MacroVoices #469 Jeff Snider: The Mar-a-Lago Accord Seen Through A Eurodollar Lens
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This is Macro Voices, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. Macro Voices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Eric Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Macro Voices Episode 469 was produced on February 27th, 2025. I'm Eric Townsend. Eurodollar University founder Jeff Snyder returns as this week's feature interview guest. Jeff thinks the Mar-a-Lago Accord represents progress in the sense that the U.S. government is finally willing to explore big changes needed to fix the U.S. national debt problem.

But Jeff thinks that Zoltan Poser's plan, which is at the heart of the current Mar-a-Lago deliberations, might be ill-conceived. We'll discuss both Jeff's criticisms of the current effort, as well as how Jeff would do it differently if he were invited to participate in the Mar-a-Lago discussions. Our producers are also working on getting Zoltan Poser on the show to discuss his strategy, but he's a busy guy these days. We'll keep working hard to make it happen.

And I'm Patrick Ceresna with the Macro Scoreboard. Week over week, as of the close of Wednesday, February 27th, 2025, the S&P 500 indexed down 306 basis points, trading at 59.56.

Market is correcting after failing to break out to old-time new highs. We'll take a closer look at that chart and the key technical levels to watch in the postgame segment. U.S. dollar index down 64 basis points, trading at 106.47. The April WTI crude oil contract down 483 basis points to

We're now trading back to the lows of past year. The April RBOB Gasoline down 560 basis points to 219. The April Gold Contract down 20 basis points trading into 2930. Copper down 44 basis points trading to 454.

Uranium down 54 basis points trading to $64.95. And the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield down 22 basis points trading at $4.30. The key news to watch this Friday is the Core PCE Price Index. And next week we have the ISM Manufacturing and Services PMIs.

the ECB press conference, and the U.S. jobs numbers. This week's featured interview guest is Eurodollar University founder Jeff Snyder. Eric and Jeff discuss the Mar-a-Lago Accord, misconceptions about it, and the need for monetary system change. Eric's interview with Jeff is coming up as Macro Voices continues right here at MacroVoices.com. Macro Voices

And now with this week's special guest, here's your host, Eric Townsend. Joining me now is Mr. Eurodollar himself and Eurodollar.University's founder, Jeff Snyder. Jeff prepared a slide deck to accompany this week's interview. You'll find the download link linked in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage, macrovoices.com. Look for the red button above Jeff's picture that says, Looking for the Downloads.

Jeff, it's great to get you back on the show. What I want to focus on today is everybody who's anybody is now talking about the Mar-a-Lago Accords. The basic idea being President Trump doesn't want to continue the United States trade.

not being compensated for providing security services to most of the Western world. What's on the table for discussion is the idea that maybe instead of paying interest on our national debt, we would instead, at least to sovereign holders of treasury bonds, we'd provide military protection in lieu of interest payments. That's a radical...

just fundamental change in monetary policy. So before we even dive into the details, and I know you've got a fantastic slide deck prepared for us with lots of details, let's start at the highest level of, you know, I don't think, Jeff, this is like a, you know, normally the whole market freaks out if you get a 50 basis point instead of a 25 basis point change to policy rates. We're not talking about a little change in policy rates. We're talking about a proposed change

change of the overall monetary framework of the entire Western world? When's the last time anybody changed anything of this magnitude? Is it a good idea? And what are they trying to accomplish?

Oh, there's so much there, right, Eric? I mean, I think you're exactly right in characterizing it that way. This is like she said, this is not a 25 basis point rate reduction or a rate hike by the Federal Reserve. And in many ways, just to start out, I think this is fine. This is a sign of progress because people are finally talking about, hey, we need to do something radical.

And let's be honest here. This is a radical proposal. Now, of course, a lot of caveats here. We don't know exactly what's been talked about. We don't even know how serious that anyone's taking it. But it does seem to be something that is on the table for discussion. And from the rumors and everything that's been circulating, it seems like there has been some discussions about it.

So it is, yeah, this is something that's radical and something that is sorely needed. We've needed to replace the monetary system for what? Ever since August of 2007. So we're going on 18 years now. And up until recently, nobody's bothered even mentioning it.

So the fact that they're at least thinking about and connecting, I think one of the big positives here is the fact that they're connecting some dots and finally starting to understand that something big needs to be done because it's not just like everything's going to magically heal itself. Or if the Fed comes out with a seventh version of QE, that'll somehow be the correct amount of QE at some point. What needs to be done is something radical. So I think that is absolutely the right way to think about it. And so the question isn't really that so much as

Is what they're proposing likely to succeed? And more importantly, can they pull it off? I think those are the bigger questions. And in that way, there's still a lot of ground left to be covered. Let's put it that way. It's sort of an introduction. Like you said, I have a slide deck here. Some of the positives are that, look, first of all, the Trump administration and those surrounding the president have finally realized that the dollar going up in exchange value is not a good thing.

So most of what's been proposed on the Mar-a-Lago Accord, or that's what everybody's calling it. And I'm a little disappointed because I'm right down the road from Mar-a-Lago. I'm just down Southern Boulevard. And then nobody called me and asked me to participate. Jeffrey, we know you're, we know you're in Palm Beach. Mar-a-Lago is not for people like you. We're, we're building other golf courses, Jeffrey, in the Palm Beach area that are for you. Yeah. I'm on the wrong side of the intercoastal. That's right. Um,

Yeah. So look, they've connected those dots. Remember how many years we heard that the dollar goes up in exchange value. That just means that everybody's happy. The U.S. is the cleanest dirty shirt or some nonsense like that. So finally, there's a recognition that when the dollar goes up in exchange value, that's not good for anybody. And so the the most logical thing to do in response to something like that is, OK, if the dollar goes up and bad things happen, let's get the dollar to go down and see the good things that happen.

Go back to the middle of the 2000s. Things seemed to work really well when the dollar was going down in exchange value. So you can you can finally, you know, appreciate the fact that somebody is making those connections and putting two and two together. So the real question isn't necessarily that it's OK if the dollar goes down, is making the dollar go down feasible? And is that the right way to get at what we really want, which is in a global economy that actually works?

And so that's where we kind of get off into, oh, we got to shake our head because a lot of what's come out about the Mar-a-Lago Accord, and it goes back to that paper that was written in November by, was it Stephen Moran, who was an advisor to the president or was an advisor to the president or very close to the president, which basically provides a blueprint of what this Mar-a-Lago Accord is supposed to look like. And there's a lot of misconceptions. As I said, there's a lot of ground left for the mainstream to recover.

