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cover of episode 384 NTSB News Talk podcast - Unpacking the Fatal Crash of a Citation Jet, N611VG Caused by Cabin Decompression

384 NTSB News Talk podcast - Unpacking the Fatal Crash of a Citation Jet, N611VG Caused by Cabin Decompression

2025/5/22
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Aviation News Talk podcast

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Rob:我认为在飞机上安装视频记录仪是一个明智之举,它可以帮助我们了解事故发生的原因,尤其是在轻型飞机事故中,往往缺乏数据。飞行运营质量保证计划和飞行数据监控已经证明了其在提高飞行安全方面的价值。我不明白为什么人们对视频记录仪如此抵触,难道仅仅是因为隐私问题吗? Max:我同意你的观点。NTSB也长期以来推荐安装数据、音频和视频记录设备,并建立飞行数据监控程序。黑匣子在事故调查和飞行员培训中起着至关重要的作用,它可以帮助我们了解事故发生前飞机发生了什么,从而改进培训,挽救生命。

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The podcast kicks off with the surprising news of the termination of NTSB Vice Chairman Alvin Brown and the NTSB's current hiring process. The hosts discuss the lack of transparency and the implications for an independent safety agency.
  • Unexplained termination of NTSB Vice Chairman Alvin Brown
  • NTSB is currently hiring
  • Concerns about political influence on an independent agency

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Hi, I'm Max Prescott here with news about a new show I think you're going to want to listen to. You've heard my friend Rob Mark on the Aviation News Talk podcast many times. He's an award-winning aviation journalist, former air traffic controller, and longtime CFI. Rob and I are now teaming up as co-hosts of a brand new podcast, NTSB News Talk.

In each episode, we take a close look at recent aircraft accidents and NTSB reports, unpack what really happened, and highlight the lessons that every pilot can learn from. We cover everything from poor decision-making and weather mishaps to equipment failures and risk.

To start, we'll do the show every other week. I think you're going to enjoy it, which is why I'm sharing episode one of NTSB News Talk here in the Aviation News Talk feed. If you like it, please subscribe or follow NTSB News Talk in your app so that you get future episodes. And since this is a brand new show, we really do need your feedback.

Please give us your advice on how to improve the show. To do that, go to ntsbnewstalk.com and click on Contact at the top of the page. Now here's Episode 1. Welcome to NTSB News Talk, where we talk about agency news, recent accidents from the past few weeks, and about newly released NTSB preliminary and final reports. Then we do a deep dive and analysis of one accident.

This podcast is not affiliated with or endorsed by the National Transportation Safety Board. Now here are your hosts, award-winning aviation journalist Rob Mark and Max Trescott, CFI and author who's trained as an accident investigator. Hey Rob, how's it going?

Hey, not too bad, my friend. How are you out on the West Coast? Well, funny you should ask. I was in the hospital two weeks ago for gallbladder surgery. All went well, so I'm feeling much better now. Well, I am really glad to hear that, and I am really glad to know that they did not send you home with your old gallbladder. Yeah, me too. So what do you have for us today for Agency News? I think an interesting story that came out of the NTSB this week

was that the vice chairman of the NTSB, which is an independent safety agency, Alvin Brown, who had only been on duty for about a year, I believe, was abruptly terminated. And unfortunately, we do not know why. And I don't like the fact that what is supposed to be an independent agency is suddenly made the scapegoat

unless we know that there's some particular issue that the employee was dumped for. And right now, we don't have any idea at all. And that's what makes this kind of an uncomfortable story for me. And in other NTSB news...

This is kind of surprising. The NTSB is hiring. And if you go out to USAjobs.com, you can find a list of jobs that they have available. Any of those in particular that you'd be interested in? Oh, air safety investigator. I mean, I used to know, back in the old days, the NTSB had an office in

here in Chicago, out at Chicago DuPage Airport. And when I was working there for another company, I often visited the NTSB office just because I always thought that was a cool job. And I can't remember the fellow's name that was running that office, but he said, for goodness sake,

Would you please apply for this job so you don't have to keep coming in here and taking up my time when I'm trying to accomplish important business? I said, yeah, I should, but I never did. And that was one of the things in my life I often wish I had taken advantage of.

