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Hello and welcome to the Bullard Podcast. I'm your host, Tim Miller. I'm delighted to welcome, I think for the first time, host of the GD Politics Podcast, also GD Politics on Substack.
a formerly host of the FiveThirtyEight Politics Pod, and he's got a recent piece in the New York Times arguing the Democrats need their own Trump for 2028, but not in the way you're worried about. It's Galen Druk. What's up, man? Hey, how's it going? Thanks so much for having me. It's a pleasure to be here. It's going well. It's going well. I mean, I don't... Should you have just gone with the goddamn America podcast? Are you a little concerned about the GD there? You know... Just whether that's sending the wrong signals to any potential Christian subscribers? Well...
I thought of that, which is why I also purchased goshdarnpolitics.com when I was setting up the site. So we have gdpolitics.com, galendrukepolitics.com, and goshdarnpolitics.com because we're an inclusive community, you know? Okay. Goshdarnpolitics. So that is sweet. I think maybe I'm voting for that one, but we'll see how it goes. All right. I've got a bunch to talk to you about. I want to get eventually to that Trump article, which we...
agree with passionately, fervently, hence you coming on the pod, because I like to have passionate agreements with people. And so we'll get to that. But we got some new stuff we got to do first. So since we taped yesterday's pod, the BBB, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which is no longer called that actually, Chuck Schumer got a big win. I don't know if you saw this in the Senate yesterday. He got a big win.
and he forced the Republicans to change the name of the bill. So big kudos to Chuck Schumer on that. It's passed the Senate. It's going over to the House right now. You either said or wrote that this looks to be the least popular major legislation passed since at least 1990. So I just want to start biggest picture before we get down into kind of the vote, the politics, the vote itself. I'm
Why do you think it's so unpopular? Talk about that. Yeah. So this was actually some analysis from Chris Warshaw at George Washington University who looked at the popularity of major legislation that's been passed since at least 1990 and
And this looks to be the least popular. Less popular things have been considered, like repealing the Affordable Care Act in 2017. That was less popular, but it failed. And looking at... What about W is Social Security privatization? Where did we fit on that? My boy. Well, Tim, that didn't actually happen. So it wasn't included in the big legislation that got...
passed, but I have to imagine that somewhere near this and where this polls on average is about 25 percentage points underwater, looking at four recent polls from reliable pollsters. And so it's pretty bleak.
And why is this happening? I think it's because this is an issue that Americans care increasingly about, health care. It's also an issue where Republicans start with a deficit. You know, even throughout Joe Biden's unpopular presidency, Democrats still had an advantage on the issue of health care. And it's also an issue that's becoming increasingly salient. We see it moving up in the ranks of concerns for voters. And I think it's an issue that's becoming increasingly salient.
And unlike, I would say, the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 that was quite unpopular when it passed, the media moved on, Democrats kind of moved on and argued about other things. This is the kind of story that if it ultimately gets signed into law, sticks around because there's going to be stories about folks losing their health insurance, you know,
There are projections that 10 million people will be put off Medicaid and that another 6 million or so might lose their subsidies through the Affordable Care Act. And that's not only something for Democrats to talk about, it's also something that the media is going to report on. And I'll just add here as I'm spewing out all of these numbers, like,
The Yale Budget Lab did some rigorous work looking at how this shifts around funds for the American public. It found that the bottom 20% of Americans will end up with $700 less per year if this becomes law, while the top 20% will end up with about $6,000 more.
And if you break that top 20% down even more to like the 0.1%, so people making over $3 million a year, they're going to get over $100,000 more a year when all is said and done. And so if you want to make an argument against the billionaires, against the oligarchy or whatever, and you're a Democrat, you were just handed a gift.
I guess my follow-up is I've done a little Googling while you're talking, and it feels like Social Security privatization was significantly more popular, actually, than this bill. So suck on that, MAGA. There was also some data that came out that shows, like, a lot of people don't actually know what's in this bill. So, like, how do you kind of...
parse that like it's unpopularity with also the lack of familiarity. Yeah. So I think a couple things are going on into your point actually about social security privatization being more popular in some ways. Republicans haven't even done the work to try to convince Americans that it's worth cutting Medicaid, right? Like in the Bush era, there would be some intellectual argument about how we need to make these programs solvent or why work requirements are actually a good thing. And by the way,
When asked in abstraction if there should be work requirements for Medicaid, a majority of Americans agree and a majority of Democrats even agree. And so in some ways, they've tried to do this in the dark of night, not really talking about it very much. And that may be to their deficit because there are probably some areas where they could win over at least more Republicans, because even Republicans don't have the best view of this legislation at this point. It's like only two thirds that view it favorably.
And when it comes to Americans not knowing much about it, I have seen I've been watching the polling as this has all played out. Increasingly, Americans do know about it. So today, when you ask them, like, will this increase the deficit? A majority of Americans say yes. Who will this benefit the most? I was just looking at you go polling this morning. Fifty seven percent of Americans say the wealthy when compared with other groups of Americans.
And so I think that they have a general vibe. They may not know all of the provisions that affect green energy or the provisions that affect. I mean, I think people are also aware of the tax and sorry, the repealing attacks on tips to a certain extent.
But I think that they will probably learn more. And it's, I would say, unlikely to get more popular. I want to get into the particular peculiarities of Lisa Murkowski, who did a very interesting podcast with recently and why she decided to become the tying and essentially tie-breaking vote on the bill next. So just putting her aside, what...
What's your theory of the case on why they did this? Like they really didn't have to do this. Like they could have done a two separate bills, one that was just border security, one that was just extending the Trump tax cuts. That would have also been bad on the deficit, but like.
So it was this. So you know what I mean? Like they could have just done popular stuff. Like that was an option to them. And that was something Donald Trump was pretty deft at in 2015, 2016, like focusing on just doing things people like. So like, why don't you think they did that?
Well, the parties do have a problem with over-interpreting their mandates. If you'll remember, Joe Biden started off with a decent amount of popularity, and the idea was to do popular things, and quickly they started also doing unpopular things. I mean, we don't have to rehash the whole thing, but on immigration and on inflation and things like that, he actually wasn't with the majority of Americans, and there was a backlash, which I expect to be the case here.
