372 N2UZ Bonanza Crash: When Best Glide is Insufficient; Scottsdale Learjet Update + GA News
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Have you ever wondered how a pilot can seemingly do everything right after an engine failure and still end up in a fatal crash? Today we'll talk about November 2 Uniform Zulu, a Bonanza that crashed near Charlottesville, Virginia last month, and about some of the small things the pilot might have done differently to change the outcome. Also, we'll talk about new findings from the NTSB preliminary report on a Learjet that skidded off the runway in Scottsdale, Arizona two weeks ago.

Hello again and welcome to Aviation News Talk where we talk general aviation. My name is Max Truscott. I've been flying for 50 years. I'm the author of several books and the 2008 National Flight Instructor of the Year. And my mission is to help you become the safest possible pilot. Or

Earlier this week in episode 371, we talked about a new airplane insurance comparison tool from ForeFlight. So if you didn't hear that episode, you may want to check it out at aviationnewstalk.com slash 371. And if you're new to this show, welcome. Glad you found us.

Now, if you would, in whatever app that you're using to listen to us, touch either the subscribe key or in Spotify or the Apple Podcast app, the follow key, so that next week's episode is downloaded for free. And my thanks to these people who've signed up in the past couple of days to support Aviation News Talk. They include Chris Parego and a large repeat donation from Ed Verville, who writes that he's still flying charter and doing lots of check rides in Cirrus. He also is writing for Twin and Turbine Magazine and others. So thanks to you both.

And if you'd like to hear your name next week, sign up now to support the show by going out to aviationnews.com slash support. Coming up in the news for the week of February 24th, 2025, a runway incursion at Chicago Midway forces a go around. The window has opened if you want to become an air traffic controller. And we have the odd story of a Bonanza landing at a seaplane base. All this and more in the news starts now.

From FlightSafety.org, runway incursion at Chicago Midway, Southwest Airlines Flight 2504, a Boeing 737, and FlexJet Flight 560, a Challenger 350, were involved in a runway incursion incident at Chicago Midway this week. The airliner was landing was only a foot or two above the runway 31 center when the Challenger 350 crossed runway 31 center while taxiing to runway 4L.

The Boeing 737 aborted the landing and went around. ADS-B data suggests that the Challenger was crossing the runways at about 500 meters in front of the Southwest jet, or about two-tenths of a mile. The ATC recording shows that the Flexjet crew was instructed by ground control multiple times to hold short of runway 31 center. After the event, the ground control stated, Flexjet 560, your instructions were to hold short of runway 31 center. The crew were then given a phone number for pilot deviation.

And in a related story, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said Thursday that pilot air played a role in the majority of high-profile plane crashes and close calls in the last few weeks, and he called for pilots to face serious consequences when they disregard ATC.

Duffy said in an interview that pilots should lose their licenses if they do not follow instructions from air traffic controllers, which is what he said appeared to happen on the latest near-collision Tuesday between a private jet and a Southwest Airlines plane in Chicago.

Duffy said, quote, Duffy was trying

trying to calm fears that the skies are increasingly unsafe after a series of deadly aircraft crashes and near collisions over the past few weeks, starting with the major collision of a helicopter and passenger jet landing at Ronald Reagan National Airport near Washington, which killed 67.

And from GeneralAviationNews.com, ATC hiring supercharged. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has unveiled a new plan to quote supercharge the hiring of air traffic controllers. The announcement followed a tour of the FAA's academy at Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City.

FAA officials said, quote, the FAA is opening its hiring window to become an air traffic controller for the best and brightest in our country from February 27th to May 17th, and we are making it more efficient than ever to apply and more affordable to begin training. Tuffy acknowledged that an air traffic controller staffing shortage has been a known challenge for over a decade.

And from avweb.com, on Thursday, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announced that the administration is actively working to address the air traffic controller staffing shortage by exploring a 30% pay increase for new recruits. His comments came after he met with FAA officials and students to emphasize the critical role that air traffic controllers play in ensuring the safety of the flying public. Under the proposed plan, the starting wage for air traffic controller trainees is

would increase from $17.61 an hour to $22.84 an hour. Duffy emphasized that this adjustment is designed to provide a livable wage during training, with certified controllers potentially earning an average of $160,000 annually within three years. However, he noted that the pay increase would need congressional approval to secure the necessary funding.

And in a related story from X.com, and this is the first time we've read a post from X as a news story, Elon Musk posted the following tweet, quote, There is a shortage of top-notch air traffic controllers. If you have retired but are open to returning to work, please consider doing so. And from GeneralAviationNews.com, Repeated attempts to start engine end in fire. And this comes from a final NTSB report.

The pilot told investigators that he flew the Piper PA-28160 on December 4, 2022, during which time the aircraft started and flew with no anomalies. On December 25, 2022, he was unable to start the airplane, which he attributed to the outside air temperature of minus 7 degrees Fahrenheit in Eau Claire, Wisconsin.

On February 5, 2023, the day of the accident, he attempted six engine starts before the battery died, and once the battery was recharged, he attempted an additional six engine starts before he stopped further attempts to start the engine. He said that during each engine start attempt, he applied engine primer three times and pumped the throttle control two times. The throttle control was positioned about a quarter inch forward after each start.

