369 Reagan Midair: CVR and FDR Data Revealed at NTSB Press Conference
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Hello again, and welcome to a Newsmakers Edition, where we talk about people making the news. Earlier today, the NTSB held a press conference in Washington in which they discussed new information they've learned from their analysis of the flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders from a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and a PSA Airlines regional jet that collided over the Potomac River two weeks ago. This episode includes the full audio from that press conference

including questions asked by reporters. Of particular note are some discrepancies among the different altitude measuring devices aboard the helicopter. So please stick around because this Newsmakers Edition starts now.

Hello again, and welcome to Aviation News Talk, where we talk general aviation. My name is Max Trescott. I've been flying for 50 years. I'm the author of several books and the 2008 National Flight Instructor of the Year, and my mission is to help you become the safest possible pilot. Earlier this week in Episode 368, we talked with NBC analyst and former NTSB investigator Jeff Gazzetti about the NTSB's accident investigation process in relation to the DC midair collision.

And we had a few listeners email to say that this is one of our best interviews ever. So if you didn't hear that episode, you may want to check it out at aviationnewstalk.com slash 368. And if you're new to the show, take a moment right now in whatever app that you're using and touch either the subscribe key, or if you're using the Spotify or the Apple podcast app, the follow key so that next week's episode is downloaded for free. And see if you know any of these people who've signed up in the past few weeks to support Aviation News Talk. They include Tom Ricks.

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And now here's the NTSB press conference in its entirety. Good afternoon. Thanks for coming. I'm Eric Weiss with NTSB Media Relations. NTSB Chairman Jennifer Homendy, H-O-M-E-N-D-Y, and Recorder's Branch Chief Sean Payne, P-A-Y-N-E, will walk us through the accident sequence of the January 29th midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. They will then take questions and answers.

No analysis of the preliminary investigative information will be provided and we will not be speculating about the probable cause. As always, you can follow this and other NTSB investigations on our website, ntsb.gov, as well as on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X at NTSB underscore newsroom. And reporters can always contact us through email at mediarelations at ntsb.gov. Chairman? Good afternoon and thank you for joining us.

The on-scene portion of our investigation into the January 29th mid-air collision near Reagan National Airport has wrapped up. We have the perishable evidence we need, so we want to provide an investigative update and talk about next steps. Let's begin with some information on the Blackhawks' route and then proceed through the accident sequence.

This particular flight was a check ride for the pilot flying the Black Hawk. Generally, a check ride is a practical exam that a pilot must pass to be qualified to perform specific air crew or mission duties. The Army does three types of check rides: instrument, annual, and night vision goggles. This was a combined annual and night vision goggle check ride.

We believe the helicopter crew was likely wearing night vision goggles throughout the flight, given the nature of the flight. Additionally, had they been removed, the crew was required to have a discussion about going unaided. Let me repeat that. Had they been removed...

the crew was required to have a discussion about going unaided. There is no evidence on the cockpit voice recorder or CVR of such a discussion. On this chart, you'll see the routes they were generally following, helicopter route 1 to helicopter route 4. These routes are designated by the Federal Aviation Administration or FAA. And although you see blue lines,

There are no defined boundaries to these routes. You'll note on the chart that pilots are expected to maintain the maximum altitude charted when sealing permits, unless otherwise instructed by air traffic control. The maximum altitudes along helicopter route 1 are 1,300 feet between Cabin John and Chain Bridge, 1,000 feet at Chain Bridge,

700 just after Chain Bridge, 300 at the Key Bridge, and 200 feet just south of Memorial Bridge. Now I'm going to read some preliminary investigative information, which is derived from a variety of electronic and other sources as of 1 p.m. today. About 8.15 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.

The CRJ left 37,000 feet pressure altitude for an initial descent. At 8:30, the Black Hawk began traveling generally southbound after maneuvering near Laytonsville, Maryland. CVR audio from the Black Hawk indicated the instructor pilot was the pilot monitoring and transmitting on the radio, and the pilot was the pilot flying.

