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Hello and welcome to another edition of the China Global South podcast, a proud member of the Seneca Podcast Network. I'm Eric Olander, and as always, I'm joined by CGSP's managing editor, Kobus Van Staden, from beautiful Cape Town, South Africa. A very good afternoon to you, Kobus. Good afternoon. Kobus, for the past...

- Five, six, maybe seven years that you and I have been doing this show, we've been hearing from the United States and we've been hearing from China that they've been telling countries, "We don't want you to pick or choose either China or the US." That was one of the staples of Biden diplomacy. Even back into Trump one, they would go out into the world and say, "Listen, this isn't about China or the US." They weren't as aggressive. They were very critical of China, but they didn't tell countries that you have to either be with us

or with them. There wasn't that binary choice that we saw during the Cold War with the Soviets where countries were split evenly between either on a Soviet camp or on a US camp. And of course there were some non-aligned countries and we're gonna talk about that today. That is not the case anymore, Kobus. As you know, your country is in the line of fire. Your president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was in Washington last week trying to repair the damage that's been done to the US-South Africa relationship. And at the same time, a number of other countries

have come under fire. If you recall, a couple of weeks ago, we did a show where we played some sound from Senator James Risch, who in the US Senate, who called for a reevaluation of US ties with Kenya. All of a sudden, Kenya now is in the firing line because of William Ruto's close ties with Xi Jinping in his recent trip to Beijing. Also Panama, Colombia, any number of countries. The Trump administration is not saying anymore that

that you don't have to choose. In many instances, both the Trump administration and lawmakers on Capitol Hill are saying if you align with China or US enemies and rivals too closely, then it might be time to reevaluate this relationship. At the same time, countries like South Africa, Cobus, are trying to straddle these worlds, trying to hold on to both of the relationships.

So do you get a sense in South Africa right now based on the discourse that they feel like they have to make a choice between the US or China or the US and the BRICS? Or is this something that you think policymakers can navigate and find their way through?

At the moment, the discourse in South Africa, I think, is more about trying to manage the optics and trying to find some form of deal that can be made with the US. And there's been discussions even about possibly arranging deals for Elon Musk, you know, and so on. So it seems like at the moment, the South Africans still assume that it's possible to maintain a relationship with the US against the background that China remains its biggest bilateral trade partner.

So the centrality of China to the South African economy remains as is at the moment. And I think they hope to be able to show up their relationship with the US rather than what I think underlies all of that kind of maneuvering is the reluctance to be pushed towards a choice. You know, because I think in a lot of cases, like being pushed all the way to making a choice is the worst scenario for South Africa, or it's the thing that South Africa would least like to do.

And so, you know, so I think at the moment they're still trying to maneuver around that. And it then depends, you know, how strong the pressure becomes externally. Do you get the sense that they're ready if they are confronted with a break in diplomatic relations or some kind of move from the United States that says, we're done?

We don't want to be part of South Africa anymore. Already, you know, the president has sent a very strong signal saying he's not going to attend the upcoming G20 summit because of South African politics. And again, these are racial politics, but he's not going. So there are sending strong signals of their displeasure with South Africa. Do you think South Africa is ready if the day comes where the United States says we're done with you?

I think South Africa is definitely hedging at the moment. You know, there seems to be looking around for a lot of diversification in the investment and other economic relationships. But I think, you know, South Africa still is a vulnerable country with a relatively sizable US investment. You know, so if suddenly they are forced to choose, that will have some very significant costs for South Africa. But overall, I think if they are pushed to make a choice, they probably will end up going with China simply because of the kind of...

overwhelming kind of structural centrality of China in the South African economy. Well, this once unthinkable dilemma that countries in the post-war or post-Cold War era never thought they would have to confront is now here. A growing number of countries did not expect that they would

be in the firing line, like Kenya or Colombia, for example. And so now they come down to what do they do? There is a movement in a number of countries to go back to the Bandung Conference of 1955, I think it was, in Indonesia, where that's with the origins of what was called the non-aligned movement. And now there's been a revitalization of that into the act

non-aligned movement and one of the biggest proponents of that is our old friend Ambassador Jorge Haine who is a former Chilean ambassador to South Africa, to India, to China, so obviously many of the countries that we cover on a regular basis and most importantly he is the author of The Non-Aligned World Striking Out in an Era of Great Power Competition that he co-wrote with Carlos Fortin and Carlos Omenami. We want to welcome back to the program Ambassador Haine. Thank you so much for your time today. A very good morning to you in Boston.