And so on one hand, it's Trump over-interpreting his mandate and saying, I want to do this, I want to do that, and we'll put it all in one bill. It's also the Republican Party, I mean, you're intimately familiar with this, the Republican Party being drawn in different directions. So there are now the conservative populists like Josh Hawley, who say that they like Medicaid, although he voted for this bill, obviously. And then there are also the budget hawks like
Rand Paul, who obviously didn't vote for this, but say that they're very concerned about the debt and deficit. And so how do you both...
try to not explode the deficit so much so you are going to cut benefits like Medicaid and SNAP benefits and also Affordable Care Act subsidies, but also try to be something of a conservative populist while also incorporating all of these promises that Trump made on the campaign, like no tax on tips, no taxes on your interest payments for your car loan and the like. And what you end up with is something that kind of
I guess it accomplishes a little bit of each, but it also does quite a bad job on the deficit. It does ultimately take away people's benefits. And ultimately, you know, the things that Trump said he wanted to do for folks like no tax on tips and the like will expire at the end of his term.
Yeah. I mean, like in a strange way, you don't you hate to hand it to Bannon, but like the Bannon version of this bill would have been more popular, right? Like if they did like not extending the top tax bracket and, you know, not doing as much on the benefit cuts. And I don't know, maybe adding more money for like an alligator moat around all of the jails instead of just one. Like, I think that kind of combination of policies feels like more popular than what they did.
Yeah, I mean, that's what Susan Collins was pushing for as well. She tried to add an amendment that would bring the top tax rate back up to 39 and a half percent from 37 percent, which I forgot to mention. If you want to do all those things that are priorities for different parts of the Republican Party.
and then also not raise taxes on anyone, you're going to end up with something that kind of offends everybody in some way. My theory of the case on this is, and part of this is just inertia and Trump wanted to get something done and it's stupid legislative. It's like old night, you know, same problem with every legislature where everybody's trying to get a little bit of what they want. But I think maybe the fundamental sin is that like,
A shocking number of congressional Republicans believe their own bullshit when it comes to like them being fiscally responsible and the Democrats not being fiscally responsible. And so like they convince themselves that they have to do these cuts to maintain their self-esteem.
perception, their identity as a fiscal hawk would be in doubt if they didn't do the cuts part of this. And so they are going to kind of lop on these unpopular cuts to a bill that still is bigger than anything Biden did or Obama did as far as increasing the debt. Like, I think that's like literally it. Like they fooled themselves into doing this. Yeah, I think there are
plenty of people within the Republican Party that believe in work requirements for Medicaid and reducing benefits. I should also say here that there is a cynical aspect to this, which is, yes, we hear a lot about Trump doing better with lower income, lower education level voters, but Democrats still do quite well with the poorest people in America and then the upper middle class and wealthy in America. You know, Harris won outright the top income bracket that exit polls look at.
And this is going to hurt most the people at the very bottom of the income ladder that actually Republicans don't rely on quite as much as they do the middle class, right? This is going to benefit the wealthy the most, but at least it's not going to have
sort of the deepest negative impacts on the people who are the prime Trump voter. You know, everyone gets lumped into the working class here, but when we're talking about the working class, we're talking about people making, you know, $50,000, $60,000 a year. We're not talking about the people who are making, you know, according to this Yale Budget Lab, if you're in the bottom 20%, you're making very little money a year and you're seeing the deepest cuts and the most negative impact from this bill. As Josh Hawley argued in the pages of the New York Times,
There is some push within the Republican Party to care more about the worst off among us.
But here, it seems like there may be some electoral calculations as well, because what they weren't doing was slashing Medicare. That's a good point. And they also ended up adding in a bunch for rural hospitals. I note that a huge chunk of money then goes to help support rural hospitals, which is needed and right. But is it nothing to help low-income hospitals in urban neighborhoods? It's like effort at sort of targeting your base versus the other side's.
Speaking of efforts to do that, Lisa Murkowski. So you talked to her at an opportune time. When was it? Like a week ago? Two weeks ago? Time is a flat circle. Yeah, yeah. She ends up being like the vote that is needed here to get to 50. The Republicans could only lose three. They had lost Paul Tillis and Collins. And so Murkowski was kind of the teetering vote at the last second. She ends up supporting it extremely reluctantly.
in a very unusual post positive vote interview she says that she thinks it's a bad bill it's going to hurt people so we're going to psychoanalyze that next but i want to play just a little bit from your interview with her where they're you're there you ask her specifically about kind of this carve out for alaska
Is this something where you could get to yes for this if there was a waiver for Alaska on those Medicaid provisions? Or do you think there are other places in America like the situation you've described in Alaska? Well, I think that there are other pockets where, again, you have limited economic opportunity, right, in some of our really rural areas.
And so, again, that's one example is work requirements. And I'm trying to be specific because I think it helps people. I'm not saying Alaska needs to be carved out of everything. What I'm saying is I've got to have some flexibility. I have to have some appreciation that not all states are equal in terms of how you're able to implement work.
What'd you make about, obviously you asked her that question, so you kind of felt like this was coming. I just kind of look at it and it's like, it's kind of a small, in the grand scheme of things, I don't know. It's not like Alaska got something, like avoided getting punished, right? And so I don't know. What'd you make about her kind of making the decision to vote for this after some of those changes?
Yeah, honestly, at the end of my conversation with Lisa Murkowski, I thought she's a yes for this bill because she was pretty clear that she'd been working with her caucus, with leadership, with the White House, pursuing things that she wanted to pursue. And I mean, a big priority for Murkowski is, you know,
energy resource production in Alaska, which ended up, I believe, being part of this bill, although things were getting added and subtracted at the last minute. So I'm not 100% sure on that. But Murkowski is somebody who said all along that I'm out here for Alaskans. She repeated that again and again in the interview.
And so ultimately, I think she felt that she got what she wanted. And because there were so many carve outs made and so many sort of concessions in some ways made for Alaska in this bill, at least that they considered.
probably she would have lost a lot of faith amongst her colleagues if at the end of all of that, she voted no. And so you get this situation where she feels like she has something good for Alaska, but then she comes out and says, I don't think this is a good bill for America. So what we can say is that's probably not the greatest political strategy to get folks to, you know, admire the work that you're doing necessarily. And so in some ways, like she's being honest. She said, I'm here to represent Alaska and I got what I wanted for Alaska. And so I voted yes.
You kind of landed there then on the two-pronged rationale for her decision, which is the Alaska focus in the brand, which she was very adamant about in your discussion. But also the social... Literally, it's high school cafeteria stuff a little bit. She does have relationships with Thune and with the leadership in a way that maybe she wouldn't with some of the more recent MAGA guys in the caucus. And I think felt like...
