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Brilliant Pebbles Are Back

2025/1/31
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Robert Wall: 最初的“为美国建造铁穹”计划并非直接采用以色列的铁穹系统,而是寻求更广泛的导弹防御方案。行政命令的细节远超预期,引发了对具体实施方式的关注。我主要负责提出问题和引导讨论,点明了美国铁穹计划的背景和目标,并引出了对具体技术方案和挑战的探讨。 Brian Everstine: 作为五角大楼编辑,我详细介绍了特朗普政府关于“美国铁穹”的行政命令,强调其防御范围远超原版铁穹,旨在防御包括高超音速导弹在内的各种先进导弹攻击。该命令加速了现有项目,并特别强调了开发天基拦截器等新能力。我认为,该计划在太空部队的角色和资金方面存在挑战,但特朗普政府对此表示支持。我主要负责提供政策和项目层面的信息,分析了行政命令的具体内容和潜在影响。 Steve Trimble: 我对天基拦截器的概念有怀旧之情,并回顾了其历史。早在1960年代,DARPA就推荐了天基拦截器方案,里根总统的“星球大战”计划也以天基拦截器为核心。虽然技术上可行,但成本高昂且存在政治障碍。我认为,尽管面临挑战,但技术进步和新的威胁格局使得天基拦截器再次成为可能。我主要负责提供历史背景和技术分析,将“美国铁穹”计划置于更广阔的历史和技术背景下进行评估。

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Aviation Week's defense conference is coming. Join military and civilian leaders, industry experts, stakeholders, and allies in Washington, D.C. on May 13th and 14th to share knowledge in a collaborative environment. Participants will explore the challenges confronting leaders, including geopolitical threats, how to strengthen the industrial base, emerging technology trends, and more. Head to events.aviationweek.com or click the link in the description of this podcast to

to register. Welcome to the Check 6 podcast. Attentive listeners will remember a few months ago our Cold War comeback episode where we would discuss the revival of ground-launched cruise missiles. Today, we bring you a similar topic, one where the future evokes the past, as we explore the Trump administration's first meaningful action on defense modernization, the Executive Order on Missile Defense, or what has been referred to as Iron Dome for America.

Here to talk to you about that are Brian Everstein, Aviation Week's Pentagon Editor, and Steve Trimble, our Senior Defense Editor. I'm Robert Wall, Aviation Week's Executive Editor for Defense & Space.

When this first came out, "Build an Iron Dome for America," one thing we knew right away was it would not be Iron Dome. The Israeli anti-rocket system that has been highly effective, but is also quite short range. So it's not really applicable to the American context. So the question really has been, what would the administration pursue? And I have to say, the executive order has a lot more detail than some people initially expected. Brian, why don't you talk our listeners through what's in it?

Yeah, so this all happened on January 27th, which really was Pete Hagseth, the new defense secretary's first day over at the Pentagon. He hinted at this during a brief interaction with reporters on the front steps of the river entrance. And the order came amid Trump's first flurry of,

defense-related orders. So it mixed in with some ending DEI orders, COVID vaccine mandate-related things. There was this order on Iron Dome for America. So as you alluded to, despite some snide remarks, the order goes far beyond the scope of the original Iron Dome. It calls on the Pentagon to start with a report within about two months outlining an approach to protect against ballistic, hypersonic,

advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks, both from rogue adversaries, but mostly, more importantly, from peer adversaries, such as China and Russia. The order couples up, speeding up some existing efforts, such as Missile Defense Agency's hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor layer, and the Space Development Agency's ongoing proliferated warfighter space architecture.

But it notably presses for some new or increased efforts, such as developing SDA's custody layer, new capabilities of defeating missile attacks prior to launch. But I think what we will talk the most about here are two main prongs of the effort, such as developing an underlayer and terminal phase intercept to defeat what they're calling a counter value attack. And obviously the most attention grabbing is developing and deploying space-based interceptors that are capable of boost phase intercept.

