387 Vectors to Final and glide path behavior on RNAV (GPS) approaches + GA News
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In episode 383, we talked about why sometimes an autopilot fails to couple to an RNAV GPS glide path. And some of you ask how that changes if you activate vectors to final on an RNAV approach.

So I jumped back into the sim to find out, and I'll share those results today. Plus, a listener asks about how using VNAV affects all of this, and I'll talk about the real-world gotchas of using that function. And in our update section, we'll talk about the probable cause for a Medivac Pilatus PC12 that crashed near Reno in 2023.

and we'll read your emails about experiences you've had with doors opening in flight. And we'll share yet another reason why you're supposed to follow all of the step-downs before joining the ILS Clydeslope at the FAF. Hello again, and welcome to Aviation News Talk, where we talk general aviation. My name is Max Trescott. I've been flying for 50 years. I'm the author of several books and the 2008 National Flight Instructor of the Year. And my mission is to help you become the safest possible pilot.

Last week in episode 386, we talked about the crash of a Citation S-550 in San Diego and why that pilot might have picked the wrong altitude from his chart. And we also talked about why a cabin or baggage door opening after takeoff shouldn't be a life-threatening event. So if you didn't hear that episode, you may want to check it out at aviationnewstalk.com slash 386-386.

And if you've just found our show, welcome. So glad that you're here. And now take a moment and in whatever app that you're using to hear us, touch either the subscribe key or if you're using Spotify or the Apple Podcast app, the follow key so that next week's episode is downloaded for free. Coming up in the news for the week of June 2nd, 2025, DOT starts the search for a lead contractor in the ATC overhaul. G100UL fuel loses in court.

And a North Pole pilot, and not the one you're thinking of, was arrested. All this and more when the news starts now.

From FlyingMag.com, the Department of Transportation announced on Tuesday that they've issued a Request for Information, or RFI, which allows companies to explain how their expertise and capabilities would advance the project. The RFI is seeking an integrator or lead contractor who would handle nearly every aspect of the ATC rebuild, including the construction of new facilities and the installation of new

new telecom and radio equipment, and surveillance systems. The document poses 38 questions hitting on topics from past experience to timetables and cost-saving measures. Interested parties are also asked what obstacles they foresee and how they stand apart from their likely competitors. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy and the FAA are hosting Industry Days at DOT headquarters in Washington next week to encourage companies to participate and discuss the plan.

The DOT's modernization plan costs for the construction of six new ATC centers and 15 towers, the largest build-out of its kind since the 1960s. Every piece of equipment currently used by air traffic controllers, from radios and computers to navigation tools, would be replaced immediately.

and archaic technology like floppy disks would be phased out. The plan also envisions the integration of fiber optic cables, wireless devices, and satellite systems into the broader ATC network. From GlobalAir.com, GAMI G100UL not universal enough to replace Avgas in California, according to a judge.

California Judge Raj Chatterjee has stated that CAMI's unleaded fuel needs to be universally available to all gasoline-powered aircraft and be generally considered by the aviation industry to be safe to be considered commercially available. Until then, California FBOs will not be required to sell G100UL instead of 100 low-lead.

The California Center for Environmental Health, or CEH, filed a motion in early December stating that FBOs in California should now be required to sell Gammy's G100UL fuel in place of 100 low-lead

per a 2014 consent agreement with 26 FBOs and four fuel distributors that states that the FBOs and distributors must sell a lower-lead alternative that is commercially available. The FAA provided two ways for unleaded fuel to be certified for use. Fuel could receive approval by the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative, or PAFI, or obtain an STC from the FAA, which applies to specific aircraft.

G-100UL has an STC for use in certain piston-powered aircraft. According to GAMI, the fuel cannot be used in piston-powered helicopters, experimental aircraft, and light sport aircraft, which make up 17% of the GA fleet. GAMI claims that experimental aircraft are approved to use G-100UL and that less than 3% of the fleet are excluded from using G-100UL.

Multiple aircraft companies have opposed the CEH as GAMI has not yet developed or released a standard through ASTM for G100UL. Manufacturers such as Piper, Aviat, Diamond, and Cirrus and Textron have all stated that the fuel should not be used in their aircraft at this time. From AINonline.com, Beta makes first electric flight into New York City airport.

Beta Technologies, alias CX-300, on Tuesday became the first all-electric aircraft to land at a New York City airport. In partnership with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, one

one of Beta's prototypes landed at JFK after a passenger-carrying demonstration flight with a pilot and four passengers, including Blade Air Mobility CEO Rob Wiesenthal and Republic Airways President Matt Koskal. According to Beta, the energy cost for the 45-minute flight was just $7, compared with what it estimated as $160 in fuel cost for a helicopter making the same trip. The Alia flew at 135 knots,

operating under a market survey ticket the FAA issued to the Vermont manufacturer, allowing it to operate outside its primary test area.

New York officials who were present said that they are eager to encourage the adoption of advanced air mobility services as part of a wider effort to decarbonize public transportation. For the past six years, VEDA has been working on both the conventional takeoff and landing CX-300 model and its Alia 250E VTOL sibling. It is aiming to achieve FAA-type certification with the former by the end of 2025.

