad regime to sit tight amid the war in Gaza because Russia was really nervous that Syria would become destabilized by this Israeli campaign.

Now, we are in a situation where the Assad regime fell. Now, the Assad regime fell because of a complex set of factors, but I think one conducive factor was certainly the Israeli campaign that weakened Hamas and Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in Syria. We're also in a situation now where the Iranians are weakened as a result of this year-long campaign.

And Iran has become and is one of Russia's strategic partners in the region. So the strategic bottom line here, Maria, to me is that Russia is looking weaker in the region than it was a year ago. Upheaval, and we can talk more about the axis of upheaval later, upheaval can cause predicaments or risks to Russia if there's too much upheaval.

I think the Russians will still try to balance in the region and stay on good terms with the various actors from which they have certain expectations, economic, security interests, but they are in a weaker position than they were a year ago. Noted. Thank you. Natasha, anything to add to Hannah's commentary? Yeah, I'm glad that Hannah noted this issue of distraction because I think this will continue to come up because the reality is Gaza is devastated. Parts of Lebanon are devastated.

And now a lot of Western donor countries, including the United States, are going to have to really recalibrate how they're dealing with Syria as well. So, I mean, I still think that that distraction aspect is there as the sort of also geopolitical ideological upset with the U.S. support to Israel during these wars remains as well. So I still think that that's there. And I also want to just emphasize that the likes of Iran and Russia do not win with the likes of Israel and the United States toe to toe.

they win through wars of attrition, right? So I think Russia is in particular, I think a bit more agile at diving in and out of conflicts, sort of causing crisis and then leaving. But without a doubt, obviously these two actors, Iran and Russia are on their back foot in the Middle East. And if we just apply a kind of a big T, I think to the region with sort of the crossroads of it being in Iran or sort of the heartland of Syria,

And we look at this sort of lateral line going from Iran to Lebanon into the Mediterranean and so forth. And then we look at this vertical line that would be going down from essentially Russia through Iran, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa.

we see that the horizontal line has been severed, right? And perhaps irrevocably for a while for the likes of Iran and potentially Russia. I think we'll talk about that more when we get into the bases in Syria and what that portends for Russia's future in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, even in the Sahel and parts of West Africa and Sudan, other places where it's been present.

But I think that that, in fact, really, really debilitates Iran. And I think we'll talk about this more later, but I would predict that we will see a strengthening of that vertical axis of upheaval, is what I guess what we're calling it these days, where Russia and Iran, that alliance is strengthened. And we've already seen Iran try to play up that alliance in recent days for obvious reasons, especially as we see

the Trump administration coming in and potentially returning to maximum pressure campaigns. And Russia potentially wants to do that too, to really maximize an obvious humiliation, frankly, to them in the region that's hard to play in any other way. I mean, the loss of Tartus and Lataiya in particular, or the Syrian intervention as a whole, which was really the crown jewel of Russia's return to great power politics internationally, is truly shocking. And I think we'll send

ripples through the region and beyond. But I do think that we will see again on that vertical axis, I think a strengthening there.

Excellent point. I love the horizontal versus vertical axis distinction. So precisely on that point, you both have mentioned the situation in Syria. And of course, we cannot discuss Russia in the Middle East without discussing the fall of the House of Assad in Syria. Natasha, since it's really your bread and butter, could you please give us the lay of the land in Syria right now? Who the main players are in the country right now? Can we even know for sure? And what are the expectations about the next months?

Yeah, I mean, I think that that's a really good question. It's hard to underestimate what a historic and surprising moment it's been. It's been a little bit over a month since the fall of the House of Assad, you know, a 54-year dynasty, over the course of 11 days, which is just shocking. But I would mention Hayat Tahrir Hashem, which is a terrorist group, at least designated as such by the UN, the United States, the European states and others.

is now essentially the government of the entire country. It's quite shocking. They do not have control over the entire country. Turkey and its sort of mercenary forces, if you will, or proxy forces, the Syrian National Army, had been making their way east to take more territory from the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces that are backed by the United States, at least for now. And so there's a lot of still complicated politics here.

