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Talk Your Book: Floating Rate Income

2025/3/31
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Bill Sokol
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Fran Rodilosso
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Michael Batnick
作为 Ritholtz Wealth Management 的管理合伙人和研究总监,Michael Batnick 是一位知名的投资专家和播客主持人。
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Michael Batnick: 我很好奇,对于那些正在收听节目的顾问来说,他们可能会对这个话题很感兴趣,但我认为他们肯定需要了解更多信息,因为这涉及很多内容。 Ben Carlson: 我同意。Fran和Bill,感谢你们今天抽出时间来参加我们的节目。 Fran Rodilosso: 谢谢你们的邀请。 Bill Sokol: 很高兴今天能来。 Fran Rodilosso: 在开始讨论CLOI(我们将要讨论的ETF,即抵押贷款债务)之前,我想先解释一下什么是抵押贷款债务。它与公司债券或国债并不完全相同。 Bill Sokol: 我认为很多收听节目的听众可能不了解2008年这些流行词的含义。什么是抵押贷款债务? Fran Rodilosso: 抵押贷款债务(CLO)是一种证券化的杠杆贷款组合。这些贷款通常被称为银行贷款或银团贷款。这些贷款是提供给现金流良好的公司的贷款,并以这些借款人的资产作为担保,其优先于这些公司的其他债务。 Bill Sokol: CLO通常包含150到300笔个别贷款,并且像任何证券化一样,CLO会发行债务来为购买这些贷款提供资金,债务投资者将获得基础贷款产生的利息。 Fran Rodilosso: 但是,支付不是按比例进行的,而是按顺序进行的。因此,存在不同的从属级别、不同的梯队和不同的信用评级来反映其优先顺序。 Bill Sokol: 因此,存在AAA级梯队(优先支付利息,损失风险最小)、股权梯队(优先吸收违约损失,并在支付利息后获得所有剩余现金流)以及介于两者之间的AA到BB级梯队。这种结构允许不同程度的风险和回报。此外,我还应该指出,它们支付浮动利率。这反映了基础贷款的浮动利率性质。利率通常是SOFR加上一个固定利差,利差反映了所承担的风险水平。 Fran Rodilosso: 杠杆贷款是浮动利率的,这是资产类别的性质。这是因为它们是由银行发放的,银行喜欢持有浮动利率资产。这样可以匹配CLO的资产(贷款)和负债(CLO债务),避免错配。 Michael Batnick: 好的,非常直接。不,我在开玩笑。这太多了。我们将在接下来的30分钟内详细解释。好的,这些就像贷款的贷款,有不同的梯队。Fran,我们这里究竟在看什么? Fran Rodilosso: 可以将CLO视为一个基金。该基金拥有一个股权投资者(可能是基金经理或外部方),占基金资本的约10%,其余90%的资本来自债务发行(CLO梯队)。 Michael Batnick: 从最终投资者的角度来看,可以通过选择想要承担的风险水平来向CLO结构贷款,可以选择AAA级贷款(具有极高的从属等级,获得大部分现金流)。 Fran Rodilosso: CLO就像一个基金,该基金持有广泛的银团贷款或银行贷款(通常是低于投资级别的),但这是一个大型多元化的贷款组合,这为投资者提供了很多保护。低评级债务梯队和股权相对于高评级债务梯队的从属关系也提供了保护。 Michael Batnick: 2022年的债券熊市主要是一个利率风险事件,而不是信用事件。由于CLO的浮动利率性质,其表现良好。 Fran Rodilosso: 是的。浮动利率性质当然有所帮助。在2022年和2023年,利率波动仍在继续。这是浮动利率性质,但正如我们即将讨论的那样,您还会获得利差收益,即高于浮动利率的非常有吸引力的利差。这也帮助提高了回报。 Michael Batnick: 你们选择的时机非常好。它是在2022年6月推出的,当时我们正处于一个非常糟糕的债券熊市,但这主要体现在国债和投资级债券上。从2022年到现在,几乎有10亿美元的资产流入。事实上,一度超过了10亿美元。因此,很明显,对这种投资产品有巨大的需求。 Fran Rodilosso: 投资者对CLO投资产品有很大的需求,原因有两个:一是其在利率波动期间的回报;二是其长期风险回报图表显示其夏普比率很高,回报优于投资级信用,波动性更低,并且与其他核心固定收益工具没有关联性。 Michael Batnick: CLO的主要风险是信用事件,如果信用利差扩大,CLO的价格就会受到影响,特别是随着资本结构的下降,其对信用的敏感性会更高。 