Now, you weren't going to that office to report on yourself, were you? No, no. I would never have been quite that stupid because I know that if I was the subject of an investigation, they'd find me anyway. Exactly. Might as well come clean. Well, you've got a story here about video recorders. Tell us about that.

Matt Thurber, who I used to work with at AIN Magazine, had an interesting editorial a couple of weeks ago about the idea of putting video recorders onto aircraft. Well, of course, we've been listening to this story for many years because, of course, it really came to be after the Rob Holland aerobatic pilot was killed.

by something that was very, very difficult to uncover at first. And just like every other accident, especially those in light aircraft, we often have no idea what happened. I mean, as the discussion was earlier about the caravan that did a go-around and the pilot lost control in a turn. Well, boy, if we just knew...

that there was something else going on in the aircraft at the time that perhaps distracted the pilot, that caused him or her to lose their focus on what they should have been doing? Or was it simply pilot error because they just didn't have the respect for angle of attack that they should? But so again, Matt made a point that it would really have helped if we could have had a

in there to record what was going on. And some of these do exist. I don't know what they cost. But when I posted this story up on, I think, on LinkedIn or something, just to share what I thought was an interesting topic, lots of people did not like it. I heard lots of people say that this was an invasion of privacy and that nobody from the government should know exactly

exactly what I'm doing when. And of course, we know that the air carrier side, the Airline Pilots Association, has been against video recorders in the cockpit of commercial airplanes since the word go. They are always afraid that they're going to be used as indisciplinary action.

But I think at this time in our lives, if we can have the flight operations quality assurance program that is downloading data from aircraft so that a flight department manager can see unusual aircraft operations and be able to

to sit down with the pilots involved and say, hey, guys, what happened here? You had a really unstable approach going into Denver the other day, and that the goal of it is to make you a better pilot and make you a safer pilot, and nobody is being attacked for that anymore.

And of course, it's not being used for disciplinary action. And I just it just feels to me like this is a no brainer. Look at Cloud Ahoy. We can subscribe to that system and turn it on when we take off and come back and completely see exactly what I was doing on that flight where we went out and did a flight review. And I can see the good, the bad and the ugly.

So what is the big deal with this? I guess I just don't understand. Well, with any new technology, you're going to be having folks in favor and also have detractors. I did want to mention that this has long been on the NTSB's most recommended list, and they have a page up on their most wanted list called Install Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish Flight Data Monitoring Programs.

And it says they believe that other types of passenger-carrying commercial aircraft, not just airlines, and they list charter air tours should be equipped with data, audio, and video recording devices. These operators should also have programs in place that analyze the data derived from these devices. So Rob, NTSB agrees with you.

And two, I think one final point on this, we can move on. But if we look at an accident that happens to a part 121 carrier, let's look at the Air France accident that happened back in 2009, I believe it was. The first thing that everybody wanted once they realized there weren't going to be any survivors were the black boxes, the flight data recorders. Why? Because we could

hear the cockpit voice conversation, and we could learn what kinds of parameters the aircraft was going through prior to the accident. And again, we did that, and it completely changed the way that we trained transport category pilots, because that's what the impetus was for upset prevention and recovery training. And

It was a good thing. And we don't know how many lives have been saved because UPRT is now law of the land. But again, it's difficult to prove a negative. But I still think in the grand scheme of things, how can we say that that's bad?

Okay, let's move on and talk about some recent accidents. This is four accidents that have not had any type of report issued on them. First one comes out of Alaska, in which a Cessna 207 crashed while doing a go-run just after it attempted to land.

Reports are that there may have been a loose dog on the runway. Several witnesses reported that, and that possibly led to the aircraft going around. Unfortunately, the aircraft was slow as it attempted to go around and crashed, and there were fatalities, so...