She had an obligation to like work with them in good faith or whatever. Yeah. I mean, I think they knew from the jump that they needed her vote and the way to do it was to put positive things in the bill for Alaska. And, you know, when we talked, it was, you know, about two weeks ago at this point, um,
It was clear that they had been working on this for a while, and she had raised plenty of issues regarding Alaska that were being considered. And she said in the interview, you know, they have to consider my concerns for Alaska because they need my vote to pass this bill. So I think that was an open part of this whole negotiation from the jump. There's another section of the interview which I played last week, which was kind of this question of,
you know, whether she might be interested in forging some kind of coalition government with Democrats or with other independent, you know, types, depending on how things go off in the midterms. You were like a dog with a bone on that question that went on for like seven minutes. So I could only play a little clip of it on this podcast. But what did you make about that whole exchange? And how do you look at it now after seeing kind of how the last week has played out?
You know, to her credit, she could have just said no and ended the conversation. So at the very least, I think she tries to be honest when she's answering questions, which is if this is something she would ever consider. She didn't say flat out no, which is what led to a conversation that I think it was even longer than that because I first started questioning.
by asking if she would ever consider being unaligned or independent. And then I said, okay, well, if Democrats win three seats in the Senate at the midterms and they need a fourth in order to have a majority, would you ever consider caucusing with them if, once again, they promised that you could pass good legislation on behalf of Alaskans?
And she could have just said, no, I'm a Republican. I'm going to stay this way. But the conversation kept going for about 10 minutes, which tells me it is something that she has considered. It's not a secret that I think she has pretty, you know, I'm going to speak in like memeable language here, but deep reservations with the Republican Party.
And she talks at length in her book, which is why she was doing these interviews about places where she's broken with her party and her reactions to January 6th and her concerns for her own security. There are people who are spending time behind bars because of threatening her. And she said in the interview itself, it's no secret that my party has rejected me or something along those lines, has not embraced me, I think she said.
And so there's obvious discomfort there. You know, she says that also she doesn't like democratic policy. I think you aired that clip with Nicole last week.
And I think that that's probably also true. And so I think oftentimes we look at these folks in Washington and they're super cynical and they're egotistical and they're kind of like unlikable people. I think she's truly conflicted. I think that she is not a cynical politician. I think that in some ways she's got a lot of feelings. She wants to represent Alaska and she's
She oftentimes lands in places that piss off Republicans and she oftentimes lands in places that piss off Democrats. And it works for her in Alaska in some ways because of the electoral system that they have there with open primaries and then a ranked choice voting system in the general. But I would imagine that under any other system, she'd be booted.
And maybe the answer to that is that, like, she's conflicted and she's working through it. Because part of me comes to the question of, and please take this in the greatest spirit in which it's intended, because I love and honor the GD Politics podcast. But it's like...
The fact that she's doing that interview, I mean, I don't know, maybe you're just pals with the chief of staff or something, but like, she's not coming on my podcast. She's not really going on MAGA podcasts, right? You know what I mean? Like, she doesn't have a natural, you know, usually if you're a politician that's selling a book, right, you would find the podcast that fits your natural constituency. Yeah.
And she would go on that because you figure that the listeners would really like you. You know what I mean? Like if Abigail Spanberger was doing a book next year, she's going to come on the Bulwark podcast because she figures people will like her. Like...
She doesn't have that, right? And so I guess my question is, who is she trying to reach? The GD Politics podcast listeners. I mean, look, I struggle with that myself. I am trying to reach statistical nerds, you know, crosstab divers. Well, you know, in a world where everyone sort of retreats to their partisan corners, I struggle with that too because the work that I do and have done for the past decade is not really about sort of telling people
what they should think,
or, you know, sort of sharing my moral values necessarily with folks. It's more just saying, this is the world as it is. There are parts of it that you'll probably like. There are parts of it that you probably won't like. And, you know, hopefully we can go along on this ride together and have a sense of humor, you know, where appropriate along the way. And it is a tricky space to occupy in an era when it's just way easier to find your tribe and kind of celebrate with them. And so, yeah,
In some ways, I understand that sort of tricky in-between. It's easy to end up pissing a lot of people off.
Yeah. Or providing opium to no one. And, you know, Lord knows. Yeah, that's true. Hey, who doesn't? We honor that here, too. Or she could go hang out with Elon. Elon's trying to start a new party. And, you know, it's kind of like the ketamine and deficit hawk party. And they could add on Alaska drilling to that. And boom, there we go. You might have a ticket. The interesting thing, I guess, just just finally closing on the Murkowski thing, which I'm wondering what you made of it is like.
She's not up until 28. I guess the argument against for her going the coalition government route that
you guys were talking about is like why she ends up voting for this bill. Like she thinks that she can get what she wants out of John Thune and that like working the inside game with that is a, is a workable path for her right now. And so she doesn't need to blow it all up, you know, over her feelings about, you know, the ice police state that we're going to run. Yeah. I think that it's probably less likely at this point that,
In this very moment that Democrats feel like they want her on their team, but people have a short memory in politics and folks are going to move on and there's going to be another vote. And if Murkowski wants to, you know, at the end of the day,
Murkowski has an awful lot of power in Washington. And if she wants to maintain that power in a different environment, remaining the gettable vote is a good way to do that. And, you know, given how she's voted in different ways, it's probably not entirely worthless for Democrats to try to pursue some moderate Republicans here and there. And obviously they were successful in doing that during the Biden administration. And so in a future administration, especially look, you
The piece that I wrote in the New York Times that we're going to discuss, a big piece of it was like, okay, I think Democrats can win future presidential elections by being top-to-bottom partisans because they'll rely on mediocre candidates from Republicans. And what we've seen over the past decade is kind of a race to the bottom in terms of candidate quality for these national presidential elections. But if Democrats want to
have any kind of meaningful majority in order to legislate. They got to win majorities in the Senate too. And so you either have to sort of put together a policy platform that appeals to Americans in states that have currently been written off, or you have to pursue folks like Lisa Murkowski. And both of those are probably unappealing to top to bottom partisans, but that's the world that we live in.
Well, let's just do it. Let's just get into that because the core of the Dems need a new Trump argument that you made in the Times is speaking about national politics. And I do want to close with some commentary on the draft you did about the Democratic nominee in 2028. And I have some negative feedback for you on that. But like, while it's true about the national political presidential candidates, the argument you're making, I think it's also true about Democrats in the Senate.