From GeneralAviationNews.com, Spatial Disorientation, GA's Deadliest Threat. A new study finds that spatial disorientation is a distinct threat to GA due to the high risk of fatalities in these accidents. According to 2025 research from EFAA's Civil Airspace Medical Institute, or CAMI, GA accidents caused by spatial disorientation had a 94% fatality rate compared to the 19% fatality rate for all GA accidents.

A study, which looked at 367 fatal GA accidents in the NTSB database between 2003 and 2021, found that pilots with fewer than 500 hours were more likely to be involved in these accidents, also contributing to higher fatalities, VFR, and to IMC flights.

Lastly, the researchers discovered that more and more spatial disorientation flights over the years are associated with positive toxicology findings, particularly for drugs that pose impairing effects. The findings highlight the necessity for continuing education and awareness efforts for spatial disorientation. From GeneralAviationNews.com, Fashion Model Injured During Photoshoot With Husky Pilot

This comes from a final NTSB report. The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped Aviat Husky A-1B aircraft reported that he intended to land on a dry lake bed behind a model who was being photographed to create a wall of dust for the photograph.

During the landing roll, he was moving too fast to stop before reaching the model and elected to execute a go-around. He then returned to the lake bed and landed, where he saw that the model had been seriously injured. According to the photographer, he and his model had been approached by the pilot, who offered his airplane as a backdrop for the photo shoot. After taking several photographs near the airplane, the pilot offered to overfly the model for additional photographs.

The pilot flew over the model twice, and on the third flyover, the airplane was lower than the previous passes, and the left wing struck the model in the back of the head. Following the accident, the photographer obtained images from other photographers of the pilot performing similar maneuvers over other models at low altitude. Probable cause? Unsafe in-flight operation of the aircraft and failure to maintain clearance from a person on the ground, which resulted in a serious injury.

And I pulled that final report where I learned that this occurred on Gene Dry Lakebed in Nevada. The 67-year-old pilot had a reported 600 total hours, of which 250 hours were in type. The pilot wrote, As I approach the lakebed, I set up a landing behind Kelly, who was the model, to create the dust. As I land, I see that my landing line was no longer clear. Kelly was now inside the safe area I was going to land.

I was too fast to stop before her. Given that the airplane is a tail dragger, I believe that if I had tried to use brakes to stop, it may have caused a nose over, or if I had tried to turn on the ground, it would have resulted in an unstable turn, probably a ground loop or worse. My only option, in my opinion, was to attempt a takeoff.

I returned to the lake bed, saw what had happened, and rendered aid as best I could. He later talks about helping the woman into a rental car so her companion can drive her to the hospital. And also from GeneralAviationNews.com, pilot loses control on landing when feet get stuck on rudder.

This comes from a final NTSB report. The Starduster 2 pilot told investigators that during landing at the airport in Norwich, New York, his right foot slipped off the rudder pedal and became wedged between the pedal and the adjacent airplane structure. He partially freed his right foot and attempted to regain control when his left foot became wedged between the left pedal and the airplane structure. The pilot was unable to regain directional control and

and the airplane veered off the runway and hit terrain. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower left wing. Probable cause? The pilot's loss of directional control during landing rollout due to interference from the pilot's foot-slash-shoe with the airplane's structure that resulted in a runway excursion and impact with terrain. And finally, and this comes from our You're Not Gonna Believe This file, North Pole man accused of flying while intoxicated.

And this comes from Newsminer.com, which I believe is a newspaper in Fairbanks, Alaska.

It says a North Pole man is accused of flying while intoxicated and landing his plane on Fort Wainwright in April. And just to give you a little more background, I looked the pilot up in the FAA database, and he does live in the town of North Pole, Alaska. The town, which is located near Fairbanks, has a population of about 2,400 people, and it's known for its year-round Christmas decorations, including candy cane-striped streetlights.

According to a criminal complaint, the 43-year-old pilot was flying in the North Pole area early on April 25th when a bird flew through his windshield, breaking off his side of the windshield. He said he felt something hit his head and that he could not see out of the windshield, so he made an emergency landing of his red Universal Stinson 108 aircraft at Ladd Army Airfield on Fort Wainwright.

He now faces a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence after the crash landing and exhibiting aggressive behavior toward military police. He also reportedly had an empty shooter bottle in the aircraft and displayed mood swings and signs of alcohol consumption at the hospital.

His blood alcohol content was .091, which is more than double the limit for flying. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and his bail was set at $2,500. According to the FAA database, he's held a private pilot license since at least 2010, but is prohibited from flying at night. Also, his last medical was issued in 2008. To top it all off, according to the FAA, the aircraft he was flying is currently deregistered.

So if you ever find yourself flying near the North Pole, watch out for this pilot. That's the news for this week. Coming up next, a few of my updates, including the findings from the final NTSB report for Pilatus PC-12 that crashed near Reno, Nevada, and your emails about your experiences with doors opening in flight. And then later, for our main topic, we'll talk about how using vectors to final affects your ability to couple to an RNAV glide path. All right here on the Aviation News Talk podcast.

And now let's get to our video of the week. First, let me read this email from Ken Snyder who wrote, love your podcast. Today I listened to episode 386 in the discussion of the recent rash of accidents due to door openings. This reminded me of a video I saw a couple of years ago that you may want to share where

which has an example of a canopy opening event that is handled well. Steve Hinton and Mark Moody were doing an initial test flight on the Kermit Weeks A-26 Invader. At about 3.15 into the video, both canopies pop open. They're a clamshell assembly. When the canopies open, you can see the surprised reaction of Steve and Mark, but they recovered quickly and continued to fly the airplane. Control was never in doubt.