I think that raises the question, when do you land and when do you not? Would you go around for a dog on the runway or does it make sense to go ahead and continue to land? What do you think? I think it depends. And we're going to hear that a lot in this show. It depends. I think I would like to know where the dog was. And I don't know that we ever will. But if the dog was right here,

Yeah, I think you raise a really good point, which is sometimes it's less risky to go ahead and land even if there might be some object that's not going to land.

in the runway, especially if you can get over it or around it. I did have a dog one time running right next to me as I was taking off from Enzanada. And in that particular case, I went ahead and continued with takeoff because to me, we were already probably, you know, 30 knots and it just made more sense to get out of there and hope that the dog didn't cut in front of me. So I think

As you said, kind of depends. And I think it also points to something that we don't talk enough about, which is the fact that we never practice go-arounds. And when we do, so many people fail miserably at them. And I don't mean just because this is a single-engine Cessna. I've seen people in multi-engine turbant airplanes screw up go-arounds unnecessarily.

unbelievably badly. And because it's just not something that we do very often. In training, we plan to shoot an approach down to minimums. We don't see anything and we're going to go around. So we know that in the back of our head. But if someone says, well, there's something on the runway, go around. Well, everybody messes it up or a lot of people mess it up. Flight Safety Foundation's done studies on this, that they mess up go arounds. Yep. So in some case, it makes sense to

to take the risk known versus the risk unknown. There was another accident for which we don't have a lot of information about that was near Big Creek, Idaho. I took a look at the ADS-B data for that. It was a Satabria. And interestingly, there've been a number of Satabria crashes in recent reports that have been out.

This one was at about 8,700 feet when the last hit occurred. So we don't know if that's where they just lost data or if it continued on from there. But think about it. What kind of performance do you have in the Satabria at 8,700 feet midday in the mountains on a warm day?

Well, good point. And we know because this was a GCBC, we know that it had a 150 horsepower engine in it as opposed to the smaller ECAs that have a 115. So that certainly was some help to them. There was only one person on board. But again, if we could figure out what the temperature was at that particular airport at night,

At that time, we could figure out what the density altitude would have been. But again, do we know what this guy was doing at the time? I don't think we do, do we? No, we've got very little information yet.

But I just thought it was interesting that I've seen a number of Stabrias that have shown up in recent reports. And yeah, they don't have a whole lot of power for being up in the mountains. And certainly 9,000 feet in the air on a warm day, there may be some reserve, but at that altitude, you'd already have full throttle in there. So I can't imagine what this person may have been trying to do, but there's not much, I'd say there's no margin for error there.

Sure. Well, let's look at recent final reports that have come out. And this one is relevant because it was a fatal Satabria crash that occurred in Wyoming. So this flight occurred on September 1st, 2024. So it's kind of interesting that the final report is out so quickly, only about seven or eight months after the fact. Unfortunately, one person on board died and there was a serious injury to the other. But that does give us some more information about the flight that we might not have otherwise.

This was a Satabria. The location was Mititsi. I can't pronounce that correctly, but it's in Wyoming. And it said that they had a partial loss of engine power there.

And the probable cause was the pilot's decision to continue the flight over rising terrain at a low altitude in a high elevation, high density altitude environment. How many times have we spoken about ad decision making on the part of the PIC that leads them to the ground prematurely?

Again, this is just like the previous Satabria accident. At 10,000 feet, there's no reserve power with two people on board this airplane. And then it went to partial power, which...

We know a partial power failure is often very difficult to identify for any pilot. Yeah, there's a lot of uncertainty as to whether the power is going to come back or not. The purpose of this flight is rather unusual, though we've seen this before. It says the flight was to fly to a predetermined location in a national forest, locate the passengers' relatives on the ground, and spread the ashes of the passengers' recently deceased family member.

After arriving at the location, they observed family members on the ground, circled, spread the ashes. After releasing the ashes, the pilot leveled the airplane and applied engine power. He stated that the airplane, quote, reached an altitude where it could not climb and that airspeed was near stall speed.

