386 When a Door Ajar Becomes a Fatal Distraction: GA Door-Open Accidents and What Pilots Should Do + GA News
01:05:22 Share

A door pops open just after takeoff. It's annoying, right? But deadly? It shouldn't be. Yet GA pilots continue to crash and die because of how they react to something as simple as an unlatched door. Today we're talking about how a minor distraction can turn into a major accident and what pilots need to know to stay safe. And in our update section...

I'll talk more about the deadly crash of a Citation S-550 in San Diego last week, including why it was illegal to fly that approach, even though the controller cleared the pilot for the approach. Hello again, and welcome to Aviation News Talk, where we talk general aviation. My name is Max Trescott. I've been flying for 50 years. I'm the author of several books and the 2008 National Flight Instructor of the Year. And my mission is to help you become a safer pilot.

Last week in episode 385, we talked about the deadly crash of a Citation in San Diego that flew too low on an instrument approach. So if you didn't hear that episode, you may want to check it out at aviationnewstalk.com slash 385. And if you're new to the show, welcome, glad you found us. And now if you would, in whatever app you're using to listen to us, touch either the subscribe key or if you're using Spotify or the Apple podcast app, the follow key so that next week's episode is downloaded for free.

And if you've been listening to this podcast for a while and enjoy it and feel that you're getting value from it, I sure hope that you've signed up to join the club to help support the show. In fact, see if you know any of these people who've signed up in the last two weeks to support the show. We have one new mega supporter. These are the donors who donate $50 a month to help support the show. My thanks to Jerome Schumacher, who says that he also just got his instrument rating. So congratulations, Jerome.

Other new PayPal supporters include Yaron Brill, Hal Lambert. We also had some one-time donations from PayPal, including Tyler Stank and Jeff Butler. And if you'd like to hear me read your name on the show next week, sign up now to support the show by going out to aviationnewstalk.com slash support. Coming up in the news for the week of May 26th, 2025, the FAA is discontinuing some charts.

Gartman introduces charts of their own, and you won't believe how a student pilot's emergency ended up with him in jail. All this and more in The News Starts Now.

From FAA.gov, the FAA is discontinuing some charting products. The notice says, please be advised that the FAA is discontinuing the following products. One, the Aeronautical Chart User's Guide. And by the way, that's the handy legend that tells you what all the symbols are on the charts. And I'll include a link in the show notes where you can download this guide.

The others are the Class B enhancement graphics, of which there is one for each class Bravo. Now this is not the terminal area chart, but rather it's a simplified version of it that shows only the boundaries of the Class B and the waypoints that define it. And then three large wall planning charts are being discontinued. These are huge and you sometimes see them covering a wall at a flight school. They include the U.S. wall planning chart.

the Alaska VFR Wall Planning Chart, and US IFR VFR Low Altitude Planning Charts. The final publication date for these products will be June 12, 2025. As each of the current versions of the above products expires or become outdated, they will be removed from the FAA website. It says that the charting notice reflects FAA's reprioritization of the services it provides in light of changes in staffing, administration priorities, and other factors.

From FWeb.com, Garmin reinvents procedure charts with SmartCharts. Nine years in the making, Garmin has reinvented digital aeronautical procedural charts with a new product it calls SmartCharts. Available with the Garmin Pilot app for iOS, the SmartCharts procedures automatically adjust and scale as the pilot zooms and pans within the chart, similar to Garmin's data-driven maps across its entire aviation product line.

This data also allows smart charts to highlight details and notes that could be easily overlooked and lost on traditional charts, while also reducing clutter and reducing the potential for error. In a first for the industry, the approach vertical profile view on the approach smart chart is geo-referenced, with the aircraft appearing on the profile at its altitude.

Additionally, airport surface smart charts add additional visual information and color, like airport lighting systems, hold short lines, other airport markings, and windsock locations. Airport diagrams also have quick access buttons at the top of the chart that showcase airport information like communication frequencies, runway information, and alternate minimums data.

SmartCharts is available via a Garmin Pilot Premium subscription for iOS devices in the U.S. and the Bahamas. From GeneralAviationNews.com, Sporty's introduces new CFI Test Prep course. Sporty's has launched a new CFI Test Prep course that's designed for both the initial CFI airplane and for CFII instrument applications. The course delivers preparation for what is often considered the most demanding phase of a pilot's training journey.

The all-digital course features scenario-based questions, oral exam prep, and test-specific study guides designed to help applicants teach themselves the material, not just learn it, according to Sporty's. Sporty's has partnered with ASA to integrate ASA's Instructor Pilot slash CFI prepware into Sporty's training platform. The course, available online and in Sporty's Pilot Training app, is available for $199.99.

From avweb.com, Tornado Levels, much of London, Kentucky Airport.

Aircraft hangars and at least one ultralight aircraft manufacturer were destroyed in a tornado at London, Kentucky airport. A deadly storm system that killed at least 17 people in the London area two weeks ago also destroyed much of the local airport. It appears that at least a half a dozen aircraft, including a medevac helicopter, several vintage airplanes, and an ultralight were destroyed by a tornado that cut right through the airport.

Private hangars were also flattened, and it's not clear how many aircraft were inside of them. It was reported that one aircraft was sucked up into the vortex of the funnel cloud. Among the casualties was ultralight manufacturer Kolb Aircraft, whose large hangar was destroyed. An aircraft under construction inside was flipped over. Charles May, co-owner of Kolb, said, You never expect something like this. It's like winning the lottery, but in reverse. What are the chances?

Nobody at the airport was killed or injured. The terminal and a restaurant were also spared serious damage. The tornado was part of a severe storm system that swept Missouri and Kentucky. And also from avweb.com, gamma numbers all positive for the first quarter of 2025.

gamma the general aviation manufacturers association has released its first quarter 2025 statistics for aircraft shipments and billings results are positive with double digit increases in all categories for fixed-wing aircraft compared with q1 of last year turboprops led the charge with a 23 jump to 133 aircraft shipped compared with 108 last year pistons weren't far behind

Up from 296 deliveries to 353, a 19% gain. With business jets rounding out the numbers with an 11% boost, that would be 141 deliveries versus 127 in Q1 last year, total aircraft deliveries increased by 18%. But billings, boosted by the pricey bizjet deliveries, increased by a whopping 25.7% to $5.04 billion from $4.01 billion.