And essentially, I'm going to make the short of the argument and you can kind of expand on it. When you say Dems need a new Trump, you're talking about the fact that Trump took heterodox positions.
in both directions, right? Like he came in and offered the Republican base a lot of red meat when it came to immigration and issues such as that. But then he also like hedged to the middle, if you want to call it that, on other things like social security privatization, which you mentioned earlier, like the wars, right? And that the Democrats haven't really had a lot of candidates in
that have tried that, and that could be a successful recipe. So anyway, is that a good summary of the argument? And expand on that. They haven't had a lot of candidates try that, at least not recently. And I should say that another important piece of what Trump did was, at the time that he ran, the Republican Party was very unpopular, about as unpopular as the Democratic Party is today. Now listen, the Republican Party is also unpopular today, but it is more popular than the Democratic Party.
And so he was dealing with a pretty disillusioned electorate, primary electorate, and he ran pretty aggressively against the Republican Party. And so that's another piece of this. I think that ambitious Democrats should consider trying to break with an unpopular Democratic Party by running against it, sort of showing I'm going to be a different type of Democrat. And here's the evidence. I'm not one of the Democrats that you've become familiar with during the Trump era, the Biden era, the Hillary Clinton campaign, et cetera.
Yeah, let me just add on this point on Trump, because just in the Trump nature, like Trump didn't just run against the unpopular Republican Party. He was withering. Oh, yeah. In a way that like, and that was part of why a lot of people didn't think it was going to work, like myself included, right? I was like, I believed that you could run as whatever a nationalist, far right, Republican, populist guy and win. That person probably would have won in 2012 if they were a good candidate.
I was skeptical of Trump in 2016 because I didn't believe you could do that and like go after these like what you had thought would be sacred cows with the Fox watchers. Like, you know, people that had George Bush brooches and elephants, you know, paraphernalia around their house wouldn't vote for somebody that like actively shit on that legacy. But that was wrong. Like, you know, he didn't just kind of.
run away from the Republican Party, he ran at it in a very aggressive way. And you think that that same type thing could work here? Look, and maybe he didn't have those people necessarily early on, he was winning those early primaries with 30 some percent of the vote, but clearly those people could still get on board. And one thing about, you know, public opinion is,
On issues that are uncontested, you don't really know where the public lands. So if you had polled in 2015, what do you think of George W. Bush? What do you think of John McCain? What do you think of Mitt Romney? Republicans would have said, oh, you know, great. You know, today, Democrats, 75 percent of Democrats, which is still, you know, comparatively low, will say that they have a favorable view of Biden. Right.
But if somebody starts trashing those things that you are kind of inspired by, you find charismatic, you might change your opinion. And so I think a lot of folks who had been sort of along the ride for the ride with the Republican Party did change their minds once Trump came onto the scene and made that pitch.
And look, I started by saying that both parties are unpopular in America today. And so when you're running in a competitive election for folks in deep red or deep blue seats, you can tune this out. You want to run to the extremes. If that's what floats your boat, I guess go for it. The primary electorate is going to keep putting you back into office.
But if you want to win in a part of America that's actually competitive, one of the best ways to do it is to not be seen as fully one thing or the other, not fully Republican, not fully Democrat, but something else. And Trump was able to do that. By the time voters went to the polls in 2016, they viewed him as the less extreme of the two options, despite the fact that he had taken extreme positions throughout the campaign. And they saw him as less conservative than any Republican nominee going back to George H.W. Bush, which is as far back as the data was.
went, went. And, you know, we haven't seen a Democrat try this recently, but we have seen Democrats do this. I mean, I mentioned in the piece, Bill Clinton, who, you know, Democrats were very disillusioned when he came onto the scene. If you'll remember, Mario Cuomo didn't even run in that primary because he thought it was so fated for George H.W. Bush to win re-election. And
And, you know, he had his moments where he broke with the Democratic Party. And then he also ran to the right on crime and the debt and deficit. And he ran to the left on health care. He was also a very charismatic person who was able to bring people along for the ride. I mean, Obama as well. We think of him now as like the most establishment figure in the Democratic Party. But at the time, he was running against the establishment. He, you know, was running against Hillary Clinton on her Iraq war vote while he was to the left on that. He was actually to the right of Clinton on health care, for example.
And then also talked a lot about sort of putting partisanship to the side and rising above the fray. And that is one of the best ways to win over sort of marginal, persuadable voters, which
is by saying, oh, that negative caricature that you think of when you think of a Democrat, that negative caricature that you think of when you think of a Republican, I'm neither of those things. I have these sensible popular policy positions that I will pursue on behalf of you and sort of try to cut the partisanship out of it. In this piece in particular,
Some positions I mentioned that a plausible candidate could take. And again, the issue landscape will change between now and when this becomes applicable. But it's something like, you know, run pretty heartily to the left on health care and move to the right on immigration, in particular border security. Run to the left on housing and run to the right on the debt and deficit. That may not sound coherent to a top to bottom partisan. But again, the marginal, gettable, swingable, moderate people who code as moderate are
have, you know, views that don't fit one party top to bottom.
I want to hear a couple of models for what you think it might look like in a Senate race, because I think that the Senate race is a little different than a presidential race in particular, because for Democrats to win a marginal Senate race, you're trying to win the marginal voter in Iowa. I think that's what we're talking about right now, really. We're not talking about the Maine or North Carolina race. We're talking about how do the Democrats win Senate seats outside of the purple states. So I think that model looks a lot different. Which Democrats still haven't been able to do in Maine over the past
Right. Good point. But I'm just saying that, like, you could probably win a main with a more traditional type of campaign with some caveats apply in Iowa. You're going to have to do something different. Right. And so it's a little bit different on a Senate race than a national campaign. But on a national campaign, looking at the Democrats need a Trump model, I think that somebody could win a Democratic primary in twenty twenty eight.