He did not recall the airplane's altitude at the time it stopped climbing and reported the due to his injuries. He did not recall any of the subsequent events. Again, it's pretty important that I think an instructor who is –

Working with anybody in that area, in areas of high terrain, really focus on density altitude in non-turbocharged airplanes that at 8,000, 9,000 feet, you're done. That engine's working as hard as it's going to go. And if you're down at 65 knots, you need to get that airplane on the ground.

or it's going to come down on its own. That's interesting. I have read over the years about at least two different incidents where people were spreading ashes. And my conclusion after reading those reports was I will never spread ashes from an airplane because there are just all kinds of problems with doing that. The one that I recall was that

when someone opened the window, the ashes suddenly started swirling around inside the cabin. And you can imagine that that's just not going to be pleasant and it's going to make it more difficult to fly. So I think there are specific techniques I don't even want to get into that you need to, you know, dump ashes in a way that's not going to cause danger to the pilot. But like I said, I think the best answer, don't do it. You know, leave it to somebody who's done this professionally in the past.

What is the exact reg in part 91 that says thou shalt not drop things from an airplane? Yeah, I believe it says that you're allowed to do it so long as it doesn't cause any harm to persons or property on the ground, something like that. I see, but it absolves the people in the airplane. Yeah.

Yeah. Well, good judgment is never absolved, right? You need to always use that. And of course, my judgment is someone wants to spread ashes, find somebody else to do it. I don't want to be involved in it.

Now, we mentioned that this particular accident, the final report came out in about eight months. Here's one that came out in just three months. Now, one of the differences, nobody died in this particular accident. But I think these days that when the causes are so obvious, and particularly if they're not fatalities, NTSB seems to be pushing a little harder to get these final reports out a little bit faster. To me, three months is just unprecedented. But this involved an aircraft that crashed on

Mount Equinox near Manchester, Vermont. And this was a family that had left on a flight from Baltimore on the morning of February 26th in their Piper PA-28 heading to Killington, which is a great ski area near the Rutland Regional Airport in Vermont. And it says that after trying to avoid clouds, the pilot said that he started to deal with icing, which caused the plane to stall multiple times before a crash landing near

near the 3,800-foot summit of Mount Equinox.

It took rescue crews hours to rescue him and his family. He and his two children suffered only minor injuries, and he said that he was thankful to be alive. Now, no surprise, it says that this pilot was not instrument rated and that the cause of the crash was the pilot's improper decision to continue with VFR flight rules in low visibility conditions that require the use of instruments. They concluded that icing and loss of airspeed caused the plane to stall.

So how many times have we heard this over the years? Well, let's see which part. The one where the instructor said, when you run into bad weather, like clouds that are forcing you lower and lower, closer and closer to the ground, or perhaps you enter precipitation and the temperature is near zero centigrade, you have got to get out of there.

It's funny to me that people would take these kinds of risks with their kids on board the airplane. I mean, if anything, I would be less likely to try anything with my children on board an airplane. But there are people that

just don't seem to understand the decision-making part of what they signed up for when they earned their private pilot certificate. Well, I think we've got a strong clue here. It said that they were going to a Killington, and that tells me that was a family ski trip. They had left from Baltimore. If they were near Manchester, they were probably 95% of the way there.

And we've seen in the past that get there-itis, when you get very close to the end of the trip, judgment kind of goes out to the window because I think pilots start to think, oh, if I can just make it these last few miles or these last few minutes, I will have made it. I don't have to turn around. And yet those are exactly the kinds of situations where pilots need to learn, hey, when you're in those conditions, do it.

Put it on the ground now. Wait for the weather to improve. Don't just continue flying, hoping that it's going to work out because hope is not a strategy and you don't want to put your family at risk, even if it is that great big vacation that we've talked about and planned for months.

Too often we learn that pilots just like this said, I'm almost there. I'm 95% of the way. I mean, I'm sure I could make it. It couldn't possibly get any worse.