Thank you, Eric. Thank you, Corvus. Delighted to be back with you. It's great to talk with you. And again, I wanted to have this conversation with you now because we want to take your ideas that you've articulated in the book and take them out of an academic context and let's now apply them into these real-world scenarios that we have. Because when you wrote the book...

This was pre-Trump when you wrote the book. We were not confronted with these choices, but at the same time, here we are. So before we get into specific countries and how you would advise presidents and prime ministers in those countries, can you maybe just articulate for our viewers and our listeners, what is active non-alignment as you detailed it in this book? Active non-alignment is a foreign policy doctrine for developing nations in today's world, for the global south. It is a guide to action.

to action, a compass to navigate the troubled waters of today's world, in which there are many things going on, but in which the central dynamic continues to be posited by the competition between the United States and China. World order is undergoing a major transition. This is what happens when you have a declining hegemon, the United States, and a rising power, China.

And all sorts of things happen as a result of that. So developing nations are between a rock and a hard place. And as you were talking earlier with Kobus, the question is what to do. Obviously, there is a temptation to side with one of the great powers. But what we argue is that it's a mistake. Active and Alignment argues that developing nations should put their own interests

interests front and center. They should not give in to these pressures. They should not align themselves with either of the great powers. And there is a very straightforward reason for it. Great power competition is, by definition, a competition.

Therefore, both Washington and Beijing are trying to win over the hearts and minds of nations and governments and countries around the world. Therefore, they have to, well, offer incentives and make this country support the hegemon in one case or the rising power in the other. In those conditions, countries have the opportunity to, well, make the most.

If you want to, say, build a port, who offers the best conditions? Is it the United States or is it China? And there is a duopoly. There isn't a monopoly. We are not in this unipolar moment anymore. And there's an important difference here between what happened in the Cold War. In what way? Obviously,

When you had this competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 50s and 60s and 70s, the Soviet Union was a significant military power, space power, you know, ideological power. But it was not a significant economic power. The Soviet economy was much smaller than the U.S. economy. It was also a closed economy. Therefore, it didn't have much to offer to Africa, Asia, Latin America in terms of trade, investment, financial cooperation.

The situation today is radically different. China is already a bigger economy than the U.S. economy in PPP terms. According to some projections, it will be bigger than the U.S. in nominal terms, perhaps as early as 2030.

China can put on the table things that the Soviet Union was not in a position to put on the table. This offers many opportunities. Kobus was talking earlier about the situation of South Africa that does a lot of trade and investment with China and something similar in South America. For South America, China is a bigger trading partner than the United States or Europe. In

In the book you identify hedging as a key strategy for non-aligned countries and you position it between balancing on the one hand and bandwagoning on the other. I wonder if you could talk us through those terms, like what does balancing and bandwagoning mean, what does hedging mean in between them and what does hedging look like in practice?

So in the traditional IR literature, what is posited is that you can do either of two things when confronted with, you know, another power. One of them is balancing, which means you take a strong position against

that power, or you can bandwagon, which means you go along with it and do, you know, whatever you are told. The traditional analysis has been that weaker powers, which, you know, in this case means developing nations, didn't have much of a choice but to bandwagon. You know, obviously, say for Ecuador to confront the United States, it was not something that was in the cards. Therefore, the assumption was that they had to go along and bandwagon.