It's not just enough to connect the dots and say the dollar goes up in exchange value. That's bad. Now let's do something about it. You have to understand why the dollar goes up in exchange value and what the ramifications are from that. And then if once you get that, the next thing is, OK, dollar goes up. Can we actually get the dollar to reverse? And is that something that we really want to do? And in many ways, it's getting the cart before the horse. It's actually everything is backwards and there's a lot of reasons for it.

And one of the reasons why this is so difficult to begin with, to start the slide deck here in the second slide, you know, Milton Friedman said it best in one of the last interviews he gave before he passed away.

He said, basically, the difficulty of having people understand monetary theory is simple. Everybody defers to the central bank because central bankers pay off all the economists. And everybody in the mainstream media gets all of their advice and their interpretations from central bankers to begin with. So anything that happens in the monetary realm, it's from the perspective of the central bank. And that is the biggest impediment to understanding why the dollar goes up and why it's bad. Because nobody looks for the real reason why the dollar goes up.

just in the slide three here in dealing with the question of whether or not the government can force the dollar to go down, even before we get to whether or not that's the right policy, whether the government can actually do that is a major question as well. As even the New York Times, the New York freaking Times wrote back in 1992. So we're talking over 30 years ago. Exchange values are not written by central bankers and politicians. They're written by the euro dollar marketplaces.

Which means that already in question is whether or not the government can get what it wants, assuming what it wants is the right thing to want. So with those things in mind, we can start looking at what the Mar-a-Lago Accord is supposed to be and what it's supposed to accomplish and then kind of try to figure out whether or not it can have any chance of success. And just spoiler alert, I'm certainly skeptical about all of this.

To begin with, the Trump administration back in 2019, if you go to slide number four, I mean, they already made a, I don't want to say a half-assed attempt at weakening the dollar. They were just doing what they wanted to do. And again, back to your original point, Eric, having failed trying to jawbone the dollar lower in 2019, this is one reason why they seem to be taking the more radical approach because

They zeroed in on, OK, the dollar goes up. That's bad. What do we do about it? And in 2019, it wasn't enough. And then, of course, the pandemic came along and everything got kind of put on the back shelf. The Biden administration, they were never going to talk about anything like this. So now they're coming back in. And one of the first things they're talking about is, OK, what do we do something? Do we do something radical about what's happening in the dollar system?

And that's the 2024 article, which I'll get to in just a second here by Mr. Moran, borrows heavily from Zoltan Pazer's numerous works, especially his 2022 idea about Bretton Woods 3. We can spend a lot of time on Bretton Woods 3 and I don't think it's really necessary because it's another one of those things where

It gets the cart before the horse. It gets everything backward. But then again, that also explains why everything that we'll talk about here has everything in the reverse position. So you go to slide six. Slide six is the user's guide to restructuring the global trading system, which is the print that Stephen Brand put out back last November.

And already, you know, I'm always skeptical when you talk about international finance and international money and anybody who puts anything out. And I always the first thing I always do is search for the number of times they use the term euro dollar.

because if it doesn't show up, that's already a huge red flag. It means they're missing something and missing something important, which goes back to the first slide or the second slide that we showed here. Nobody talks about the euro dollar because it's a taboo subject among politicians and central bankers and officials because it upends the idea that central banks are at the center of the universe. And one of the reasons why we can't ever understand why these things are happening is simply because, and the same thing with Zoltan's Bretton Woods 3, is

They don't understand the nature of the euro dollar. They always defer to central banks when it comes to monetary affairs, and therefore they're never looking at the euro dollar as either the explanation or the solution. So if they don't use the term euro dollar, that's already a red flag that shows that they're missing something. And when you get right into it, going to page seven,

skipping almost to the bottom of Mr. Moran's, his user's guide to restructuring the global trading system. He even says the root cause of the dollar overvaluation, which is what they're talking about, the strong dollar, is demand for reserve assets. And that's just complete nonsense. The root cause of a dollar overvaluation, the reason the dollar exchange value has gone up is because of the euro dollar system experiencing massive and systemic shortage.

which is something that central bankers don't want to ever talk about or even consider, which is why we're stuck trying to connect dots in the dark because they don't look in the right place. But again, this is, you know, from one perspective, this is a measure of progress.

Because not only have they decided that the dollar exchange value going up is a bad thing, they're looking for different explanations for why that is. Now, they don't look at the right explanation because the Fed won't let them and mainstream economics won't let them. So they're looking at other possible explanations that would make sense for why the dollar goes up in exchange value. And they've settled on this. Yeah.

Now, hang on a second, because it seems to me that if anything, the clear evidence is the opposite. A lot of central banks have been divesting U.S. Treasury holdings in favor of other things. For example, you've got the Global South and their de-dollarization initiative, which

seeks to replace U.S. dollar central bank holdings with other reserve assets. I don't know what the total number of U.S. treasuries, what the notional principle held by foreign central banks is today as compared to, say, a few years ago. I don't know if you know that off the top of your head, but it seems to me like that

It's trending down, not up, isn't it? Yeah. So there's already an inconsistency here. A couple of things I would respond to with what you said, Eric. Number one is that start with the inconsistency is that it is not a straight line trend. And I'll get into it. We actually do have a slide with the Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasury. So we'll get into a little bit of that. But it's the same thing, right? The other mistake is that we have to separate politics from actual economics and by economics, I mean, small economics and monetary economics. While

While you might say that certain governments are moving away from reserve assets, that doesn't mean the economies that they're supposedly running, which they don't actually run, are doing the same thing. So, for example, the Chinese government might be moving away from U.S. treasuries both voluntarily and involuntarily. But that doesn't mean the Chinese economic system is moving away from U.S. treasuries or Chinese banking system.

system is moving away from U.S. treasuries. So we can't make the mistake that all that if we talk about India, for example, that all of India is moving away from treasuries and de-dollarizing, which, by the way, they're not actually doing. They're just trying to internationalize the rupee. So, yeah, your your your inclination, Eric, I agree with that. You know, Stephen Moran pulls this out as the root cause of the big problem of the U.S. dollar. And already you can see that, OK,

They've connected a couple dots, but they're making some tenuous connections that don't stand up to real scrutiny. And again, we'll get to that in just a second with some of the slides here. And again, this goes back to you don't use the term euro dollar. You're going to be looking at in the wrong place for these answers. And the reason why U.S. treasuries go up and down in balance sheets of reserve managers because of the euro dollar system and conditions in it.

But that's sort of the original sin here from everything that follows from it. So the whole idea behind the Mar-a-Lago Accord, assuming this is what they're really pursuing, again, we don't have any more information than what's provided here. So if you believe that inelasticity and demand for U.S. treasuries is the cause of the dollar exchange value going up and that's bad for the U.S. economy, then you need to do everything in your power to dissuade foreigners from using U.S. treasuries and U.S. dollars for reserve assets.