like being absolutely the most withering person possible about how awful the Republicans are and just being absolutely against not just Donald Trump, but JD Vance, but Mike John, you know, but the BBB, just a withering attack on their policies while also taking very strange, like weird anti, you know, weird positions like against the Democrats on anti,
any series of issues. Like literally you could pick the buckets could be fucking AI, you know, it can be phones, could be schools. Like, you know, you could do, you could do a bunch of different stuff. Do you think that's right? Or like, do you think it's about affect like being like you went over the partisans by, by being,
you know, like Trump was good at fighting the other side. And then you went over the moderate voters with a couple of random issues, or do you think that it has to be policy based? So I think you bring up a very important point, which is that voters cast ballots based on
a lot of things that have nothing to do with policy. Because campaigns oftentimes get waged over policy, how you talk about policy is one way to communicate information about yourself beyond just what you might do in office. Because remember, Donald Trump didn't do a lot of this stuff once in office. It was mostly about telling people what kind of person he was. And it's right that you bring up that he didn't just
attack the Republican Party. He spent a ton of time also attacking the Democratic Party, the media, the left, all, you know. So I'm not saying here that this sort of Democratic-
Trump, who again, to be clear, I'm not talking about violating democratic norms or, you know, attacking institutions. I'm talking more about this, this triangulation sort of thing is somebody who would, you know, heartily attack the Republican party. Well, Fetterman is just the example of this just really quick. Like we'll get to what Fetterman has done the last year. He's run against the democratic party, but then only.
Like you almost never hear him talking about how terrible or, and he does from time to time, but like he doesn't do it in a way that gets attention. Like his provocations are all aimed left. That is not what will work. Absolutely. You have to have provocations aiming right and, and left. Yeah. And especially during the primary, you focus on the red meat to your base. And so for Trump, that was immigration. But for this person, I don't know,
If AOC would ever take right positions on some of these things or say it's Josh Shapiro or whatever, you talk a lot about a public option. You talk a lot about how health care is broken and Republicans have broken it even further. And you really get people riled up believing in you on that issue and also maybe bring up some issues that aren't fully polarized, fully polarized.
like housing, for example, and talk about affordability there. The Democratic Party is unpopular and Joe Biden's presidency wasn't particularly popular. So there are a lot of opportunities to create those differences, create those distinctions by just attacking what's already been done that's unpopular. And you
you know, you don't have to probably go as far as Donald Trump did in 2015, 2016. But again, you're right that it's not just policy. It's also charisma. It's also celebrity and it's authenticity, right? And, you know, for Donald Trump, being that kind of
brash, off the cuff, whatever kind of person was authentic to him. I think that whoever Democrats field, it'll be important that the path that they take is authentic to them. So when thinking about this strategy, it's harder for somebody like Pete Buttigieg, who was part of the Biden administration, or somebody like Gavin Newsom, who has become at least was something of a poster child for the Democratic Party to then go and like run against the Democratic Party.
It would probably be easier for a lesser known person like a Josh Shapiro, like an Andy Beshear, somebody like that. Like, I'm not saying that those are necessarily the strongest candidates for Democrats in 2028. I think in many ways, time will tell. The issue landscape will change exactly how unpopular Donald Trump is and the specific areas in which he fails or succeeds are yet to be seen entirely. But I think...
You're right to point out that authenticity, charisma, celebrity, even just going viral can mean an awful lot. You keep trying to drag me into the 2028 hot stove discussion and we're saving it for dessert. Okay, that is saved. I have three other topics I want to get to. Just as leaning in on the Senate, for example.
The Democrats are going to, and I talked about this with Iglesias a couple of weeks ago. If the Democrats are going to have any kind of majority where they can do anything in the Senate, they have to win in places like Texas and Iowa this time.
I like that. There's just no other, like, even if they sweep all of the blue and purple States, I think that their ceiling is like 54, 53, maybe 52. Even I don't have in front of me, but it's like not a, not a high number of centers. Well, Tim, let me, I'll get, I'll do the math for you. They got to win four seats in order to win the majority in the Senate.
Their top pickup, especially now with Tom Taylor's retiring, is North Carolina. Their second best opportunity is Maine with Susan Collins up for re-election, although that has eluded them for a decade. Then after that, it is take your pick, but...
States that Democrats have not done well in it's Iowa, it's Texas, it's Alaska. Those are probably their best options from there. I don't know, maybe Kansas. Those are probably their best options from there. And then they also have to defend some of their seats, you know, in Michigan and the likes.
Yeah, I was I meant more like long term, like if you're like playing like playing this out into the future, if the Democrats also want to like have a governing majority, you know, because you don't have a chance to win the Pennsylvania seat back for six years or whatever. But like if you play it out a decade, even if you win all the blue and purple seats now, like the ceiling is still very low. Yeah, there's not a lot of seats to pick up there. You have McCormick, you got Ron Johnson, you know, just a couple.
So then the question for you is, what does a candidate look like that wins in Texas and Iowa? And I want to put aside the caveat that
you know, we lost 30,000 jobs last month. Maybe we go into a great depression by next October and the Democrats don't have to do anything and they accidentally win a couple Senate seats. But so let's put the exogenous event aside. Like what is a Democrat that would even have a chance for you in Texas or Alaska or Iowa or Kansas? I think it's probably the mold that I mentioned. I
So what is Americans' biggest concern today? It's still the economy and the cost of living. And so you want to present probably more progressive policies on something like that, which I know we're holding off the Zoran Mamdani conversation until later. Oh, that's next. It's coming up next. But you probably present, like, run something of a single-issue campaign on the things that Americans care most about, while also, I think, pivoting
pivoting on some of the areas where Democrats have been least popular. I think in a place like Texas, in particular, border security. I mean, that was one of Joe Biden's worst issues. It was pretty clear to people, I think, at this point that those were policy choices that exacerbated the migrant crisis. And so,
sort of letting that be known. I don't know if you want to touch this stove, but there are even plenty of arguments that the American rescue plan was significantly too large and inflationary in its own right. I mean, by the end of 2021, the San Francisco Fed had concluded that it added three percentage points to annualized inflation and
And so there are areas where, you know, Democrats have fallen down on the issues that Americans care most about. And I think by breaking with the party or even just giving voice to it, like I know that Pete Buttigieg is trying to do this in places where he's like, oh, we kept schools closed too long and the like. But saying, you know, Democrats fucked up here and there, I think to a Texas audience is going to buy you a lot of credibility with folks who might not naturally be in your corner. Right.
And then in addition to that sort of juicing enthusiasm, boosting enthusiasm by talking a lot about the most important issues like cost of living.
I think that you're not even thinking big enough. I think you just lost by five points in Texas. Okay. All right. Go for it. Give me that. Give me that. With your candidate. I don't think that there's a great answer to this, but I think that if you do the playbook you just laid out and you have a really heavy focus on cost of living as a candidate and that's your number one issue and that goes from healthcare to housing to all that and there's some populist economics in there, that's fine.