What we are arguing is that today that is not necessarily the case for the reasons that I said

earlier, and that you have an intermediate position. That is, you hedge. That is, in some cases, you will align yourself on a particular issue with one power, can be the United States. On another, you might do so with China. It also means that you give mixed signals. You say, well, I'm going to do this. And then you backtrack. You explore alternative options. That is what, you know, we

It's meant by hedging, which is something in between balancing and bandwagon. And then we elaborate a bit on something else. What we say in the book is that the grand strategy of active non-alignment as a doctrine is what we call playing the field. What do we mean by playing the field? Playing the field means you look out and say, okay, these are the priorities I have. This is what I need.

say I need a line of finance or I need a railway line, who will give me the best conditions for this particular project? Peru is a very good case. Peru needed a big port because the current port of Callao is totally overwhelmed. So there's a private company that had this land in Chiang Kai and they went out into the market and said, we need capital and we need

somebody that will build this port. It could have been a U.S. company, but it ended up being Costco, a Chinese company. And they built the first part of what will be a $3.6 billion port, the most advanced port on South America's West Coast. Now,

Now, this has raised, you know, quite a ruckus, and there's been quite a bit of criticism in the U.S. and elsewhere. How is it possible that China's building this? Well, this was a private Peruvian initiative backed at one point by the Peruvian government, obviously. But it was, you know, the Chinese that came through. And this is how this works. So, you know, there is competition. And what we are arguing is that you take advantage of that.

Okay, so I want to talk about where we are today in the Trump era. And the Trumps do not look at the world the same way as previous American governments have. And so you talk about the Chiang Kai-Port, that was done in a previous era that does not exist anymore.

But it does not seem to me that the United States is going out there with a competitive offer and entertaining the perspectives of developing countries as to what they want. Instead, and I can see that here in Southeast Asia, they are telling other countries, this is what's going to happen. And if you

Don't do this. I'm going to either put tariffs on you, I'm going to cut you off in other ways for development financing. And I could see that if a country came back and said, listen, I want your best offer to me, I think the White House would tell you to go get stuff. And let's kind of apply your thinking right now to real world scenarios.

This is a part of the world that you know very well. President Molina was forced into a corner to cut off, you know, to end his relationship with the Belt and Road Initiative. Also to, against his will, to force to be able to eject C.K. Hutchinson from the Panama Canal. Now it's looking like that the Americans are demanding free access to the canal, not only for military ships, but for all ships.

I'd like you to apply the principles of hedging and bandwagoning and all the different principles in the book to the situation in Panama. And what would you advise the president on how to respond, especially given that Panama is a dollar economy?

And the fact is, is that the Americans could have cut off the supply of dollars to Panama, effectively suffocating that economy. What choices does a country like Panama have? And we're going to go through a couple other choices, other countries as well, because we want to apply your thinking to a real world example. Great question, Eric. And I think Panama is an excellent example of what I would argue is

what shouldn't do when faced with these choices. So let us drill down a little bit. And I would argue that in the case of Panama, the Panamanian government has done exactly the wrong things. And that is why they are getting into a bigger and bigger mess. When Secretary of State Rubio visited Panama in February, you know, mind you, this is the first time a Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of State, undertakes negotiations

his first visit abroad to Latin America since 1911, which gives you an idea of the priority that Panama and that Latin America has acquired in the second Trump administration. Now,

I am told from reliable sources that the plan of the Panamanian government was not to let Secretary of State Rubio get near the Panama Canal and have photo ops. He would be met at the presidential palace and given the royal treatment, but not to get him near the Panama. Well, he did get to the Panama Canal and had plenty of photo opportunities. So that's number one. Number two, I'm also told that Panama quitting the Belt and Road Initiative announced that it would leave it.

was not something that was demanded by the U.S. government. It was something of Panamanian government's own initiative, which gives you an idea of how wrongheaded this whole approach has been. Now, number three, you mentioned C.K. Hutchinson. When that was put on the table and it became public, I am told that the Panamanian ambassador,

arrived at the U.S. Congress on the day of the State of the Union speech in February by President Trump. And the ambassador was elated because he said, well, now with this, we're getting rid of the C.K. Hutchinson-controlled ports. We are over the hill. We are safe by now. Well, and then he listened to the speech. And in the speech, President Trump reiterated that we are going to take back the Panama Canal.