Israel has even taken advantage of the situation and retaken more territory beyond the Golan Heights within Syria. And so I think the big question mark for me and for a lot of people, I think, is where does the US come in? Where do European countries come in and Gulf states in potentially filling this vacuum left behind by the Assad regime and Iran and Russia primarily? I think, you know, and Hannah can speak to this quite a bit. I think the abandonment of Assad by Russia was

probably the most shocking aspect of the past couple of months for me. It wouldn't have taken too much, I think, to bombard their way out of this as they had before. And so the fact that they were so conciliatory towards the rebels so quickly really shows, I think, where Russia is at the moment. We do know, I think, that HTS or HTS representatives had reached out to sort of Russian interlocutors potentially in Turkey before they even took

took Damascus to essentially reassure Russia that the war was not with them, that they were fighting to basically depose Assad. And so that might have had some effect in the recalibration of Russia, whether or not they should come to the rescue.

And as with Iran and Hezbollah's inability to come to the rescue, that might have also factored into their decision-making process. But their first step has essentially been to draw down their presence in Syria as they negotiate with the new government in Damascus. You know, we've spoken about recent reports that, you know, Russia has been completely kicked out of its port in Tartus, for example. I think that's a little bit premature. It's probable that negotiations are ongoing or, frankly, that Russia has a lot of other things on its mind.

and so does the new government. But we have seen vessels move out into the Mediterranean. We even saw that before the fall of Assad. And certainly, materiel moving towards Libya. You might see the expansion of Russian bases there in Libya, as with the ports in Libya, at least in eastern Libya as well. Fascinating topic, except that I would claim that

Assad regime didn't really fall in 11 days, right? It was really falling since 2011. It's just... Absolutely. Took a little longer, but nonetheless, the ending was predictable, after all, as it turns out. Hanna, anything to add to that? And specifically on the status of Russia's bases in Syria, as the Russian experts, you know, we're really interested in the possible implications of it. How consequential do you think the current dynamic is?

What do we make of reports that Russia is trying to move equipment and systems to Libya? Or maybe it's just too early to talk about it. Maria, before I come to the basis, let me just add a few more general words about where the Russians are at in Syria right now. I think this is, I totally concur with Natasha, a real strategic defeat. I think it is most pertinent in a Russian loss of leverage vis-a-vis two key players, Turkey and Israel, in terms of the consequence of the fall of Assad.

I think vis-a-vis Turkey, Russia had already lost leverage in this very complex, multilevel relationship since the invasion of Ukraine. And now the Turks have won another card vis-a-vis Russia. And this is true regardless of how the Russians are trying to spin these recent developments in Syria. You'll recall, Maria, that Putin speaking at Prea Malinia in December

was trying to frame this as, well, we achieved our goals, our anti-terrorist goals in Syria, and Russian diplomats have largely blamed the sequence of events leading to the fall of Assad on US policy, on the Caesar Act, on the sanctions, on the West not giving Syria an opportunity to deal with its economic and social problems. But regardless of this spinning, the fact that this is a strategic blunder for Russia

is clear. Now, I think the highest priority in Moscow is to retain the bases, and I'll come to this. But there's more generally, I think, an attempt to retain some influence over shaping a post-Assad Syria. Now, I would argue that the Russians have some leverage or some reason to believe that they can retain some influence in Syria.

You know, I think they've pivoted very fast in those fateful days when the Assad regime fell, pivoted from labeling HTS terrorists to talking about political forces in the country, opposition groups. You know, the MFA pivoted.

quite fast. And there's now actually in Russia changes in legislation in the works to facilitate a delisting of HTS as a terrorist organization. I think it was December 28th when Putin signed a law which would sort of allow the Russian government to remove organizations from Russia's list of terrorist organizations. And I think this is done with a view to dealing with HTS.

I would also note that Russia has always cultivated over the years ties to various opposition groups in Syria. And Natasha noted contacts that might have existed with HTS even prior to the fall of Assad. And I think maybe the fact that the Russians were always seen as not quite as bad as the Iranians in Syria,

A secular player, at least. Yes, a player that supports a criminal Assad regime, but not a player that is seeking to foster demographic change in Syria might give them some advantage to retaining some influence on the ground over the Iranians.