Michael Batnick: 让我们谈谈这个产品的包装,因为已经有了大量的……那不是一个词。如果查看该产品的价格回报,它一直向上。最大回撤约为3%。让我们谈谈ETF包装中获得的流动性与底层投资组合的流动性之间的不匹配。如果经济发生信用事件,我们会看到它下跌15%吗?价格发现机制如何运作?请原谅我提出的冗长的问题。 Fran Rodilosso: CLO的价格更像债券,交易方式更像债券,交易通常是通过竞价清单进行的,但它们也是透明的。 Fran Rodilosso: AAA和AA级梯队,甚至单A级梯队,都有很高的流动性,但在BBB级和BB级梯队,可能会出现15%的回调。 Fran Rodilosso: 历史上,很少有BBB级CLO违约,但其价格波动性很大,这取决于信用市场变化。 Bill Sokol: 我想补充Fran的一点,过去三年,我们只看到利差收紧,偶尔出现一些波动,包括最近。但是,当然,您没有利率敏感性。这通常是固定利率核心债券回报的最大驱动因素。因此,您没有这个。您有信用敏感性,但我们最近没有看到很多。但这就是为什么我们认为,当您投资CLO时,您需要采取正确的策略。您需要广泛投资于整个资本结构,并保持灵活,以便能够管理风险并抓住最佳机会。我们认为,采取积极主动的方法并具有灵活性(不仅仅是关注评级)是管理这些风险的正确方法。 Fran Rodilosso: 在经济衰退的情况下,预计会看到利差扩大和一定程度的回调,但不太可能看到违约。在投资级CLO中,由于从属关系的存在,即使在BBB级以下,也很难出现足够的违约导致即使是BBB级也出现减值。投资投资级CLO的主要风险是利差风险,即利差扩大时可能出现的市价波动。在经济衰退中,利差扩大是主要风险,损失的深度将因资本结构的不同而异。高收益梯队(BB级)可能会跌至每美元80美分左右,而高评级梯队(AAA到单A级)可能会出现5%或更多的回调。历史上,CLO在全球金融危机期间表现良好,很少有梯队出现永久性损失。 Michael Batnick: 对于CLO的投资流程,是否专注于CLO市场的特定部分,是否有信用标准,或者是否根据环境选择表现最佳的投资? Fran Rodilosso: 我们有两个ETF,一个专注于投资级CLO梯队(AAA到BBB),另一个投资于较低评级的夹层债券(AAA以下)。CLO的选择是由Pinebridge Investments(子顾问)进行的,他们拥有数十年的市场经验。 Fran Rodilosso: CLO的选择过程包括自上而下和自下而上的两个方面,包括宏观观点和微观分析。微观分析包括对经理、底层贷款和CLO结构的评估。Pinebridge会避免那些违反多元化要求或对C级贷款敞口过大的CLO。CLO通常具有多元化的结构,单个发行人的集中度通常不超过2%,任何行业也不超过10%。Pinebridge可能会避免那些违反多元化要求或AAA级梯队交易价格大幅低于票面价格的CLO,但这些情况也可能带来机会。投资过程始于经理评估,然后是自下而上的投资组合构建,最后是自上而下的投资组合构建,即使在风险偏好较高的情况下,AAA和AA级梯队的投资比例至少为40%。 Michael Batnick: 高收益ETF在全球金融危机期间和之后经历了大幅回调,CLOI是否会类似地交易? Fran Rodilosso: 这取决于当时的配置情况,主动管理可以帮助减少波动。对于CLOB(较低评级策略),其回报可能更接近高收益或杠杆贷款,但在2020年,广泛的CLO指数表现更像投资级公司债券。 Michael Batnick: CLO在投资组合中的理由是什么?它与什么竞争或替代什么?为什么选择投资CLO而不是其他产品? Fran Rodilosso: CLO具有完整的资本结构,其风险调整后的回报在过去十年中表现最佳,投资级梯队适合投资级投资组合,较低评级梯队可以补充高收益投资。CLO提供更高的利差、更好的信用质量和多元化,并且在通胀环境中表现良好。 Michael Batnick: CLO可以作为在通胀环境中表现优于普通债券的替代品。 Fran Rodilosso: CLO不仅提供利率保护,而且在利率上升的环境中,特别是当信用环境不差时,CLO将是一个非常有吸引力的选择。即使在利率下降的环境中,CLO仍然具有吸引力,因为其利差高于其他债券。 Fran Rodilosso: CLO ETF的投资者主要是顾问(特别是RIA)和保险公司。 Fran Rodilosso: 向投资者解释CLO比较困难,最常见的问题是CLO是否与2008年市场崩盘有关。CLO与2008年市场崩盘的次级抵押贷款和全球CDO不同,其结构在2008年表现良好,但经历了极端的市价波动。 Michael Batnick: CLO容易销售的原因是其高收益率。 Fran Rodilosso: 投资CLO的优势在于其高收益率和高信用质量,但投资者需要权衡其复杂性和波动性。投资CLO需要权衡其复杂性、波动性和缺乏久期。 Fran Rodilosso: 建议顾问访问VanEck网站了解更多信息,网站上有博客、白皮书和网络研讨会。