At times during the start attempts, he placed the mixture control into idle cutoff and ran the engine starter. The pilot finally gave up, and he and his passengers got out of the airplane. That's when one of the passengers saw a small flame inside the engine cowl. The pilot told the remaining passenger to move the mixture control to idle cutoff. Fuel selector was not turned to the off position. The flames continued to spread, and the aircraft was destroyed.

Photos showed flames during the accident in two areas. The first area was beneath the engine, and the second area was near the right aft top side of the engine by the right forward fuselage. Examination of the engine compartment in the first area revealed that the carburetor airbox assembly and the carburetor heat assembly were consumed by fire. The fuel lines leading to the carburetor were intact.

The area above the carburetor exhibited soot consistent with lower combustion temperatures above a hotter area which lacked soot and was around the carburetor bowl. Examination of the second area revealed a separated and thermally damaged engine primer line for the number 3 cylinder. The remainder of the engine primer lines were intact. The area near the separated primer line did not contain a comparable amount of soot as that of the area further from the separated primer line.

Fire damage precluded determination of the fuel and ignition sources of the fire. Probable cause? The engine fire that began for undetermined reasons following numerous engine start attempts. And also from GeneralAviationNews.com, lack of brake fluid leads to plane crashing into hangar.

The Cessna 425 reported an uneventful flight and landing at Bismarck Municipal in North Dakota. After taxiing to the ramp, he proceeded to stop the airplane in front of a marshaller. After moving the throttles toward the ground idle position, he observed the airplane turn left and reported that the right brake was inoperative.

He moved both propeller levers to the feather position and both throttles toward the reverse beta position. The airplane continued forward and hit a hangar, which substantially damaged the left wing. While the pilot was not injured, the two passengers sustained minor injuries. Post-accident examination of the braking system revealed the brake master cylinders were nearly empty of brake fluid, with no leaks observed.

A review of maintenance logs revealed that the pilot, who was also a mechanic, recorded completion of the Phase 3 inspection of the Cessna 425 maintenance manual on May 21, 2022. The Phase 3 inspection included servicing the brake master cylinders. The pilot mechanic reported that during his inspection, he checked the brake pads and checked for leaks around the brakes in the master cylinders,

He had to press the brake pedals to find there was resistance. However, he did not check the fluid levels of the master cylinders during the inspection. Probable cause? A loss of braking due to inadequate servicing of brake fluid by the pilot mechanic, which resulted in a loss of airplane control on the ground. And also from GeneralAviationNews.com, pilot continues takeoff after wing hits runway.

The pilot reported in security video at the airport in Port Orange, Florida, confirmed that during a takeoff attempt, the Piper PA-46's right wing contacted the runway. The pilot pulled back excessively on the yoke. The airplane pitched up, stalled, and descended back onto the runway. It traveled off the end of the runway and hit trees before coming to a rest on its side. The pilot was seriously injured. The pilot told investigators that, in retrospect, he should have rejected the takeoff when the right wing contacted the runway.

Examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The inspector noted that both wings separated and the fuselage was substantially damaged. Probable cause? The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control during a takeoff attempt, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall, runway excursion, and collision with trees. And finally from FlightSafety.org, Bonanza crashes at seaplane base.

Beechcraft A-36 Bonanza, November 321 Tango Bravo, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at the Alton Bay Seaplane Base, that's Bravo 18, in Alton Bay, New Hampshire. The pilot and passenger were not injured.

A witness-recorded video shows the aircraft on final approach to the ice runway when it landed hard and short and struck a snowy berm. The right landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid off the ice and struck another pile of snow before coming to rest. The Alton Bay Seaplane Base is a state-owned, public-use seaplane base located in a cove of Lake Winnipesaukee. During the winter months, the base may seasonally open an ice runway instead of the normal seaplane landing area. It

It is the only FAA-approved ice runway in the U.S. And when I viewed the video, it appeared that the pilot misjudged his height above the ice runway as there was no roundout or flare. The aircraft simply descended straight down onto the ice and then immediately pitched nose low, perhaps because it struck the snowy berm, and the nose gear and right main gear collapsed.

Coming up next, our video of the week. And then later, we'll have new information on the Learjet crash in Scottsdale, Arizona. And we'll talk about a serious crash in Santa Barbara. And then get to our main topic about a Bonanza that lost its engine and came up short at Charlottesville, Virginia. But first, and now here's a Headset Minute by Lightspeed with Derek Schmidt. Derek, welcome to the show. Good to see you again. It's a pleasure to be back, Max. Let's talk about the squishy part of headsets, the ear seals, the soft goods.

Some pilots think that they should last as long as the headset. Is that the case? We wish the answer was yes, but soft goods are replaceable accessories. So they do enhance the flying experience when they are in their best possible shape. But over time, sweat, heat, elements like cold and humidity, these will all reduce the shelf life of those headsets. And eventually, the materials that they're made out of do need to be replaced.

The way I kind of explain it to customers on the phone, if you think about a car, your windshield wipers on the car need to be replaced periodically in order to get the best possible vision out of the windshield. Well, the same is very much true for the soft goods, especially the ear seals.

For the quietest headset possible, our engineers actually rated the foam that's inside those ear seals to be a part of the total ANR system. So as they do break down, it does decrease the quieting that is available within that headset. This is why we do recommend replacing those ear seals every 12 to 18 months. Even if they do not look bad, they may not be riding the same level of ANR quieting as when they were new. Are there any special deals that pilots could get for the soft goods of their Lightspeed headsets?