They declare an emergency and recover the aircraft safely. So to see this video of the weekend, all of our videos of the week, go on out to aviationnews.com slash video. And the links for our videos of the week are on the same page with the links that you can use to become a supporter to start supporting the show. So when you go out to view the videos, look at the bottom of the page for the video links and look at the top of the page where you'll see four options listed for supporting the show.

And that link is aviationnewstalk.com slash video. And just a quick reminder that whenever you buy a Lightspeed headset, Lightspeed will send a check to help support Aviation News Talk, but only if you first go to this special link that we've set up for you to get to their website. So when you buy, go first to aviationnewstalk.com slash Lightspeed, which will take you to their website where you can buy your new headset.

And here's a feel-good story that I've been watching unfold over the last few days. Earlier in the week, I saw a posting on Facebook by a man who goes by the username JStumpyBlythe, and he posted in the Airplanes and Coffee group and wrote, Hello, pilots of Florida. I'm 55 and live in Daytona Beach. I was diagnosed with pancreatic carcinoma in November and was given four to six months to live. Already beat that.

But here's my question. I would absolutely love to fly in a vision jet before my time comes. I'm not a pilot, but rather someone who enjoys all of the design and performance of the vision jet. If anyone knows of someone that would like to make a dying man's dream come true, please let me know.

And then within a day or so, I read that Cirrus had arranged for one of their company pilots to give him a flight, which apparently occurred a day or so ago. Jay then posted photos of his flight and wrote, quote, Well, Fox 35 was there, and now they want me in studio on Friday morning live on the air to talk about it. How awesome is that? I had the absolute best time ever. More pics to follow.

So thanks to everyone, including Cirrus Aircraft, who were involved in making that happen. It's definitely nice to see that kind of kindness that we find all of the time in general aviation. And here's an email from Tyler Stank. We mentioned his name last week because he made a donation. He wrote, I started listening when studying for my CFI about 18 months ago. I always said I'd donate when I found a job. My career transition didn't go as planned, but

but I just got my first paycheck from Garmin, where I'm an aviation software developer. Well, Tyler, I think that's going to be a great job. I hope you enjoy that. And of course, you can always teach on the side. And I think Garmin has a company flying club, so I'm sure they'd be happy to have another CFI teach other employees.

And my thanks to these two people who've signed up in the past week to support Aviation News Talk. They include a new Patreon mega supporter. These are the folks who donate $50 a month to help support the show. And after two months, I send them a signed copy of one of my books. Thanks to Tom Kroeber for signing up to join the show. And we also had a one-time donation from Barry Harper. In fact, that's a repeat donation. Barry has made a number of donations. Thanks so very much to both of you for signing up to support the show. And I'll see you next time.

And if you choose to sign up and make a donation, as Tom and Barry have done, I'll read your name on next week's show. All you need to do is go out to aviationnewstalk.com slash support. And my thanks to patron supporter Sam Dawson, who sent us this FAA info. And this is related to how to fly an ILS and why you're not supposed to intercept it at higher than the glide slope intercept altitude at the FAAF.

The subject of this info is failure to comply with minimum crossing altitudes at step-down fixes located on ILS inbound courses. And the purpose is this info emphasizes the requirements for operators to comply with all altitude instructions, e.g. step-down altitudes, prior to the final approach segment when cleared for an ILS approach.

and that it says under background, on ILS approaches, step-down fixes are established for obstacle or traffic separation. For all practical purposes, the glide slope remains stationary regardless of atmospheric temperature and pressure. Conversely, step-down fixes are published for a pilot to fly using indicated altitude, which varies with temperature and pressure changes. Therefore, the proximity of step-down fixes in reference to the glide slope changes with the weather.

And then under discussion, it says what this means to pilots is that on some approaches outside the final approach segment on a cool day, you might be able to follow the glide slope and all the published step down altitudes may pass below your aircraft.

The next day, after a warm front passes, you could follow the same glide slope and, because the temperature is hotter this day, those same step-down altitudes now protrude into the glide slope and require pilot action to ensure compliance with the published minimum altitudes or step-down fixes. On both days, your flight plan on the glide slope was the same, but on the hotter days, the step-down altitudes crept up into your glide path.

High barometric pressure produces the same effect as high temperature.

And then it continues, regardless of cause, pilots are cautioned to adhere to published step-down fixes located outside the final approach segment on an ILS approach. If a pilot elects to follow the glide slope while outside the final approach segment, he should be fully aware that this technique needs to be closely monitored and, if necessary, action must be taken to meet all step-down altitudes. Examples of airports where multiple altitude deviations have occurred include

but are not limited to LAX, ORD, Atlanta, and SLC. Recommended action, directors of safety, directors of operation, chief pilots, fractional ownership program managers, training managers, and operators of aircraft should ensure that aircraft under their control when cleared for an ILS approach do not descend below published step-down altitudes on an ILS final approach course while outside the final approach segment.

So this just reinforces what we read from the AIM a couple of weeks ago, which is that you are to follow all of the step-downs and join the glide slope at the published glide slope or glide path intercept altitude at the FAF.