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Today's Animal Spirits Talk Your Book is brought to you by VanEck. Go to VanEck.com to learn more about their VanEck CLO ETF. That's ticker CLOI. It's VanEck.com to learn more.

Welcome to Animal Spirits, a show about markets, life, and investing. Join Michael Batnick and Ben Carlson as they talk about what they're reading, writing, and watching. All opinions expressed by Michael and Ben are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon for any investment decisions. Clients of Ritholtz Wealth Management may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.

Welcome to Animal Spirits with Michael and Ben. On today's show, we are talking about collateralized loan obligations. Wait, isn't that what almost took down the financial system in 2008? No, not exactly. Those were collateralized debt obligations. Some of them might have been inside CLOs, Ben. I don't know. It's been a long time. I haven't read Too Big to Fail in 20 years. I read a lot of very long magazine pieces about this stuff back then because there weren't really blogs and stuff to get into this.

But yeah, I think anything with the word collateralized in it probably has people feeling a little nervous. Thank you for not checking my math there. Okay. A little bit off. So we talked to Fran and Bill from VanEck today, who work for their fixed income ETF portfolio management team. We talked about CLOI, which is a collateralized loan obligation ETF, which is obviously making way in the headspace of investors because this thing went from zero to a billion in like the last decade.

Three years, I guess. Unbelievable. So it's essentially, it's a basket of loans that invests in a basket of loans. Yes. Baskets all the way down. And there's higher, hearing about the products is interesting. It just made me think how many different ways, you think of fixed income as like this really boring asset class to invest in. Oh, you just buy government bonds and that's it.

And now there's so many other ways to invest. And I think the fact that we've had so much extreme volatility in bonds over these, in this decade has made people try to rethink, wait, maybe I need a little bit of this or some of that and try to hedge different environments. Well, guess what? The appeal to this is it's actually not fixed income. Right. Oh, because it's floating rate. Right. Right. So yeah, when rates go up and inflation goes up, this thing, the rates adjust and you don't have...

the interest rate rate. Because fixed income investors got destroyed in 2022. And investors that were exposed to floating rate, that is more credit risk, which actually weirdly held up in 2022, made it out just fine. Yes. But I do think there is something to the fact that

fixed income investors have woken up to the fact that I need to be way more thoughtful about this allocation and maybe have different pieces of my allocation that account for deflation and disinflation and then inflation and then financial crises and all these different things that can impact different aspects of the fixed income market in different ways. This is a good conversation with Fran and Bill. It is a highly complex subject.

And so this is not the type of thing that loans itself to just one conversation. So for advisors that are listening and want to learn more, there is more to be found at VanEck.com. So with no further ado, here is our conversation with Fran Rodalosso. Fran is the head of fixed income ETF portfolio management at VanEck. And Bill Sokol. Bill is the VP and director of product management.

Guys, welcome to the show. Thanks for having us. Thanks. Great to be on today. Before we get into the conversation about CLOI, the ETF that we're going to be talking about, collateralized loan obligation, not exactly a corporate bond or a treasury bond.

I'm assuming a lot of people that are listening to this might not have been around back in 2008 when these buzzwords were there for the wrong reason. What is a collateralized loan obligation? So a CLO or collateralized loan obligation, it's a securitized portfolio of leverage loans. These are often referred to as bank loans or syndicated loans.