So they're saying there's too much demand for U.S. reserve assets and U.S. dollars for non-productive purposes. And so that's where we get into the idea of a debt swap and forcing reserve managers into longer duration. I don't know how much detail you want to get to all of this stuff because, in fact, essentially, Eric, it's just kind of

It's kind of trivia at this point, but this is apparently what the Trump administration, if they follow this blueprint, they're going to be recommending is that using these various tactics and all of the leverage available to the U.S. government, including the threat of tariffs and maybe even the actual implication of tariffs to get foreign reserve managers to accept either better terms, like you said before, lower interest rates on longer duration bonds or

or to accept the fact that they're just not going to get paid on U.S. Treasury like they did before, even if it does dissuade them from holding U.S. Treasuries because they've decided that the exorbitant

excess demand for U.S. dollar assets is the reason why the U.S. dollar exchange value goes up. So they're going to use all the tactics that they can possibly do to get foreign reserve managers to hold less dollars and less treasures. And there's a couple, I mean, there's a lot of nuance in what was reported here and what they're talking about. A couple of positive things and a couple of correct things, too. One of the things that Moran points out that I didn't put in the presentation here is

is that he believes that there's very little downside to U.S. Treasury rates by dissuading foreigners from holding U.S. Treasury. I think he's correct in that because he identifies that U.S. Treasury yields are set by fundamentals in the global marketplace, not by the various supply and demand changes

in that marketplace, whether it be the Fed buying stuff or whatever else. It's really about growth and inflation expectations globally. So he believes that if they do dissuade foreigners from holding U.S. treasuries, it won't lead to skyrocketing yields because there's really no evidence that would be the case to begin with.

Hang on a second, Jeff, because I want to clarify this point. You keep saying they're trying to dissuade foreign holders from holding so many U.S. treasuries. Isn't it really true that they want foreign holders to continue financing U.S. debt? They just want to stop paying interest on it. So, I mean, it's a different kind of treasuries. They want them to swap their treasury holdings for these new Zoltan bonds, which don't pay any interest. Isn't that the gist of it?

Well, that's that's one of the tactics to get foreign reserve managers overall to hold less U.S. treasuries. Those who will continue to own U.S. treasuries, either because they want to. There's a carrot and a stick approach to this, too. Remember, there's there's another side of this. And that's part of joining up with the Mar-a-Lago Accord means that you get some of the benefits associated with it, which gets into some of the nitty gritty details that Zoltan provided.

For example, you'll have lower interest rate, longer duration U.S. treasuries, but you won't need to sell them because the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury Department itself will set up a liquidity program that allows you to pledge those treasuries for cash or use them as collateral for cash so that you don't need to liquidate U.S. treasuries. So there's a whole bunch of there's a whole intricate network of details. But the upshot of it is to use less U.S. dollars in unproductive financial portfolio means and largely foreign officials.

recognizing a lot of foreign official reserve managers are not going to, they're not going to ditch U.S. treasuries altogether. A lot of them will accept lower interest payments, which is a byproduct of what, from the Trump administration's perspective, it's a byproduct benefit of this overarching plan, because if the reserve managers go for it, and they do expect a lot of reserve managers will, that means lower interest rate payments from the U.S. federal government and

Since the U.S. federal interest rate payments are the largest source of the deficit these days, that's just another added benefit and bonus from the government's perspective.

But the overall goal here is to get the U.S. dollar exchange value to go down, which they associate with negative economic outcomes, including the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing. In many ways, again, this is where the Mar-a-Lago Accord goes wrong because it's very, you know, 19th century thinking that the currency exchange value helps drive exports and imports, you know, beggar thy neighbor type of policy. So, again,

Under the terms of, you know, that Moran set forth, it's, you know, it's the dollar is overvalued for this reason. Therefore, it hampers U.S. manufacturing, U.S. competitiveness on the global marketplace. If we get the dollar to go down, one of the other benefits of doing so will make U.S. manufacturing more competitive. Therefore, more manufacturing can be cost effective and profitable if it's brought back to the United States.

I think this is one of the reasons why it got so much support, at least within political circles, is because it has what appear to be a whole range of off of of offshoot benefits over and above what they're trying to write, what they're really trying to accomplish here.

Like I said, you go to slide number nine and you get into some of the details that are supposed to be part of the carrot approach to get reserve managers to accept longer duration bonds that pay much less interest is that you won't have the you won't you won't necessarily need to have short run treasuries, which is the preference for reserve managers because they often need to liquidate them. And this is one of the places where I really like to point out, like

Understanding why would reserve managers need to liquidate their treasuries in the first place leads you in the direction of the euro dollar and getting toward real answers. So this is one of those areas where Moran and the Mar-a-Lago Accord lost an opportunity to connect some further dots and make more sense.

But this it just it just keeps going from here. It's basically all of these techniques and tactics. And a lot of them were not really spelled out. There's a lot that's just generalized. We just want to weaken the dollar kind of a thing without really coming up with more more concrete tactics. Why is sort of like the Trump administration will use as many points, many pieces of leverage as they possibly can. Tariffs being a big one. Promises of security also being a big carrot.

to get people to accept what will be the consequences of this accord, which they expect will be the dollar to go down. And part of the reason that they expect the dollar to go down is that a lot of other counterparties, a multinational group of countries, will accept this overall plan because they'll see some of the benefits to their own systems.

You get to slide number 10, and that's where you get into some of the pushback. I mean, Moran talks about in the conclusion that Wall Street doesn't believe that the federal government has the ability to get the exchange value to go lower, which is absolutely true. Again, it gets back to what's what, you know, the lack of dots that aren't connected to this point.

Can the U.S. government make the dollar go lower? That's that's one of the big questions that is just right now, as far as the Mar-a-Lago Accords are concerned. That's a big question that's just assumed to be true. There's a lot of you know, this this is consistent with a lot of popular thought on the topic that governments control exchange values, which is why I get to, you know, I've included as the third slide.

That quote from the New York Times in 1992, which shows that governments don't get to set exchange value. And this is one of the areas where Wall Street is correct in its skepticism of something like this, is that even if there's an accord, even if governments agree that they want the dollar to go lower, that still doesn't mean that the dollar will actually go lower, which is why there really hasn't been a whole lot of market reaction to all of this chatter. Now, I know, Eric, you want to talk about some of the other

consequences of even discussing these types of things. But as far as the market is concerned, there's a low level of buy-in about whether or not this is even feasible, assuming all the other stuff that we just talked about is actually correct, but it's actually not, which is what you get to when you get to slide number 11.