Until it does. Yeah, I think as pilots, we're optimists. Otherwise, we would probably never climb into an airplane at all. That's true. There's one other preliminary report that I wanted to mention, and it's a fatal ferry flight that occurred in the Atlantic. Now, I just had an interview on Aviation News Talk a couple weeks ago with Sarah Rovner, who talked about it.

ferrying airplanes around the world. And we didn't really talk about how the dangers of going over the ocean is significantly higher than it is if you get a ferry aircraft over land over the U.S., for example. This particular aircraft was a Fireboss, which is a plane on floats and that it's used to drop water on the fires.

And they were planning a fairly long leg from somewhere in Canada to the Azores, which I think was about a 950-mile leg, which would be well beyond what this aircraft could do.

And to me, that says that they were probably using the tank that would normally carry water to carry fuel. And in fact, Saren mentioned that these particular situations where you're faring fuel in what they called the hopper tank, where normally you would have insecticide or something else, that would carry water to carry fuel.

that those have been a little bit more likely to fail in flight and people lose their fuel. So it's kind of ironic that this was an aircraft that was essentially a float plane. But if you're going to land out in the Atlantic 130 miles offshore, being in a float plane doesn't give you a whole lot of advantage because you've got a relatively high center of gravity and the odds of that aircraft tipping over if you get it successfully on the water are pretty high. So sad to see that this

A pilot died in this crash.

I remember, Sarah, from my days at Flying Magazine, we did a story one month in which we featured her because when it comes to ferrying airplanes around the world, this lady has quite a bit of experience. Yeah, indeed. I was also going to say, ferrying a fire boss, wow. I mean, you look at this airplane with those big floats on the bottom, and I can't imagine an airplane with more drag flying

than something like that, no matter whether it had a PT6 on the end of it or not. Yeah, so that was episode 379 in Aviation News Talk, and I'll include a link to it in the show notes. And now let's get to our deep dive segment. Rob, what do you have for us today? Sure. We have an accident from June of 23 that the final report just came out on a few days ago, and it was a citation, part 91 citation, that was destroyed by

in Montbello, Virginia. And unfortunately, this person that was flying it was single pilot, and he took three other people with him. And what I think is just, it's a sad, sad story. But what really is sad about this is that the pilot was the owner, and the owner just skipped so many flights.

maintenance requirements on this airplane. They mentioned that he had some medical conditions, but they don't think any of them were incapacitating. But when you get to the actual maintenance records of the aircraft, that's where things really started to go south.

I mean, there were five items overdue for inspection on this aircraft. Yeah, so this aircraft was November 6-1-1 Victor Golf. It was a Citation 560, and the accident occurred on June 4, 2023. And the probable cause from the report was, and TSB determines, the accident to be, quote, pilot incapacitation due to loss of cabin pressure for undetermined reasons, conceded

contributing to the accident was the pilot's and owner slash operator's decision to operate the airplane without supplemental oxygen. Now, it's not real clear to me that the pilot is the owner operator, but they could possibly be one and the same. It's just not clear. No, that's true. And I think that what we do know is they scrambled a couple of F-16s when the pilot failed to respond to air traffic control.

And when the F-16s got up there, they saw somebody slumped over the control wheel in the cockpit and the airplane was just flying along on its own up at somewhere between 30 and 35,000 feet. And then the airplane just said, okay, I'm done. And it started to spiral into the ground. And unfortunately, as we talked about a little earlier, the

What caused the decompression of the cabin? Well, we don't know that. We just simply don't know. But what we do know is that there was no supplemental oxygen available because the oxygen bottle that would, this is an Excel citation, that would have fed the masks in the cabin was practically empty.

And what does that mean? It means somebody wasn't paying attention to the maintenance items. And there are other issues related to the masks on the pilot and the copilot side that said it doesn't matter how hard you suck on this baby, that there's not going to be any air.