And these are loans made to cash flow generating companies. The loans are secured by assets of these borrowers, and they rank senior to other debt of these companies. So senior to things like high yield bonds. And historically, they've had lower levels of losses as a result of that seniority. A CLO typically holds 150 to 300 of these individual loans.

And like any securitization, what happens is that the CLO will issue debt in order to fund the purchase of those loans. So the investors in that debt earn the interest that is being generated by the underlying loans. So interest and principal actually is paid to the debt investors. But this isn't paid pro rata.

it's paid sequentially. So you have different levels of subordination, you have different tranches, you have different credit ratings that reflect the seniority. So you have a AAA tranche that's going to be paid first, paid interest first, and it's the most insulated from losses in the portfolio. You have an equity tranche, which absorbs any default losses first,

before any of the other debt holders and it receives all the excess cash flows after interest payments are made to the debt holders. And between the AAA and the equity, you have AA down to BB typically. And this structure does allow for different levels of risk and return. And they, I should also note, they pay floating rates of interest. So that reflects

the same floating rate nature of the underlying loans. So you're going to get a SOFR plus a fixed spread. And the spread is going to reflect the level of risk you're taking. What is the reason for the floating rates? Why is it floating?

Well, leverage loans are floating rate. It's the nature of the asset class. Typically, it's because these are made or historically, these have been made by banks and banks like holding floating rate assets. And you want to match the assets of the CLO, which in this case is the loans with the liabilities, which is the CLO debt. So you don't have a mismatch.

All right. So pretty straightforward. No, I'm just kidding. That was a lot. We're going to unpack this over the next 30 minutes. So, all right. These are like loans of loans with different tranches. Fran, what exactly are we looking at here? Think of a CLO as a fund. And that fund has an equity investor. Sometimes it's the fund manager. Sometimes it's outside parties.

That represents about 10% of the capitalization of that fund. 90% of the capitalization of that fund comes through the issuance of debt. Those are CLO tranches. They range from AAA typically down to BB. So there's sort of one in each major rating fund.

category. So from an end investor point of view, you can lend money to this CLO structure by choosing the level of risk you want to take. You could lend money at the AAA level, which has a super high degree of subordination underneath it, which receives really most of the first cash flows.

that accrue to that CLO. As I said, a CLO is like a fund. What's being held by that fund are, as Bill said, broadly syndicated loans or bank loans, which are typically sub-investment grade, but it's a large diversified portfolio of loans. And that is where a lot of the protection comes in for investors, that and the subordination of the lower rated debt tranches and of course, equity to the higher rated debt tranches.

So in 2022, when we had the bond bear market, it wasn't really a credit event. It was an interest rate risk event, right? So my guess is because of the floating rate nature of these, CLOs managed that period pretty good then. Yeah. So the floating rate nature certainly helped.

In 2022, 2023, it continues the rate volatility we've seen. And it's the floating rate nature, but also, as I'm sure we'll discuss, you get a spread pickup as well, a very attractive spread over the floating rate. And that also helped with returns.

So you guys timed the launch very well. It was June 2022. As Ben mentioned, we were in a really nasty bond bear market, but that was primarily in treasuries of all things and investment grade bonds. So from 2022 to today, almost a billion dollars in assets has entered. In fact, it was over a billion at one point. But so obviously there was a massive amount of demand for something like this

Why do you think investors are starving for this sort of investment? A couple of reasons. One is they're looking at the returns that they've delivered through bouts of rate volatility. But number two, when you look at even longer term risk and return charts,

CLOs have really high Sharpe ratios. They have better returns than investment grade credit with lower volatility. The leave at the lower rated tranches, you'll have higher returns than US high yield corporates with the low interest rate or zero interest rate duration. They're not correlated to say your ag or other core fixed income instruments. So there's this diversification benefit

as well. So it's a combination of risk, return, diversification. Is one of the downsides then if we have a disinflationary environment or a deflationary environment and other bonds get a little boost because of yields falling, is that where CLOs struggle? What's the downside for these assets? The coupon will go down if the Fed starts cutting rates. That's just the nature of floating rate. But there's no price in that. So it's not really a downside. You're not going to see rate

sensitivity from a price perspective, really these are credit instruments. So the main risk here is that you have a credit event that spreads widened out and you're going to see that reflected in the price, the value of the CLOs. They're much more sensitive, especially as you go down the capital structure, they're much more sensitive to credit. So I want to talk about the packaging of this product because there's been an extraordinary

dis amount. That's not a word. There's been no volatility. If you're looking at the price return of this thing, it is up until the right. The max drawdown is like 3%. So talk to us about the mismatch between like the liquidity that you get in the ETF wrapper versus the underlying portfolio of

within each loan that's in this portfolio. And then I guess in the event that there is a credit event in the economy, would we see this thing gap down 15% or how would the price discovery work? And forgive me for the long rambling question. A few things. Maybe we'll start at the end of that question.