We do consider them very important as far as a piece of the operations of the headset. We do offer a program called the Wingman Club. If you purchase a refresher kit through our website, which includes the head pad, mic muff, and both ear seals, you will be entered automatically into the Wingman Club. For the next five years then, you can go back to our website.

And 30% discounts will be applied off the retail cost of any of the accessories that are offered there. That's great. Derek, thanks so much for joining us here today. Happy to be back. Thank you. Thank you.

And now let's get to the good news. First, congratulations to Trevor Moody. He says, I want to let you know that I passed my multi-engine instructor initial checkride this week, which means that that's his first CFI and it's in multi-engines. He says doing the multi-engine path first was a bit unusual, but it worked well for me since I fly a twin diamond. Aviation News Talk was a great resource, especially the mock checkride episodes you did with Jason Blair. Also, your suggestion of getting an advanced ground instructor certificate was a good one. How

Having that and teaching a few ground schools really gave me extra confidence on instructional skills and the many technical subject areas. And that's what I did as well. I taught ground school before I became a CFI. Also, finally, thanks for introducing me to Jim Hopp at Advantage Aviation. He was an excellent instructor for my CFI spin endorsement. So congratulations, Trevor.

And now let me tell you about our video of the week. This is related to the last story we did in the news about a Bonanza that had a hard landing on an ice runway in New Hampshire. So you can see that for yourself.

The links for the video of the week are on the same page with links you can use to become a supporter to start supporting the show. So when you go to view the videos, look at the bottom of the page for the video links, and at the top of the page, you'll see four options for supporting the show. So to see our videos of the week and or to support the show, go online to aviationnewstalk.com slash video.

And I've mentioned in the past that I'm now writing articles in a monthly column for Flying Magazine. And I wanted to let you know that the magazine sometimes publishes links to articles a few months after they appear in the magazine. And they just posted a link to an article I wrote for the December issue about somatographic illusion. In it, I wrote, "...somatographic illusion is a stealthy killer. It reveals itself in seemingly unrelated ways and can sneak up and kill you before you know what happened."

And then I talked about some different accident types involving that illusion. And you're going to find a link to that article in our show notes at aviationnewstalk.com slash 372. Now let's talk about the Learjet crash in Scottsdale. The preliminary report for that accident, which occurred two weeks ago, just came out.

It says in part, on February 10, 2025, about 1438 Mountain Time, a Gates Learjet 35A was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Scottsdale, Arizona. The captain was fatally injured. The first officer and one passenger were seriously injured. One passenger sustained minor injuries, and an occupant inside a parked plane sustained serious injuries.

The captain was the airplane's regular pilot, and he had flown with the FO consistently since June. The purpose of the accident flight was to transport passengers to Arizona for a local event. Around 2.34 p.m., at an altitude of 2,800 feet above ground, the aircraft turned onto an extended final approach path to runway 2-1 at the Scottsdale Airport. Investigators obtained security camera footage and numerous videos from personal cell phone cameras.

A witness provided video taken from a golf course near the final approach path that captured the airplane for 11 seconds. The airplane can be seen on final approach with the left landing gear trailing aft from its normal position. Additionally, there is a circular bright spot seen above the landing gear strut consistent with the landing gear light illuminating the bottom of the wing flap and the landing gear strut position facing aft.

And I've looked at the screen grabs in the report taken from the video, and it's very clear that while on final, the left landing gear was way out of position. It was swung toward the back of the aircraft.

Surveillance videos and ADS-B data showed that at 2:38 pm the aircraft touched down on runway 21 just before the aiming point markings with full flaps extended. It immediately entered a left wing low attitude and began veering left exiting the runway's surface. The airplane traveled over the rock covered runway safety area islands located between the runway and taxiways

The airplane crossed taxiway Bravo, collided with a windsock, and entered the ramp area where it struck the right side of a parked Gulfstream G200. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers and the drag chute was not deployed. And I've read elsewhere that the Learjet 35A has a drag chute that can be used to slow the aircraft during landing. Security camera recordings show that the airplane came to rest with its nose embedded between the right side of the Gulfstream's fuselage and the inboard trailing edge of the right wing.

The same flight crew for the accident flight had a landing mishap on June 20, 2024, in McAllister, Oklahoma. A video of that event revealed that the airplane landed hard just short of the runway surface and bounced several times. As a result of the hard landing, both left main landing gear tires burst. The pilot hired a mechanic who had worked on the airplane when it was owned by the previous owner to perform a hard landing inspection on the airplane.

During an interview with a mechanic, he stated that after obtaining a flight permit and repositioning the airplane to his facility, he removed both landing gear to facilitate the pertinent eddy current inspections that were required. He stated he followed the maintenance manual for all of the work he performed.

And then the report includes a section with a long description of the landing gear assembly, how to reassemble and grease it, and I'm not going to read that part. But skipping ahead, it continues, investigators took measurements of the aft trunnion pin shoulder protrusion off the aft trunnion fitting if it were not engaged fully forward into the trunnion casing.