Now let's talk about the final NTSB report that has just come out for November 273 Sierra Mike, a Medevac Pilatus PC-12 that crashed in Nevada on February 24th, 2023. We talked about that crash in detail in episode 273, and in that episode I included ATC audio from the pilot in which he mentioned that the autopilot had disengaged. And just recently we talked about a number of different fatal accidents,

that occurred after a pilot said over the radio that his autopilot had disconnected. Now, the important facts were evident from the ADS-B track, and I talked about them at the time, but just to recap, here's what the final report says.

The pilot, two medical crew members, and two passengers departed on the medical transport flight, which was operating on an IFR flight plan in Knight IMC. Onboard data and ADS-B flight track information showed that between one and three minutes after takeoff, the autopilot disengaged and then reengaged. However, the airplane continued to fly a course consistent with the published departure procedure. About 11 minutes after takeoff,

the airplane turned about 90 degrees to the right, away from the next waypoint along the departure procedure, and remained on that heading for about 47 seconds. Around this time, the airplane's autopilot was disengaged again and was not re-engaged for the remainder of the flight. Also, about this time, the airplane's previously consistent climb rate stopped and

and the airplane maintained an altitude of about 18,300 feet MSL for about 20 seconds, even though the pilot had been cleared to climb to flight level 250. The airplane subsequently turned left to a northeasterly heading and climbed to about 19,400 feet before entering a descending right turn. Shortly after entering the right turn, the airplane's rate of descent increased from about 1,800 feet per minute to about 13,000 feet per minute.

The distribution of the wreckage at the accident site was consistent with a low-altitude in-flight breakup. Now, here are a few things from the final report that we couldn't have known. Following the second autopilot disengagement, the pilot would have been required to manually maintain control of the airplane while operating an IMC, which increased his susceptibility to spatial disorientation.

The airplane's subsequent flight path was consistent with a phenomena known as graveyard spiral, a sensory illusion in which a pilot believes they are flying at a wings-level descent. However, the airplane is actually in a descending turn. Autopsy of the pilot revealed a 3-centimeter fibroblastic meningioma, which is a tumor that

in the right parietal section of the brain. The presence and location of the tumor may have impacted the pilot's ability to synthesize and respond to sensory interpretation from the conditions under which he was flying. However, it's also possible that the tumor may have been an incidental finding without any significant symptoms, and the pilot's next of kin indicated no changes in his behavior or health before the accident.

Based on the available information, whether the effects of the pilot's undiagnosed brain tumor contributed to the accident could not be determined. The accident pilot was not permanently assigned to the base from which the accident flight departed. Rather, he was classified as a float pilot who rotated among the operator's bases throughout the country.

The operator did not have any formal training or mentoring procedures in place to ensure local area knowledge was passed along to pilots new to a specific operating area. The investigation was unable to establish the pilot's experience operating a night IMC over mountainous terrain. All three crew members of the accident flight were relatively new in their respective roles.

The pilot was hired by the operator about five months before the accident, while both clinicians had been assigned to the airplane for about six months. The company's website highlighted the, quote, three to say go, one to say no protocol as the best practice among air ambulance providers that empowers any member of the flight team for any reason to raise a safety concern.

For Rotocraft flights, the operator required that clinicians with less than one year of experience be paired with clinicians with more than one year of experience, a practice that leveraged the flight team's collective experience to benefit flight safety. However, fixed-wing operations were not subject to this requirement.

The operator's procedure also required company dispatchers to inform flight crews if a flight had been turned down by another operator. Although the weather can change throughout the course of a given day, the fact that other pilots and operators turned down flights due to weather in the area on the day of the accident should have been related to both the pilot and the medical crew as part of their decision-making process.

However, review of communication logs did not indicate that the company's dispatchers made the accident crew aware of the turndowns earlier on the day of the accident. The operator also required that a flight risk assessment be completed before each flight. However, no such assessment was located for the accident flight.

Even if a risk assessment had been conducted, the crew's relative inexperience and lack of information about the earlier turndowns increased the likelihood of a knowledge-based error during the risk assessment and decision-making process. That an inexperienced flight crew was permitted to accept the accident flight given the weather conditions and the previous flight turndowns with no additional approval demonstrated an insufficient risk assessment process and lack of organizational oversight.

Another fatal accident involving the accident operator occurred 71 days before this accident. The investigation into that accident also revealed the lack of a pre-flight risk assessment. The pilot, age 46, had a total of 2,136 hours, but just 94.6 hours in the Pilatus PC-12. He was hired about five months before the crash.

A review of the pilot's training record from the operator indicated that he began his initial PC-12 flight training on October 5, 2022, and concluded on October 10, 2022, for a total of 8.1 hours. On the flight dated October 10, of the 53 flight subject training areas, 33 subject areas were graded S or Satisfactory, and 20 were graded W or Waived. Of these 53 flight subject training areas,

One was titled Autopilot System and another was titled Nav and Avionics System. On two previous separate flights, on October 5th and 7th, the pilot received a grade of U or Unsatisfactory for those areas and subsequently graded Satisfactory on October 9th.

The accident pilot was employed from May 10th through August 12th, 2021 by a Part 121 airline. The airline reported the accident pilot was unable to satisfactorily complete the training program. The reasons provided were pre-departure, climb, descent, and approach procedures. The probable cause was the pilot's loss of control due to spatial disorientation while operating in night IMC,

which resulted in an in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident was the disengagement of the autopilot for undetermined reasons, as well as the operator's insufficient flight risk assessment process and lack of organizational oversight.