how much CLO prices. Remember, these are debt instruments that are collateralized by those loans. These actually trade more like bonds. They're normal settle, T plus one settle. There's not necessarily a lot of electronic trading. It's a lot of end investor to end investor via trade lists like bid wanted in competition or offer wanted in competition lists. But they also trace their transparent. So the

The CLO tranches that are issued by these structures have a very different dynamic in terms of the liquidity, although levered loans also trade pretty regularly and are quoted. They just have longer settlement cycles. So particularly in the AAA and AA tranches, even down to the single A, there is a lot of liquidity, meaning you can see, you know,

point bid ask spreads, uh, through bouts of volatility. There are typically buyers because there are, uh,

bank treasuries, there are corporate treasuries, there are insurance companies. Japanese banks are a well-known user of particularly the AAA tranches. Same goes with a lot of those institutions for AA tranches. It's as you go further down to say the BBB and BBB tranches where, Michael, to your question, where you might see those 15% drawdowns, that's possible.

And that has happened. And that's where a lot of BBB CLOs, by the way, very few of them have ever defaulted historically, like a very, very small number. So the structures have held up, but the price volatility in response to shifts in the credit market is there. And that's, you know, that further down the cap stack is where you see that type of price volatility. In terms of

the ETFs performance. Maybe Bill, I'll let you speak further to that, but I'll start by saying we haven't seen that much even spread volatility over the last several years, even since this was launched or the other CLO ETFs that are out there. And Bill, maybe you want to talk a little bit more how this ETF would respond to that.

Well, I guess I would just say to Fran's point, the last three years, right, we haven't, we've only seen really tightening spreads with a few blips here and there, including very recently. But of course, you don't have the rate sensitivity. And that's going to be, I mean, that's usually your biggest driver of returns in fixed rate

core bonds. So you don't have that. You have the credit sensitivity, which we haven't seen a lot of lately. But it is why we do think when you are investing in CLOs, you need to have the right strategy. You want to invest broadly across the capital structure. Given that you will have lower liquidity and higher volatility as you move outside of AAAs, you want to have the ability to stabilize

stay nimble to manage risk, but also to find the best opportunities. And we think being very active in your approach and having flexibility that doesn't just look at the rating is the right way to manage those risks. We had an example just several months after we launched the ETF. There was this sort of LDI crisis with the UK pension funds.

And they needed to raise liquidity. They were decent-sized holders of the higher-rated CLO tranches. That's what they sold. They sold AAA, even some AA CLOs, not because they were for sellers. It's because that's where they could get the liquidity from.

And so that was a pretty good example. CLOs did get a lot of attention at that point in time because that's what those funds are selling. But the price volatility did not show up in those higher rated tranches. There were plenty of buyers at that point in time.

You mentioned the spreads. People have been worried for, I guess, a couple months now that we're seeing a slowdown in the economy. The stock market is rolling over. People are becoming worried again. And one of the things people in the finance world keep pointing to is, well, spreads are still pretty darn tight, and they haven't blown out yet.

Does this surprise you at all? And I guess my follow-up would be, is the bond market going to be prescient enough to see a slowdown coming and then spreads will blow out? Or do spreads blow out after the fact that you already see the slowdown is here?

First of all, you're talking to someone who's been in the bond and credit markets for 30 years. So I'm always thinking spreads are too tight. So that's just the nature of being a bond market pessimist. I should have started in equities. It would have changed everything. But yeah, I mean, when you look at fundamentals sort of to a backward looking view on spreads, you could justify them. The question for us has been,

Looking forward, our potential paths for the market, for the economy, for corporate balance sheets are the various risks priced in enough. And I think a lot of people agree there's not a lot of room for error in credit spreads. But on the other hand, you've got base rates that are pretty high levels. So you could look at over 5%.

on investment grade corporates, over 7% yield on even high yield fixed rate corporate bonds, CLOs which are much higher in credit quality overall, coupons are still over 6%, the weighted average yield to worst is still close to 6%. These are still attractive all in yields with a lot of carry that could cushion against

wider spreads, not a 500 basis point blowout in spreads that might come with a surprisingly deep and rapid recession. So we expect that there will be more spread volatility and more rate volatility. We think CLOs are a way of actually going up in quality for people with high yield or levered loan allocations now to help weather some of that.