From GeneralAviationNews.com, pilot regrets flying after pressured by boss. And this comes from a NASA ASRS report written by a CFI. The CFI wrote, I was on a training flight with a student practicing maneuvers in the practice area when the Cessna 172 began to experience severe engine roughness.

With ZZZ being the closest airport, we made the decision to request priority handling and get clearance to land there. Once we had landed safely and gotten clear of the runway, we exited the aircraft and began to talk with the airport manager about what to do next. After talking with the airport manager, he advised me to call my boss, the owner of the flight school and head of maintenance. While on the phone with him, he told me to get in the aircraft, instructed me to run the engine up to full power for a few minutes, and then

to burn off any possible spark plug fouling. Afterwards, he had me do multiple magneto checks at different RPMs to test if the problem had been fixed. Upon doing the test, the engine was running smoothly again. After informing him that the problem had been fixed, my boss, who is also an ANPIA, advised me to fly the aircraft back to ZZZ-1 airport.

From there, I discussed with the airport manager and my boss as a group what action to take. My boss told me that I was cleared to take off to return to the home airport as long as it was only me on board. The aircraft manager discussed with the tower, who also said I was cleared to depart.

At this time, my boss made it seem to me like this was the correct thing to do to bring the aircraft back, and I felt pressured by my boss and did not want to go against his instructions. Two days later, my chief instructor contacted me about the situation, advising me that I had taken the wrong course of action and should have never departed the airport. After reviewing the regulations, I now realized that I did not follow the proper protocol. I

I learned that as PIC, I should not have let anyone influence my decision to fly or not to fly no matter what implications it may have. Going forward, I'm going to make a better effort to create a better safety culture and encourage my fellow CFIs to never fly no matter how pressured they may feel by external pressures. And finally, from Ivy Press Online, student pilot in Highway 76 emergency plane landing sentenced to 30 months for drug trafficking.

Dateline San Diego. Troy Smith, a 36-year-old student pilot from Oceanside, was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison for his involvement in drug trafficking. The sentencing follows an incident where Smith's aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing on State Route 76 in Oceanside in September 2024, which led to discovery of his illegal activities. Smith pleaded guilty in January to two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

The first count is related to the emergency landing that occurred at approximately 1.39 a.m. on September 26, 2024, during which Smith attempted to conceal a package of cocaine from law enforcement officers. The second count pertains to his mailing of cocaine through the U.S. Postal System in 2023. Additionally, during the investigation, Smith acknowledged similar conduct involving the mailing of cocaine on at least two other occasions.

While Smith faced potential penalties of up to 20 years in prison and a fine of $1 million, his plea agreement resulted in the reduced sentence. Well, that's the news for this week. Coming up next, a few of my updates, including more information on last week's citation crash, and then our main topic about doors opening in flight. But first, and now here's a Headset Minute by Lightspeed with Derek Schmidt.

Derek, I have three different kinds of plugs on my various Lightspeed headsets. Tell us about the different plug types. We get asked this question all the time. What plug type should I get on my headset? For most pilots, the answer is dual GA plugs.

These are incredibly common in general aviation flying. And even if other panel jacks are available in the aircraft, usually GA are available as well. So for pilots who are switching back and forth between planes or just starting out in aviation, general aviation plugs are usually what we recommend. There's also a LEMO plug, which is a six-pin or panel-powered plug that

that draws power from the ship's power. And so the headset itself doesn't need any batteries in order to power the A&R on the headset. Some of our newer headsets as well, the Lightspeed Delta Zulu, will actually use that ship's power to charge the lithium-ion battery that's also included on the headset.

Yeah, I love the LEMO plug on the headset that uses it because I'm not constantly having to swap out batteries from that headset. So if someone has a headset with a LEMO plug and they end up wanting to fly an airplane that's got the dual GA jacks, can they do that? Absolutely. There's a number of adapters that are available and just as simple as reaching out to a local aviation supply shop, they'll get you all sorts of varieties of plug configurations for your setup.

Excellent. And what's that funky third plug type? That one's called a heli or a U-174 plug, and you will know if you need it. Yes, it's for those of us who fly helicopters. Derek, thanks so much for keeping us informed and making sure that we stay plugged in. Happy to be here, Max.

And now let's get to the good news. This comes from Patreon supporter Matt Souza. He writes, I recently earned my complex and high performance endorsements along with a checkout in a rental Piper Saratoga. I'm reaching out to tell you how much chair flying has

helped me during the transition. Following your recommendation on its effectiveness, I made it a point to chair fly at least twice a day. I was amazed at how much it paid off when I was in the plane. It worked incredibly well. Even now that I'm officially checked out, I continue to chair fly regularly. I know I'm still new to the Saratoga and this kind of practice is helping me build muscle memory and becoming a safer pilot. Matt, congratulations to you and thanks for sharing that story

And yes, I think I talked recently about how chair flying helped me pass my commercial helicopter check ride. And we've got a new video of the week. This one is about a state police helicopter video showing a rescue at night of a two-year-old who was lost in the woods. Of course, they use the infrared camera. It's really fascinating to watch.

The links for all of our videos of the week are on the same page with links that you can use to become a supporter to start supporting the show.

So when you go to view the videos, look at the bottom of the page for the video links. And at the top of the page, you'll see four options, including Patreon, that you can use to sign up to support the show. To see all of the videos of the week or to support the show, just go out to aviationnewstalk.com slash video. And just a quick reminder that if you haven't signed up for our Lightspeed giveaway, you will not be getting a free top-of-the-line DeltaZulu headset worth $1,200.

Instead, someone else who took the two minutes it takes to sign up will be getting that headset. But it's not too late. Go out on the web and sign up now at aviationnewstalk.com slash giveaway. And to help you get to that website, we've got a link in our show notes. And of course, whenever you buy a new headset, make it a Lightspeed. And when you do, Lightspeed will send a check to support Aviation News Talk. But only if you first go to this special link.

that we've set up to help you get to the website. So when you buy, go first to aviationnewstalk.com slash lightspeed, which will take you to their website where you can make your purchase.