And all of this is really expected to start quite soon. The order calls on the Pentagon to put a plan together submitted before the fiscal 2026 budget is finalized. So just a matter of a few months.

I mean, it's really quite massive. I mean, if you think about it and if we think about what the money is that goes behind this. But it's also kind of quite interesting because space-based interceptors are as old really as the concept of advanced national missile defense. So Steve, what was your take? And take us down the brilliant pebbles flat path for a second, would you please?

Sure. Yes. And, um, I mean, there is a nostalgic quality to this. Like I remember being in the library as an adolescent reading aviation week, reading about this kind of thing. And, uh, you know, so it definitely rings a bell, uh, for me, uh, you know, uh, historically, um,

But yeah, this idea is not new. If you go back to the 1960s, Project Defender by DARPA actually recommended this approach and said it was technically feasible even then, financially problematic. In 1984, President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative, which is pejoratively nicknamed Star Wars in the 1980s. A piece of that

Well, the main piece, in fact, was space-based interceptors. It went through several evolutions. It began not as Brilliant Pebbles, but as Smart Rocks, which is how you eventually get to Brilliant Pebbles. And Smart Rocks was really interesting because, I mean, these were battle stations, like 400 orbiting battle stations, 20 tons each.

Because the idea was you didn't have the microelectronics and the processing capability to put that on the missiles themselves. So you put them in these sort of garages that had all these sensors that could detect the warheads in mid-course and feed that targeting information to the missiles, which wouldn't have any sensors on them or processing capability to target themselves. But they could receive this information from the battle station and head towards that target. But

Launching 400 or so battle stations, each 20 tons, you know, including the, and you add the interceptors, you add the sensors, it's going to be really expensive. In fact, you know, they went from like $40 billion estimate in the 1980s to $100 billion estimate. So, I mean, this is starting to get really unaffordable. They looked at some other concepts. I mean, um,

Edward Teller, you know, the famous Project Manhattan scientist, he was advising Reagan on this. And he had this idea for this really ambitious concept called Excalibur, which would detonate a nuclear device and then focus the X-ray energy into laser beams that can individually target these warheads. They soon discovered that was completely infeasible to do, at least back then, probably even now.

And then Lowell Wood at MIT Lincoln Laboratory came up with this idea saying, actually, you know, microelectronics are sophisticated enough that we can miniaturize them. And just, you know, we don't need these battle stations anymore under smart rocks. So instead of these big rocks, smart rocks, we're going to have even smarter or brilliant pebbles, you know, small things, you know, four feet long pebbles.

They would be housed in what they called a life jacket, which would maintain their power levels, their telemetry with ground stations, and also be a bit more aerodynamic. So their lift, even, there's not much drag at those altitudes, but there's a little bit. But it would just maintain their altitude, or sorry, their orbit for a bit longer.

And then launch in response autonomously to a missile attack. The belief at the time was that that was technically feasible. I mean, the Jasons looked at it in the late 1980s and said, this actually can work. I mean, there's nothing scientifically or technologically that is beyond this. In fact, it's using very mature technologies for the most part.

The problem was there were two, well, probably three problems. One was the launch costs were exorbitant back then. You know, think about 18,500 kilograms per pound to launch into space in the early 1990s. That's about $1,500 per kilogram today. So it's an order of magnitude less, which is a big deal.

The second issue was kind of a policy issue. You know, space-based interceptors, as well as even ground-based interceptors at the time, violated the ABM Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed with the Soviets in the early 1970s. We withdrew from that treaty in the early 2000s under President George W. Bush. So, you know, but still, you know, launch costs remained, you know, a big problem. And so that brings us kind of where we are today, right?

Um, where we, we, you know, uh, we, you know, the, the, the pieces of, of, of star Wars that exists today, our ground-based interceptor GBI, that was part of star Wars, right? Uh, but there's 44 of these interceptors, uh, that we have stationed in Alaska that are there to, uh, defend against, uh, a launch of a limited attack by a rogue nation, specifically North Korea is what we're talking about.