So shortly after that, of course, as you may know, Secretary of Defense Hexet visited Panama and demanded that there would be troops, U.S. troops, on a rotating basis, not on a permanent basis. That was sort of the mild concession that was allowed by Washington. You know, they would be stationed in Panama's military bases, which is obviously something that goes very much against the neutrality provisions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty. Which the Trumps don't care about.

That's right. Okay. So how do you apply all of this then to what you think they should have done in return? Well, my point is this. The evidence that we see so far, and I think Mexico is a good example of how to handle this. If you give in on the assumption that the more you give in that you will be sort of the last man or the last woman standing, there is no end to it. Trump administration will continue to push.

if you stand up, as the president of Mexico has done. And she has taken a strong stance and she is managing the situation, President Sheinbaum is, in a better way than, say, Canada did originally with Prime Minister Trudeau, who visited Mar-a-Lago and was humiliated there. So I think Mexico gives us a good notion of how to confront this. You negotiate, you hedge, you say, I accept this, but I'll not accept that.

simply giving in, as Panama has done, is a recipe for disaster. But Ambassador, let me just follow up very quickly that Claudia Scheinbaum has said that she is going to match Chinese tariffs that the United States has. I mean, she has effectively exceeded to every single request that the United States has had regarding Chinese investments in Mexico. BYD and some of the others have postponed their plants there. I don't see how that's kind of a success for balancing, given the fact that she's accommodated the U.S. on every request regarding China.

Well, I mean, one thing is on the request regarding China. Another thing on the question of the initial tariffs and on the continuity of the free trade agreement. So there are different things here. And mind you, Mexico, of course, sends 80% of its export to the United States. So Mexico is in a particular vulnerable position. As is Panama. Yes, of course. But the question is, how do you handle this?

And again, you know, you mentioned Colombia, traditionally considered the U.S. best friend in Latin America. I think Colombia is another good example of how to manage this quite well. Just on the issue of Panama, you know, since this entire process has started, one of the dynamics we've seen is increasing pressure from the Chinese government on CK Hutchison, the Hong Kong-based company that owns a lot of these ports and that made a big deal with BlackRock, I believe,

to sell numerous ports, including these two in Panama. So I was wondering how your view on non-linement and hedging kind of fits into this big role of non-state actor in this case. So, you know, kind of where they, you know, kind of they seem on my side to represent a different form of volatility or unpredictability, particularly because there's different governments have different kind of levels of traction, you know, with these non-state actors.

So, you know, kind of how does non-state actors play into the wider kind of like, you know, kind of landscape that you're laying out? Great question. And well, it seems to me the fact that the Chinese government is putting obstacles in the way of this transaction goes to show that this is a game that

two sides can play. So Panama gives in. Well, but China is obviously very upset because of Panama quitting the BRI response. Now, let me zero in on that question, on the issue of ports, which it seems to me is a very critical element.

As we know, seven of the 10 largest ports in the world measured by cargo movement in China. China, of course, is the biggest trading nation in the world. Therefore, it has a vested interest in ports around the world. So this is whole conspiracy theory that the reason China is building ports and acquiring ports around the world is to position China

the PLA Navy. All of this, it seems to me, has really no basis. If you are the biggest trading nation in the world, you need ports and you need to move your cargo. And what happens in the case of Latin America is that we have a very serious infrastructure deficit. We have been under-investing infrastructure for a very long time. And it is Chinese companies that are offering the best conditions to move in, in the case of ports, but also in other railways, tunnels, bridges. And therefore, the question is, what are we going to do?