If the bolt is secured before engaging the pin in the trunnion casing, then the grease hole would be aft of the bushing, allowing grease to escape from the pin into the wing bay. With the adjacent access panel removed using a mirror, the pin can visibly be seen not making contact with the aft trunnion fitting when it is not fully pushed into the trunnion casing. The NTSB is aware of at least three other prior events where a Learjet landing gear had disconnected from the airplane and

because the retaining bolt was not engaged through the aft trunnion pin. A mechanic who performed the landing gear servicing in December 2024 stated that nothing appeared unusual, but remarked that the left landing gear took an excessive amount of grease.

The flight crew did not make any radio calls indicating that they were aware that the landing gear may not be operating correctly. The landing gear control panel is located on the right side of the center instrument panel. It features three red unsafe lights, three green lockdown lights, and the landing gear selector switch.

A down and lock switch on each actuator housing illuminates the corresponding green lockdown light when the gear is fully deployed. If the actuator is not locked, the light remains off. Each gear's red unsafe light is triggered by a micro switch on the inboard gear door. The light shows when the door is open and turns off when the door closes.

So if we read between the lines, it sounds like the left landing gear was not properly maintained and Grease was not able to go into the areas that it was supposed to. I think also the NTSB is implying that while on final, the pilot would have seen a red gear unsafe light, but didn't mention it to ATC and chose to land with that red light on. Now let's talk about the non-fatal crash of a Cirrus SR-22 near Santa Barbara.

It occurred on January 29th, just a few hours before the Reagan National Midair Collision, and hence it got very little coverage in the news. Here's what KEYT.com wrote about the crash.

A small private aircraft crashed in an open field just north of the Stork Road off-ramp on Highway 101, leaving two professional pilots with major injuries. According to the FAA, the crash occurred about 2:16 p.m. near Santa Barbara Municipal Airport. The aircraft has been identified as a Cirrus SR-22

Tail number November 124 Lima Zulu, registered to Lima Zulu Aircraft Corporation. It's been confirmed that filmmaker Robert Zemeckis is affiliated with the company. His publicist, Michelle Bega, released a statement saying, "...two professional pilots, whom Mr. Zemeckis routinely employs, were flying the aircraft. There were no passengers on board." Witnesses reported seeing the plane deploying a parachute before it came nose down into an open field.

Video taken by a passing motorist showed the aircraft already on the ground and burning, while bystanders and a CHP officer rushed over a fence to assist the pilots. A photo obtained by investigators shows the aircraft intact on the ground before flames engulfed it. Two occupants, a 29-year-old man and a 33-year-old woman, had exited the plane before first responders arrived. They were found just outside the burn area with major injuries and were transported to Cottage Hospital.

Flight data shows that the Cirrus SR-22 departed Santa Barbara at 1.51 p.m., flying along the coastline before turning back to land and appearing to prepare for a landing when it crashed near the freeway. Now, I've looked at the ADS-B crash data and heard the ATC audio for the crash, and here's what I found. The aircraft departed from Santa Barbara and traveled west along the coast, where it briefly did some maneuvers. It then returned to Santa Barbara and was instructed to make a base entry to runway 15R.

It performed a touch and go and made right traffic to make another landing on 15R. It was told to extend its upwind leg and then, somewhere around the crosswind to downwind turn, received this instruction from ATC: "Sheriffsport and Missoula, keep your power tight over the departure on runway 25. Traffic departing will be asserted."

And that was courtesy of LiveATC.net. That instruction was to help avoid an aircraft that was taking off from and climbing out on runway 25. The accident aircraft can be seen to make a slight right on downwind to get a little closer to the runway, and after that small correction, its downwind leg was flown about one nautical mile from the runway, which is a fairly normal distance for flying the downwind leg of a Cirrus. The aircraft climbing out on runway 25, which was also a Cirrus, was taken off from and

passed two miles in front of the accident at Cirrus, so there was never much of a conflict between these aircraft. Now the data starts to get interesting as the aircraft passed a beam of the numbers and starts its descent for the runway. It was flying at a ground speed of about 110 knots on downwind, and then started to descend at about 500 feet per minute while maintaining the 110 knot speed.

After about 15 seconds, the descent rate increases to 1,000 feet per minute and then briefly goes back to about 500 feet per minute, perhaps as the flaps were added. Now, at this point, the aircraft starts a very early turn to base. And by early, I mean this base leg would have been just 0.4 miles outside the runway threshold, whereas I'd fly a typical base leg in a Cirrus maybe a mile and a half from the runway.

Simultaneously, the descent rate for the aircraft increased dramatically. Literally in just six seconds, it went from about 500 feet per minute to 3,000 feet per minute.

All the while, the aircraft was in a turn to the right to get on the base leg. At some point, the parachute was pulled. However, it was apparently pulled at a very low altitude as the aircraft crashed in a very nose-low position. When I teach in Cirrus Aircraft, I generally tell pilots that they should pull when they're at least 500 or 600 feet above the ground, depending upon the model of Cirrus they're in.

After the parachute is first deployed, the aircraft settles into a nose-low attitude because initially the parachute risers in the front of the aircraft are longer than the ones in the back. Then after 8 seconds, line cutters fire, making the rear harness about the same length as the front harness, and the aircraft is then much closer to a level attitude.