So as investors talk to you about some of the opportunities, risks in the fund, and they go to your faction like, oh, okay, let me just take a look at what's under the hood. And they look at the top 10 holdings. They say, well, okay, Neuberger Berman Loan Advisor, CLO. And Fred, I see you laughing because it's a bunch of CLOs in here. So what exactly are investors getting exposure to when you really look under the hood?

Well, with each CLO in the ETF portfolio,

underlying that are typically hundreds of individual leverage loans. So ultimately, they're getting the payments from those loans, but with the protection that the CLO structure provides. They're also getting the expertise of the CLO manager. So you mentioned Neuberger Berman. So Neuberger Berman is actively managing that portfolio of that CLO. And in our ETF, they're

They're getting the credit selection of our sub-advisor, which is Pinebridge Investments, to look into the loan portfolio, assess the manager, assess the terms of the CLO to make sure there's value in holding that deal. You mentioned the structure of the CLO. So this is senior to everything else?

So in the event of distress or bankruptcy, this is the slice that gets paid first? Yeah. So there's multiple layers of subordination. There's the underlying loans, which are senior to bonds. So you do have senior secured exposure in the underlying loans.

Those are securitized, and what we hold is the CLO debt. So in addition to the underlying strength of the collateral, you have the subordination that's built into the structure of the CLO. So if you're buying a AAA or a AA, for example, you have the subordination of all the

tranches underneath you, as well as the first loss equity tranche. In the event of a real recession, what would you expect losses to look like? But also, drawdowns can be divorced from actual losses, no? Investors could overreact. In a recession or a big credit event, we would expect to see spread widening and some level of drawdown. And what that level is will depend on the severity of

of spread widening, we don't expect to see defaults. In CLOI, which is our investment grade CLOs, investment grade tranches, just from a mathematical perspective, when you look at the amount of subordination, even below BBB, it's very difficult to have enough defaults in a loan portfolio where you're going to see impairment of even the BBB.

And when I say very difficult, we're talking multiples of the historical average of leverage loan defaults. And you need to see that over typically five to seven years. So it's just something that doesn't happen. So default risk is not the primary risk when you're investing in investment grade CLOs.

It's spread risk. It's the mark to market that you might experience when spreads widen. All right. So I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I feel like that particular risk of spreads widening, that happens in a recession, of course, no? That is your primary risk. The depth of losses will vary up and down the cap stack, right? So the high yield tranche of BBs, maybe

start trading down into the mid to low 80s in terms of cents on the dollar, the higher rated AAA down the single A, you might see 5% drawdowns, maybe more in an extreme scenario. But Michael, you already made the point. Those permanent losses, which would come from the CLO tranches themselves defaulting,

There's a historical record going back 30 years. So these existed during the global financial crisis. In fact, they've existed since the early or mid-90s. The structures were actually less robust than they are today in terms of having a little lower levels of subordination, not quite as strict on the diversification mandates to get the ratings. There was virtually no

that suffered permanent losses in the five years, like 2008 to 2013. We have a chart in one of our books of losses, meaning default losses among CLO tranches. And it's basically a flat line at zero. Yes, a handful of double B tranches and Bs.

And a very, very small handful of BBB tranches did default. But those were like on a market basis, it was negligible permanent loss. But the volatility can be high. These correlate with the loan market and the high yield market. They don't correlate with the treasury market. This is a good transition into your investment process. So I'm curious, do you have a specific part of the CLO market that you focus on? Do you only invest in high quality bonds? Do you have credit standards or is it more...

Due to the environment that you pick, what is looking the best because of the spreads or because of the economy? Do you have a specific area you focus on? Well, we have two ETFs. One focuses just on investment grade, so AAA to BBB CLO tranches. The other invests in lower-rated mezzanine, which is basically everything below AAA, but

So it's going to give you a higher yield with more volatility, of course, in the event that you do see a recessionary environment. But how those CLOs are selected is actually by Pinebridge Investments. So they're the sub-advisor on the ETFs.