Will we continue to improve our infrastructure and therefore be able to make the big jump to a developed condition? Or will we sort of stand in underdevelopment because...

because the development of our infrastructure may be considered a geopolitical threat by the United States. Now, mind you, the other issue that is very important here to keep in mind is there is this criticism of, you know, Chinese companies building ports and other infrastructure. But it's not like U.S. companies are competing in these bids.

or in these tenders. U.S. construction companies do not participate in tenders and bids in Latin America. They decided that a long time ago. Some say it's because they think there's a lot of corruption involved. Others say the projects are too small. Whatever the reason, they do not participate.

So, what is the alternative? It seems to me that for some, Latin America should prefer to stand and stay underdeveloped rather than build up its infrastructure. And that, it seems to me, is a real non-starter.

Well, that's been what, Kobus, you've been saying for a long time when it was the question came up about Huawei. It was Huawei or nothing. And oftentimes the Americans would say, yeah, we'd prefer you have nothing in Africa and other places. We just got this same type of messaging, you know, just last week in Colombia. And we're going to go back to Colombia here that the United States embassy in Bogota basically said that they're not happy that Chinese state-owned contractors are working on infrastructure projects.

particularly some of the subway initiatives that are being financed by multilateral development institutions, and the Americans are threatening to weaponize that and to cut it off. President Gustavo Petro said, if that's what you want to do, that's your right to do it. But again, how does your theory hold up against when the United States is weaponizing multilateral development finance in order to try and force a country like Colombia to make choices about who its development partners are? What would you advise Gustavo Petro?

So, Eric, I think the case of the Bogota metro is an excellent example. It's something that I have followed for a long time. Bogota has probably the biggest traffic jams of any capital in Latin America. I was in Bogota a couple of years ago. It takes you three hours to get

you know, from the airport to whatever hotel you're staying at. It's a real nightmare. Why is that? Because for 30 years, they had been kicking down the road the plan of building a metro. There was a lot of resistance. Now, a couple of years ago, they finally decided to go in under a right-wing government. And so they looked around. And obviously, a lot of people said, well, we would like a U.S. company to build this metro. U.S. companies do not build metros.

They are not in that business. So what was the only alternative? The only alternative, competitively speaking, was, you know, for the Chinese to do it. So again, what are you going to do? Not build metros? So, you know, the U.S. is unhappy about, you know, what are you going to do? Now, the important point here to keep in mind is this. Now, and this goes to our point of the difference between what obtained in the Cold War and what obtains today. Today, there are other...

other multilateral development banks that can step in. We have the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank. We have the New Development Bank that can do the sort of things that the World Bank or the IMF isn't prepared to do. So Colombia will join the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank. After deciding to sign on to the Belt and Road Initiative, Colombia was one of the last holdouts

in Latin America that is not signed on. After announcing that, President Petro announced that it will sign on to the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank. So the U.S. said, well, then we are not going, the Inter-American Development Bank will not finance various projects. Well, go ahead.

Yeah, but he doesn't have a guarantee that the AIIB is going to step in to make up the gap. I mean, that's a big risk on his part. Yes, there are no guarantees in life. But if Colombia wants to develop, if it wants a subway, you know, it has to deal with companies and the banks that finance that.

One of the reasons that I saw raised for Trump targeting Colombia quite early on during this era was that Colombia is so dependent on its trade with the US, and so therefore fundamentally vulnerable to the threat of tariffs. So I was wondering, for economies like Colombia, is the threat of tariffs this kind of Achilles' heel that they just can't overcome? Or is there a way around that? I guess the question becomes

They have to diversify their economies, but that's a 20-year project. You know, it's not necessarily something they can do over the next two weeks. So, you know, so what kind of options are there when they have such vulnerabilities to the U.S. and to tariffs particularly? Well, all of these things are complex and difficult. And you're right. Of all the countries in South America, the one that has perhaps lagged the most is

in the development of its trade with China has been Colombia. For Brazil, for Uruguay, for Chile, for Peru, China is the number one trading partner. That is not the case of Colombia, so you are quite right on that. On the other hand, Colombia has a lot of natural resources. One could argue the structure of its economy is very complementary to that of China, and I don't see any reason why they shouldn't be developed further. In here, it's important to look at sort of the more structural elements