Since this aircraft hit in close to a vertical latitude, we know that the aircraft must have hit the ground less than eight seconds after it was deployed and that the line cutters wouldn't have had time to work. Based on the attitude and comparing it with other low-altitude employments, one pilot guessed that the accident aircraft was at about 300 feet AGL when the chute was pulled.

So whatever happened in this aircraft happened very quickly. The pilots are very lucky to have survived such a low-level parachute deployment, albeit with some injuries. The preliminary report is not out, so we don't have any evidence as to what led to the rapid descent.

It seems unlikely that the pilot lost control, as the turn to base seems to have been in control. Another unlikely possibility is that one of the pilots accidentally pushed hard on the controls. I think it's more likely that there was a power loss that occurred suddenly. Perhaps one of the fuel tanks was run dry, or perhaps the engine suddenly quit.

Regardless of what the issue was, the pilot clearly didn't pull back quickly to reach best glide speed. If they had, the descent rate would have probably been closer to 1,000 or 1,500 feet per minute and not 3,000 feet per minute. But the entire event happened so quickly that the pilots were probably startled, and it's possible they focused on turning toward the airport, which they should have, and or restarting the engine, and somehow forgot to pull back on the stick to get to best glide speed.

Clearly, though, they did the most important things correctly, which was they made a quick decision to pull the parachute when it was clear that they were out of options. So hats off to these pilots for surviving some type of emergency that unfolded rapidly, and I hope they recover quickly. Coming up next, we'll talk about the crash of November 2 Uniform Zulu, Bonanza that lost its engine and didn't quite make it to the runway in Charlottesville, Virginia. All right here on the Aviation News Talk podcast.

And just a quick update, the segment that you're about to hear was recorded about a month ago, but it was delayed because of all the many other crashes that we talked about that occurred between then and now. I'll add a quick update at the very end because the preliminary report has come out, and it does add one new little piece of information. And now let's talk about the crash of November 2 Uniform Zulu, a Bonanza B-35B that crashed at about 12.35 p.m. on Saturday.

We'll listen to the ATC communications, which were provided by LiveATC.net, and walk through the ADS-B data for that flight. And as you listen, think about whether there are any things that could have been done differently that might have led to a successful outcome. The plane departed Florida on Friday and flew to KRCZ, the Rockingham Airport in North Carolina, where the pilot apparently spent the night.

On Saturday morning, the plane departed Rockingham at about 11.20 a.m., climbed to 7,500 feet, and flew north. We don't know the intended destination, but we do know the engine stopped about an hour later when the plane was about six miles south of the city of Charlottesville, Virginia. The airport the pilot tried to reach, KCHO, the Charlottesville Airport, is located north of the city with a field elevation of 640 feet.

the aircraft's ground speed and cruise had been about 190 knots. If it were running at 75% power, the true airspeed would have been around 170 knots, suggesting the aircraft was getting about a 20 knot push from a wind from the south. Now that fits with the winds on the surface at Charlottesville Airport where 40 minutes before the accident the winds were from 2-0-0 at 9 knots and 20 minutes after the accident were at 2-0-0 at 10 gusting to 16.

The event started at around 1228 p.m. It was most likely an engine failure as the pilot later told the tower that he had three hours of fuel on board and that his propeller was stopped. It's also possible that the pilot ran a fuel tank dry, though that seems less likely. ADS-B data shows the aircraft slowed over the next 40 seconds to about 150 knots, and then the aircraft began descending while staying on its northerly heading.

The descent rate averaged between 1,000 and 1,200 feet per minute most of the way to the ground. We can also tell that the aircraft was not receiving flight following, as ADS-B data shows that he was squawking 1,200. At about 12.30 p.m., the aircraft started squawking 7,700 as it was passing through about 6,250 feet.

Just a few seconds later, Potomac Approach apparently noticed the squawk as they broadcast this message. Number 2, Uniform Zoo with Potomac Approach. You happen to be on this frequency? The pilot didn't respond, but a few seconds later, he called the Charlottesville Tower. Now, to create this next recording, I used two separate channels from LiveATC.net.

The channel with the better audio quality sometimes switched to Potomac Approach, and when it did, the tower could no longer be heard. However, I could hear the tower on another channel that had more noise on it. So I switched back and forth between the channels so that you'll always hear the best audio quality that was available. The conversation runs for about five and a half minutes, and it runs in real time. During some of the silence gaps, I'll update you on the progress of the aircraft.

Note that at the time of the accident, the barometric pressure reported by the tower was 30.35 inches. So if you look at the ADS-B altitudes online or in a video, you'll need to add 430 feet to them since those altitudes are transmitted in pressure altitude, which is 29.92. The altitudes I'll be reading are corrected altitudes. Note that the crash site was at about 400 feet MSL, about 250 feet lower than the airport.

Charles Zulu Tower, banana two uniformed Zulus. Two uniformed Zulu Tower. Declaring an emergency, I'm 10 miles south, I just lost my engine, I'm at 5500 feet descending. Alright, two uniformed Zulu, roger, I can get you into runway 3, it's gonna be closest to you. Current winds are 200 at 11, and the altimeter is 3035, roger, I can get you into the left downwind.