There's also the fact, of course, that the Russians are a permanent member on the UN Security Council. And the rhetoric coming out from HTS over the last month and various interviews that have been given by Al-Sharaa suggest to me that there is also a recognition then that one might not want to sort of get completely on the wrong foot with the Russians.

And then there's a regional dimension here that I wonder about, which is that some of the Arab states, and we've seen the Saudis being quite active now on the Syrian dossier over the last few weeks, they might want a certain counterweight to Turkey and Syria. Turkey is now seen as increasingly strong in the region, which

I think is something that has certain Arab states become quite nervous. And so they might not be opposed to some Russian influence as a counterweight to Turkey as well. So those are some of the factors that might play into Russia retaining a degree of influence. But I will just sort of

say as a bottom line that if we compare the Russian role to previous years, and if we think about how important the Astana process, Russia plus Iran plus Turkey was in shaping the trajectory of the conflict, you know, certainly between 2015 and I would say 2018,

Russia is now a diplomatic sideshow compared to that. It is a diplomatic sideshow, I think, compared to certainly Turkey and Saudi Arabia when it will come to shaping dynamics in Syria. Now, quickly on the Russian basis, Natasha has already noted that we've seen certain movements, both out of Tartus, the naval port, and also we've seen, I think, consolidation, first of all, of Russian presence in Syria. So

So everything's been moved to Khmeimim, the air base, and part two is from other bases that Russia maintained in Syria. We've seen withdrawal of certain equipment, military equipment to eastern Libya, really since December, radars for air defenses, components of S-400s.

And then I think more recently reports really that the Russian submarine presence has completely left the Mediterranean, that the last Russian submarine, the Novorossiysk, left the Mediterranean in early January. I'm not sure what will end up being decided as a sort of final status in terms of Russian presence in Khmeimim and Tartus.

As far as Russian messaging goes, this is still in negotiation. This is still an open process. But I think regardless of what will happen, Russia will not want to put all its eggs into the Syrian basket anymore because this presence might always be somewhat precarious because of the nature of the new government there. So they will want to look for some alternatives. And so the question here is, what can those alternatives be?

I just want to note on the naval port, Maria, that Tartus was never really a major naval hub. The Russian presence there was not massive. It was suitable for what the Russians wanted to achieve in Syria. If we think of those Kaleba cruise missile strikes conducted from the Mediterranean in 2015,

the Russian posturing, some intelligence gathering, the support for the Russian intervention, but it was not a massive presence. So they don't need a major naval port to compensate for Tartus.

Libya could be an alternative. And there's more generally evidence of a growing Russian presence, you know, of runways being updated at the air bases in Jufra and Kharabia, where the Russians are present. And certainly the Russians have been said to want a permanent naval presence in eastern Libya for quite some time, whether that's Tobruk or Benghazi. It's my understanding that that would require quite a significant investment in infrastructure for that to materialize.

But there's also, I think, US pressure on Libya not to let that happen. And so whether it's actually going to materialize, I think, is an open question. Other than that, possible alternatives, if we want to sort of speak hypothetically, could include Algeria, where the Russians have a longstanding defense relationship.

The Algerians have several commercial ports, they have ship repair facilities. We've had Russian defense officials visiting in recent months, but again, it's very unclear to me whether the Algerians would allow for any kind of more sort of beefed up or permanent Russian naval presence there. There's also Port Sudan for the south, but there I think negotiations with the Russians over a naval port have really been dragging out and complicated by the fact that we have an ongoing war in the country.

At the moment, I think there's a lot of moving parts and not a lot of clarity of where this is all going to end up.

Thank you, Hannah. So just to make sure, to conclude, sort of Russia has options to continue, for example, its operations in Africa. That's one of the arguments why it needed this basis in Syria in the first place, but it can find substitutes in other countries, even if it will require a little bit of extra investment. Natasha, would you agree with that? I mean, I would just interject a little bit here. I mean, I've been interviewing Syrians for a long time.