You know, the natural complementarity that exists between South American economies and

China is quite dramatic. As you know, China has 19% of the world's population, but only 7% of the world's freshwater reserves and only 7% of the world's arable land. What does that mean? It means that China will not be able to feed its own population. It will always depend on importing food. In South America, the relationship is

almost the opposite. South America has 25% of the world's freshwater reserves. It has an enormous amount of agricultural land, some of the best land in the world, the Pampa Humida in Argentina. And therefore, it can provide the sort of, you know, agricultural goods and food that China needs. So from a structural point of view, there's a lot of complementarity between South American countries and China. And that holds as well for Colombia.

But again, let me push back. And I'm also going to start channeling a little bit of the conservative right wing in Colombia and also in your country in Chile that is really starting to put pressure on some of the left wing governments that are embracing China, Petro being one of them. But.

People are saying, why is Petro alienating the United States when they do $40 billion of trade with the United States and only $20 billion of trade with China? I mean, this is economic suicide, people will say, given the nature of the trade relationship. Also, the U.S.-Colombia trading relationship is quite balanced, about $20 billion on each side. The China-Colombia trading relationship is highly imbalanced.

about 18 billion dollars of Chinese imports, only about 2-3 billion dollars of Colombian exports. So if you are a politician today and you're placing your bet with the Chinese, I think it's understandable why some people think this is lunacy. We have an election in '26 in Colombia where conservatives are probably going to run on withdrawing Colombia from the Belt and Road and reorienting relations with the United States.

I think the same type of momentum is going to happen in Chile in November 16th, when your compatriots go to the polls and President Boric and his close relationship with China is also going to come under scrutiny as well. So take us into the domestic politics dimension of all of this, where it's not just that president has to choose between the US and China, but also facing pressure from domestic opposition parties.

So you mentioned the situation of Colombia. Well, let me mention the situation of Chile. Chile exports almost 40 billion to China for Chile. China is the number one trading partner. 40% of all of Chile's exports go to China.

And Chile exports only $14 billion to the United States. So in the case of Chile, you could revert the argument. You could say, well, why give in to Trump's pressures when we export two and a half times as much to China than to the U.S.? So the point, it seems to me, is this. What you need is a policy that looks at the medium and long term. And the case of Chile is an excellent example. Let me drill down a little bit on it.

Chile has managed to build this relationship with China over time and with Asia more generally.

because it has had considerable continuity in this policy. Chile was the first country in South America to establish diplomatic relations with China as far back as 1970, even earlier than the famous Nixon and Kissinger visit to China in 72. And as a result of that, it was also the first country in the world, not just in South America, individual country, to sign a free trade agreement with China in 2005. Since then, trade with China

China has increased eightfold. It was $8 billion in 2005. It is today around $60 billion. Today, according to some indicators, Chile is the most developed country in Latin America, according to the HDI. It is the third in terms of per capita income. One reason for that

that is because of the relationship with China and the relationship with Asia more generally. 60% of Chile's exports go to Asia and 40% to China. So the point I'm trying to make is that Asia is today, particularly East Asia, the

the most dynamic area in the world with the most growth. And for countries in Latin America and in South America, it is obviously a very important partner. We have to work with them. Now, that doesn't mean that, you know, we neglect the relationship with the United States. But the notion that

we must choose is quite wrongheaded. President Boric recently visited Brazil and at a joint appearance, President Lula and President Boric said explicitly, we don't want to have to choose between the United States and China. We want to do business together.

with both. And both and President Petro, of course, were in Beijing for the recently China CELAC, the fourth ministerial meeting that took place and that was very fruitful and productive. Now, again here, you know, and again in Chile and in Colombia and in Brazil, the opposition, of course, said this is wrong. The president shouldn't go to China.

at this very fraught moment. Well, you know, the way international politics works today, Eric and Kobus, is either you are at the table or you are on the menu.