I hope I make the airport. All right, Roger. We'll have runway 3 available for you if you need. I can also clear this taxiway for you. Freetangle X-ray, break off your approach, turn left and contact departure. We're going to re-seek at the end. No problem. Break it off, turn to the left. Freetangle X-ray. At this point, the aircraft is descending through 4,800 feet at 105 knot ground speed, and it's 8 miles from the runway 3 threshold. It's been about 2 1⁄2 minutes since the aircraft first started losing power.

and it's just about to reach the southern edge of the Charlottesville metro area where there are fewer open fields. 172 Mike Echo is a student solo. 172 Mike Echo, Charlottesville.

7, 2 Mike Echo. Alright, 2 Mike Echo, what I'd like you to do is enter the right downwind for runway 21, and once you get in there, just make a couple 360's, I have an emergency inbound, I'll get you in here shortly. Right downwind for the 21, a couple 360's, 2 Mike Echo. 2 Uniform, Zulu, the airport is pretty much at tier 12 to 11 o'clock and about 7 miles. 2 Uniform, Zulu in sight, unclear if I'm going to make it, I'm at 3900 feet.

Alright, Uniform Zulu, just in case, paralleling the runway over here there is Highway 29. I'm not sure if that's the best place for you to land now. And if needed, just to the southwest of the airport is a whole bunch of open field. Uniform Zulu, second. That's for the streeties. Probably that's your 9, 10 o'clock now on about 3, maybe 4 miles with a couple of golf courses. Phoenix Landing background.

Hey, Charlotte Hill Tower, Cab 4537, do you want us to break off to the south as well? We're on a pie-mob funnel now. Cab 4537, is current right stand contact departure? Is the turn right heading 270, could you suggest a 270? Okay, roger, we'll turn right 270, what type of departure frequency do you have that? 132.85 Okay, 132.85, thank you.

The aircraft is now about four miles from the airport at about 2,300 feet and 105 knots. It's over the eastern edge of the city, and there are a significant number of fields just ahead at about two o'clock and less than a mile.

The aircraft ultimately heads for the only area of open fields between it and the airport. The uniformed Zulu is not going to make it. I'm about, I'm going to go for a field in front of me about three or four miles south of the airport. The uniformed Zulu, roger, I'll let the people know.

Current winds at the airfield are 240 at pace. Altimeter is 3035. The aircraft is descending through 1,500 feet at about 1,100 feet AGL and at 90 knots, and it has just completed a 90-degree turn to the right, which essentially puts it on a left downwind for the field he has chosen. In a minute, he'll start making a 180-degree turn back to the left to line up with the field on a westerly heading. The field belongs at river, at the south of the river.

Being informed to your roger and getting people to on the way to you right over now. The pilot is aiming for a 3,000-foot-long field next to a river. However, the aircraft crossed the boundary of the field at about 700 feet MSL, which would be 300 feet AGL. On a typical three-degree descent path, an aircraft loses about 320 feet per nautical mile. So this aircraft would have had to descend it closer to five or six degrees just to get down to the ground level at the far end of the field.

Based on the address reported for the crash location, it appears the aircraft was not able to get down in time and crashed into the woods just beyond the far end of the 3,000-foot field.

Local news reports said the aircraft wreckage was, quote, in a wooded area on the floodplain of the Rivana River, and that the pilot, the only person on board, died in the crash. So while he generally did an excellent job of managing the emergency, it appears that he overshot his intended field. Now let's talk in more detail about the accident and some alternate choices the pilot could have made. Hopefully, you've been thinking about them as we've talked about the accident.

When the aircraft's airspeed started decaying rapidly, it was about 14 miles from the runway threshold. After it slowed and started descending from 7,500 feet, it was about 13 miles from the threshold. The field elevation is 640 feet, so the plane was nearly 6,900 feet above the airport.

The POH specifies the glide range as 1.7 nautical miles per thousand feet, which works out to a 10.2:1 glide ratio. So for every 6,000 feet, which is about a nautical mile, the plane should be able to glide about 10 nautical miles. With a 10.2:1 glide ratio, from that altitude it could only travel 11.5 nautical miles, meaning it would come up about a mile and a half short of the runway.

I put the ADS-B data for the flight into Flystow.net, and it shows that from the time the aircraft started descending until the time it reached the ground, it traveled 11 miles. The accident site was about 2.5 miles from the runway threshold, but the aircraft had made a right turn followed by a 180 degree left turn to reach the field. So the pilot got about the predicted glide range from his plane, if we don't include the tailwind that he apparently had at the descent, which we'll talk more about in a minute.

The pilot was likely well-trained in his aircraft. There is a short video on YouTube in which the aircraft owner, who was presumably the pilot, talks about the benefits of having attended a BPPP or Bonanza Pilot Proficiency Program. Now this is one of the best training programs available for Bonanza pilots, and this pilot apparently spent the time and money to take this training, which speaks very well for him.

Since he was apparently well trained, he most likely put the aircraft in the maximum glide configuration, which includes gear up, flaps up, cowl flaps closed, and the propeller control pulled all the way out for low RPM. Now that last step, pulling the propeller control back to the low RPM position, is one I often see pilots forget. So you'll want to remember that step if in your airplane you can control the propeller pitch.

The POH specifies the maximum glide airspeed is 105 knots. While the POH doesn't state it explicitly, that speed is usually for maximum gross weight. But the aircraft had only the pilot on board, so it would have been well below max gross weight, and so the best glide speed would be slower, perhaps in the mid-90 knots range.