They have decades of experience in this market. They've managed similar strategies for their institutional clients. As far as the process, Fran, do you want to walk through that? Sure. There's both a top-down and a bottom-up element. So certainly, macro views and a macro call.

would lead to relative positioning and say that the top of the stack, the AAA versus whether or not there's enough value say in the all investment grade one to be going more heavily into the BBB tranches. There's also a big bottom up component. Michael, you asked about some of the risks, like the managers themselves can be risks. There are about 200 managers in the space overall.

And, you know, there are maybe 52 that are represented, I think was the last number in CLOI today. So they're not going to, there are some managers that Pinebridge will stay away from. They don't believe they're good stewards of that portfolio. So there's a tiering of managers. That's one risk. But other sort of bottom-up analysis, they literally look into the underlying loans for all of these structures. And

Uh, you know, it takes a lot of systems and a lot of analysts, uh, and that's, you know, why we hired a sub-advisor for this product because they had all of this infrastructure. Uh, you can anticipate, you know, where the equity tranche might start, uh, uh, suffering, you know, fairly significant first loss absorption and, uh, or where a CLO might start breaching, uh, some of the diversification mandates that are in, uh,

the documentation to begin with. I mean, these things, as Bill said, 150 to 350, some structures have 450 loans in them. You won't see individual issuer concentrations typically go above 2%. No industry is gonna be more than 10%. So there's all sorts of enforced levels of diversification.

structures that breach these or that have too much exposure to triple C rated loans. Those might be things that the sub-advisor will avoid. Or maybe if the AAA tranche is trading at a significant discount to par,

and a breach is going to force acceleration of payments to the AAA tranche, that might actually be an opportunity. So it's obviously a very nuanced market. I don't want to go too much deeper than that. But needless to say, there's a process that starts with manager assessment,

it goes into looking at each individual CLO or deal from documentation to what's in the portfolio. Then there's a top-down portfolio construction. Is it time for risk off or risk on? In CLOI, by the way, even risk on, we're never going to be really below at least 40% in the AAA and AA tranches combined to always maintain that liquidity portion of the portfolio. So not to give you a compliance question,

people a heart attack. But we've got a lot of trading data and trading history from the high yield ETFs. They were around in the GFC and, of course, afterwards. So they lost almost 50% on a price basis, just in terms of the price drawdown. In 2020, during the sharp sell-off, these things were down over 20%.

Would you expect CLOI to trade in line with that? Does it have that sort of potential price volatility in a nasty global event? Part of it is going to depend how it's allocated at that time. And that's why we have a broad strategy with that top-down strategy.

lens, right, in terms of allocating the portfolio. So if it's mostly in AAA or AAA AA, I would not expect that. And that's where the active management comes in, I think, with CLOB, which is the lower rated strategy, you could have returns, certainly closer in line with what you see in high yield or leverage loans, it's probably

The ETFs didn't exist in 2020, but there's been a broad index that's been live since about 2020. The sell-off, at least in as much as it's reflected in the index performance during 2020, the broad CLO index behaved more like investment-grade corporates, which was still a very significant drawdown for that brief period. What is the case for CLOs in somebody's portfolio?

What does this compete with or replace? And why would you invest in this versus something else? The nice thing about CLOs is that they have a full capital structure. So first, you have to determine what level of risk you want to take. But if you look at CLOs broadly, they've had the best risk adjusted return over the last decade. So

You know, any exposure would have helped in a fixed income portfolio over the last decade. And when I say the best performing, I'm talking among other fixed income asset classes. So if you're looking at investment grade tranches, you know, we think that makes a lot of sense in an investment grade portfolio. So you would probably fund that with, you know, a core bond from a core bond fund or investment grade corporates.

for treasuries. If you're looking lower in the capital structure of a CLO, that can be a really nice complement to high yield. So what are you getting? You're getting higher spreads versus bonds and loans with the same rating. You're getting safety. I mean, adding investment-grade CLOs, you're getting a better credit quality with very low default risk.

certainly versus investment-grade corporates. And you're getting diversification. That's both from the underlying credit exposure, but also the floating rate nature of CLOs versus a typically fixed rate exposure for core bonds. We had a lot of investors who wrote to us during the bond bear market and said, hey, listen, I thought inflation was going to come because the government was spending trillions of dollars, and I put my money to tips, and I still got killed.

And so I think a lot of people said, I guess the only alternative is for that environment is T-bills or something that's very short term and that it's going to get the pickup. So I guess you could say in a lot of ways, CLOs are kind of an answer to that, right? Where in that type of environment, a rising rate environment or a higher inflationary environment, CLOs are probably going to do better than your typical bonds. Is that fair? Yes, that would be. That's not the only case. This is a credit.