And as you know, I write a monthly column for Flying Magazine, and they've just posted links to a couple of those articles, so if you don't subscribe, you can read them online. One of those is called Flying the Margins, How One Pilot's Choices Stack the Odds. Subtitle is Sometimes It's Not Worth Finding Out If Normal Aviation Variability Will Exceed Your Capabilities.

And in it, I wrote that in his book, Pre-Accident Investigations, safety expert Todd Conklin wrote that aviation accidents are the unexpected combination of normal aviation variability. And I talk about this accident where there were a number of variables that just kept stacking up and ultimately exceeded the pilot's capability to manage them all.

And another one of my columns is also now available on the web. It's called What Happens When Autopilots Fail? Accidents Can Occur If Workload Exceeds An Aviator's Capacity. So you can see a similar theme there. And I talk about several accidents in which pilots crashed soon after reporting to ATC that they had lost their autopilot. So if you'd like to read those articles, check out our show notes at aviationnewstalk.com slash 384.

And I have some truly exciting news to share. I have dreamed for years about building a network of high-quality aviation podcasts, and it's finally happening with the launch of three new shows that I think you're going to love. The first is NTSB News Talk, and you probably heard the debut episode that I shared in our Aviation News Talk feed as episode 384.

That show is co-hosted with my friend Rob Mark, who's been a frequent guest here. We're going to do that show bi-weekly, and we're going to try and unpack what went wrong and how pilots like you and I can avoid repeating some of those mistakes. So please follow or subscribe to NTSB News Talk in your favorite podcast app.

The second show is UAV News Talk. Formerly called the UAV Digest, this show is back with a new name. I've teamed up with one of the original co-hosts, David Vanderhoof, to relaunch it as UAV News Talk. So think of it as your bi-weekly source of all things about drones, UAVs, UAS, and EVTOLs. And it has a deep archive of over 428 episodes.

I'm doing that show because I'm looking forward to visiting and interviewing people at some of the eVTOL companies in my area. And just last week, this is pretty surprising, I experienced my first drone delivery of food from a local company.

And I'll be talking about that in the next episode. And so if you would just search in your favorite podcast app for UAV News Talk and then touch on subscribe or follow. The last show is The Rotary Wing Show. This is the go-to podcast for helicopter pilots. It was originally founded in 2014 by Australian pilot Mick Cullen, and it has 113 episodes. And it's a show that I used to listen to because I loved it as I was

driving 45 minutes to Hayward to take my helicopter lessons. Now, we're currently working on the transition and will release new episodes soon, but I've always wanted to have a separate helicopter show because I know that relatively few of you are helicopter pilots, so I don't want to be doing a lot of helicopter topics on this show. But if helicopters are your thing, or even if you're just curious, check out the Rotary Wing Show.

So if any of these topics interest you, please search for them in your podcast app of choice and then click follow or subscribe. And if you have story ideas or if you want to help with the helicopter show or you just want to share feedback, go out to aviationnewstalk.com and click on contact at the top of the page. Now I want to follow up with some new details on the crash of a Citation S-550 in San Diego that we talked about last week in episode 385.

You may recall that my main conclusion was that the aircraft didn't fly the approach correctly. It appeared to fly the approach in stair steps as you would fly an LNAV approach, but that it leveled off 173 feet below the LPV minimums, and then while flying level at 500 feet MSL, it hit power lines and crashed.

We've seen this before. When an aircraft flies below the published minimums for an approach, they sometimes crash. Which is why if you're an instrument pilot, you should always double-check your minimums, make sure you get that number right, and then never go below minimums.

A problem I've seen occasionally when giving instrument instruction is that sometimes a pilot will just glance at their chart literally for one or two seconds to read the published MDA or DA altitude, and then I've seen them dial in the wrong altitude because they misread the chart. Could this lead to a fatal mistake? Yeah, absolutely. So when you're flying an instrument approach, which number is the most important? Yeah, the minimums, the MDA or the DA altitude.

So when I see this behavior, I always tell a pilot that they can't afford to get this number wrong. And like a carpenter who measures twice and cuts once, pilots need to be absolutely certain that they read the correct number when looking for the minimums. And how do you do that? Well, by doing more than just glancing at the published minimums for one to two seconds and looking at it more than once.

You can also circle the number when you're briefing the approach, which you should be doing long before you start to fly the approach. When I'm teaching in the VisionJet, we typically start looking at the details of the approach we plan to fly an hour before we arrive at our destination. In the case of the Citation S550 in San Diego, could the pilot have misread the minimums?

Absolutely yes. In fact, after rereading the chart today, that is my leading theory of why this aircraft flew the wrong minimums.

Sometimes pilots will cheat and purposely fly below minimums, but I don't believe that's what happened here. I said last week that the pilot appeared to be flying the approach as an LNAV approach because he leveled off multiple times rather than flying the glide path. And he correctly leveled off at the right altitudes for the two fixes prior to the MDA. So that tells us his altimeter was probably set correctly and that he read those altitudes on the chart correctly. But

When I read the chart today, I looked for a possible reason as to why the pilot may have leveled off at 500 feet. And I found it. If you have a copy of the RNAV GPS Runway 28R approach for Montgomery Field, KMYF,

Look at the LNAV minimums line. Recall that I said the pilot was flying this approach as if he were flying to LNAV minimums with a level offset penny and pelos. The LNAV minimums for the approach are 840 feet with three quarters of a mile visibility, though a NOTAM raised the minimums to 940 feet. If you look to the right of that 840 number, you see the number 417 and

which means that 840 feet MSL is 417 feet above the touchdown zone elevation of 423 feet. If I were flying this approach and reading the minimums, those are the only two altitude numbers I would look at if I were flying to LNAV minimums. But, if you look slightly to the right of those numbers, you'll see a set of numbers in parentheses, and I always ignore those numbers as they are published for military pilots flying military aircraft.