And up at 35,000 feet, the time of useful consciousness is not very long. I used to know those, but I don't think it's much more than about a minute. And so if this was a rapid decompression, say with maybe a hole in the cabin, they wouldn't have had long at all. But with the state of the maintenance on this airplane that we do know about,

it might be much more likely that this was some kind of a failure in the pressurization system

Because it wasn't maintained correctly. I think four weeks before the accident flight, maintenance personnel noted 26 discrepancies that the owner declined to address, including several related to the pressurization and environmental control system. Oh, my gosh. I mean, really?

Twenty six discrepancies. I mean, when I flew citations, I wouldn't even fly in one that had one discrepancy unless, you know, it met the M.E.L. They said, well, you can go with, you know, VFR with this thing broken or something. But twenty six discrepancies. And I know this is a sad accident. But what it also points to is that when people are offered a ride by somebody that has an airplane.

You don't know anything about that person other than, oh, yeah, that's Joe from work. He's been flying that airplane for years. You have no idea whether this is a safe pilot or not. You don't know how the aircraft was maintained. And that is just something that...

normal people would never even know enough to ask. And that's what's really sad here. Yes, and this aircraft was recently purchased. And I've talked in the past about how pilots who've recently purchased aircraft are more likely to have accidents in those aircraft. Also, this was an older airplane. It was about 35 years old. And I think sometimes when pilots buy older planes, they don't appreciate how expensive the maintenance is going to be. The Washington Post picked up this story and here are a couple of quotes from it.

Regarding the maintenance, it says that responsibilities for those issues was disputed in interviews this week by the owner, whose daughter and granddaughter were on the plane, and the man who sold the plane weeks before. The current owner said, quote, it had to be the prior owner. I was never aware of any problems. If I was, I certainly would not have put my daughter on it.

It says the NTSB cited an inspection the month after the pilot bought the airplane that identified 26 issues, including the emergency exit door seal sticking out of the airplane, improper installation of the humidity regulator, and improper securing of the cabin temperature sensor.

The report says, quote, the airplane owner declined to address these issues. The plane's pilot told mechanics that he had concerns with how the plane had been inspected and maintained before the sale and that it had a warranty according to documents released by the NTSB.

The previous owner said the plane was, quote, in perfect condition when he sold it. If the sale had not gone through, he said, he planned to fly it to Alaska for a family vacation. Quote, I would have flown my family in it anywhere, he said, but I always check my oxygen before leaving Mother Earth. Now, getting back to the oxygen, certainly when I fly in the Vision Jet, we have a minimum dispatch required on the oxygen. If we don't have a certain amount of oxygen, we're not allowed to fly.

Now, I've never flown a Citation, but what do you know about what's required for the dispatch of those aircraft? Well, I don't know the pressure, but I know that it's something that the maintenance personnel, because I flew them for a 135 operator, so we had a DOM, a director of maintenance, who was responsible for making sure that everything was hunky-dory. And on the Citation, there was a door on the nose of the aircraft that

that you could open and see the actual pressure. And when I pre-flighted the airplane, I always took the two minutes to open the door and just go, yep. I'd say, okay, we're good. Got air because that is extremely important.

And also, you know, again, it was just my own paranoia about being caught up high with no air to breathe. Yeah. And you mentioned time to consciousness. My guess was at this altitude, it's probably closer to 30 seconds. But either way, it's pretty darn quick. Now, if you were to have an explosive decompression, then it's going to be pretty obvious because you're probably going to have some condensation in the cockpit. It's probably going to be a little difficult to see everything.

My guess is that these types of pressurization controllers are more insidious than that. They probably just don't provide the level of pressurization you need in the cabin. And unless you've got all kinds of cautions and warning alerts, you may not be aware of that until after you're already starting to feel a little lightheaded and starting to feel like, oh, I'm feeling pretty good, not realizing that hypoxia has crept up upon you.