And now let's get to some of your emails. Many of you sent me emails about last week's episode 386, when a door ajar becomes a fatal distraction. And you talked about your door opening experiences. So I'd like to share some of those emails. And I've asked our intern Kelly, who I introduced on a previous show, to help out by reading your emails.

The first email comes from mega supporter David Broskow. And by the way, you don't have to be a patron supporter like David for us to read your email on the show. Though it turns out that patron supporters are much more engaged than other listeners as I do get more email from them. Kelly, if you would please read David's email. Max, your last episode ended with a call out for open door experiences.

I had one just about six months ago while departing John Wayne Airport heading for Catalina Island. Thankfully, I had incredibly good training and knew that the door to my Piper Aero was not likely to fly open, given all of the components of airflow around my airplane. I asked my friend whether he was able to close the door without strain, and ultimately, he was able to do so.

If not, I was prepared to get to a safe altitude and return back to John Wayne before heading out over the Long Beach Harbor.

What I learned during your show, as I always am learning, is that I really should brief all of my passengers on this potential and to reassure them that it is not generally threatening to our safety. David, thanks so much for your email and for being one of our mega supporters. And you raise a really good point that I don't think I've heard anyone mention before. And that is that it does make sense to brief passengers before takeoff about not panicking if a door should open in flight.

and then explain what you will do or what you want them to do under those circumstances. And that particularly makes sense if you know that you're flying a particular plane with a history of doors opening in flight. I mentioned last week that I had probably two dozen door openings in flight, but I didn't mention why it had so many of them.

There was one particular Cirrus SR20, which I believe was a 2011 or 2012 model that I used to teach in at the San Carlos airport, and the right door was extremely difficult to get to close properly. Even when I made a lot of effort to ensure that door was closed, it would still often pop open during the takeoff roll, and then we'd abort our takeoff.

The St. Carlos Tower would always ask us for the reason for the aborted takeoff, and one day I got a call from an FAA inspector I know asking me about why this particular plane had so many aborted takeoffs. So, sometimes the FAA does take note of these kinds of things and seeks to find out what the reason is. I'm guessing he later contacted the plane's owner, but I don't know for sure.

Now, Kelly, if you would, please read the email from patron supporter Jeff Butler. Max, I just listened to your most recent episode. Early in my training, 10 hours or less, my door came open. My CFI calmly said, don't worry, just keep flying the plane. He had me stay on the controls for a few minutes and continue whatever we were doing. Then he took the controls so I could close my door. This cemented in my brain that an open door is not an emergency. And wouldn't you know it?

About a month later, my door popped open again on rotation. After an initial startle, I continued to climb out, not worrying about the door. So the first one taught me not to overreact. The second one taught me to check the door better before takeoff. Jeff, it's great that you got these experiences early in your training and while you had a CFI on board to coach you through the experiences and to emphasize the need to focus on flying the airplane rather than worrying about the door.

Great, too, that this happened apparently before you soloed. Now, I don't routinely give people experience with open doors prior to solo, and I think that is something that I'm going to change in my teaching. Because pilots should experience their first open door with a CFI on board and not have to figure out what to do on their own the first time a door opens in flight. It makes me wonder if some of the fatal accidents we've talked about involve pilots who'd never experienced an open door prior to their accidents.

Kelly, please go ahead and read the email from patron supporter David Dismore of Jacksonville, Florida. Max, we have had two fatal Mooney accidents with baggage doors in our area. It appears the door came off and caused the crash. Perhaps a different strategy is needed for these planes.

One was in St. Augustine in March 2024, and the other was in Jacksonville in December of 2021. David, thanks for writing. You piqued my curiosity, so I did a little research on Mooney baggage door accidents.

I searched the NTSB database going back to the year 2000 and found five NTSB reports involving open baggage doors. Of those five reports, two of them were fatal and they were the accidents you mentioned in 2021 and 2024. Two of them had no injuries and one of them had injuries.

There was also an accident that occurred in 2020 in the UK, and I read part of the final report and also noticed that there is a YouTube video that captured the event from inside the cockpit. The synopsis for that report says, quote,

A Mooney M20K aircraft, Gulf Oscars Sierra Uniform Sierra, had been flying for approximately 15 minutes and was in level flight when the baggage door opened and detached. It struck the right tailplane and remained wrapped around the leading edge near its tip. This caused the pilot control difficulties and increased drag. The pilot declared a mayday and made a successful emergency landing at Mebri Airfield.

The investigation found the safety clip for the internal emergency operating handle of the baggage door was not correctly installed, so instead of holding the handle closed, it held it in a slightly open position. During the flight, it seems most likely that this handle moved sufficiently towards the open position to disengage the chute bolts from the door frame, allowing the door to open. It could not be determined whether the safety clip was incorrectly installed or

or why it had not been noticed. And I also found a Mooney M20 series service instruction from 1983 that said, in part, reports have been received that baggage doors have come open during takeoff or in flight conditions.

These have been traced back to improper re-engagement of the latching pin into the outside handle cam assembly after demonstration or use of the inside auxiliary exit handle. The purpose of this service instruction is to install a positive means of pin engagement whenever the auxiliary exit handle is activated.