They don't apply to us as civilians flying civil aircraft. And the first number in the parentheses is, yeah, you may have guessed it, 500. So let me ask you, do you think that a fatigued pilot flying at 3.47 a.m. in the morning after flying for seven and a half hours from New Jersey, who was probably stressed because there was no weather available for Montgomery Field and the weather at nearby airports was low,

Do you think a pilot in this situation could possibly have quickly read the 500 number and mistaken this for the LNAV minimums for the approach? I think that's far more likely than an alternative theory, which is that the pilot purposely flew 173 feet below the published LPV minimums. And it's a cautionary tale for all of us.

All pilots make mistakes. Many of those mistakes are non-consequential, but some of them can kill you. And when you're flying instruments, the one mistake you cannot afford to make is misreading the minimum altitude, whether it's an MDA or DA, for the approach that you're flying.

If you're flying in day VMC, you might realize that you're too low and recognize your mistake. But if you're flying at night, especially if you're in IMC, you will not recognize your mistake and it can possibly kill you. I mentioned last week that I don't accept flights in the middle of the night because it's too easy to make these kinds of mistakes.

If you do have to fly at odd hours, especially in the middle of the night, please bring a second pilot along. One of the many reasons that airlines have such an enviable safety record is that they fly with two pilots. And with two pilots, the second pilot almost always catches errors made by the other pilot.

I received a lot of emails from you about the crash, and also there were many comments on YouTube, and I wanted to address a couple of other issues you raised. One I talked about indirectly last week, but the other I completely missed. Let's talk about the one I completely missed. It was in some ways subtle, and it brings up a rule that's rarely talked about. And as I thought about it, I realized that had I been in the same situation as this pilot, I too would have missed it,

and not realize that it was not legal to fly this approach into Montgomery Field at all. Here's the deal. We know that the AWOS at Montgomery was out of service, and so there was no local weather for the field. But the controller gave the pilot the weather for other fields that were just a few miles away.

As I listened on the tapes, my thought was, yes, that sounds reasonable. Those fields are nearby, so the weather is likely similar. And while not having local weather is not ideal at the time, that to me seemed like a reasonable basis for continuing to fly the approach. And my thanks to Matt Jensen, who replied to my post about the crash on Twitter and asked,

And Matt, you are correct. It was not legal to fly this approach without the local weather for Montgomery Field.

You've probably read other instrument charts that say something like, if local weather is not available, use the altimeter setting for airport XYZ and add 60 feet or some other number to the minimums. But the RNAV GPS Runway 28R approach for Montgomery Field has no such statement. It does not permit the use of weather information from any of the nearby airports.

So with the AWOS out of service, it was not legal to fly this approach or the ILS, which is the only other approach for this field.

Just to double-check this, I emailed aviation lawyer Mark Culber, who we've had on the show, and in the email I cited AIM 5-4-5 that says, quote, When the altimeter settings on which the approach is based is not available, the approach is not authorized. And I ask, is the pilot or ATC are both responsible for knowing this and not flying an unauthorized approach? He replied, quote,

Yes, the AIM tells us that an approach is not available without an approved altimeter setting if you want a regulatory basis for the prohibition rather than the AIM. I think it's just the catch-all in 91.175 Section A that says, quote, "...unless otherwise authorized by the FAA, when it is necessary to use an instrument approach to a civil airport."

Each person operating an aircraft must use a standard instrument approach procedure prescribed in Part 97 of this chapter for that airport. Basically, we are bound by what the chart, which is regulatory, allows us to do.

And he said there's a blurb in the 7110.65, which I think is sometimes called the controller handbook, which places the onus on the pilot and insulates ATC. Note 2 to paragraph 4-8-1.a says in part, quote, "...the receipt of an approach clearance does not relieve the pilot of his or her responsibility to comply with applicable parts of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations."

and the notations on the instrument charts which levy on the pilot the responsibility to comply with or act on an instruction. For example, straight-in minima not authorized at night, procedure not authorized when glide slope glide path not used, use of procedure limited to aircraft authorized to use airport, or procedure not authorized at night, or snowflake icon with associated temperature.

And some of you might want to argue, well, the AIM isn't regulatory, so that doesn't apply. Well, good luck with that. In FAA enforcement proceedings, the NTSB and the FAA have repeatedly upheld violations based on guidance from the AIM. So translation, if you break a reg or even act carelessly, the FAA will absolutely cite the AIM to support its case.

And FAA Order 8900.1, which incorporates what we used to call the FAA Inspector's Handbook, says, quote,

Pilots who deviate from the AIM guidance must be prepared to show that their actions were consistent with the regulations and safe operating practices. So, bottom line, the accident pilot was not authorized to fly the approach, even though ATC cleared him for the approach because they didn't have the weather for Montgomery Field and there was no authorization on the chart to use weather from another airport.

Listeners also ask about whether the pilot was allowed to fly the approach faster than the speeds authorized for Category B. There were also a lot of questions on YouTube about whether the Citation was a Category B or C aircraft. And if it were a Category B aircraft, would it still qualify for flying the approach in Category B if it exceeded the maximum Category B speed limit of 120 knots? You may recall that last week I said, quote,

During the level off at 2,500 feet, it was able to slow to 175 knots as it crossed the final approach fix and started its final descent on the glide path. During the descent on the glide path, the aircraft slowed from 175 knots to 124 knots just before it crashed.

I only have a little citation time, but to me that seemed like an atypical way to fly an instant approach. Generally, I like to slow to approach speed prior to the FAF, and then a glide slope or glide path intercept, descend at that speed, and remain at that speed until I reach minimums. For Category B, you have to be at 120 knots or less, and I wondered at what point do you have to be at that speed.

So this week I did a little research and I found out that you have to be at that speed at the FAAF, which is the beginning of the final approach segment. The FAA Instrument Procedures Handbook says, "...the minimums applicable to a particular aircraft are based on the actual speed flown during the final approach segment."

And Terp's criteria, which is FAA Order 8260.3e, says the category to be used shall be determined by the speeds used during the final approach segment. So why is this all important? Well, the approach chart for the RNAV GPS-28R approach only permits Category A and B aircraft. There were a lot of comments about the citation being a Category C aircraft, but I think that's incorrect.

It's apparently listed in an FAA database as Category B, and if an aircraft is not listed in the database, the category can be determined by multiplying the VSO speed for an aircraft by 1.3. I looked up VSO for the citation, multiplied by 1.3, and the result was less than 120 knots. So I'm fairly confident the accident aircraft was a Category B aircraft, and hence would fall under Category B minimums.