But to pair with that, you need to like own a gun store or like be actively like have some have a view, a passionate view about a cultural issue where you think the left is really wrong. And that's not just like a random thing you mentioned sometimes, but that's like the second most important thing that you talk about. Yeah.
And when you ask people in Texas, like, what do you know about this person? It's like, well, they want to make cost of living better. And they also really care about trans sports being only boys and girls. This is why I would not be a good candidate for this because I'm a cultural lib. But I think you have to be a hard cultural pivot away from the Democrats on something. Yeah. And I think that's probably in a place like Texas on immigration. It's not sort of...
how you necessarily treat people who are already in the country who came in illegally, but more how you deal with the border. I think that probably the trans issue gets overplayed a little bit in the role that it played in 2024. It's a clearly an 80-20 issue. The Democrats have been on the wrong side of this, but it's just not a salient issue. Americans don't care that much about trans. Yeah, but it's a signaling thing. Sure. It's a signaling thing. But
You have to figure out something to signal to people that you are not like one of the elite libs that they don't like. And so that so like for that, it's like that would just be a signaling. And Americans care a lot more about immigration. And it's also the two parties have become highly distinguished on that issue. And so breaking with your own party on that, I think, would also accomplish the same thing.
Let's do the immigration thing. Because I think the immigration part is complicated. So I'm about to argue against myself a little bit. And maybe not really, because I think the thing might be different if you're an Iowa Senate candidate in 2026. And if you're a Democratic presidential candidate in 2028, it's different for a variety of reasons. But...
I feel like the immigration issue is going to become so salient over the next year and a half that it is going to become very hard for Democrats to zag towards Trump on it in a way that makes sense. Like, I think they could have done that with effect in 2022, zagging against Biden by saying we needed to be harder on the border, but trying to do it in a way that
between what Trump is going to do and whatever, what some democratic policy would be, I think is going to be very challenging. And I just, I want to use one example of this. I play every clip of this that I find, but in the manosphere recently, we've had Andrew Schultz saying he's uncomfortable with what's happening with immigration. We've had Rogan saying he's uncomfortable with what's happening with immigration. Here is a barstool sports podcast that I was listening to earlier this week, and I want to play it.
I totally flipped on immigration. Oh, okay. I guess that's a good set. 100%. So, for years, I thought, if you're not here legally, you shouldn't be here at all. I flipped. I think the people who are working, the people who are paying taxes, those people should be able to stay. Okay. And the other people who are doing bad things, we need to find those people and get them out. Okay. Seems well-reasoned. Yeah. You know why my thoughts switched on immigration? Why not? I was talking to my girlfriend in bed one night, and she knows I'm...
I'm a little right. She knows that. And she was like, just talking. She's like, can we talk? I was like, yeah, sure. She's like, this is fucked up. I'm like, what's up? Talk to me. She goes, explain to me how her family got here, all that stuff. And I was like, you know what? You might be right. Oh, wow. There you go. You might be right. Because there are people here who work very hard and pay taxes, and they should be able to live in America.
Shout out to Jersey Jerry's girlfriend, not giving out blowjobs until he switches on immigration, I guess. But that was him with Big Cat on Barstool. Yeah, enticing pillow talk. Very enticing pillow talk. I don't know, man. Talk about the immigration polling. I think that sometimes the Democrats are fighting the last war on this one. And I think that the divide on immigration is going to be less about the border and more about why are masked agents
agents nabbing people off the streets in a free country. Yeah, let me throw out one other thing that I just remembered while we were listening to that, that I do mention in the pieces. Another way you can signal sort of your openness to non fully partisan ideas is the debt like every 15 years, the debt and deficit takes on a new role in electoral politics, and people start talking about it again. I think especially after this recent, you know, tax and spending bill, you
voters are, I think, primed to hear an argument about how the debt and deficit are too big. And it's not natural territory for Democrats, but if they want to be the people who do that, I think that could help them to significant effect in the places that you mentioned, like Texas, Iowa, Alaska, and the like. And it's also kind of an anti- Finally, a bulwark Democrat, a green eye shade bulwark Democrat running. And if only, do we have any contributors live in Iowa? We got to move Amanda Carpenter out of West Virginia to somewhere where she can run. Now, look,
pretty much everyone who runs on the debt and deficit doesn't actually do anything about it, but it is a way to also fight the establishment because it's an area where you can say both parties have fucked up on this. Donald Trump during his first term spent more deficit dollars than any other president in American history. You know, Democrats have not cared about it as well. You can even like bend the idea of,
And talk about it in different ways. Like it's about generational equality. The more money we spend today, the less money we can spend on young people's education and health care tomorrow. And so are we going to bankrupt ourselves for the boomers or are we going to sort of put together some policies that millennials and watch out for millennials and Gen Z? There are many different ways to talk about.
an issue if you want to frustrate it in people's minds. Anyway, I'm not, I'm beating around the bush. Well, thank you for pandering to the host. Thank you for pandering to the host on debt and deficit issues. But what about on the topic of do we think that the immigration polling is changing? This might be hopium on my part. Yeah, I think
You are 100% correct that the polling is changing. This is going back to the idea of politicians, presidents in particular, over-interpreting their mandate. We saw that happen with Biden. At the end of Trump's first term, higher numbers than ever before said that immigration benefited the country, we should be more open to it, and we're very down on Trump's approach to immigration.
Biden comes into office, there's a migrant crisis, they don't do very much to sort of stem it at the border. Obviously, it became clear in blue cities and blue states with sort of like busing migrants up to those places. And Biden became very unpopular on the issue. And for the first time ever, Americans said,
Oh, actually, you know, because when he first ran, this wasn't actually a popular policy outside of his base. Americans said we should build the wall. We should do mass deportations. Americans turned sharply to the right on immigration in reaction to what they perceived as Biden's de facto open borders policy.