But today, North Korea has about 80 to 200 nuclear warheads as assessed by the U.S. intelligence community. That can overwhelm that defense. And that's why we're coming up with next generation interceptor.

But on top of that, China now is in the process of building out their nuclear arsenal, a triad with potentially up to 1,000 ground-based ICBMs. And of course, Russia still has their arsenal of about 1,500 nuclear warheads or nuclear systems with even more warheads and obviously a lot of tactical nuclear weapons at shorter ranges.

So, and not only that, you also have this proliferation of conventional missiles, which we never saw during the Cold War and hypersonic missiles. So the idea is we've seen what Israel has been doing with conventional attacks, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, mortars. They have this system called Iron Dome. That's a big part of that, although that's for the shorter range threats. They have this multi-layered system with Arrow and David's slaying missiles.

Also incorporated into that, and we've deployed THAAD as well as a theater system to augment Arrow. And we've seen how effective that's been in the last two years. So obviously, President Trump here is taking the cue from that and saying, you know, we can do something like that. And when you think about it from the idea of space-based interceptors, this is kind of like...

Iron Dome in space. I mean, you know, these interceptors would be probably very small, not unlike the Tamir missile used in Iron Dome, very different from Tamir, but in size and sophistication, probably not that much different.

Brian, you've been following obviously the missile defense portfolio and as Steve quite closely the last few years. As you look at what they announced here over the last few days, separate maybe from the space-based interceptors, what will require new programs or what is maybe already in process either as a development program or at least has been something they've been talking about pursuing?

Well, the main new part is the space-based interceptor. A lot of the other sensing seems to be acceleration or expansion of existing programs. I mentioned MDAs, HBTSS, SDAs, tracking layer. And

It seems like there's been kind of a hang-up within the Space Force of trying to take on some of this work. It gets into sort of the debate between the military and the intelligence community on doing space-based ISR. We're seeing that a lot on the push for...

shifting MTI from aircraft to space. And talking to some experts here in Washington, it seems like Trump is kind of putting his thumb on the scale and giving the Space Force some more leeway, some more authority to take on some of this role away from the IC by picking up what the SDA is trying to do. I mean, as Steve has pointed out in a prior podcast, not a huge surprise necessarily that we see in such a space focus this time around, right? Yeah.

No, I mean, it's been something that's been in the works. I mean, Trump created the Space Force. It's a big priority. He really likes, obviously likes his legacy there. And one thing that'll be interesting to see is...

how the MDA can really put this under its wing. It's been kind of limited in its acquisition authorities and getting enough money within the building. Interestingly, this comes as the MDA's overall charter is being rewritten and looking on to bring on some new acquisition authorities, kind of bringing on what some of the services have been able to do with things like the Rapid Capabilities Office to procure things more quickly. So it's kind of an open question if under these new authorities, they will have what they need to get some of this done.

Yeah, very interesting. Steve, just kind of curious from your perspective, if you look at all this, I mean, you alluded already to the launch costs, of course, but what would you say is meaningfully different this time? I mean, why should we believe that it could work this time if that's what we believe?

So it was always technically feasible. And obviously we have to see the details of what the, what the architecture they use to find out exactly how feasible this one will be as well as how much it's going to cost. Right. So, and that's still, it's still an open question about how much it's going to cost, uh, the impact on deterrence and, you know, um,

You know, that's another question that has to be worked out. When we withdrew from the ABM Treaty, you know, Russia said that's what provoked them to start their nuclear modernization as well as invest in hypersonic capabilities as well as some of these other things that we've seen, like the Poseidon torpedo and things like that. Now, another thing that's different is this emphasis on some of these space sensors that Brian was talking about.