One area where the pilot might have done just slightly better would have been to fly a somewhat slower speed in the descent, which would have given him a slightly longer glide range. Though as I'll explain in a moment, it wouldn't have made enough difference to make it to the runway.

The aircraft initially slowed to about 145 knots ground speed, which would have been about 125 knots airspeed before it started its descent. Ideally, it should have waited until it was about 30 knots slower in the mid-90 knot airspeed range to maximize its glide distance. Though after losing about 200 feet, the pilot did slow another 20 knots to 125 knots ground speed, which would have been 105 knots airspeed, the published best glide speed for max gross weight.

So the pilot did about as good at flying the best glide airspeed as one could expect under these circumstances. He did start with a 20 knot tailwind, which undoubtedly decreased in the descent. Assuming the tailwind averaged 10 knots throughout the entire descent, that could have increased the glide from about 10 to 1 to around 11 to 1. But the aircraft would have still come up short of the runway. If you're wondering whether the pilot could have selected another airport, there weren't many good options.

If he was using Garmin avionics and pressed the nearest button, the Charlottesville airport was the closest airport that would have come up. Had the engine failed just one minute later, he probably would have made it to the airport. But given the position and altitude that he was at, he had few good options. As pilots, sometimes we find ourselves in a position with few good options, and that's just part of the risk we accept when we choose to fly. In some ways, having the engine fail at that exact moment was just bad luck.

But sometimes we make our own luck. So let's look at other possible choices the pilot could have made that might have changed the outcome. Have you thought of any of these? Here's one. From nearly the first transmission, the pilot expressed doubt about whether he could make it to the runway. In fact, he expressed that doubt a couple of times. Yet, he still continued to the airport. Continuing to the airport meant flying toward Charlottesville in a more densely populated area with fewer off-field landing options.

Had he concluded sooner that he wasn't going to make it to the airport, he could have spent more time looking for open fields, some of which might have been behind him. But it can be very difficult after an engine failure to tell for sure if you're going to make it to the airport. But there are some tools that you can use to help determine whether you're likely to make it. The most basic technique is to look at your landing spot and, as you get closer to it, see whether that landing spot moves up or down the windshield.

If it's moving up the windshield, then you're not going to make it to your spot, unless there's a major favorable change in the winds. Or, you can use a glide range ring to see if you're going to make it to a spot. For example, some EFB apps such as ForeFlight have a glide range ring feature that shows the distance you can glide in any direction.

Also, some avionics have glide range rings. The glide range ring is a ring on the moving map that shows the area the aircraft can reach in a power-off glide. The ring is based on the aircraft's best glide speed and glide ratio, and the size of the ring adjusts based on the terrain and winds. So, had the accident pilot referenced a glide range ring, he might have concluded sooner that he couldn't make it to Charlottesville and have considered other options. As you've been thinking about other possible choices the pilot could have made,

What did you come up with? Here's another one. The pilot apparently wasn't using flight following, though if he had been getting it, it would not have changed his ability to make it to the Charlottesville airport.

But, if he had been getting flight following, and had referenced a glide range ring, and told Potomac Approach that he couldn't make it to the airport, ATC could have presented him with other options. After declaring an emergency, they would have brought up their emergency map of the area, and almost certainly, they would have spotted an option that might have worked for the pilot.

When the aircraft started losing power, the Snow Hill Airport, a private field with a 2,200-foot-long grass strip, was at 2 o'clock and 6 miles. Interestingly, most private airports don't show up when you press the nearest key in Garmin Avionics.

When the G1000 came out in 2004, I remember being surprised to discover that because, if I'm remembering correctly, the portable Garmin handheld GPS units that we used with model numbers like 296, 396, and 496 did have these private airports in them. Again, I may be wrong about that, but here's my point. Many avionics don't display private airports. So you're going to need to find them a different way, such as looking at a sectional map.

Or if you're getting flight following, ATC can point these airports out to you. Now, if I were in the accident pilot situation and I had a choice, I would definitely prefer the 6,800-foot runway at Charlottesville over the 2,200-foot grass runway at Snow Hill.

But, if I could see from a glide range ring that the chances of making it to Charlottesville were slim to none, I'd be very happy to go to Snow Hill. Now, there are a lot of trade-offs in going to a small grass strip, but if the only other option is landing in a random field or maybe in the trees, I'll go for the grass runway every time. Here's some of the trade-offs.

Grass fields are much harder to spot than paved runways. I pulled up Google Maps to look at Snow Hill, and frankly, while I saw a lot of fields at that location, I couldn't positively identify the runway. But if I were circling down from even 6,000 feet, I'd have at least four minutes to try and identify the runway, or to pick one of the attractive-looking fields near that location.

One problem with making a power off landing to a short runway like Snow Hill is that you don't want to come up short, so you'll probably aim for a point about a third of the way down the runway. And if you misjudge your spot, you may run off the end of the runway. But it's far better to run off the end of the runway at 20 or 30 knots than it is to come up short of the runway or to land in the trees. Another choice the pilot could have made was to have flown at 9,500 feet instead of 7,500 feet.