So if you own a Mooney, you may want to be aware of this service instruction. Kelly, now please read the email from patron supporter Carl Hood. The shirt tail from my solo says check the door, along with the rest of the usual stuff commemorating the day. I had three different instances of the door of the 172 popping open in the pattern pre-solo, but obviously got it mastered prior to being cut loose to go solo.

Thank you to my CFI, Zach Beyer, for making sure I never forgot that again. Carl, thanks for sharing that. Good that you had experiences with a pop door before your solo. Though, I'm surprised that you had three instances of it in the Cessna 172R model, which was introduced in 1996.

I think that the current door latching mechanism was introduced in the 1984 model year, and it's a dual latch system that reduces the likelihood of in-flight door openings. And it's significantly better than the older single point latch system in older Cessnas, which was more susceptible to wear and potential failure over time. And I've had a number of those older doors pop open.

So I don't know why your door with a newer latch opened so often, but good that you had lots of experience with it before you soloed.

Kelly, please go ahead and read the email from Tyler from Missouri. Thanks.

Thanks for the great show and fly safe. Tyler, thanks for your email. And it's great that you had an instructor who demonstrated an open door prior to your solo. Sounds like you got some good instruction.

Kelly, now let's hear from mega supporter Jared Davis. Max, love the show and supporting you via Patreon. Your recent show about the door popping open after rotation gave me a chuckle. Don't get me wrong, it is serious business that we are having these issues of airplanes losing control due to a pilot being concerned about a door, but it really doesn't affect most aircraft. But I had to laugh because there is a local DPE that I consider a very dear friend that has developed a call sign latch.

I have been on not one, not two, but three flights over the years with him where the door has popped open on Bonanzas and Barons. To my knowledge, none of these were intentional, but I have heard rumors that now on check rides, doors are often popping open on purpose so that the pilot is exposed to the scenario and training rather than a first time on their own.

Personally, I think that this is a great scenario for an early aviator to experience, so that everyone can realize that it truly isn't a big deal in most light GA aircraft. There are obviously some that are more serious door types, such as the gull wings that you mention, that practice would be frowned upon. However, in the bulk of the training fleet of Piper, Cessna, and Beach,

This really doesn't change how the aircraft flies, and I think that more pilots should experience this scenario. So my advice to those that haven't experienced it in person is find a local LATCH and go try it out. Jared, thanks so much for sharing this story about your friend LATCH. Great name, by the way. And good to hear that more pilots are getting more exposure to open doors on check rides.

And if you have any stories you'd like to share, send me an email. The best way to reach me is by going out to aviationnewstalk.com and clicking on contact at the top of the page. When you do that, it's guaranteed that I'll see it. If you send me email or worse yet, try and contact me through social media, much better chance that I'm not going to find it when I go back to look for it.

Coming up next, we'll talk more about RNAV approaches, including vectors to final and the VNAV function, all right here on the Aviation News Talk podcast.

And now let's talk more about GPS approaches. I had a number of nice emails from you about episode 383 called Why Your RNAV Glide Path Won't Capture. If you didn't hear that episode, a key thing that we talked about is that the GPS glide path indicator doesn't turn magenta until the FAF or final approach fix becomes the active waypoint, which occurs as you cross the fix prior to the FAF, which is sometimes but not always the intermediate fix.

That's significant because the autopilot won't couple to the GPS glide path when the indicator is a hollow white diamond. So you need to follow the step-downs on the approach at least to the fix prior to the FAF. Otherwise, if you cross the IAF and remain at that altitude, the autopilot won't let you capture the glide path early at that higher altitude.

A couple of you wrote asking how using vectors to final changes this situation. The answer is, yeah, it does change it. Once again, I went back to my club to use one of their G1000AATDs to confirm the behavior. And again, I flew a number of approaches and activated vectors to final at various points in time. And the behavior was pretty much what I've seen since we first started seeing WASC-capable receivers in aircraft about 20 years ago.

A WASC-capable GPS receiver differs from earlier GPS receivers in many ways. One of them is that instead of just doing a ram check of the geometry between the satellites currently being received,

It does a signal integrity check to see whether the current signal quality exceeds either of the limits for the different approach minimums. For example, if the vertical portion of the WA signal or VPL exceeds the 50 meter limit, the receiver will downgrade to the minimums permitted on the approach from LPV to LNAV. Normally, if you're flying an approach via own navigation, where you start at either the IAF or the IF, and then fly the step downs of an approach,

That signal evaluation occurs when the FAF becomes the active waypoint. And of course, that's also the same point at which the glide path turns magenta and the autopilot can couple to it. So as you cross the fix before the FAF, the FAF becomes the active waypoint. The receiver evaluates the signal quality. And if it's good enough for LPV minimums, the glide path indicator turns magenta.

So generally this evaluation occurs toward the end of an instrument approach. But things are different if you activate vectors to final. When you do that, by of course choosing PROC and then activate vectors to final, the signal evaluation occurs at that moment. And it doesn't matter where you are relative to the approach or how far away you are from the approach. The signal evaluation occurs when you activate vectors to final.

And under some circumstances, immediately after the signal evaluation occurs, the glide path indicator turns magenta and the autopilot can couple to it. Whether the glide path indicator turns magenta or not depends upon the aircraft's ground track. If the aircraft track is within 90 degrees of the approach's final approach course, the

the light path indicator turns magenta. And actually, it will still occur if you're within about 100, maybe 110 degrees of the final approach course.