One of the big things that you have to do with this is not just tracking the missile after they've launched. You have to know where they are before they've launched. And with mobile systems, that's really, really difficult and has plagued our ability to do that for decades, right?

But that's what that custody layer, which is called out in Trump's executive order, that we're going to invest in this custody layer, which is something that has been on the back burner for space development agencies. They have the tracking layer, which is about tracking missiles once they've launched. Custody layer is about keeping track of them before they've launched. Steve, are you saying we need brilliant eyes along with brilliant pebbles? That's amazing. Yes, yes, yes. Exactly. Yes. Man.

Man, this feels very Cold War all of a sudden. So, yes. And so there's that element, as well as HBTSS, which has also been, you know, the SDA, the Space Development Agency, has got the tracking layer. Well, what that's doing is deploying this proliferated constellation of sensors that have this wide field of view. So you don't need as many.

to cover the globe. But I remember when we interviewed Derek Tenier about this in 2020, he said it's an open question whether or not a wide field of view sensor is going to be, it's going to have the sensitivity and the resolution to actually target, you know, warheads in mid course. And I don't know where they are with that now. I mean, a lot of that, you know, those kinds of details often get very classified. But that's why the Missile Defense Agency was in parallel working on the hypersonic ballistic trackers.

tracking space sensor, HBTSS, sometimes called Habits or Hobbits, you know, even though MD8 doesn't like it when you do that.

But that's got a medium field of view sensor with a gimbal system. That gimbal allows it to expand its view, but it's more sensitive, it's higher resolution, it's believed to be, or expected anyway, to be more effective at tracking, acquiring targets and tracking them. To give them that weapons quality track, so you can have launch on engage versus launch on remote.

which is another sort of technical part of this. But that's a big part of it. And if they can get that done, that makes the feasibility of these interceptors significantly greater.

I mean, as you both have alluded to, I mean, we've obviously, the U.S. has invested, you know, billions over decades into this field. And, you know, as fielded systems now, we have ground-based interceptors for, as you mentioned, we have the more shorter range systems that add an SM-3 for the Navy. What happens? Are they just out of vogue now? Or what's their role in this, if at all?

So that's what's called for, that appears to be what's being called for under this so-called underlayer, right? The overlayer is the space-based interceptors. The executive order also talks about deploying an underlayer of ground-based and theater area interceptors to counter what they called counter value attacks. And it's an important term because in sort of nuclear, in nuclear warfare terminology,

That is talking about targeting civilian populations, major cities, not military targets, but major cities. So in that sense, you'd have, you know, missile defense batteries around Washington, D.C. We do have NASAMs against air attacks from cruise missiles or aircraft in D.C. already. But this would be against ballistic attacks, probably aimed at shooting down any leakers that aren't hit by the space base interceptors.

And so then you're talking about THAAD. Maybe you're talking about SM3 with Aegis Ashore, you know, but deployed around major cities around the country. It sounds like now that can be very expensive. I mean, a single Patriot battery is about a billion dollars. THAAD is even more. Aegis Ashore is several billion dollars. So you're talking.

And not to mention the sensor network and the command and control apparatus that would have to take place for that to work. That could be probably even more expensive than the space-based interceptors, depending on what they decide they need to defend.

Let's briefly, at least before we wrap it up, talk about some of the inherent challenges, technical and otherwise. For example, one thing comes to mind. Already, the U.S. has kind of a shortage, you could argue, of missile motors to meet current demands. And now that demand could be going up. So you could see a supply chain bottleneck right there that needs to be addressed, and that'll probably slow any effort.

What do you guys see either in that vein, political hurdles? Obviously, there's the funding question.