This is also part of the original problem here where Moran assumes that the reason dollar is overvalued in his mind because of reserve managers holding high levels of reserve assets. What are the ways in which they'll dissuade people and reserve managers from holding reserve assets?

is that they won't need to defend their currency against volatility because in this Mar-a-Lago Accord world, they won't have that type of volatility. And again, this is another one of those opportunities that was lost because you start thinking, OK, why do reserve managers have to sell their short-dated treasuries to begin with? Then it comes back to the euro-dollar system and dollar shortage.

There's a whole lot in this whole thing. I don't know how much more detail you want to get into. We get into the stuff about Zoltan's Bretton Woods 3, where some of it's derived from that, which is also getting everything backwards. But that's an overriding problem in my view is that

Mar-a-Lago Accord proceeds from false assumptions. A lot of those assumptions are looking at symptoms and not addressing root causes. And that's Zoltan Bretton Woods 3 to a T. As you look at slide 12, this is a transcript that Zoltan had with Bloomberg's Odd Lot podcast from a couple of years ago.

And he talked correctly about how these crises like the Asian not financial crisis in 97, along with the global not financial crisis in 2008 and even March of 2020, how they were monetary crisis. But then he describes the symptoms, which in his mind was a broken FX peg in 97, a crisis of power when he's talking about the reserve fund in 2008 and March 2020, which is a crisis of interest rates. And those were just the symptoms of the original problem, which was a euro dollar shortage.

So if you're constantly looking at the symptoms of all of these things, including the rising dollar exchange value, you don't identify the correct cause. You end up looking in the wrong direction to try to fix things that you don't really have the ability to fix. And slide 13, if anybody's interested, that's actually a video clip I put together on what actually happened on in March of 2020. Just hit the play button for that.

It all starts with the same thing. Everything comes back to dollar shortage, which is the one thing that never gets mentioned in any of these things. What drives the dollar exchange value up and what drives the interest of foreign reserve managers to own reserve assets is as insurance against these dollar shortage episodes that we go through. So slide 14, you get to the dollar exchange value.

And the fact that DXY, which is the main index that most people use to measure the dollar exchange value, the fact that DXY hit its lowest point the day Peirce Stearns failed is a huge clue about what actually drives the dollar higher. It's risk aversion. You want to call it flight to safety. That's that's some of it. Flight to liquidity. It's basically monetary, monetary characteristics and conditions in the euro dollar system.

So the reason why Trump wasn't able to weaken the dollar in 2019, the reason why the dollar was going up is we were experiencing dollar shortage issues that really erupted in September, October, November and December of 2018. And they continued on into 2019, frustrating the Trump administration quite a bit, especially where it came to the Chinese, where they labeled the Chinese a currency manipulator because the Chinese yuan was experiencing the other side of the dollar going up.

So you go slide 15 and slide 16. Those are just IMF data just punctuates the fact that, again, they're connecting some of the dots. You can see that the dollar exchange value goes up at the same time that global economic output really deviates from trend and never goes back. So you have the negative economic consequences from the dollar going up. Again, it's not the dollar going up. That's a symptom itself. The negative economic consequences, slide 16 shows.

You can really see the negative consequences in terms of trade volumes, which have just completely fallen way off trend. And it all started in 2008, right when the dollar bottomed out and went higher ever since then. So again, they're connecting the dots between the rising dollar exchange value and the negative economic outcomes, but not really identifying the cause, reason why both of those things are happening simultaneously. It's not that the dollar exchange value goes up and it causes economic weakness in manufacturing in the United States.

The dollar exchange value goes up and it causes economic weakness everywhere. Even for countries whose currencies goes down in value against the dollar, their export economies actually get crushed at the same time because it's more than just the causes that are identified, really identifying with symptoms rather than causes.

Jeff, before we dive into the details and the tick data and so forth, let's just go back to the high level for a second. When is the last time that anybody proposed to change the global monetary system on such a huge scale as what's being discussed right now? This is not bigger than Bretton Woods. I mean, is this as big as Nixon taking us off of the gold standard in 1971? How

How do we think about how big this is, how big of the consequences could be, and how likely is it that this actually comes to fruition in some form? As far as the last one, I don't think anybody has any idea. How likely does this come to fruition? I honestly hope it doesn't because there's so much that's wrong about it. I think it would actually be harmful to go down this road with so many false assumptions going from there.

But again, going back to what we said at the beginning, Eric, I agree with you. I think this is a huge positive that somebody is even thinking along these lines saying, OK, we need to do something radical here, which is something I've been arguing for a long period of time. Look, this is not something that's going to be fixed with the current status quo. We really do need to shake things up and do something completely different. I've been arguing for reforming of the currency system ever since 2008 when it became clear that there was really no going back.

But that being said, that positive, that out of, you know, to your other question, how big is this? Nixon closing the gold window to me was just a trivial thing that happened at the end, at the end of the introduction of the euro dollar era. So that's not really comparable. You really do have to go back to the to the Bretton Woods, you know, the conference in 1944 or something, something like this. So this is the biggest change to the monetary system in 80 years.

I wouldn't call it to change the monetary system. It's the biggest, it's the most, it's the closest we've gotten to even talking about doing something like that.

which is, again, a huge positive because it will get people talking about why these things are happening. So we haven't seen anything like this since the 1940s. Really, the euro dollar introduction and the euro dollar evolution, that just happened behind the scenes. That was probably a bigger thing, but there was no top down. It wasn't like countries got together and decided they were going to do this. Just a bunch of bankers in London who decided they were going to do it. That was probably a more radical introduction, something I would prefer to see these days.

But the fact that, you know, we have authorities, you know, the U.S. president even thinking about doing something like this. And maybe if the rumors are true, they're actually involved in discussions. Yeah, this is this is huge stuff. But that also that's a double edged sword because looking at radical solutions from the wrong perspective raises the risk of introducing more harm than doing good.

Because the idea that governments are going to weaken the U.S. dollar to be complete, no likelihood, no chance of that happening. And then coercing foreign reserve managers to accept lower interest rates risks some backlash there. There's a lot of foreign reserve managers who are already unhappy to begin with. So there are negative consequences there.

associated with even trying something like this and trying something like this, which is the wrong set of solutions, a long set of proposed solutions means that there's more likely to be downside than not. So this there's small measure of positive that this is a radical idea that's being taken seriously is over is overtaken and superseded by the fact that it's the wrong set of ideas and the wrong set of proposed solutions.