I think the Syrian population dislikes the Russians. I mean, they have bombarded and completely razed to the ground lots of villages and towns and cities in Syria. And Syrians will not forget that anytime soon. I think that there's a difference between the people of Syria and HTS. HTS has clearly proven to be a very pragmatic actor, not just with the Russians in recent months or recent weeks.

but also with Israel. I think the issue is if Western governments or if Russia pushes the government a little too far away from the population. This is obviously a population that will rise up against the government, especially a nascent government like this one.

And so I think there is a danger of, you know, the US trying to too quickly reestablish public ties with Israel, for example, or the Russians pushing on a more public relationship or protection because HTS actually has been providing some protection for Russian convoys as they've been moving to and fro from their bases in order to get not just military material out, but also personnel out more critically.

And that would lead me to the other point, which is it would be a significant loss, I think, if Gulf states or Western governments waited too long, I think, to approach Syria and fill this vacuum. Because if Russia is able to actually retain a foothold again in Syria, I think that speaks to an enormous failure on the part of Gulf states, Turkey, the US government, European countries. This is a really critical window of opportunity.

and it remains to be seen if that's going to happen. On the basis, I mean, I think that there's a lot of technical details here that make Tartus particularly special. As Hannah was mentioning, there's only been like 11 vessels in Tartus at any one time with a few auxiliaries.

So, not a huge presence there, but in terms of for logistical reasons and maintenance reasons, it's been very difficult to find any kind of suitable alternative. And the last thing I'll say on that point is that the fall of Assad and the fact that Russia abandoned him rather quickly as he was facing this rebel offensive also make the likes of Algeria, Burhan and Sudan

And of course, Haftar in Libya sort of think twice before putting all of their eggs in that basket. And that's kind of what we've seen. Even Russian news outlets have recently said that apparently the Sudanese government has said that they cannot establish a permanent base in Port Sudan. So I think that that remains to be seen. Of course, things can change, but it's complicated.

Truly feels like a moment of geopolitical weakness, right, when it comes to the region. Shifting gears a little bit, or maybe just continuing the conversation, something that, Natasha, you've described as a vertical axis shaping a bow between Russia and Iran. And we clearly have seen really deepening cooperation between the two countries, already starting since 2015 when Russia intervened in Syria, but certainly they doubled down on it after the war in Ukraine, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. So

So I don't want to even list to our listeners, I recommend a great article Hannah published in War on the Rocks together with Jim Lamson, which describes in detail this shaping cooperation. Most recently, we have seen also the presence of the two countries signing a treaty on comprehensive partnership, which is also somewhat similar but somewhat different from what Russia has signed with North Korea also last year, which really alarmed many of the experts. In

In this agreement, Moscow and Tehran promised to collaborate on strategic and military questions, along with issues related to trade and economic integration. But unlike what we've seen in case of Russian North Korea Treaty, we do not see similar types of mutual defense clauses. Accordingly, how do we make sense of it? Hanna, what do you think we make of these deepening corporations?

How alarmed shall we be? How do we understand the timing also of this similar deepening cooperation between the two? Yeah, I won't go too much into the details of the deepening cooperation over the last three years because it's been much discussed and well documented. Everyone will have heard of the Shahed drones, which have not just been supplied to Russia by Iran, but Iran has also facilitated the production, the indigenization of their production in Tatarstan and Al-Abuga over the last year or so.

So I won't go into the details except to say, I think that what we've really seen is a shift in the dynamic between Russia and Iran, where what was previously a sort of patron client dynamic, where Iran was totally reliant on Russian support, has been recalibrated. And Russia has also become reliant on Iranian support to some extent.

So let's come to this new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was signed last week. And you asked me about the timing, Maria, and I think people also have questions about the extent to which this agreement is similar or dissimilar to the partnership agreement that Russia has with North Korea.

So I think on the timing, this agreement was negotiated for a long time. It was long anticipated and its signature was actually delayed because there was an expectation that when Pezeshkian came to Kazan, Russia at the end of October for the big BRICS summit that Russia as the BRICS chair hosted, there had been an expectation that the agreement would be signed then. It was postponed. One can speculate over the reasons.