And so it isn't just about rate protection, but in that environment of rising rates, particularly since a lot of rising rate environments are not necessarily negative credit environments, that would make CLOs a very attractive choice for

But they are also like take today's environment where people are expecting at least the base rate to come down another 50, 75 basis points this year when the coupons on CLOs might come down then in unison with that if credit spreads remained roughly where they are. But you're getting like for AA rated CLO tranche, you're picking up about 95 basis points in spread versus a AA corporate rate.

So that spread pickup, it's been there all along and it does vary, but that is another thing that will draw investors to CLOs and why the CLO ETFs have grown a lot in the last several years is

is not because this is some new asset class. It's an asset class that's been around for several decades, but there are a whole class of investors or several classes of investors that just didn't have access to them. Starting in 22 and going to almost a billion dollars in such a short period of time is super impressive. It speaks to, listen, the proof is in the pudding, at least so far. Do you have any idea, I know it's tough with ETFs, but

Do you have a sense of who is investing in these things? Are these institutional investors? Are these RIAs? I would assume that this is probably less a retail-driven product and more an intermediary or institutional product. In our funds, we're seeing most of the inflows coming from advisors, typically RIAs.

They have been big adopters of CLO ETFs. I would say the other channel where this has found success is with insurance companies. So insurance companies have historically been very big investors in CLOs.

But the ETFs provide them the same exposure that they've been getting maybe through separate accounts with institutional managers, but with the liquidity. So often they might use the ETF alongside individual holdings of CLOs. Fran, do you find this to be a more difficult investment to explain to people that are inquiring? What's your most commonly asked question, I guess?

To question number one, yes. The learning curve is long and steep. So it's usually not a one meeting or two meeting type sales process. Our sales team has spent a lot of time trying to understand what they're talking to their clients about, but that's super important. And we do like to focus on some of the risk factors.

risk aspects as well. So yeah, it definitely takes a lot of explanation. The very first question that almost always comes up for someone new to the asset class is, isn't this what blew up markets in 2008 and 2009?

And we have a pretty chart that says, no, those were other types of collateralized debt obligations in the subprime mortgage sector and global CDOs that were a kitchen sink full of everything. And these structures actually held up quite well.

You didn't ask this directly, but yes, they did experience extreme price volatility back then, of course. But those permanent losses via defaults at tranches were very few and far between. So it's never a loss unless you sell. That's what we're trying. I'm only teasing.

But I always like to say that the easiest thing to sell investors is yield. And you mentioned that you have the spread over these other parts of the bond market at various credit ratings. And I think that's the easy sell is you can get a bump in yield by investing in these products, correct? Yeah.

Yeah, I think it's a bump in yield and you're not taking on additional risk. It's the quality that you're getting along with that higher yield. So what are you giving up? Because there's got to be something that you're, there's got to be a give and take. Well, I think there's a few things. I mean, one, there's just the complexity, right? I mean, it's understanding, right? Investing in something that's complex. All right. So what you're giving up is like a little bit of like, what exactly am I investing in?

Well, I mean, there's the complexity that goes along with it. And of course, like the volatility, right? We've talked about the volatility, the spread risk. That's something that needs to be well understood, I think. And you're giving up duration. Like for some investors, they want the duration as sort of one of their risk-off, risk management tools. And that's something...

They don't serve that purpose. In fact, for a lot of our investors, they've seen it as a great complement to a high-quality, longer-duration allocation. And so it's sort of a balance.

That makes sense. All right. So for advisors that are listening, they're like, all right, I'm intrigued, but I definitely need to learn more because that's a lot. Where do we send them? I assume that you guys talk to advisors all day. Is that right? Yeah, we do. And we've been having a lot of meetings on CLOs over the last three years. And, you know, I would encourage them to go to our website, bandmech.com. We've been doing a lot of educational content over the last few years. We have blogs, white papers,

We do webinars a lot because there's a lot of education needed, and I think that's going to continue. All right. Well, Bill and Fran, we appreciate the time today. Joining us on a Friday, no less. Thank you, guys. Enjoy your weekend. You too. Thank you. Thank you both very much. Thank you to Fran and Bill. Remember to check out vanek.com for more. Email us, animalspirits, at acompoundnews.com.