At 8:33:41, the Black Hawk crew requested helicopter route 1 to 4 to Davison Army Airfield, which the tower controller approved. At 8:38:39, the Black Hawk reached the intersection of the DC Beltway and the Potomac River near Carderack, Maryland. After briefly turning westbound,

The Black Hawk turned back to the east and began descending as it picked up helicopter Route 1 over the Potomac River southeast toward downtown Washington, D.C. At 8:39:10, Potomac Approach cleared the crew of the CRJ for the Mount Vernon Visual Runway 1 approach.

At 8:40:46, the CRJ rolled out of a left turn established on the ILS localizer for runway 1 at approximately 4,000 feet pressure altitude, 170 knots, with landing gear up and flaps extended to 20 degrees.

At 8:43:06, the CRJ crew made initial contact with DCA Tower. The tower controller then asked if the crew could switch to runway 33. The CRJ crew agreed to switch to runway 33. At 8:43:48, the Black Hawk was about 1.1 nautical miles west of the Key Bridge. The pilot flying indicated they were at 300 feet.

The instructor pilot indicated they were at 400 feet. Neither pilot made a comment discussing an altitude discrepancy. At this time, we don't know why there was a discrepancy between the two. That's something that the investigative team is analyzing.

At 844.27, as the Black Hawk approached the key bridge, the instructor pilot indicated the Black Hawk was at 300 feet, descending to 200 feet. Between 844.41 and 844.45, the CRJ crew selected 30 degrees of flaps and then 45 degrees of flaps. At 844.49, the CRJ landing gear were down and locked.

The aircraft was fully configured for landing about 6.2 nautical miles south of the airport. At 8:45:27, the autopilot was disconnected and the CRJ began a shallow right turn off the runway one localizer at a radio altitude of approximately 1,700 feet and an airspeed of 134 knots. This occurred about five nautical miles south of the airport.

At 8:45:30, the Black Hawk passed over the Memorial Bridge. The instructor pilot told the pilot flying that they were at 300 feet and needed to descend. The pilot flying said they would descend to 200 feet. At 8:45:58, the Black Hawk then crossed over the Washington Tidal Basin and followed the Washington Channel consistent with helicopter route 1.

It is now approximately two minutes before the collision. At 8:46:01, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on the CRJ-CVR informing the Blackhawk that traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge was a CRJ at 1,200 feet circling to runway 33.

CVR data from the Blackhawk indicated that the portion of the transmission stating the CRJ was circling may not have been received by the Blackhawk crew. We hear the word circling in ATC communications, but we do not hear the word circling on the CVR of the Blackhawk. The recorders group is evaluating this right now.

At 8:46:08, the Black Hawk crew responded they had the traffic in sight and requested visual separation which was approved by DCA Tower. At 8:46:29, the CRJ crew received a 1,000-foot automated callout. At 8:46:47, DCA Tower cleared other jet traffic on runway 1 for immediate departure with no delay.

At 8.47.27, or 32 seconds before impact, the Blackhawk passed the southern tip of Haines Point. A second later, the CRJ began a left roll to turn to final on runway 33. The CRJ was at a radio altitude of 516 feet and 133 knots.

At 8:47:29, the CRJ crew received a 500-foot automated callout. At 8:47:39, or 20 seconds before impact, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on both CVRs, asking the Black Hawk crew if the CRJ was in sight.

Audible in the ATC radio transmission was a conflict alert in the background. At 847.40, the CRJ crew received an automated traffic advisory on the TCAS system stating, Traffic. Traffic. TCAS is the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System on the CRJ.

At 8:47:42, or 17 seconds before impact, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on both CVRs directing the Black Hawk to pass behind the CRJ. CVR data from the Black Hawk indicated that the portion of the transmission that stated "pass behind the" may not have been received by the Black Hawk crew.

Transmission was stepped on by a 0.8 second mic key from the Blackhawk. The Blackhawk was keying the mic to communicate with ATC. In response, at 8:47:44, the Blackhawk crew indicated that traffic was in sight and requested visual separation, which was approved by DCA Tower.

The instructor pilot then told the pilot flying they believed ATC was asking for the helicopter to move left toward the east bank of the Potomac. At 8:47:52, or seven seconds before impact, the CRJ rolled out on final for runway 33. The CRJ was at a radio altitude of 344 feet, 143 knots.