One possible reason might be that one wanted to elevate this event and not have it happen as a sideshow to the BRICS summit. Now, the fact that it happened last week so closely linked to the inauguration of Trump in Washington, I think is no coincidence. I think there is a desire here by Russia and Iran to signal we are strategic partners and no new US administration will manage to drive a wedge between us. So I think that was an important signal here.

The agreement itself is quite meaty. It's quite long, 47 paragraphs compared to, I think, 21 or so in the previous agreement from 2001. It's quite wide ranging and quite meaty, even in terms of military technical cooperation. It is true that the kind of commitment that we have in the treaty with the DPRK on mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties, that kind of commitment is absent in the Russia-Iran agreement.

But there are various clauses that imply a deep level of commitment in various areas of defense cooperation, whether that's, for instance, on intelligence cooperation, mutual visits of military ships, training of military personnel, joint exercises. So there is a lot there. Also cooperation on space, for instance.

Now, why is there no such commitment to mutual assistance in the event of aggression, similar to Article 4 in the Russia DPRK Treaty?

Well, I think from the Russian viewpoint, I think there's certainly a desire not to commit oneself to any sort of obligation to come to Iran's defense. I think there's a very clear understanding in Moscow these days that the prospect of war with Iran, of military escalation vis-à-vis Iran is very real as we end the 2025.

whether that is by Israel unilaterally or by Israel joined by the United States. And I think Russia, for what it's worth, and notwithstanding the sort of growing confrontational thrust of its Middle East policy over the last few years, Russia has always wanted to avoid getting into a direct military confrontation with Israel or in fact with United States and the Middle East.

If we look at Russia's Syria policy over the years and the deconfliction mechanism with the Israelis on the one hand or with the United States on the other, are indicative of that. In fact, the deconfliction with Israel, from what I understand, and I was just in Israel two weeks ago for conversations on Syria, the deconfliction worked until the last moment on

until the Assad government fell. So I think there's no appetite in getting into any kind of military confrontation in the Middle East, especially as the campaign in Ukraine remains the utmost priority for the Russian military. And that's why from the Russian viewpoint, I was pretty sure that we wouldn't see that kind of commitment in the treaty.

Now, having said that, I was sort of prepared for seeing something somewhat more forward leaning because even in the DPRK treaty, what you see is a commitment to come to assistance in the event of military aggression. But then there's the caveat

I think the language is that it needs to be in alignment with national legislation, which one could argue is giving the Russians the option of a cop-out, even in the DPRK case. And so I could have conceived that we would see something similar regarding Russia-Iran. But in the end, we see a lot of language on military defense cooperation, but not that kind of commitment. Anna, thank you. Just to clarify. So the point is...

Russia is not afraid of a similar escalation and having to come to defense of North Korea, but it is afraid of similar possibilities in the case of Iran. And so it wants to sort of protect itself against it. Yeah, I think the prospect of a war with Iran or military confrontation with Iran in the Middle East are assessed as a lot higher than, you know, someone going to war with North Korea. I think

I think that's pretty clear from Moscow's point of view. Thank you, Natasha. Back to you. Do you agree? Maybe something to it, what Hannah just said. And also within the expert community, there is a debate as to what the relative weakening of Iran, given the destruction of the so-called axis of resistance, means for Iran-Russia collaboration. Some argue that Russia no longer needs Iran as much, now that Iran has significantly weakened.

Others say that Russia has no other options than having to collaborate with Iran. And if anything, it will have to like double down. What is your take on this?

Yeah, I mean, I would agree with Hannah on all those points. I mean, it's interesting if we rewind back to 2015, it was actually the Iranians that went to Moscow to ask them to intervene in Syria to help what was then the flailing Assad regime despite Iran and Iranian proxy support primarily on the ground, I should say. It was really Russian air support that turned that conflict around in Assad's favor. But today,

Certainly, I think the tables have turned. I mean, we talked a little bit about Iran producing military supplies for Russia, drones, etc., that have also turned the course of that conflict in certain respects in Ukraine, of course. And I would also agree with Hannah, I mean, the notion of there being upheaval in the DPRK is just a totally different scenario, not just because of how isolated that regime is, how

seemingly resilient despite everything that regime is. It has nuclear weapons, but it also has China as its primary sponsor and protector. So I think that Russia feels that it can potentially put that article into an agreement with DPRK. And I think that that really speaks to how weak the Iranian regime is right now, not just internally, but I think externally. The fact that we have seen it somewhat humiliated by Israeli attacks in recent months,

The fact that we've seen internal protests in recent months and years as well, I think speaks to the situation that the Iranian regime has been in. I mean, it has really been bruised and battered, especially over the course of the past year, and I'm sure is trying to recalibrate how it builds its strength outwardly. We do know that it's building up an arsenal of PBAs or pharmaceutical-based agent chemical weapons, and one would think that that's for internal threats primarily.