That extra 2,000 feet would have let them glide another three miles, which would have been enough to make it to the Charlottesville airport. But if I were flying the same route, I too would have chosen 7,500 feet, which I think is a sweet spot when flying longer distances. At lower altitudes, there's a lot more traffic from aircraft that are flying shorter distances and or on training flights. But if you were to fly higher, say at 9,500 feet, there's less oxygen.

For years I've said that any time I fly around 10,000 feet, after about an hour I can tell that my thinking and responses are slightly dulled. So if I have to fly at 10,000 feet for more than a half hour, I'll use oxygen if at all possible. So it's totally understandable that this pilot chose to fly at 7,500 feet. But I'll certainly think about my altitude selection more in the future, especially when flying in rural areas where there are longer distances between airports.

Another thing the pilot might have done differently was to choose a route that would have placed him within glide distance of an airport at all times, even if he were at 7,500 feet. You may recall back in episode 251, we talked with Jeff Galloway, who works for Cirrus and who did my annual Vision Jet Recurrent training a few years ago. Jeff is a former Air Force F-15 instructor pilot, and he talked about using energy management techniques after an engine failure.

Specifically, he talked about staying in the energy cone around an airport, which is the cone you'll need to stay within in order to glide to the airport. He also described a process for flight planning your route and altitude so that you were always within the energy cone for some airport during your entire flight. And he shared stories of two pilots who failed to reach the runway because they didn't follow that technique. So to enhance your safety, you might consider using a similar process for flight planning trips.

For the accident we're discussing, it's clear the accident pilot was not in the energy cone for Charlottesville, though he clearly was within the energy cone for Snow Hill, at least for the first few minutes of the emergency. Obviously, planning a route that flies from energy cone to energy cone is going to be a little less direct unless you fly at a really high altitude, but it probably won't add more than a few minutes to any particular trip.

Long before we had GPS, pilots used to fly cross-country flights by flying from VOR to VOR. And while these routes zigged and zagged and looked inefficient, I was always surprised to calculate that in most cases, they only added a couple of minutes to flight times. While thinking about this accident, I started searching for a flight planning tool that could create a flight plan that always keeps you in an energy cone, but I couldn't find one. So let's throw this challenge out to ForeFlight and Garmin Pilot and other EFB apps.

please create a tool that lets us flight plan a route that keeps us within energy cones for the entire route at a particular altitude of our choice. Now that's a relatively easy problem for a computer, but it takes a fair amount of time for a pilot to figure out. But here's how you could start the process.

Using the Bonanza example, if our aircraft has a 10 to 1 glide ratio, from 7,500 feet you should be able to glide about 12.5 nautical miles under no wind conditions. So assuming that the airports along your route are all close to sea level, find a route of flight that goes from airport to airport where the distances between airports are 25 miles or less.

You can then modify this technique to account for the glide ratio of your plane, the altitude you want to fly at, and the field elevation of the airport since they won't all be at sea level. Frankly, if ForeFlight or Garmin Pilot offered a flight planning option like this, I would probably use it every time I fly. But there are some other simple things you can do for route planning

30 years ago, I used to fly volunteer doctors and dentists to Mexico in the Cessna T2-10 that I owned with a partner. After a couple of trips, I realized that the direct route had me flying for 10 to 15 minutes over mountainous terrain north of Los Angeles. But looking at a sectional chart, I saw that I could alter my route a few miles to the east and instead fly along Interstate 5 in California's Central Valley.

This added no more than five minutes to the trip, and it placed me in a far better situation if I were to lose an engine. Even if the interstate were too crowded to land on, there are lots of grass fields paralleling that highway that were far more attractive than the mountains that I've been flying over. So before you punch GPS direct and use that as a route, look to see if perhaps you can alter your course a little so you're flying over terrain that's better suited for an engine-out emergency.

So I think on Saturday, the accident pilot found himself in a tough position with few good options. But had he made one or more different decisions when planning his trip, the outcome might have been different. Hopefully in the future, we'll have new flight planning tools that make it easy to plan a route that stays within energy cones throughout a flight.

And here's some additional information from the NTSB preliminary report. It says a flap actuator was recovered and measurement of its arm corresponded to a flap's position of between 0 and 5 degrees. So apparently the pilot landed flaps up.

It also says the propeller would not rotate by hand. It was noted that only one of the three nuts remained that secured the oil filter mount. The mount was loose against the housing and the other two nuts were not located. The oil sump was subsequently removed to facilitate borescope examination and only residual oil remained. A crack in the engine case was observed near the camshaft gear. Borescope examination revealed multiple metal fragments near a crankshaft counterweight.

Additionally, metal fragments were found in the oil sump and oil filter element. And just a reminder that I love hearing from you and I read many of your emails on the show. If you'd like to send me a message, just go out to aviationnewstalk.com, click on contact at the top of the page. That's absolutely the best way to send me a message. And of course, I also want to thank everyone who supports the show in one of the following ways. We love it when you join the club and sign up at aviationnewstalk.com slash support.

To support the show financially, you can also do that at aviationnewstalk.com slash PayPal. We also love it when you leave a five-star review on whatever app that you're listening to us on now. And of course, if you're in the market for a headset, please consider buying a Lightspeed headset and using one of the links in our show notes, because if you use those links, they will donate to help support the show. So until next time, fly safely, have fun, and keep the blue side up. And remember that you can always go around...

Go around coming down. Your side is baby sliding upside down. You can all