At 8:47:58, or one second before impact, the CRJ began to increase its pitch, reaching about 9 degrees nose-up at the time of collision. FDR data show the CRJ elevators were deflected near their maximum nose-up travel.

The last radio altitude recorded for the CRJ was 313 feet and was recorded two seconds prior to the collision. The CRJ pitch at this time was again 9 degrees nose up and roll was 11 degrees left wing down. The CRJ was descending at 448 feet per minute.

The radio altitude of the Blackhawk at the time of the collision was 278 feet and had been steady for the previous five seconds. The Blackhawk pitch at the time of the collision was about a half degree nose up with a left roll of 1.6 degrees. Now examination of the wreckage will assist in determination of the exact angle of the collision.

Now, we're confident with the radio altitude, radio altitude of the Blackhawk at the time of the collision that was 278 feet. But I want to caution that does not mean that's what the Blackhawk crew was seeing on the barometric altimeters in the cockpit.

We are seeing conflicting information in the data, which is why we aren't releasing altitude for the Blackhawks' entire route. I'm going to turn it over to Sean Payne for an explanation of that. Sean is branch chief of the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division. Thank you.

I'm Sean Payne. I'm branch chief of the Vehicle Recorder Division. This is the Flight Recorder Lab at the NTSB. I can give some insight into the challenges of understanding what altitude the Black Hawk pilots would have seen on their gauges in the cockpit. You may see pictures released of showing us in the lab rebuilding the flight recorders. That's part of our job. But a bigger part is ensuring that the data that we have downloaded is true and accurate. We call this validating the data.

I'm going to define some terms for altitude in a way that most audiences can understand. I may end up reading much of this verbatim, as I want to be precise in my language. The first term is radio altitude.

You've heard this in our other press conference before. This is a measure of the helicopter's height above terrain, in this case the Potomac River. It is measured by bouncing a signal from the helicopter to the river. We have determined that this parameter is valid. This is good data. This gives us confidence in knowing exactly how high the helicopter was above the ground. This parameter is not the primary means the pilots would have used to determine their height during flight.

The pilots are not typically navigating using radio altitude. It is often different from what they see on their primary altimeters. The next term is barometric altitude. This is typically the altitude the pilots would use while they are flying. This was not recorded on the FDR. Barometric altitude takes into account certain atmospheric conditions. This would be displayed in front of both pilots on their instrument panel. As I said, this was not recorded.

The next term is barometric pressure setting. This is an adjustment that the pilots use on their primary barometric altitudes, altimeters, to ensure that the altimeter is set properly. This is critical. This was not recorded by the FDR. This accounts for the local pressure at the time of the flight. Again, this was not recorded by the FDR. The next term is pressure altitude. This is more of an engineering altitude that the helicopter systems can tap into.

This altitude is calibrated using what we call a standard atmospheric pressure. We have found that this parameter is not valid. This is bad data. Normally we can use this parameter to compute the barometric altitude displayed to the pilots. Because this data is bad, we have to use other methods to make this determination.

Last, the FDR does not record GPS information, so we cannot simply verify any of this with GPS information such as GPS altitude. This does not exist in the dataset. We are working to determine if this bad data for pressure altitude only affected the FDR or if it was more pervasive throughout the helicopter's other systems. We will have an answer to what altitude the pilots saw on their gauges as they were flying

To examine this, we will use a combination of methods. First, we have already started working with Sikorsky, Collins Aviation, and the Army to retrieve engineering documentation to understand how this may have affected other helicopter systems. Next, because we cannot turn to the FDR for this information, the wreckage of the helicopter needs to be examined. We need to look at the remains of the pitot static and air data system.

I must stress that these systems were badly damaged in the accident and this will be difficult. Last, we will need to look at the altimeters themselves and determine their independent functionality. I'd like to stress that we've just completed the on-scene phase of the investigation. We need to follow our process and be meticulous. Ultimately, this work will determine the altitude displayed to the pilots and will be included in our final report. I'll pass it back to you, Chairman. Thanks, John.