But Iran is really going to take some time to have to recalibrate and build itself back up again. And I would say it doesn't help at all that we're in a Trump administration at the moment.

Very interesting. And certainly we'll get to the Trump administration. But before we get there, I have a broader conceptual question about the, as we have discussed at the beginning, what does it all mean for the shaping axis of upheaval, right? The so-called alliance, or maybe you disagree, it's an alliance between Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China in this context. And to what extent we can think of this collaboration as being long-term strategic, maybe ideological in nature,

or more of a temporary pragmatic alliance that is out of the maybe sort of pragmatic considerations? What are your opinions on this? Hanna, maybe let's start with you. Yeah, Maria, I'll say something about the axis of upheaval in a second, but just I wanted to add one sort of thought to what Natasha just said, coming to this notion of the weakening of the Iranian regime. I think that's spot on. And if we link it back to Russia, the question that we now need to ask

is what role can Russia or is Russia willing to play in order to help Iran reconstitute its coercive and deterrent capabilities after this year of being exposed to this Israeli campaign? So when it comes to Iranian missile capabilities,

to reconstituting or rebuilding the axis of resistance, the proxy network, or in terms of moving across the nuclear threshold, how is Russia going to look at this? And I think we are basically in a situation where Russia can do something for the Iranians on the margins right now. Yes, there can be perhaps somewhat more assistance to the Houthis, something that we have already seen indications of over the last few months.

But when it comes to, for instance, support for Iran's missile program, or I think more importantly, air defenses to make Iranian missile production less vulnerable to future Israeli attacks,

I think the situation is that Russia is probably very much constrained in giving that kind of support to Iran. So my point to you would be that I think, in fact, the amount of upheaval, the simultaneity of conflict in Ukraine and in the Middle East has actually created, I would argue, a situation in which both Iran and Russia are constrained, at least over the short to medium term, in terms of what they can do for each other.

I think this is sort of a point I want to state at the outset. Now, coming back to your question on the axis of upheaval, I mean, that denotes the growing cooperation not just between Russia and Iran, but also with DPRK and China. And I do think that these four countries share a dissatisfaction with the current international order, believing that the current system does not accord them the status of freedom of action that they believe they are entitled to. So I think there is a sort of ideological glue here.

But I think the cooperation that we've seen within this axis, to my understanding, has been much more bilateral in nature. Russia-China, Russia-DPRK, Russia-Iran. And there's little evidence to date of multi-way cooperation except for, for instance, select naval drills, Russia-Iran, China, for instance. But

but not so much three or four way cooperation, though that is something that could conceivably change into the future. But I also think that there are sort of two caveats, I think, when it comes to thinking about the axis of upheaval. The first caveat is that while all four countries, I think, do want to promote a post-Western global order,

they differ in their tolerance for upheaval. That's something that we've already discussed. I think when it comes to the Middle East, even China's appetite for upheaval is more limited than Russia's. And Russia's own appetite for upheaval, as we've just seen with events in Syria, is also with limitations. So that's the first point I want to make about upheaval. And the second, though, is that if I look at Russia's global foreign policy, Maria,

I think that Russia needs to engage in some balancing between what I would call dealing with the revisionists or the upheaval actors and what I would call the reformists, big heavyweights in the international system that want to see a reform of the international system, but that are averse to too much upheaval. And here I think of Russian partners in BRICS like Brazil or India, for example,

who are not very keen to promote this very anti-Western agenda that Russia is pursuing in the international system. I mean, Russia's narrative in its global foreign policy is predicated at the moment on this notion

that Russia is leading what it calls the world majority or the global majority in a struggle for a more multipolar order. In that pursuit, Russia cannot go all in with the forces promoting upheaval. It needs a lot of other powerful countries in the international system

whether that is for lifelines for its war economy and defense enterprise, or also for dealing in multilateral institutions. And so I think there will always be a tension in Russian foreign policy, sort of navigating between those two camps, the revisionists and the reformists. And it might put at least some limitations to how forward-leaning Russia is going to be in terms of pursuing our people. That's a fascinating description, Hanna. Thank you very much.