However, the aircraft started the segment at 175 knots ground speed and finished at 124 knots ground speed, so the aircraft was not allowed to use Category B minimums.

The FAA Instrument Procedures Handbook says, quote, the minimums applicable to a particular aircraft are based on the aircraft's approach category. If it is necessary to operate at a speed higher than the upper limit of a speed range for an approach category, the minimums for the higher category must be used.

And 97.3 establishes that approach categories are based on 1.3 VSO, but operational use of minimums is determined by the actual indicated airspeed flown. So unless this aircraft was flying into a 55 knot headwind, being at 175 knots at the final approach fix means that it was not allowed to use category B minimums,

And Hansett couldn't use this approach as Category B is the highest category authorized for the approach. You may have also heard about some notums for some lights being out of service, and some of the media misreported this as the runway lights being out of service. After that occurred, airport management stated that the runway lights were operational.

The lights that were notamounted to service were the PAPI and the approach lighting system. Of these two, the approach lights are the more significant. If you've ever flown an approach to 200 feet minimums with low visibility, you know that those approach lights might be the only thing you see as you approach the runway. And the absence of those lights would make it harder to spot the runway, especially at night in low visibility conditions.

So there were many factors involved with this crash, but the most salient one is that the aircraft was 173 feet below LPV minimums, possibly because the pilot misread the approach chart, and had it been at either the MDA or the DA, the aircraft wouldn't have collided with power lines and crashed.

Coming up next, we're going to talk about a number of recent accidents involving open doors that have killed pilots and about what you can do to avoid these kinds of accidents. All right here on the Aviation News Talk podcast. Today, we're digging into why pilots are still losing control and crashing after something seemingly trivial occurs, a cabin or baggage door opens in flight, and how you can ensure it doesn't happen to you.

And if you're thinking, what's the big deal? Why are we talking about this? Let me point out that in just the first few months of 2025, we've had four serious crashes in the U.S. where a pilot experienced a door or baggage door opening after takeoff and didn't make it back safely. Three of those four crashes were fatal, and the fourth one resulted in burn injuries to the occupants. So while it's easy to dismiss these kinds of accidents, they're important as they continue to kill people.

One such accident occurred this past weekend in Colorado in a beach barren and resulted in the death of both people on board. And another one ended with two fatalities and 19 people injured on the ground. And these aren't isolated incidents. They're part of a pattern that the FAA and NTSB have been warning us about for years. First, my thanks to Patreon supporter Eric Newman, who emailed me and suggested that we talk about this topic.

He wrote regarding this past weekend's accident, Hey Max, after yet another fatal accident involving an open door, I think it's time to do a segment on this. It's not an uncommon occurrence, and it's definitely scary when it happens to someone for the first time. But it is not an emergency. Aviate, navigate, communicate. I was right-seated in a Bonanza last summer departing Greeley, Colorado, and was given the privilege of performing the takeoff.

Just about the time we arrived at Pattern Altitude, the door next to my shoulder popped open. My much more experienced left-seater calmly reassured me, notified ATC of our need to return, and we did a touch-and-go where I closed the door on the roll.

I learned that the plane flies just fine with an open door, that at 140 knots, the door is essentially immovable from the three to four inch open position, and that other than a lot of noise, it's a non-event. Eric, thanks so much for your email and for having taken a few minutes a year ago to sign up to become a Patreon supporter of Aviation News Talk. I love it when people...

value the show enough that they're willing to take a few minutes out of their day to do that. Now, I have had open doors more than a dozen times, probably close to two dozen. And I'll tell you why later I've had so many of these incidents. And here's what typically happens. The pilot takes off, climbs out, suddenly hears a loud bang. Maybe a passenger door wasn't latched properly or a baggage door pops open. There's lots of noise, wind, maybe some vibrations, papers might fly around.

The pilot is startled. That's probably the biggest effect. But the airplane is still flying just fine. But the pilot gets distracted, maybe tries to reach back and close the door, or decides to immediately return for landing with a low-level steep turn. That's where the real danger lies.

Let's talk about some of these recent accidents, and then I'll tell you about some of my open-door incidents, including one that scared the daylights out of me. First, here's the one that happened this past weekend. On Saturday, May 17th at about 10 a.m. local time, November 4321 Zulu, a B-55 Baron, took off from runway 30 right at Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport in Broomfield, Colorado, with two people on board. Shortly after takeoff,

The pilot radioed the tower to say, quote, we're going to have to go back and re-land. We've got the door popped open. The tower instructed the pilot to make right traffic and cleared him to land, but there were no further transmissions from the pilot. The aircraft climbed to just 250 feet AGL and then started a right crosswind.

During the right crosswind, the aircraft lost about 200 feet while slowing from about 100 knots to 96 knots. Now, the only way the aircraft could have slowed while losing that much altitude was if the engines were pulled way back.

Most likely, the pilot felt that with the door open, that he should reduce airspeed. Tragically, as the Baron turned to the downwind, it continued to slow and lose altitude. As it rolled out on the downwind, its ground speed was 81 knots. A few seconds later, it started turning to the left, and the last recorded speed was 71 knots at about ground elevation. The plane crashed and caught fire, and there were no survivors.

One notable thing about this accident was that the pilot climbed only to about 250 feet AGL while trying to fly a traffic pattern. Obviously, most traffic patterns are either 800 or 1,000 feet AGL, and it would be easy to dismiss this low altitude as just a random mistake by the pilot. Yet, I've noticed over the years that flying a ridiculously low traffic pattern is actually fairly common when pilots panic and

and try to quickly return to the airport. So please remember this, and instead fly a normal traffic pattern, even when you have to return quickly to an airport. I don't know the psychology behind why pilots often do this, but here's my guess. I'm guessing that incidents like this are very anxiety-producing, and that pilots want to get back on the runway as quickly as possible. When you want to get somewhere quickly, it's common for people to look for shortcuts in their routing to save time.

If you have to climb all the way up to 1,000 feet, that obviously takes more time than if you stay down low at 300 feet. So in the moment when a pilot is panicking and not thinking straight, it may seem perfectly logical to stay close to the ground, simply because that will objectively shave off a few seconds from the total time to get back around the traffic pattern. But doing that creates a whole host of other problems.