What I just read, we are going to publish that online, so I'm not going to take specific questions going back to certain times that I've already read. I think that can get very confusing, and so please refer to what we do post online. I do want to make a few corrections and also provide some additional information on a couple of other issues.

First, the ATC group has been looking at the radio frequencies. The airplane and the helicopter were both on two different VHF frequencies, not UHF. Also, just a correction, Metropolitan Police Department recovered the Blackhawk CVR and FDR, not the FBI.

I do want to provide a little bit of information on ADS-B out for the Black Hawk. ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast. So the helicopter was equipped with and capable of transmitting ADS-B out. We don't know why it wasn't transmitting. What we'll have to look at is the installation of the equipment,

We'll have to look at programming. We'll have to look at whether there was some sort of equipment malfunction or if the ADS-B was turned off. So there are other, a lot of people are asking about was it turned off? There are other things we have to rule out first. We're also, the team is going to do a visibility study.

The visibility study, we're going to do a laser scan of the cockpits of an exemplar CRJ. We're going to also laser scan an exemplar cockpit of an exemplar Blackhawk. And we're going to take that information as well as information from examination of the wreckage,

different seating positions, different heights, different eye positions, also taking into account night vision goggles. And we're going to do a pretty in-depth visibility study, which we do often, and see if we can demonstrate, which we will be able to do on a software program, what the pilots of the Black Hawk could and could not see. Now, we will begin...

moving the wreckage from DCA to a secure location over the next week.

And that's all I have for now. I am going to take questions. Again, I'm not going to take questions on specific times that I read through in the Blackhawk route or in the CRJ as it was moving to Runway 33, but all of that will be online at ntsb.gov, and you can find that. So I will take questions as I call you. Please raise your hand, state your name and your affiliation. Tom.

Madam Chair, Tom Costello with NBC News. Thank you for the update. Do we understand correctly, you're looking into the possibility that there may have been, I underscore may have been, a malfunction in terms of the accuracy of the altimeter readings inside the cockpit for the Black Hawk helicopters?

One more time. Do I understand correctly, you're looking into the possibility that there may have been bad data and therefore inaccurate readings inside the cockpit of the chopper for altitude for the pilots to read? That's correct. We are looking at the possibility of there may be bad data. We're looking at, were they seeing something different in the cockpit?

that differs from the FDR data, which was radio altimeter. In other words, they may have thought they were at one altitude when in truth they were at a different altitude. It's possible, but we have a lot of work to do until we get to that. How critical is the finding that the crew could have been wearing night vision goggles and how much will that factor into your investigation? So the question is how critical is the finding that the crew could have been wearing night vision goggles? Uh,

That is, you know, part of our investigation where it's going to be a factor in our visibility study. We're going to have to see what was possible for them to see at the time leading up to the collision and the accident sequence. Is there anything in the voice recorder indicating that the crew of the Blackhawk saw the impending collision? Is there anything in the voice recorder that the crew of the Blackhawk could see or tell that there was an impending collision?

We do not have any indication that the Blackhawk crew would have seen that. Paul Wagner with News 4. Based on the possibility that they were wearing these night vision goggles, we've heard from people who wear them that it may affect your peripheral vision. So if the plane is coming into 33 and they're coming down the river, that possibly the peripheral vision may have been affected to see that plane off to the left?

The question is visibility and night vision goggles. This is exactly why we do a visibility study and we'll test that as part of our study. But, you know, time will tell. You know, just to level set here, we're only a couple of weeks out and we have a lot of work to do. That will be a part of the work.

Do we know if the traffic advisory that was received by the CRJ crew was the Black Hawk? That's something that our ATC group isn't analyzing.

So the instructions from ATC were to pass behind the

the CRJ, that transmission was interrupted. It was stepped on. We do not have evidence on the CVR of the Blackhawk that

They may have not received pass behind the because the mic key. They were communicating with air traffic control at the time. Did that full message come from air traffic control and pass behind the passenger plane or was it just pass behind the and then it got cut off in the blackout? Pass behind the was not communicated.

And what were the next words? Actually, it was communicated by ATC. It was not heard on the Blackhawk CVR.