Also, whether it's not just as to what it is that they want to envision, right, is also whether they have the resources that are needed to undertake such an ambitious endeavor, given in mind that they disagree on what they want in the first place. Definitely echo the point on also primarily bilateral nature of the corporation within their axis of upheaval. Having said that, the fact that it's starting as bilateral maybe does not prevent it from evolving into something more than that.

Natasha, can I have your take on that? Do you think maybe something that we're seeing right now is just early origin of potential something more powerful or given the inherent limitations that Hannah so brilliantly described, this is where maybe they're doomed to stay?

I mean, maybe I'm too cynical to believe in ideological alliances. I tend to think that ideology is window dressing for the masses and for useful idiots that can be brought along. And that goes for the axis of upheaval and also for Western governments and their alliances as well. And that's kind of what we saw in the Cold War. And I think we're seeing a return to that, but in a multipolar context, obviously.

And we have seen, I think, alliances grow from Venezuela all the way over to the Middle East and Russia, Nicaragua, I mean, and so on and so forth. So there's certainly those alliances that are taking place. And that is transactional. But it also helps, I think, with this revisionist nature of looking at the world. That is helpful because it increases the power and influence of these regimes, not necessarily because of any kind of ideological commitment to a new world.

It's essentially to stay in power for many of these regimes. And so in and as much as they can benefit from a fellow traveler being sanctioned. So in other words, India and China being able to benefit from cheaper oil and energy resources from Russia and Iran, all the better for them. I think that's how we need to be looking at this. I think there's a little bit too much of a black and white when we look at this sort of axis of upheaval, the black versus the white, the good guys and the bad guys.

There's a lot of people that are riding this out and benefiting from both sides. And we see this in Gulf countries, most especially in the Middle East, but we're also seeing it increasingly in North Africa as well. So, I mean, I think that especially regimes in the Global South are learning how to sort of balance this to their benefit. But most certainly, I don't think necessarily a pragmatic transactional relationship needs to be mutually exclusive of some kind of commitment to

to overhaul a U.S. hegemonic order. But it strikes me from what you both have described that part of the story is just resources and ability to benefit at least temporarily from the current arrangement, cooperation, which may also not last when the situation changes. And it reminds me

a little bit of the Soviet effort outreach to what was called at the time the third world countries, the so-called global south countries, which again, while some countries pretended that they have a temporary ideological alliance with the Soviet Union at the time, really it was only for their own benefit and the pragmatic reasons that the regimes really exploited in a lot of ways the Soviet Union to get what they wanted rather than to embrace the true values of Marxism. On that note, maybe that offers the US policy an

an opportunity to exploit the existing differences and the pragmatic nature of this relationship. And since we're recording this, the day after Trump's inauguration as the 47th president of the United States, how do we assess the Trump factor in the region? What are the actual maybe weaknesses that the U.S. policy can exploit? And can the Trump administration do that successfully? Hanna, let's start with you. Well, maybe I'll start by recalling that recently,

Russia didn't like Trump's Middle East policy all that much during his first term. I mean, what did Trump do during his first term? Among other things, he withdrew from the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and he fostered the Abraham Accords or dealt with the whole Israel-Palestine and Israel-Arab file in a way that made Russia feel that the United States is monopolizing this space, which is something that Russia didn't like because

because Russia doesn't like to be sidelined when it comes to Middle East diplomacy. Now the expectation, of course, when it comes to Iran is that we will see some kind of maximum pressure 2.0, possibly even pressure for military action against Iran.

though also an expectation that there could be an attempt at a deal and that we will maybe now have a short window of opportunity in which diplomacy with Iran could be explored, though the contours of a possible deal, I think, are very unclear because the Iranian nuclear program obviously is not what it was 10 years ago.