Now, we are seeing, we call this thermostatic public opinion in the industry. Now we are seeing Trump come back into office, over-interpret the mandate once again, pursue deportations in a way that many people see as inhumane, ad hoc, and not even sort of in line with what they envisioned as his priorities, and continue
So increasingly, we're seeing folks move against him. I was just looking at a Quinnipiac poll this morning where the number of Americans who say that most immigrants in the country illegally should be given a pathway to citizenship has increased by 10 percentage points over the past month or so. And so Trump is going to now make his own policy platform unpopular by doing it in a
sort of careless, ad hoc, you know, potentially inhumane way. And, you know, I want to say something here about, like, how do you critique that as a Democrat without going full 2019, like, abolish ICE, decriminalize crossing the border, all of that kind of stuff? For one, views on the border itself hasn't changed. Like, Americans are happy with the way that Donald Trump has
decreased, for the most part, decreased encounters at the southern border. And that data is pretty clear in terms of what has happened there. But, and the data has been slow to update here. So I think the most recent data we have is from 100 days in on Trump's first term. He has made a
arrests, but deported fewer people than Biden in his last year in office. And fewer of those people have criminal records. So even if you take the promises that he made, which is worst first deport, you know, people with a criminal record, he is not doing it as effectively as some past Democrats have done. And you can use Obama as an example as well. Part of that is just because Biden was deporting people that just came across the border. They're going right back. But anyway, but
Anyway, but maybe then emphasize emphasize the part about the criminal record. Yeah, but this is where your stats nerds sometimes fall apart because like it is it is a difference to people. If you're deporting somebody that just came across the border that's sitting in some place in Texas waiting for a hearing versus taking the Iranian mother out of the suburbs and like sending her across the border, right? And so like because there's fewer border encounters, there's also fewer deportations of the kind that people are okay with if that makes sense.
Okay, well, then we can look at Obama's situation, right? He was far more effective at doing the thing that Trump says he wants to do than Trump himself. So because they have sort of been careless in this, and now they're they were pursuing workplace raids, and then they kind of did a U-turn on that. There are lots of different areas to critique the Trump administration on immigration. But you're right that the humanitarian issue is absolutely one of them. And
he has made his own approach to this unpopular. What did the path to citizenship number rise from in two? Do you know? Do you have it offhand, Quinnipiac number? I do have it offhand. So nearly two thirds of voters, 64%, say they prefer giving most, this is Quinnipiac
by the way, they prefer giving most undocumented immigrants in the United States a pathway to legal status, while 31% say they prefer deporting most undocumented immigrants in the United States. This is a change from roughly six months ago, so I stand corrected, it was not a month ago. In Quinnipiac University's December 18th poll, 55% of voters said they preferred giving most undocumented immigrants a pathway to legal status. So Trump himself has moved public opinion against himself by 10 percentage points since he's been in office. Yeah.
It's interesting. I think that an aggressive, we're going to pass a law to make ICE agents show their face and put their names on it. And we're not going to deport anybody that hasn't committed any crimes. Like, I think there's a way to go at him that way aggressively for Democrats that is a winner, not a vulnerability. And I'm just worried that some Democrats are scared of that. Tim, I think one of the challenges is that, and we're seeing this change a little bit, but the people in American life,
for whom immigration is a number one issue, are almost all Republicans. And, you know, for Democrats, their top issues are, you know, well, one, the economy and affordability, but healthcare is really high up there. Even some of the most liberal younger voters, when you looked at polling in 2024, it showed that it was all like jobs, housing, affordability, that kind of stuff.
And so I think making the central focus of a campaign, an anti-Trump message on something that is just not Democrats' biggest priority, while that probably will scratch an itch for the MSNBC set, because I think that people are very offended by what Trump is doing. I don't know that that expands the tent or sort of increases enthusiasm amongst more marginal voters anymore.
in the way that you were describing. But I will say that one of the reasons that when sort of folks who do a lot of research into Latino voters, part of the reason that they were so solidly part of the Obama coalition, what they'll tell you is that that was when the conversation was focusing on people who are in the country today and not the border, right? During the
Biden, the conversation was about the border. During W. Bush Jr., the conversation was about the border. And that's just going to be bad terrain for Democrats because Americans trust Republicans more on border security. But once you start talking about people who are already in the country, it gets a lot easier for Democrats to make that case. And I think, obviously, we saw Latino voters shift
seven points to the right between 2016 and 2020, and then another nine between 2020 and 2024, being a total of 16 percentage points to the right in two presidential elections. I think if Republicans want to keep those voters, they should be careful about signaling to the broader Latino electorate. Like, you know, having a secure border is something that Latino voters are broadly pondering.
positive about but signaling to people that like you don't give a shit about like latinos who are in the country including some people who are in the country illegally is probably bad for republicans long term with the latino electorate right i'm going to give you a preview of where i'm going with the 2028 draft review by telling you that we're going to lump the new york mayor conversation into that so that's how we'll close the pot that's how we'll close the podcast for listeners
Galen did a draft with Nate Silver where they picked who they thought was going to be the most likely to be the Democratic nominee. There was a very complicated point system, which I do want to put to the side for this because I think that my listenership is going to be less interested in the game theory of what Nate had put together as a kind of a complex point system. So just for the basics, you get more points if they're the nominee, and you also get some points if they decide to run. Your first pick was AOC.
Nate was mad at you because that was also his first pick, which I think is interesting. I want to talk about that. Then he picked Josh Shapiro as his first pick. And now I want to go just go down your top five. This is what I'm going to call your team, your first five rounds. AOC, Kamala Harris, Pete, Ruben Gallego, and Jared Polis were your candidates. Nate's five candidates were Josh Shapiro, Cory Booker, Gavin Newsom, Gretchen Whitmer, Andrew Cuomo.
And I would like to be invited into the game. That Andrew Cole looks like a real good right now. At first, I was like, can I take the field against both of your first five rounds? But then I decided I actually want to be invited into the game. And I would like to... I get to start at round six. And I'm going to take Wes Moore, Raphael Warnock, Andy Beshear, JB Pritzker, and Zoran.
And I'm rolling my squad against either of your teams. And I want to talk about why in a second. But what do you make of that? So I think many of those people were eventually picked. You know, I would say that I made the mistake of going into the...
exercise thinking a lot about my first pick because I thought it was something of a hot take and not thinking enough about my subsequent picks, which obviously Jared Polis is
Sometimes when you're doing this, you pick people to make a statement more than you do to suggest that they're actually the likeliest to win the nomination. But maybe Polis and Harris weren't the best picks in that case. I mean, I probably would have picked AOC then Josh Shapiro if I had my druthers, but...
Yeah, I mean, the reason I picked AOC, which again, is to say that I viewed her at the time as the likeliest nominee, not necessarily the likeliest, sort of the best option to win a general election or the person that I wanted or whatever, for what it's worth. I'm not a registered Democrat. So in New York State, I can't vote in a Democratic primary anyway. We have close primaries here, which was also the case in the New York City mayoral race a couple weeks ago, a week ago.