Yeah, the funding I think is what stands out the most. And talking to some of the experts around here, hearing numbers starting at 20 billion, possibly getting up to 25 billion. 20 billion came from the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance here. Todd Harrison, AEI, put out an estimate of up to 27 billion just for the space-based interceptors. And I think one important thing to point out is this is coming as the military is spending so much on offensive bliss

ballistic missiles, we have Sentinel, we have the rest of the nuclear triad all just taking so much, just eating all the services lunch on funding. So that I think is the biggest immediate priority to get over. The space industry seems, I don't know if stretch is the right word, but there's a very healthy demand with what SDA is trying to do on proliferated LEO, trying to just meet what they're trying to do just on the PWSA. So there's a lot of components there.

And I would just add to that, I do think the political element of this is going to be a constraint. And I'm certainly not picking sides in it. I mean, the counter argument to doing this has always been that these kinds of strategic types of missile defenses are inherently destabilizing. That was what led to the ABM Treaty in the early 1970s when both sides agreed that if, you know, we just...

just shouldn't even try to defend ourselves and rely on mutually assured destruction for our protection.

And, you know, that's that's been a huge debate. It was a debate during Star Wars and the SDI initiative. It was a debate when we withdrew from the ABM treaty. Obviously, that that does appear to have spurred Russia to do something. If we implement this, there will definitely be a counter by Russia, China, maybe others to to address this and develop some way of of countering it.

Possibly by increasing the volume to make it even harder to shoot everything down. That's how these things work. And that discussion is probably going to heat up the most over the next few years, even beyond the funding issues.

There has been already some support a little bit. We saw Senator Wicker, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, talk a little bit in support of this. I mean, we have a one-party control in Washington that is very early in the Trump administration, very eager to get on his good side. So I think we'll see some movement, at least in initial markups, to push this forward, depending on what the Pentagon does produce. Makes sense. Well, let me go briefly back to one question inspired by Iron Dome here. I'm

Yeah, the Israelis have Iron Dome. They relied on the Tamir interceptor. They now have realized that even though that is a relatively low-cost interceptor, it still costs a lot more than a lot of the target that's going after. So they're now introducing Iron Beam, a laser, to shoot down these rockets and mortars more affordably. So I guess the logical question, where does space-based laser fit in this, in the Iron Dome for America?

Well, it is mentioned in the executive order that we need to work on directed energy as well. I suspect it's not going to be a space-based laser because the physics there are very challenging to generate the power in orbit to make a useful beam. That's why Teller was looking at this nuclear detonation device in space, which has a whole lot of other issues when you start talking about nuclear detonations in space.

But we, uh, on the ground, uh, you know, supplementing, uh, theater-based defenses, uh, ground-based, uh, high energy lasers, uh, probably at probably extreme power levels, uh, you know, is probably what they're talking about and looking at doing is very difficult. Also extremely expensive. High energy lasers are way more expensive than people realize, I think sometimes, and there's

If there's a cloud, if there's wind shear, you know, the turbulence in the air between where the laser is and where the incoming missile is, those are all problems that lasers are still trying to overcome. But it does seem, you know, that that's going to be part of this in some way. Again, though, the details are going to be very significant in terms of where they are and how they augment the kinetic component of this defense system.

Well, let's wrap it there. I'm sure there's going to be lots more to talk about on this topic in the months and years to come. Really interesting to see how it makes it into the next budget drop and how all that develops. So lots to chew on, as I said, for years to come probably on this. So thank you, Steve. Special thanks to Brian, who has pulled an all-nighter because of the tragic developments in DC with the crash.

the collision of the airliner with the Blackhawk. So, Brian, thanks for all the work this week on Iron Dome for America and this horrible accident. And also thanks to our podcast producer, Guy Fernau, for putting all this together. And of course, as always, thanks to your listeners for checking in with us and come back for a future episode of Check 6.

Aviation Week's defense conference is coming. Join military and civilian leaders, industry experts, stakeholders, and allies in Washington, D.C. on May 13th and 14th to share knowledge in a collaborative environment. Participants will explore the challenges confronting leaders, including geopolitical threats, how to strengthen the industrial base, emerging technology trends, and more. Head to events.aviationweek.com or click the link in the description of this podcast to learn more.

to register.