So instead, try to fly as normal a traffic pattern, including the correct altitude, as you can. Now let's talk about another recent accident. This comes from a preliminary NTSB report on January 2, 2025. About 2.09 p.m. Pacific, an experimental home-built Vans RV10, November 8757 Romeo, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Fullerton, California.

The pilot and passenger were fatally injured, and there were 19 ground injuries, eight of which were serious and 11 minor. Security video footage revealed that the airplane was in the run-up area for about three minutes, and during that time, although the left door was in the down position, it was not flush with the fuselage.

A witness, who was located on the airport ramp on the south side of runway 24, about 850 feet short of the departure end, observed the airplane fly by him after takeoff. It passed from right to left at what he considered to be a high speed, but at a lower altitude than he would have expected considering its distance down the runway. Once the airplane had departed the runway environment, and it was about 100 feet AGL, he realized its left door was open and up.

He then saw an arm reach up and pull the door down. Multiple witnesses, who were all pilots, observed the pilot during the final stages of the flight in the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern. They all provided similar observations of it flying lower than normal and banking aggressively left as it made the transition from downwind to base.

Three witnesses then saw the airplane roll aggressively again to the left for what they assumed was a turn to final, all stating that they could almost see the full wing profile and were concerned it might stall. The airplane then rolled right as its nose dropped and dove toward the warehouse where it collided in a fireball.

The witnesses all stated that just before the impact, they saw a white piece fall from the airplane. They described the piece as pedal-like and that it floated or fluttered to the ground. And I'll just add that this was most likely the door which apparently ripped off the airplane just before impact.

The report continues, the RV-10 design incorporates two gullwing doors on either side of the cabin. And let me just mention that the Columbia 350 and 400 also have gullwing doors, and I know of multiple instances where these doors have ripped off the aircraft. So while most GA aircraft doors tend to open only an inch or two and stay in that position, I'm guessing the gullwing doors are more likely to rip off if they open in flight.

and if this pilot was aware of that he may have been trying to hold the door down with one hand to keep it from ripping off continuing the report the left cabin door located on the facility roof was largely intact and had pulled away from its roof hinges

The door handle was found just short of the forward closed and locked position, and because it was not fully forward, its locking button had not engaged. The lock pins were found extended about a half inch out of the door ends, and when the door handle was tested by moving it forward, the pins extended a further 7 16ths of an inch, and the locking button engaged.

The door latch indication system supplied with the kit was composed of four magnetic reed switches, mounted individually within each door pillar. The switches were configured to confirm via LED warning lamps on the instrument panel that each door pin was in the fully extended and locked position. On the accident airplane, it appeared that only two reed switches had been installed, with each mounted to the aft pillars of both doors.

As such, the modified system would not have won the pilot if the forward latch pins had failed to fully engage. Now let's talk about another accident, and this also comes from a preliminary NTSB report. On March 9, 2025, about 3.30 p.m. Eastern, a Beech A36TC, November 347 Mike, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident that lit its Pennsylvania.

The pilot and one passenger were seriously injured, and the other three passengers sustained minor injuries. According to the pilot, during takeoff he heard a loud pop and was unsure what it was. He pulled the throttle back, and when he realized the cabin door had opened, he thought he pushed the throttle back forward but was not sure. He noticed the airplane's airspeed was not increasing and immediately looked for a place to land. He was unable to recall anything that happened after that point.

A passenger sitting in the rear seat behind the pilot stated that during takeoff, quote, as soon as the airplane left the ground, the front door opened. The pilot contacted the air traffic control tower and requested to land. The front seat passenger was holding the door closed. The airplane turned left, started shaking, and she knew the airplane was going to crash at that point. Other news sources say that witnesses reported seeing the plane veer left and the crash nose first with an immediate fireball.

and that all five passengers were injured and three were taken to a burn unit. Now let's talk about the fourth of these accidents that occurred this year. The NTSB preliminary report just came out for a fatal crash that involved an open baggage door. It says...

On May 10, 2025, about 9.30 a.m. Eastern, a Piper PA-32RT-300, so that's a Saratoga, November 30689, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yulee, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The pilot's wife reported that the purpose of the flight was for the pilot to reposition the airplane from

Nassau Airport, which is 83FL, Yulee, Florida, to Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport, Foxtrot Hotel Bravo, in Fernanda Beach, Florida, where they would wait for approaching thunderstorms to pass through the area before continuing on to Tennessee. Video showed that during the takeoff, the baggage door was open. The door stayed open until the airplane became airborne and exited the video frame.

Following the accident, a sweep of the usable portion of runway 12 found a case of aviation oil about 100 feet from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline. A bag of dog food was also found about 440 feet from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline.

Review of surveillance video from a residence that was located about 550 feet north of the departure end of the runway showed the airplane in a steep left-wing low descent prior to impacting a tree in the ground about 10 seconds after departing the airport.

So there you have it. In less than five months, we've had four accidents involving open doors, three of them fatal, and a fourth in which some of the victims were hospitalized with burns. And seemingly, all of these pilots could have landed safely after a door opened if they had just focused on what is always our primary task, which is, say it with me, fly the airplanes.

Now let me talk about some of my experiences with open doors, and then I'll talk a little about why doors seem to open so often, and what you as a pilot can do about it. As I mentioned earlier, I've had more than a dozen doors open in flight. I think the number is closer to two dozen. The most memorable occurred about 20 years ago, and it may have been before I became a CFI.

I was flying a Cessna 152 out of the Reed Hillview Airport, and I'd flown over San Francisco to take some photos. In a Cessna 152, the top of the door is relatively close to the pilot's left ear and is perhaps just an inch or two away. At some point in that flight, the pilot's side door opened, and the noise it made was so sudden and so loud that I nearly jumped out of my skin. It was very startling and felt like a heart-stopping moment.