Jeff, to address what you're saying about this being maybe at least for now the wrong set of solutions, let me pass by you what the way I'm thinking about this after giving it a couple weeks of thought since we first talked to Jim Bianco about it a couple weeks ago. What I'm thinking going to Neil Howe's fourth turning construct, what happens in fourth turnings, especially toward the end of fourth turnings, the fourth turning that we're in now is expected to

to last through the end of the 2020s into the early 2030s, maybe 2032 or so is where it's set to end according to historical markers. What it sounds like to me is what we're in for here is a re-architecting of the global monetary system on the scale of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. Something that big is set to happen in the next decade.

six or seven years. And what we're seeing right now is the very first discussion, this is V0.01, of what that might look like. And it will probably be hotly debated on the international stage, not just by the United States, but by the BRICS countries and by lots of people. And eventually, we'll get to a Bretton Woods-like discussion.

you know, event that happens in the late 2020s, early 2030s, where we completely re-architect the global monetary system. And I wouldn't be surprised if that occurs around a tokenized global digital currency system at some point. What do you think of that high level analysis? Does that sound about like where we're headed?

Yeah, I think that's the most optimistic way to look at this, Eric. And, you know, whether or not that's the case, we obviously can't say for sure. But if Trump is willing to go through the wall first and take all the hits for just raising this topic, that's that certainly can be a positive. And I think that would be the most positive outcome, because, like I said, I don't agree with what the solutions are being proposed here to begin with. But looking at it from that perspective, you're right. It's

At some point, when you stop and objectively look at all the problems, the data, the evidence and everything else, setting aside this deference to the Federal Reserve and what it's supposed to do, the inescapable conclusion is what you just said, that the monetary system needs to change is what we've been talking about for how many years now? Almost a decade. Right, Eric? We've been talking about how the monetary system needs to change.

And the fact that it's being considered at high levels and in positions of authority, I still think is a double edged sword. But you're right. This is very likely that if Trump does pursue the Mar-a-Lago Accords, the actual accords, assuming they can get there, will have to go through several iterations first. And so I think the questions become, OK, now that we're actually talking about the right thing for once, which is reorganizing the monetary system, what should that look like and what should it really come out? How should it come out?

I would prefer the government stay out of it entirely because, I mean, look, first of all, the Bretton Woods system only lasted a little over a decade before it started to fall apart. So it was the top-down approach that was offered there didn't last very long. And fortunately, there was a bank-centered system that was able to pick up the slack, you know, Triffin's Dilemma and Triffin's Paradox in the 1950s. Otherwise, it would have run into problems right away. So, yeah.

The idea of a Bretton Woods three that's driven by governments and bureaucrats, that terrifies the hell out of me. And I don't have a whole lot of optimism that would lead to something positive to begin with. But

As far as Trump and the radical proposals opening the door for radical solutions that don't necessarily need to be, you know, government driven top down. Maybe that, you know, just the fact that we're now starting to talk more actively about some big stuff, maybe that opens the door for some more workable, longstanding solutions like private digital currencies.

And as you always point out, Eric, private digital currencies will never be truly private. They'll all have to be some kind of partnership with government and regulators and authorities. But the fact that the president and Mar-a-Lago and all this stuff is bringing that discussion to the table and bringing some really big weight and gravity to it can certainly be a positive if it goes in the right direction. I guess that's probably the way to put it, which...

I don't have a whole lot of optimism about that because governments don't really want to get out of the way and let the monetary system work. And the only way the euro dollar actually did that and accomplished that in the 50s was that it did so out of sight of regulators and authorities. And by the time they realized what was happening, it was too late for them to do anything about it.

I don't know if that if the Mar-a-Lago Accord helps or hinders in that respect, because if everybody's looking at redoing the monetary system, you won't have a private solution sort of emerge out of the mist when everybody's not expecting it.

But I think what you're saying is probably the most optimistic take. OK, that Trump raises this issue, makes it a mainstream issue that we're talking about. And then maybe that leads to other maybe that makes it a little bit easier for everybody else involved and everybody else who's not involved, the general public to accept the idea, if just the idea at this stage, that this is something that needs to happen.

And that's one of the things that I've been arguing for a long time and encountering a lot of resistance because it's difficult, especially for people in the United States, to accept the idea that losing the U.S. dollar, and it's not necessarily the case, but losing the U.S. dollar as reserve currency, that sounds like it's a big minus, a big negative. Everybody talks about the privilege of reserve currency. It's actually a burden and that the outcome of redoing the monetary system and doing it right is,

could potentially lead to, as you're saying, 2030s being a period where the global economy actually flourishes.

So if it requires President Trump to offer this radical idea to kickstart that process of the public getting their minds around something big like this needing to happen, then yeah, it can turn out to be a positive. But as you know, and as you're thinking, there's a lot of details left to be hammered out and there's a lot of different ways it can go wrong. Maybe I'm just being too cynical, like I'm conditioned to be, but...

In one sense, that's a positive. But let's hope this current Mar-a-Lago arrangement or current Mar-a-Lago proposal never goes very far at all. Jeff, I want to stop you there because everything I'm hearing is this is clear to you. You know what should be done. So I want you to imagine that someone close to the president listens to macro voices. We do have quite a few people like that listening to macro voices. You get summoned to Mar-a-Lago. You've got 10 minutes to pitch to President Trump immediately.

Look, Zoltan's got it wrong. I've got it right. Here's what you should do instead and why. And it's got to address President Trump's goals, which are on his mind, which is they got to do something about the U.S. debt to get the cost of borrowing under control because they know it's going to bankrupt the U.S. government if they don't do something to change it.

But he doesn't want to stop spending money. And he definitely wants for the U.S. to start getting compensated for providing the not just military support, but all of the rest of the support that it provides to the rest of the world. You're in front of President Trump. You've got 10 minutes to sell your story. What should we do instead?

Well, the way I would start is that the short term goals here to reduce the deficit and reduce the deficit footprint on the U.S. economy essentially takes care of itself.

What we're looking at and what the president has already decided on, I mean, that's the, what is it, the 3-3-3 plan. The idea here is to essentially recreate the conditions after World War II. We had this gargantuan debt that came out from the New Deal in World War II. We didn't default on it. We didn't inflate it away like a lot of people say. What happened is we grew ourselves out of it. What I would say is that if you get the monetary question right, if we actually deal with the problem that actually exists,

We will grow ourselves out of it. And so all that would be required is an element of fiscal sanity, not even, you know, not austerity. We don't need to cut the budget down to zero, you know, and really go into massive restraint. You look at what Eisenhower did, started with the Truman administration, Truman and Eisenhower, and they kind of went off the rails a little bit with Kennedy and Johnson. But for the initial period, you had a little bit of fiscal constraint, restraint,

which is actually nothing more than common sense. So you're a little bit of fiscal common sense and you let the economy flourish the way that it's capable of flourishing. And eventually the economy outgrows the debt. And that's how you solve the debt problem, including the deficit problem. And then, you know, the various tactics to get interest rates down. I think there's a whole discussion there about whether you want interest rates to go down. I know from a fiscal standpoint, it sounds like you want lower interest rates, but what we really want is interest rates to go up.