But if the aircraft's track is more than this, more than 100 or 110 degrees from the final approach course, the glide path indicator will not be displayed at all. So, for example, if you're flying essentially a downwind prior to joining the approach, you are pointed about 180 degrees from the final approach course. You can activate vectors to final at this point, but the glide path indicator will not be displayed.

As you turn onto essentially a base leg to join the approach, you'll be within 100 degrees of the final approach course, and the glide path indicator will appear as a magenta diamond, and the autopilot will be able to couple to it once you join the final approach course.

Now, one interesting thing about activating vectors to final is that you can activate while you're still many miles away from the airport, which means you can force a glide path indicator to appear when you're far, far away. Though, I'm not sure why you'd want to do that, especially if you're in a mountainous area.

Because you could potentially find yourself in a situation where you activated vectors to final to force the glide path indicator to appear, but flying on that glide path is not safe because you're so far from the airport that the glide path essentially flies through the terrain. So remember, the only time you're safe to fly on a glide slope or a glide path is when you're within the confines of the published approach courses and altitudes.

Never assume you're at a safe altitude when you're outside the approach courses just because you can receive a glide slope or can force a glide path to appear.

There is one situation, though, where you might find this handy. And I did test this out in the simulator, so I know it works. I don't fly RNAV approaches this way, and I'm certainly not recommending that you fly an RNAV approach this way. And there is one gotcha where doing this could get you in trouble. But here's what's possible. If you're flying an RNAV approach via pilot navigation, also called own navigation, where you're starting the approach at an IAF approach,

After crossing the IAF, you could activate vectors to final, which would force the glide path indicator to turn to magenta. And that would allow you to couple the autopilot to the vertical guidance earlier in the approach than you'd normally be able to do that. But here's one gotcha. Typically activating vectors to final generates a 30 nautical mile long line backwards from the final approach fix.

and that line will not follow any bends in the approach. So, for example, if there's a turn at the intermediate fix, a vector to final will not follow along the initial segment, which connects the IAF to the IF.

So imagine there is such a bend in the approach at the IAF, and you've just crossed the IAF, and you activate vectors to final. At that point, there will no longer be a magenta line taking you from your present position to the IAF, and there will be no course guidance from your autopilot. So while this should work if the approach comes straight into the airport from the IAF, there are potential gotchas, and this is not the recommended way to fly an approach.

Now let's change gears here a little bit and talk about a big gotcha that can occur whenever you're getting vectors to final from a controller. And this applies to both ILS approaches and RNAV approaches with vertical guidance. For the Garmin autopilots, and perhaps for other autopilots as well, the localizer has to center and be captured by the autopilot before the glide slope or glide path can be captured by the autopilot.

If the vertical indicator centers first, before the CDI or HSI needle centers, the autopilot will not capture the glide slope or glide path. Later, as the CDI centers, the autopilot will capture that signal. However, you will now be above the glide slope or glide path, and you will need to use vertical speed mode to get the aircraft down to a point where it can capture the glide slope or glide path.

How do you get into this situation? Well, it all depends upon how close to the airport a controller vectors you and at what altitude you're being vectored. Let's say, for example, that there's an approach where typically you're vectored onto the approach at 3,800 feet. And each time you're vectored onto that approach, you join the approach below the glide slope or glide path, which is where you're supposed to be.

That's the ideal case that we're looking for. And in that case, the CDI or HSI needle will center first, and the autopilot's nav mode or even the approach mode will capture that lateral left-right signal of the localizer. Then as you proceed inbound, the glide path or glide slope indicator will descend, and as it centers, the autopilot will capture that vertical signal and start to descend along it. That's the ideal normal case.

Now let's assume that the controller issues a base turn that's closer into the airport than usual, but that you're still being vectored at that same altitude of 3,000 feet. Since you'll be joining the approach closer to the airport than usual, the glide slope or glide path at that location will be at a lower altitude. Let's say it's at 2,800 feet at that location.

Now as you're issued a final vector to join the approach, you'll notice that the vertical deviation indicator is already centered or below you before you join the approach, indicating that you're above the glide slope or glide path. As you reach the localizer, the autopilot will capture the lateral left-right signal. However, you will be above the glide slope or glide path, and the aircraft will not descend.

Now, this is something that I look out for on every approach, and it almost happened to us on a VisionJet trip to the Orange County Airport in Southern California on a trip I made about a week ago. As we were being vectored onto the RNAV Yankee 2-0 right approach, I pointed out to the pilot that the glide path indicator was close to centered and that it was possible that it would center before the HSI centered, in which case the autopilot would not capture the glide path.

As it turned out, the autopilot captured the lateral guidance literally one to two seconds before it captured the glide path signal. So, had we been vectored in a few hundred feet closer to the airport, our glide path would not have captured.

But not only did we get lucky, we were aware that we were potentially in that situation, so we were prepared to immediately use vertical speed mode to force the jet to descend if the autopilot didn't capture the glide path. So anytime you're being vectored, check to see that they didn't bring you in so close to the airport that you're above the glide slope, because if you are,

The autopilot won't capture the glide slope, and you'll need to use vertical speed mode to get down after you're established on the approach. And by the way, there is one other thing you may have noticed when using vectors to final on an RNAV approach, and we talked about this a long time ago, so it's worth repeating.