I would have to look that up, but I remember when I went to school on the original citation, there was, I believe, a horn that would go off when the... Because when the pressure slips out of the cabin, the altitude of the cabin becomes...

begins to rise to match the atmosphere outside where the airplane is. So once the cabin reached 10,000 feet, you'd get a horn and a warning light that would say, you know, cabin, cabin. It didn't actually, we didn't have oral then, but it would flash cabin pressure so that, you know, if you're driving and you have a red light flashing, it says cabin pressure and you don't notice it. I mean, it's,

You probably shouldn't be there. But that was your final indication that you better get a mask on absolutely pronto because you don't have very long to think about it. And again, if it is explosive in the sense that it all runs out in half a second, you

There are aircraft that you just couldn't even get the mask on fast enough. Yeah, especially depending upon the altitude that you're at. Well, it's probably worth talking about the proper response other than following the checklist. If you don't have a whole lot of oxygen, there's going to be an imperative to descend. And how do you get down quickly?

Well, you pull the throttles back to idle, you push the nose over, and you put it down to VMO, which is maximum operating indicated airspeed. And if you had the time to hold the nose up for a minute while you put the gear down, if you could get it that slow, that would add drag. If you have speed brakes, you know, the boards come out. Yeah.

And then you just hang on. And I remember that distinctly in training in a later citation that we'd say, okay, we've got an explosive decompression. You'd kind of go through the motions and say, yes, we're pushing over. And they stopped the sim on us a couple of times because none of us got it right because we're all new to the airplane.

And the instructor said, no, when you have to get this airplane down, you put it to the barber pole and you hold it there. You do what you trim it. You do whatever you have to because you've got to get this airplane down right now.

And I had never seen the VSI on a turbine airplane get pegged before like we did when we started doing it the correct way in the simulator. And boy, you can get down from 35,000 feet real quick. But again...

You're relying on the fact that you can also put the mask on and have something to breathe because it could take you 20 or 30 seconds to get down from altitude to a breathable space. And if there's no air in the tank, you're probably already going to be dead before you get there. Yeah. And just to go back to the steps you mentioned, first step would be disconnect the autopilot, then throttle to idle, and then

nose down in the vision jet, my recollection is we'd push it down to about minus 20 degrees, which is a lot. I don't think people are at all used to seeing what that looks like. So it's very helpful to practice it. So when I would work with people on their 25 hours of SOE after they got their typewriting, I would make sure that we always did one of these. And of course we would do it in VFR conditions and we would

would let ATC know that we're planning a rapid descent. But yeah, this is a great thing to practice both in the simulator and for real, provided that you don't have clouds around. Well, and look at how many things that we know about. We were speaking earlier about go-arounds and the fact that we just don't practice them enough and people mess them up. Why don't we practice these more often?

Is that just human nature? Yeah, probably so. But yeah, I think that's probably a good note to end it on. If you haven't been flying with a flight instructor recently, go ahead and book some time with one, even if you don't feel like you need it, because you probably are going to learn something in the process. Well, hopefully you're going to learn something. You're paying that person. I mean, unless you pick the wrong instructor, huh? Yeah.

Indeed. Well, that's it for today. If you've enjoyed the show, please tell your friends about NTSB News Talk and how to find it. And of course, if you have any comments or thoughts about how we can improve the show, let us know. So, Max, how would people contact you if they want to share any agency news or...

offer some feedback on this episode? Well, I've got an all new email address. They can reach me at max at ntsbnewstalk.com. And of course they can reach me at rob at ntsbnewstalk.com. So until next time, this is Rob in Chicago. And Max on the West Coast. Thanks for listening. Thanks for listening to this first episode of NTSB News Talk. If you have feedback or suggestions on how we can make the show even better, we'd really love to hear from you.

To do that, go to ntsbnewstalk.com and click on Contact at the top of the page. And don't forget to subscribe or follow NTSB News Talk in your podcast app.

so you'll automatically get future episodes. So until next time, fly safely, have fun and keep the blue side up, and remember that you can always go around. This podcast is not affiliated with or endorsed by the National Transportation Safety Board. The views expressed are our own, and the show is for educational and entertainment purposes only. It's not a substitute for flight instruction, official NTSB guidance, or, you know, common sense.