Is that clear? Yeah. I think the clarification of the Black Hawk not receiving air traffic control and moving it through, was the passenger plane aware of the Black Hawk even in the area being told of this? Was that something that would even be on their frequencies? I know this is a second-by-second moment, so I don't know who got what. So the CRJ crew can hear air traffic control? Yes.

And communications from air traffic control, the Blackhawk crew can also hear communications from air traffic control, but they can't hear communications from each other back to air traffic control. So it's half the communication.

Yes. Thank you, Chair Connolly. Brady Trimble with Fox Business. I know it's early in the investigation, and I know that the FAA controls the airspace around DCA. But at this point, would you say that the temporary restriction of helicopter flights is the right move, and would you advocate for a permanent restriction of those flights?

Well, I do want to congratulate Secretary Duffy for taking action immediately to restrict helicopter traffic, except for certain circumstances, life-saving flights and presidential flights. So I think they took the right safety action. We will have to, as we go through our investigation, look at

the accident sequence and take our investigative information and determine what next steps should be done. It's too early for us to say whether it should be permanent. However, that's certainly something that the Secretary and the FAA can do on their own. And because it will be you guys who put the safety recommendations forward in the end, are there any others right now that would make flying into that particular airport safe? Yeah, so here's what I'm going to say. On...

Aviation is the safest mode of transportation. I say this often. You are at greater risk getting into your car to and from the airport.

On our nation's roads are 95% of all transportation deaths. 95%. We're talking 43,000 people are dying on our nation's roads annually. Millions more injured. Aviation is incredibly safe. With respect to any safety recommendations that may come along or any safety deficiencies that we might identify, one thing I will say is our investigative process, we don't wait until the end.

of our investigation to issue something that may impact a safety deficiency. So for example, we will issue an urgent safety recommendation. If we see that something needs to be acted on immediately, we won't wait till the end of the investigation,

We won't wait till the end to issue recommendations in the final report. We will take action. We will issue an urgent safety recommendation if we need to. So that's open right now in all areas. Last question. Yes. Patrick Turf for the Scripps News. There's been a lot of talk from aviation experts that maybe the crew on the CRJ, or on the Blackhawk, rather, is looking at the wrong plane. Can you talk about whether you see anything that would support that theory or not?

Yeah, I've read these reports. It's too early to tell. We're going to have to do our visibility study to look at all possibilities of what the crew might have been seeing. So more to come on that. Thank you very much. So a lot of new information from this press conference. We learned that the CRJ regional jet did a nearly full-up elevator movement about a second before the crash, so obviously the crew was trying to avoid the helicopter.

We learned that the helicopter pilot was receiving a combined annual checkride and night vision goggles checkride, and that the NTSB believes that the pilots were wearing those goggles at the time of the crash. Night vision goggles do have a variety of limitations, though those were not discussed. We learned that there is no defined width to the helicopter routes in the DC area, even though as I've mentioned before, shading on the map depicts them as being about a thousand feet wide.

We learned that there were discrepancies in terms of the altitudes that the pilot and the instructor pilot were seeing in the cockpit, and that is a critical issue that the NTSB will continue to investigate. We also learned that a portion of ATC's transmissions were cut off because the helicopter keyed their microphone for about a second during that transmission. Hence, the helicopter crew didn't hear the words, "'Pass behind the' when the tower was giving them instructions to pass behind the jet."

So a lot of new information, but of course there is so much more that we'll learn in the months and years ahead. If you'd like more insight into the NTSB's investigation process, then check out episode 368 that we released earlier this week, in which we talked with NBC analyst and former NTSB investigator Jeff Gazzetti about the accident investigation process. And you can find that episode at aviationnewstalk.com slash 368.

And just a reminder that I love hearing from you and I read many of your emails on the show. If you'd like to send me a message, just go out to aviationnewstalk.com, click on contact at the top of the page. That's absolutely the best way to send me a message. And of course, I also want to thank everyone who supports the show in one of the following ways. We love it when you join the club and sign up at aviationnewstalk.com slash support to

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down. Your silence, baby, sliding upside down. You can always