Fortunately, after a second or two, I realized it was just the door that had opened and that I wasn't actually in imminent danger. In most Cessnas, when a door opens, the door only opens perhaps an inch since the wind keeps the door mostly closed.

however that sudden increase in noise even when you're wearing a headset can be dramatic and quite scary so if this happens to you you need to quickly regather your wits shake off the momentary fear and confusion and fly the airplane remember that there is no imperative to close the door if you want you can leave it open and close it when you land but this flight was memorable for yet another reason

At some point, I opened my window to shoot pictures with my SLR, and I will tell you that I was stupidly doing this while I was alone in the airplane. If you're going to shoot photos through an open window, I strongly recommend that you bring along a second pilot. While shooting out the window, my shoulder belt became loose and went out the window.

the shoulder belt on older sessions connects to a metal button on the lap belt and there's a piece of plastic that goes around that button to make sure that the shoulder belt stays securely attached to the button but it's common for that round piece of plastic to age and break off and when it does the shoulder belt will only loosely attach to the lap belt and it constantly becomes unattached so if you're flying an older system with this problem have your mechanic get a new plastic ring

and have it attached to the button on the seatbelt. And by the way, the trick to installing it is that you must first heat the plastic ring so that it expands enough that it can be pushed down over the button. Once it cools, it's secure and can't come off until years later when it gets hard and breaks off. I wasn't particularly concerned when my shoulder belt went out the window until I started to pull it back into the airplane and it wouldn't come back in.

That's when I discovered that the belt had lodged between the small gap between the left flap and the wing. And the metal fitting was on the other side of the flap. So when I pulled the strap, that fitting trapped the belt so I couldn't get it back in.

I spent a minute or two fiddling with it and eventually got the shoulder belt free and back in the airplane. But I had been concerned that if I operated the flaps, there might have been some kind of difficulty in landing. But overall, the experience of having the door open and losing the shoulder belt out the window sent my stress levels through the roof, which is why that flight was so memorable.

But most of my open door experiences have been in Cirrus aircraft. My recollection is that over the past 26 years, Cirrus has had four different door designs on the SR-20 and SR-22.

The first design and the last design work exceptionally well, and normally those doors won't come open unless you make a mistake, which I did one time, and I'll tell you about that in a minute. So the original G1 model doors worked well. In 2004, the G2 came out, and that design had a round button and it operated two latches, one at the top of the door and another near the bottom of the door.

And I've seen many, many cases where one of those latches either failed to close properly before takeoff or one of the latches released in flight, usually about the time we were rotating. The design remained substantially unchanged until 2016 when Cirrus introduced a new door locking system. That design features a handle on the inside of the door. When you push that handle down, the door is securely locked and I've never seen one of those doors unlock in flight if the handle is down.

But for aircraft built from 2004 through 2015, there's a good chance if you fly these aircraft off and that at some point you'll encounter an issue with the door being difficult to close or with it unlatching in flight. But here's the most important thing to know. A door popping open on a Cirrus and most other aircraft is a non-event. At most, the door pops open about three quarters of an inch and it's a little noisier inside. And that's it.

What you should know is that it's virtually impossible to close a Cirrus door in flight, so please don't waste your time trying to do it. Instead, fly the airplane. Also, it's not imperative to land immediately and close the door. And the Cirrus POH guidance for dealing with an open door has changed over the years. I pulled out an earlier POH and it says for door open in flight...

The doors on the SR-22 will remain 1 to 3 inches open in flight if not latched. If this is discovered on takeoff roll, abort takeoff if practical. If already airborne, 1. Airspeed reduced to 80 to 90 knots. 2. Land as soon as practical. So you might think from that, oh, it's pretty important to slow down. But it is not.

Here's what the POH says for a later model SR-22G6 for door open in flight. 1. Airplane control maintained.

and then procedure complete so that's all there is to it and then there's a note it says the doors on the airplane will remain one to three inches open in flight if not latched if this is discovered on takeoff roll abort takeoff if practical if already airborne do not allow efforts to close the door to interfere with the primary task of maintaining control of the airplane

So it says nothing about slowing down, and it says nothing about landing as soon as practical. And remember that while the door latching mechanism has changed, the door itself and the airframe are essentially the same. So somewhere along the way, Cirrus realized that there was no need to slow down and that pilots shouldn't focus on that. Instead, they should focus on flying the airplane. And I've flown a Cirrus with the door partially unlatched for more than an hour.

As I've said, it's just a little noisier and perhaps a little cooler inside. I am aware of one Cirrus Door related accident. In 2024 in Nixon, Pennsylvania, the pilot reported that while departing from the runway, the right cockpit door opened. The pilot was unable to close the door and he decided to return to the airport to close the door on the ground.

While on the final approach and near the runway, the pilot thought he heard the saw warning horn, so he attempted flaring the airplane to land. The airplane bounced twice, so the pilot attempted to abort the landing by advancing the throttle. The airplane veered to the left and exited the runway.

Following the accident, the pilot stated, In hindsight, I don't think the sound I heard was the stall warning horn, but rather the sound squealing through the partially open door, which confused me into thinking the aircraft had stalled. Given this information, it is likely that the pilot was distracted by the open right door during the landing, which contributed to his loss of control during the landing attempt.

Note that the pilot mentioned a squealing sound. This is something you want to pay attention to. Over the years, I've learned that when you do the run-up in an SR-22, as you bring the engine up to 1700 RPM for the mag check, if you start to hear a whistling sound, that means one of your doors is not properly latched. So listen carefully during your run-up.

I've also noticed that in the SR20, you won't hear that sound when you do your run-up with an open door, probably because the smaller engine is sending less air by the door. However, in both aircraft, you'll probably hear the whistling sound during your takeoff roll if a door is not properly latched. I did have a late model door unlatch on me one time at rotation, and it was totally my fault.

It was a rare solo flight for me in a Cirrus, and I was sitting in the left seat, and when doing the run-up, I remember reading the door closed and latched checklist item and thinking, yes, it's closed, but I didn't look at it or touch it. I was in the left seat, but didn't realize that the right door handle was not in its flush 9 o'clock position, but was instead sticking up an inch or so. Had I touched it, I would have immediately noticed that it wasn't in the fold-down and closed position.

Since it was the right door that unlatched, I wasn't able to immediately reach it, so I waited until I was at a comfortable altitude to reach over and latch the door.