And so the argument that I was making is that Democrats, I think, are ready for someone who can offer something anti-establishment-y, that it's likely to be a really deep field in 2028. And when you have a deep fractured field, somebody who's well known and has an energetic base of support is...
can sort of win those early primaries with 30 some percent like Trump did in 2016, where whereas like, you know, the rest of the field may be fractured between Wes Moore and Josh Shapiro and and Gavin Newsom or Pete Buttigieg or whoever else that having a sort of strong, energetic, charismatic message and being kind of a celebrity in your own right can be to your benefit. It was interesting that you guys both picked AOC. So since that's the thing you spent the most time thinking about, and that was your hot take,
I hear everything that you're saying there. Do you not think that she is bogged down too much by her presence during the, you know, great and woke-ification of America during the 2020s? That's why I kind of like, it's cheeky, but we get to Zoran. Like, Zoran is really the
the closest right now to the Obama emerging figure, like somebody that emerges kind of after that period. You know, Obama was not bogged down by any Iraq baggage like Harris was. Zoran, he was on Twitter. So he was posting, you know, about queer liberation and stuff. But like his image did not emerge during that time. Someone like that, I think that is interested in trying to triangulate themselves that emerges in kind of more of a
the end of Trump versus having been involved in the Trump era and having done all of the Ibram X. Kendi stuff. I don't know. What do you what do you make of that? As far as Ron Mamdani is concerned, you know, I don't know that he has presidential ambitions, but also just from a mechanical perspective, he was born in Uganda and is a naturalized citizen. And so from what I understand, you know,
the Constitution's rules for who can run for president are at odds with those presidential ambitions anyway. Because it's not really a serious suggestion. It's more of just a commentary on like what type of person is going to be able to run against the Democratic Party. So I think...
that you make good points about why AOC might not be a good general election candidate, but I don't think that those come into play as much during the primary. Historically, we've seen that Democratic voters say they care more about electability than somebody who shares their views on the issue, but that's shifted a little bit as Democrats have, I think, become exhausted by, I don't know, being force-fed the establishment's middling presidential candidates. Democrats have not had
a sort of strong, charismatic contender since Obama and then Bill Clinton before that. And so a whole generation has missed out on that, you know,
charismatic, semi-populist, whatever kind of figure within the Democratic Party. And obviously, Sanders' losses made people who were looking for that maybe not complacent, but upset, disillusioned with the Democratic Party. So I hear those concerns from a general election perspective. Xi and Zoran, and look, Zoran was, he obviously ran for assembly during the Trump era, in a sense. And he has a lot of stuff on record that is also
On the 20 side of the 80-20 issues. And they're both running pretty aggressively against...
that version of the progressive party. They're not trashing what they said, but they are not talking about it. I mean, the fight, the oligarchy tour from AOC was all about, you know, partisanship doesn't matter. Like we just need to fight the rich. It was so Obama-esque in the sort of bid to kind of putting partisan divides behind us. Zoran Mamdani totally backtracked on defunding the police during his campaign. And while he didn't backtrack on other things, really didn't talk about them, was really laser focused on affordability. And, you know,
you know, he didn't run against a
primary election candidate who had enough of a campaign to really bring those things up. And so part of the reason we haven't heard about them, or it maybe seems like he doesn't have that history is because Andrew Cuomo didn't run a real campaign against him. It's interesting. I just think that the, and maybe that's just wrong. I don't know. And a lot of it will depend on what happens with Trump. But as I was watching you guys draft, I was just like, you know, the person that is able to most run against the party is also going to have to run against the era of
And having been a major figure of the era, I think is going to make things very challenging for AOC and for Gavin and even for Pete kind of, you know, like people that I do think people kind of are going to want some like someone and maybe no one else will have the charisma to emerge and they'll kind of fall back on on a Gavin or, you know, somebody that they know. And like that to me, I guess that's my that's where I agree with you most on the Trump thing. I think that somebody that has the ability to emerge and say to people, guys, like,
I'm going a totally different direction for all this. My focus, my passion is different. These guys are bogged down and that would probably benefit them. And again, I'm being cheeky by suggesting that could be Zoran, but the fact that nobody knew who Zoran was three months ago demonstrates that really could be
I think the options are much greater than maybe people are thinking. Maybe they wouldn't be up for it because they have two strong ties to the Democratic Party. But do you think a Josh Shapiro or Wes Moore type could fit that role in your mind? I think Wes could, for sure. Yeah, Shapiro, maybe. These are now, we're now into my people. Josh Shapiro is great. I've interviewed him. I've interviewed Wes.
I think Josh is like an immediately going to get bogged down in like all of the, you know, it's just not his fault, but like all of the Israel Palestine fight. And, you know, if you're running for president, you become a national figure, like the hatred for him among the far left, uh,
Well, I think bogging down on that, like Wes is a little bit more of a blank slate. I think Wes could do it in a way that it would be a little tougher for Shapiro. And from what I understand, there are plenty of powerful Democrats who want that to happen. And for everything I said, the Democratic Party has during the past decade been pretty good at getting its wishes when it comes to triangulating in the presidential primary. So we'll see. Galen Druk.
I'm going on vacation. So I'm in a podcast marathon today. I'm doing like 19 podcasts today. So this is it. This is over. I wanted to go person by person and give you negative feedback on all of your draft picks. But we'll do that as a special bonus sub stack segment in August when we're more bored. How does that sound?
Well, I'm glad I filibustered long enough that I've now given myself some months to prepare for all of that feedback. But most importantly, enjoy your vacation. Thank you, brother. Super nerds, go sign up for GD Politics or not, or normies that want to just drop fun polling facts with their pals. Yeah, come on. GD Politics is a sub stack for you. And we'll be back here tomorrow with the last pre-vacation edition of the Bulwark Podcast. We'll see you all then. Peace.
And every night, we're back and high in the band While I'm cutting the cash box, please, a sweat falling Right up on the road station in the California And it's only now that the break got it rolling Stuck at the dial, the turn zone changes to me It's like a day It should start back to back It was a start that would make me touch your head All the speed will die out except through the main We're now in a queue with the shirts on our backs
The Bulwark Podcast is produced by Katie Cooper with audio engineering and editing by Jason Brown.