Because when bond yields go up, that means that the market is saying we believe in the growth and inflation expectations with emphasis on growth, that it's actually going to work. We want rates to go up from where they are here and not because the Federal Reserve is pushing them up for non-economic purposes. So the question is, how do we get there?

How do we get to a period where we get economic growth to reignite and restart after almost two decades of being behind? I think the answer is you make a credible reform to the currency system that is both, first of all, credible. But second of all, it is responsive, elastic, fluid and dynamic enough to to overtake and recreate all the roles that the euro dollar system did before.

as a functioning reserve currency. That means a high degree of resources that need to be invested. We have the technology to do so. You talked about a digital global currency, a digital ledger. Why not have a couple of different competing ledgers? Not necessarily driven by central banks and governments, because I think there's just way too much mistrust over something like a centrally focused digital currency.

But some form of digital currency that is decentralized, that has the credibility, especially if it has the approval, not necessarily the backing, but at least the approval of authorities around the rest of the world. You have a private monetary system that is responsive to the needs and the ever-changing needs of the commercial system. What you end up with is you unlock the secret to growth. You don't have currency volatility like we've seen because that's a symptom of the broken euro dollar system.

So you copy the best aspects of the Eurodollar system, but you don't have it as a bank centered system. We have all these interlocking ledgers and unnecessary complexity, which simplifies the situation, creates a tremendous amount of efficiencies in terms of, you know, intermediation doesn't necessarily need to be done by banks. It can be done in any format, you know, decentralized finance, DeFi, whatever.

So transitioning to a single or a couple of different digital currencies, decentralized digital currencies that are responsive to the needs of the commercial system and not just the United States, but the entire global commercial system, I think is the key ingredient in getting rid of all of these negative symptoms and unlocking security.

what we really want, which is economic growth, sustained economic growth over a prolonged period that allows us to grow our way out of our debt crisis and a lot of other people besides, because it's not just the United States that's experiencing massive level of debt.

And I think you get a lot of people to buy into something like that if it has a credible future, because even if the U.S. dollar is no longer the reserve currency, this new digital token tends to ends up being the reserve currency. That's an easy sell to even the U.S. public because the benefits of that of that digital currency is that you have a period of prolonged prosperity like today.

People my age remember from the 1980s and 1990s and the first part of the 2000s before it all went off the rail.

So solving the monetary issue by reforming the currency system, not from a top down way, but from leveraging the technology that exists, as well as understanding what the benefits were, what the really the most positive aspects of the euro dollar system and what it was able to accomplish and making sure the currency that replaces it can replicate those functions. I think that unlocks everything. And that's what I've been arguing for longer than I care to argue.

Well, listeners, you just heard Jeff's pitch. Those of you who are Mar-a-Lago members, be sure to mention it to President Trump. And we'll keep our fingers crossed, Jeff, that you get an introduction. I think you've definitely got something to contribute to this discussion. Folks, the rest of the slide deck, there's quite a few slides there for you to peruse offline. We discussed how to handle this because we're kind of out of time now. And I wanted to give Jeff a chance to tell us what needs to be done instead today.

For the rest of Jeff's analysis, he's going to record a separate Eurodollar University episode to cover what we didn't have time to cover in this week's episode. We're not going to be able to get it into your Research Roundup email for this week. We'll have it in next week's Research Roundup, so you can look for it there. Jeff, before I let you go, for anybody who doesn't know what Eurodollar.University is, it started with a series of podcasts that we did here on Macro Voices.

about the Eurodollar system. Boy, I don't know, it was like seven or eight years ago. That's pretty much obsolete now. What is the new Eurodollar University all about? What can people expect to find at www.eurodollar.university? Yeah, you're right, Eric. It's amazing how long, how much time has gone by. But at eurodollar.university, we've taken what we did back in, what was it, 2017, and we've taken what we did back in,

and greatly expanded on. It's not just about what is the Eurodollar system and how does it function or how does it not function over the last 15 years, but also talking about monetary theory, economic history, current macroeconomics. We've got subscriptions available for that. I do a daily deep dive analysis. I do a daily briefing to keep up to date on what's happening every day in the marketplace as well as the macroeconomy. But Eurodollar University members are just taking a really detailed look at

Reserve currencies, money, euro dollar. We look at cryptocurrencies and digital currencies as well. We really get into the details of all of it because you really need to get into really dive into all of the mechanics as well as history and the nuances and details to truly understand crypto.

Not just how a system should work, because, you know, it's, you know, we can never really know how a system should work. But because economics has done such a poor job of educating the public on any of these things, what does the Federal Reserve actually do? That's something we spent some time on. You know, what is QNQT? We take apart all of these mainstream myths and legends and fill in the gaps that economics has left behind.

And obviously that content is mostly paywalled. Thankfully, Jeff has kindly offered to do a free episode just for Macro Voices listeners to cover the parts of the deck we didn't get to today. Again, that will be linked in next week's Research Roundup. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues right here at MacroVoices.com. Macro Voices

Now, back to your hosts, Eric Townsend and Patrick Ceresna. Eric, it was great to have Jeff back on the show. Now, let's get to that chart deck. Listeners, you're going to find the download link for the postgame chart deck in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, it means you have not yet registered at MacroVoices.com. Just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, and click on the red button over Jeff's picture saying,

looking for the downloads. Now, Eric, what are your thoughts here on these equity markets? Well, the sell-off this week has taken us right down to key support at the 100-day moving average, which is right around 5996 on the S&P. We tried to bounce off it on Wednesday early session, but then Trump tariff talk brought us right back down to close right on that key level. And as I'm recording

early on Thursday morning. We're trying once again to bounce above that level. Is it going to be a dead cat bounce or are we looking at the beginning of a recovery here? It's a little bit too early to tell, but that's going to be the tell is whether or not that 100-day moving average will hold on the S&P.

So I see this as make or break it time for the S&P with a further breakdown from here being marked by a close below that $59.96 level. If that happens, we could easily see a much bigger correction all the way down to the 200-day moving average, which is way down at $57.55. That's $57.55.