And by the way, as I've mentioned in the past episode, there have been nearly 20 rear doors that have ripped off of Diamond DA40s and DA42s in flight when they were not properly latched. So when flying these airplanes, I always touch the rear door handle each time it's mentioned in the checklist to verify that it's actually closed. Now here's what the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook says about open doors.

It says,

to the point where attention is focused on the open door, rather than maintaining control of the airplane, loss of control may result, even though the disruption of airflow by the door is minimal. In the event of an inadvertent door opening in flight or on takeoff, the pilot should adhere to the following. 1. Concentrate on flying the airplane.

Particularly in light single and twin-engine airplanes, a cabin door that opens in flight seldom, if ever, compromises the airplane's ability to fly. 2. If the door opens after liftoff, do not rush to land. Climb to normal traffic pattern altitude, fly a normal traffic pattern, and make a normal landing. 3. Do not release the seatbelt and shoulder harness in an attempt to reach the door. Leave the door alone.

Land as soon as practical and close the door once safely on the ground. 4. Remember that most doors do not stay wide open. They usually bang open and then settle partly closed. A slip toward the door may cause it to open wider. A slip away from the door may push it closed.

5. Do not panic. Try to ignore the unfamiliar noise and vibration. Also, do not rush. Attempting to get the airplane on the ground as quickly as possible may result in steep turns at low altitude. 6. Complete all items on the landing checklist.

7. Remember that accidents are almost never caused by an open door. Rather, an open door accident is caused by the pilot's distraction or failure to maintain control of the airplane. The NTSB investigations into these accidents consistently pinpoint pilot lapses as primary factors.

Their key findings include 1. Distraction and loss of control. Nearly all reports cite the pilot's diverted attention to the open door and failure to maintain aircraft control as the immediate cause of the accident. 2. Pilot decision-making under stress. Several accidents involve pilots making hasty or inappropriate decisions upon realizing a door was open. 3.

Instead of climbing to a safe altitude or calmly configuring for a normal pattern, they try to fix the situation immediately, e.g. entering a steep turn back to the runway or attempting to physically close the door in flight. 3. Inadequate pre-flight, latch not secured. A preventative factor in many door open incidents is simply ensuring the door is properly latched before takeoff.

NTSB reports frequently note that the door or canopy was not fully secured to begin with, either due to pilot oversight or a latch malfunction. In a Piper Malibu accident, a live technician left a maintenance door unlatched and the pilot's pre-flight failed to catch it. 4. Mechanical issues, rare but possible. While pilot error is the primary theme, there have been a few instances of door latch mechanism failures contributing to in-flight openings.

For example, a Beechcraft Bonanza A-36 experienced a door opening in flight due to a misrigged warning switch. The door locking pin was resting on the stirrup, not fully engaged, yet the cockpit warning light did not illuminate, leading the crew to think the door was secure when it wasn't.

It's worth noting that none of the accidents in the last decade were attributed solely to a design flaw. The NTSB did not blame any inherent instability from an open door. In fact, the safety record shows many pilots successfully handled in-flight door openings by following standard procedure.

Thus, NTSB safety recommendations in this realm focus largely on pilot training and awareness, ensuring pilots know how to respond and not overreact, and emphasizing door security checks. For example, after a series of door-related accidents in the late 2000s, AOPA and instructors began instructing open-door scenarios in training flight.

Both the American Bonanza Society's Pilot Proficiency Program and the Cirrus CPPP weekend training events incorporate a demonstration of an open door in flight to familiarize pilots with the noise and to reinforce the habit of flying the airplane first. And passenger education can help.

Many GA door openings involve a passenger door on the right side popping open. Pilots should brief passengers on how the door latch works and to not panic if it opens. Emphasize that they must keep their seatbelts on and not try to grab at the door in flight.

A common scenario is a nervous passenger attempting to reshot their door and inadvertently interfering with the controls or distracting the pilot. Instead, brief them. Quote, If the door opens, it will stay slightly open. It's noisy, but fine. Please just sit back. I'll handle it once we're on the ground. This kind of briefing can prevent a well-meaning passenger from making things worse.

And I said earlier that I talk about why doors seem to open so often. Obviously, one reason is that pilots fail to properly check that doors are closed before takeoff. But in some cases, the doors themselves are not well designed. And in some models, the doors seem to need to pop open more often than in other models. And I have a theory as to why some of these doors are poorly designed.

As you know, I'm trained as an engineer and I've worked with a number of design teams over the years. And here's what I've observed. When a team leader assigns engineers to different parts of a product, members are assigned in a way that you might expect. And that is that the most experienced team members are assigned the most challenging or sometimes the most interesting parts of a product. And the least experienced team members are assigned to the simplest parts of a project where even if they don't come up with the best possible design, they're

It's of low consequence. So I've often joked with pilots about why doors seem to be so poorly designed. And I tell them that when a new airplane is being designed, the most experienced engineers are assigned the wing and the engine and the door design is assigned to the intern.

Clearly, doors are the least sexy part of an airplane, and I'm sure that anyone assigned to the door wants to complete that design quickly so they can move on to something more interesting. In summary, an open door incident should be a non-event if handled correctly. The only way it can hurt you is if you allow it to distract you to the point of losing situational awareness.

Now let me ask, have you ever had a door open on you in flight? I'd love to hear your story. Send me an email and share your experience. And please share this episode with another pilot, as it could help save a life. That's all for now. Fly safely, stay focused, and remember, minor distractions only become major problems when we stop flying the airplane.

And just a reminder that I love hearing from you and I read many of your emails on the show. If you'd like to send me a message, just go out to aviationnewstalk.com, click on contact at the top of the page. That's absolutely the best way to send me a message. And of course, I also want to thank everyone who supports the show in one of the following ways. We love it when you join the club and sign up at aviationnewstalk.com slash support to

To support the show financially, you can also do that at aviationnewstalk.com slash PayPal. We also love it when you leave a five-star review on whatever app that you're listening to us on now. And of course, if you're in the market for a headset, please consider buying a Lightspeed headset and using one of the links in our show notes, because if you use those links, they will donate to help support the show. So until next time, fly safely, have fun, and keep the blue side up. And remember that you can always go around. Go around.

Coming down. Till your side. Baby sliding upside down. You can always.