Imagine that you're being vectored on a downwind leg and that eventually you'll be vectored onto the approach. And imagine that you're coming from the opposite direction of the airport so that you flew by the airport to get onto this downwind leg. And also imagine that you haven't yet reached the final approach fix as you continue to fly outbound, so you're still relatively close to the airport.

If you hit PROC, activate vectors to final, before you fly past the FAF on your downwind leg, when you do that, you'll notice an SUSP or suspend enunciator. And a lot of pilots are used to, when they see the suspend enunciator, to push the corresponding button to make it go away. This is one situation where you do not want to do that.

If you do, the first push of the suspend key will activate the leg from the final approach fix to the missed approach point, which you don't want. Then if you push the button a second time, it will disable the approach. What you do need to do instead is something that's very difficult for a lot of pilots. You need to be patient, very patient, because this is a normal indication and it will go away on its own, but not right away.

So anytime you activate vectors to final and you see the suspend annunciator, force yourself to ignore it. Continue to fly the vectors you're receiving. Eventually, you'll be given a base leg turn to join the approach. And later you'll get the final turn to join the approach course. And that turn has to be within 30 degrees of the final approach course.

and it's during that final turn that the Suspend Enunciator will go away. It's set up to disappear when you're inbound toward the airport and when you're within 45 degrees of the final approach course. So just remember this gotcha. When you activate Vectors to Final, if the Suspend Enunciator appears, just ignore it. It will go away.

And changing gears slightly, here's an email from Matt Gerdes. He wrote, Hi Max, I love your show. I appreciated you getting into the details of coupling glide paths in the latest episode. I'm a Cessna 206 with Garmin GTN 750 and Cirrus SR22T G6 owner and wondering why you made no mention of using the VNAV function to descend to glide path to intercept.

Is that because this would be improper or less proper than descending in a more step-down style? Thank you. Matt, thanks for your email. The reason I didn't talk about the VNAF function is I think of it as a different topic, though of course it is related. The focus of episode 383 was on the reasons why sometimes people can't get the autopilot to couple to the glide path on an RNAV approach. And as we've discussed, the reason is that the signal quality check is

doesn't occur until the FAF becomes the active waypoint. And at that point, the vertical deviation indicator turns from a hollow white diamond to a solid magenta diamond. And when that occurs, the autopilot can couple to the glide path. And that behavior is independent of whether you've used the VNAF function or not. Now, if your autopilot does have a VNAF key and you use it correctly,

you shouldn't even have the issue we're talking about. So using VNAV is one way to reduce the odds of not being able to couple to the glide path on an RNAV approach. The nice thing about this key is it generally plays very well with the approach mode key. So if you're outside the IAF and are cleared to cross the IAF at some altitude and cleared for the approach, at that point you can push both the VNAV key and the APR approach key.

The VNAV function will couple to a magenta carrot, which looks like the letter V turned on its side, and it will follow the initial step-downs on the approach. Then later the carrot or V disappears, and the magenta diamond appears, and the approach mode will track the diamond down to minimums. Actually, it'll track it all the way to the ground, so make sure you pay attention and don't let the autopilot take you into the ground.

There is an issue with using VNAV and the approach key simultaneously, and Garmin seems to be fixing more and more of these occurrences. Sometimes when you fly an approach, when the carrot disappears, the glide path indicator appears above you, and the autopilot will command the airplane to climb up to join the glide path before it starts descending again along the glide path.

And in the process, your airplane can get very, very slow. So you need to be vigilant. And if this occurs, you may need to add a lot of power or disconnect the autopilot and hand fly the approach.

I used to see this a lot on the RNAV-31 GPS approach into my home airport of Palo Alto, but Garmin has obviously made some changes and this discontinuity is now much smaller, so the airplane no longer climbs quite as much as it transitions from VNAV to approach, and so it doesn't get as slow as it used to. I do find that using VNAV mode introduces some complications, so it doesn't always work for pilots.

The biggest gotcha is that pilots sometimes forget to turn the altitude selector knob down to a lower altitude. VNAV mode descends you to the higher of the altitude in the flight plan or the altitude you've selected with the altitude selector knob.

So if you leave the altitude selector knob at your current altitude, the airplane cannot descend. Another gotcha that is largely gone now is that originally the VNAV button had to be pushed when your TOD or top of descent was less than five minutes away. If you pushed it when you were six minutes away, the plane would not descend. That's mostly been fixed through software updates, though you might find an older G1000 plane that still operates that way.

Another potential gotcha is that the automated descent using VNAV might not be consistent with the instructions that you've received from ATC. That's often the case when you're outside the IAF, where you could possibly use VNAV to descend to the IAF altitude.

But it's also sometimes the case along the beginning of the approach where ATC may initially have you at a higher altitude or even a lower altitude that is published for a particular leg of the approach. So when you use the VNAV key, you need to make sure that what it's going to do will be consistent with the instructions that you receive from ATC.

And just a reminder that I love hearing from you and I read many of your emails on the show. If you'd like to send me a message, just go out to aviationnewstalk.com, click on contact at the top of the page. That's absolutely the best way to send me a message. And of course, I also want to thank everyone who supports the show in one of the following ways. We love it when you join the club and sign up at aviationnewstalk.com slash support to

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coming down. Don't wait until you're silent. Baby's sliding upside down. You can always