Quite a few notable investors, Stephen Cohen and others, have been calling for that deeper correction. They say it's in the cards, so I guess we'll see what happens. Right now, the number to watch, though, is a daily close below the 100-day moving average, which is right around 5996. A close below that level would likely beget more selling.

So, Eric, when looking on page two on that S&P 500 chart, I have that 50 day moving average on there and we've broken below the 50 day. And when you look back at the last year of price action, we've had like four occasions where this has occurred. It's been these like 5% market corrections that often occur numerous times throughout the year.

a year. But the bigger question, is this just one of those little market corrections or is it something bigger? Well, the first observations to make is that there's considerable momentum loss in the markets. We've more or less spent three months trading along a

key highs as the market has lost upside momentum. And a large amount of that has come from where on page three, I can have the magnificent seven ETF chart where the mag sevens have broken down. Now those mag sevens are such a huge component from a market cap weighting perspective in the S&P that when they're correcting the

that the S&P index is dragged down or is very heavy or tired simply because the other stocks have a very hard time compensating. We still have not seen the market breadth widen. And so there's been sector rotation. So as money managers are clearing

are clearly lightening up on many of the Magnificent Seven stocks. We have that money coming into consumer staples, finding some pharmaceuticals. There's underpinning rotation in the market, but that is likely to leave the market very heavy. Now, we got through NVIDIA's earnings without any big drama, but the puzzle to solve now is will they be able to

have these mag sevens have any rebound based on that because if the distribution on these stocks continues it certainly can spiral the S&P into a little bit of a deeper correction in the weeks to come now Eric I want to touch on that US dollar index what are you thinking here

The move lower continued this week, sealing the deal that the prior consolidation range from a 107 to 110 has been broken to the downside and suggesting that the top might be in, at least for now. But there are quite a few potential upside catalysts that could emerge to change all of that. So at this point, I think we're in a new downtrend on the Dixie. I think maybe the short-term top is in, but my conviction for still lower numbers is tentative, at least for now.

Well, Eric, there's been plenty of talk out there as to whether the U.S. dollar is putting in a major top and whether they can orchestrate a period of U.S. dollar weakness. But I like to keep things very simple. There's a primary bull trend in the U.S. dollar that started back in the third quarter of last year. And this rally that we have seen has just paused. And that is a very typical price action rally.

on almost any asset. And so when we have this type of pause, it's approaching a very key support line along what were all of its previous highs in the 2023 and 2024 years. Often that acts as support. There's a lot of reasons to still leave

the door open to another leg higher in the market whether it's just retesting the highs or even another leg higher there just simply isn't enough price action deterioration in the charts to suggest that there's a major new U.S. dollar downtrend underway now Eric let's move on to crude oil there continues to be this consolidation on the downside how do you size this up

The 100-day moving average at 70.11 on WTI was key technical support, and when the market broke below it on Tuesday morning, the selling accelerated. As of the wee hours of Thursday morning, the low so far on WTI was 68.40, and we're bouncing very nicely off of that level now, looking at just over 69.20 as I'm recording early on Thursday morning.

I won't be surprised to see still lower numbers to come. It seems like politically that's where a lot of powerful people want to make happen. But there's also the risk of something going wrong in these peace negotiations and seeing a Middle East geopolitical escalation, which could easily rocket numbers much higher on oil. But barring that, I think a drift lower is entirely possible now that we've taken out that key support level at 70%.

Yeah, Eric, well, to me, back about two, three weeks ago when we were testing the $72, $73 area, that was a very important line in the sand for me for a bull continuation pattern. When those levels failed, it's clear that we fell back

in to the trade range that was established in the second half of last year, which has that lower boundary of like $66, $67 and the upper boundary up in the $72, $73 area. It's likely in my mind that this trade range will prevail for the rest of the first quarter. Now, will that support hold? Will this be where the base of crude oil establishes itself? Those are the little puzzles to solve. But right now in the short term, oil

remain stuck in this purgatory trade range. All right, Eric, let's move on to gold here. Well, Patrick, gold has been flashing extreme overbought on the RSI for weeks now, and it's finally consolidating to shake off that overbought condition with the daily RSI finally falling back down below its midpoint to 44 early on Thursday morning. But the

The weekly RSI is still a concern. As of Wednesday's close, it was still flashing massively overbought at a whopping 87%.

So far, the 21-day moving average has been what's held up this market, but we sold off below that overnight on Wednesday and into Thursday morning. After testing 2889 in the overnight session, we were bouncing off of that, struggling to hold just barely 2900 an hour into the European session on Thursday morning. That's still just below the 21-day moving average, which is at 2905 now, and if we can't

close above that level of 2905 on Thursday, there's a good chance of another leg lower. Looking at the daily RSI, you know, the downside probably shouldn't be too bad because, you know, it's already halfway over. It seems like we're halfway there. We haven't been down that much. You know, probably don't have that much to go. But the thing is, that's the daily RSI.

When you look at the weekly RSI, it tells a very different story. It's just starting to roll over from extreme overbought. It's showing 83 on Thursday morning, down from 87 at Wednesday's close. So the weekly RSI is telling us that there's room for a significant downside correction over the next five

few weeks if that consolidation range just above 2890 doesn't hold on Thursday. So I'll definitely be watching Thursday's close if we can get nice and comfortably above that 21-day moving average. Probably the consolidation range is holding for now. If we close below 2890, that says to me that maybe significantly lower numbers are still in the cards.

So I'm on the fence between a continuing trade sideways and a consolidation range between 2890 and 2965, which is what we've been doing for the last week or so. That's if the daily RSI falls back into oversold territory, which should set us up for at least a bounce higher, a swing trade higher towards maybe making that 3000 target that everybody's watching.

or we could see the weekly RSI is telling us that maybe that deeper correction is coming. Again, 2890 is the pivot level that I'm watching for a daily close below to tell me that a significant move is on to the downside.

Yeah, Eric, in my mind, gold as well as reach the upper boundaries of some of the target zones. So typically the normal ebb and flow of market movement is it makes a bullish impulse and then pauses and consolidates that impulse.

it's increasingly likely that some form of a gold consolidation is likely to develop here. That doesn't make me bearish gold. It's simply about having realistic expectations of how long and how far a gold impulse can go. It's more likely that a major breakout in gold above $3,000 now is looking increasingly like a second or third quarter story.

Now, Eric, let's move on to uranium, where the U-308 continues to show some weakness, but the underpinning conditions are not necessarily confirming that. So what are your thoughts here?