Russia, I think, probably has a lot of apprehensions right now. I think Russia is nervous about the prospect of military action against Iran because Russia realistically is neither able nor willing to come to Iran's defense should that materialize. So you could see a scenario in which Russian impotence is actually sort of on display in the Middle East.

I don't think they want to see a military strike against Iran, also because of the prospects of sort of destabilization towards Russia's south, which is something that they have always been concerned about.

But then there's also the possibility that Trump will attempt to make a deal with the Iranians, but he might have an appetite for some kind of bilateral, simple deal with Iran, not something that involves allies, not a complex JCPOA type deal. So that could be a situation in which the Russians are sidestepped. So again, I think they would look with apprehensions at such a trajectory.

What I think is going to happen is that regardless of what is being pursued, I think we will likely see a Russia that will try to shield Iran to the extent that Russia can, that will not use its leverage to pressure Iran, unlike in the history of the Iranian nuclear dossier, and even might, if there's no deal and the Iranians move towards crossing the nuclear threshold,

if not support such a step, then at least be a passive bystander and sort of let it happen. That is, I think, a certain worry that I would have. So,

Maria, my bottom line, and I'm curious about Natasha's view here, is that I think an opportunity for US policy to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran is highly, highly limited. This is not 2010. We're in a different geopolitical game now. I see the fundamental trajectory of the Russia-Iran relationship as one of deepening cooperation, even if there's limitations right now in terms of what they can and want to do for each other.

But I think opportunities for wedge driving will be limited. Natasha, what do you think? I would somewhat agree with that. I would caveat it a little bit. I think the Russians are expecting and everyone in the world is expecting Trump to want the optics of a big deal without getting too much into the details. Right. Because I don't think he has the patience for the details. He wants good TV. So if he can get a ceasefire in place between Ukraine and Russia.

Russia gets to seal its current wins. It gets to play the game that it is better at rather than going toe-to-toe, a war of attrition where you go to a ceasefire and then you recalibrate, you regroup, and then you move forward with an offensive either through gray zone tactics or an actual military offensive. And then hopefully be able to calm down any kind of relationship with Iran.

Because I think Russia also perceives Iran as weak with the new Trump administration because Trump has seemingly been more conciliatory towards Russia, but much more aggressive towards Iran. And so I think that Iran is in a place of extreme vulnerability at this point. It doesn't have as many friends. It doesn't have as many levers anymore. So I think it perceives itself as being very weak.

And I am guessing that an incoming Trump administration, maybe not Trump himself, but his advisors may try to take advantage of that moment. So I think, you know, in some cases, sort of the madman theory might work with an Iran that is feeling very vulnerable right now. If it's considering the nuclear threshold, maybe it might hold back.

But again, I don't see this administration as being particularly interested in the details. That could work for an Iran. I don't think it works as well for a Gaza or a Syria. I think you really do need to actually get into the details. Again, we've already seen this. Trump and his envoy have taken credit for the ceasefire between Israel and Gaza in recent days. And it's not finished. I mean, Gaza is a mess.

It's been completely razed to the ground. And so, you know, maybe his chips are on the fact that, you know, it's a four year term. Well, hopefully a four year term and that he can just kind of withstand whatever the long term consequences of Gaza and Syria are through those big deals that he's so famous for.

And that could work. I mean, you know, in the United States, we are also not great with paying attention to details and paying attention to things at all after a certain period of weeks. That's just not the way that our 24 news cycle works. It works in President Trump's favor. And I think he knows that. And I think, frankly, other regimes understand that now very well as well. So I think that's the only, I think, really critical limitation to the

the Iranian and Russian relationship at the moment. But, you know, it could still continue, I think, behind the scenes as well. Fascinating conversation. Thank you so much, ladies. We definitely tried to delve at least into some details. Clearly not all of them. And there's clearly a lot for the new administration to think about. Hopefully they tune in. Unfortunately, we have to end it here. Massive thank you, Natasha and Hanna, for joining us today. Thank you for having us. Thank you so much, Maria.

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