Well, Patrick, yet another week of extremely bullish nuclear news flow with Energy Secretary Chris Wright visiting both Los Alamos National Laboratory and also planning a visit to Oak Ridge National Laboratory, two of the biggest and most important nuclear research laboratories, and then telling CNN that he is excited to launch an American nuclear renaissance. Policy signaling doesn't get a whole lot clearer than that.

Then an absolute majority of the Spanish Senate passed a resolution to halt the planned closure of Spain's nuclear fleet. Then Holtec announced its plans to build two more 300-megawatt SMRs on the same Palisades site where an 800-megawatt reactor is already scheduled to be restarted.

So Palisades alone represents 1,400 megawatts of electric generation capacity that will be coming back online in the next several years, and that's going to require fuel that has not previously been budgeted for. And then the German chancellor called for halting the phase-out of nuclear energy in that country. So they're going to stop turning it off.

Now, they haven't quite gotten to the point of agreeing to turn it back on. That's restarting the reactors that they'd already shut down or that the Green Party there had already shut down the party that was just voted out of power. But this was an essential first step in that direction.

So, wow, Patrick, with all of those things taken together, you really couldn't ask for more bullish fundamental news flow for nuclear energy in a single week than what we got just in this past week. Yet still, it's been another week of spot uranium outflow.

and uranium miners plumbing new cycle lows, defying the bullish fundamentals with many issues making new lower lows below their September 6th lows, which so many people thought was going to be the bottom of this secular bear market in uranium.

The catalyst that started the selling frenzy on Friday was the general manager of Orano, that's the French state-owned producer, reassuring his customers, don't worry everybody, there's not going to be any uranium shortage interfering with our deliveries in the short term, in the medium term, or in the long term.

or in the long term. Now, his statements were made very dramatically and very emphatically, as the French are prone to doing, despite the fact that it was not supported by any kind of data or analysis or rationale to explain why he was saying that. And it seems like that's what spooked the market.

Now, to my thinking, this is strong evidence of how fragile investor sentiment has become in this market, but nothing else. He didn't say that there wasn't a structural supply deficit, which there most assuredly is. All he said, Patrick, is that they would be able to make their deliveries just fine. And he's right about that. Now, he neglected to mention that prices will almost certainly need to move much higher in order for his promises to be kept.

which I'm convinced that they will. And look, at the end of the day, he's the manager of a state-owned enterprise who said nothing other than to reassure his customers that they're not going to run out of metal and be unable to deliver on their contractual obligations. What else would you expect the manager of a state-owned producer to say? He didn't cite any supply statistics or otherwise support his statement with data. So the market reaction, frankly, didn't make any sense.

Next, we got more talk from the Trump administration suggesting that they're edging closer and closer to making amends with Russia and bringing an end to the Ukraine war, which the market seems to have taken as bearish for uranium. I guess because apparently they think that Russian supply coming back on the market, if the sanctions are lifted, could result in an oversupply that would flood the market and result in a downward price shock.

Look, I think the market has that one exactly backwards. What Russia has more of than we have in the West and what the West urgently needs from Russia is their conversion and enrichment services.

Not their raw uranium, but their capacity to convert and enrich uranium. So I think that lifting of the Russian sanctions might actually be bullish for U-308 because the present bottleneck caused by a shortage of Western conversion and enrichment capacity might be addressed.

But frankly, I doubt that would even happen because I doubt President Trump is going to lift those import bans since they seem to conflict with his America First policy objectives. But still, the retail freakout that happened anyway, despite it not making any logical sense, definitely underscores the fragility of investor sentiment in this market.

Now, I bought the dip on Friday. I bought more of the deeper dip on Monday. And I bought a whole bunch more of the even deeper dip on Tuesday. We tried to bounce on Wednesday and it looked like the swing bottom might be in already. But then Trump's further announcements suggesting a deal to end the Ukraine war might be close at hand brought most issues back down to close near the lows of the day.

The real elephant in the room, as far as I'm concerned, is the risk of a broader market risk-off event. If the S&P dumps another 200 points, it's a sure bet that we'll see even lower prices on the uranium miners. And that could lead to margin calls for over-levered retail tourists, and even more panic selling would ensue.

So while there's no doubt in my mind that the process of retail capitulation that often marks market bottoms is now well underway, I'm still not at all convinced that the final bottom is in. There's still plenty of room for an outright washout if the S&P enters a deep correction from here.

If that happens, it'll create a generational buying opportunity for uranium and uranium miners. Because again, the question to ask yourself in these scary downside oversold situations is, have the fundamentals changed? The answer is yes, they have changed. They've gotten even more bullish.

So this is a buying opportunity already. It might get even better of a buying opportunity if a deeper correction in the S&P carries uranium even lower. And I think that could bring about a margin call induced real panic sell if it happens.

So brace for impact in case that broader market risk event should happen. But if it doesn't happen, we're probably already very close to the bottom now, at least in the short term. The RSI hasn't been this low since September 6th, and we got a nice 40% rally off of that low. Bottom line, watch the S&P for the tell on what comes next for uranium.

yeah well eric on page seven i have that sprout physical uranium trust and that continues to make lower highs and lower lows in an active distribution selling at a deep discount to its net asset value looking for where uh that selling subsides and where we start seeing basing formations for the potential turnaround story at this stage we're still more than a dollar away from the uh just a simple thing like a 50-day moving average or

or beating the descending trend line. And so there's a lot of repair work that has to be done before we get bull signals on this. Finally, though, Eric, I wanted to just touch on the chart on the T-bond futures. And bonds have obviously spent the entire back half of last year in a very decisive downtrend.

And after establishing that, we're really starting to see bonds come to life. We had a legitimate breakout in the last week on the upside of these bonds, and they're now breaking the descending trend lines, getting above the moving averages, asking the question as to whether we've seen a peak in yields and a low in bonds and whether or not they can counter trend here in the weeks and months to come. Certainly something that's on my mind.

Folks, if you enjoy Patrick's chart decks, you can get them every single day of the week with a free trial of Big Picture Trading. The details are on the last pages of the slide deck or just go to bigpicturetrading.com. Patrick, tell them what they can expect to find in this week's Research Roundup.

Well, in this week's Research Roundup, you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as Jeff Snyder's slide deck and the chart book we just discussed here in the postgame, including a link to a number of articles that we found interesting. So you're going to find a link to this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup.

That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners. And we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. For those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners,

send us an email at researchroundup at macrovoices.com and we will consider it for our weekly distributions. And you can also follow Eric on X at Eric S. Townsend. That's Eric spelt with a K. And you can also follow me at Patrick Ceresna. On behalf of Eric Townsend and myself, thank you all for listening and we'll see you all next week. ♪

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