So the notion that these countries sort of should sit silently while other powers decide what the future of the world will be and what place they should occupy is quite wrongheaded. It seems to me that these countries should take part, an active part. And that is what I

So Ambassador Heitner, let me take this into the very practical sense in Chile. Let's say you are back advising President Boric and you are

and there is a space observatory that's going to be built by the Chinese in Chile. So the space observatory is something that the Trumps have said is very, very problematic. Now, this is one of those difficult decisions that President Borch is going to have to make. Does he accede to the Trump proposal?

requests and the White House demands to not build this space observatory? Or does he do what you're saying and not give in and pursue the relationship with China and to build this space observatory that is potentially very controversial? How would you advise the president on this particular issue using your active non-alignment strategy?

Several things. First of all, you know, the standard criticism of the relationship between China and Latin America is that it is very one-sided, meaning that, you know, it's a sort of first world, third world type of relationship in which

China exports manufactured goods and industrial goods and we export commodities, and that there isn't very much sort of, you know, technical exchange, technical collaboration, scientific collaboration. Well, in the case of Chile and China on the observatories and astronomy program, there's a lot of that. You know, we have the clearest skies in the world in northern Chile, and China has some very advanced astronomy scientists. Therefore,

You know, there's a lot of collaboration. This has been going on for, you know, many years now. So that's number one. And that's something that is valuable. It is good for all sites and that we should preserve. Chile is building up its observatory capacity. It wants to become, and in some ways already is, sort of the leading astronomical capital in the world.

Number one. Number two, I haven't drilled down that much into it, but I have heard the argument that there are U.S. observatories in Chile, of course, and the European ones, that have similar capacities. The argument is being used that at this observatory, you just don't observe the stars. You can also monitor satellites. And that that would have, obviously, a defense significance.

My argument is this: if U.S. observatories have those similar technical capabilities,

Well, why should we object for the Chinese observatory to have something similar? Now, that is a factual question. You know, I don't have all the elements here in hand. But if that were the case, if U.S. observatories have those capacities, I don't see why there should be an objection to Chinese ones having them. You know, and again, I think this cooperation program...

between China and Chile in astronomy is very valuable, and we should have more of that rather than less. So you would reject the U.S. request to shut down this observatory and continue the relationship with China. That's what you would advise the president. I would make it dependent on the following. If U.S. observatories in Chile right now

have the same capacities to monitor satellites that are being objected to the Chinese project, then I would say we will go on. If that is not the case, I would consider the possibility of not going ahead. If we, for the moment, look at the other side of this issue, I was wondering what hedging would look like in relation to

to poor countries' relationship with China, specifically. Obviously, we're at a moment where the US is putting a lot of very explicit pressure on these countries, but a lot of countries also chafe against what they feel is a kind of a structural position, particularly economic position that they're in with China, where it's very difficult for them to induce China to move more job creation to their countries, and where they, partly because of ways that...

that government support and so on is used to keep prices very low in China, and a reluctance also from the Xi Jinping government to give up on manufacturing jobs. So in these countries that may have a trade relationship with China in particular fields like raw minerals or something, but where they feel that the relationship is essentially not really serving them as much as they would like it to, and at the same time where they don't necessarily have that much

kind of space to play off against the US, for example, because many African countries, for example, don't have very strong US trade relationships that they could use to induce something from China. So in those kind of situations, how do they hedge against Chinese power?

Well, I think that is an excellent question. But let me give you one example of one African country. It's not a small one, but it's an African country that made a choice that seemed to me illustrates very well with the opportunities that active non-alignment offers. And we discuss it in the book. And that is the case of Angola.

Angola, of course, is the country that has received the most in terms of Chinese financial cooperation, investments, $50, $60 billion, a huge amount.

Angola, of course, is a big rich country that has diamonds, has oil, excellent land. But somehow that has not percolated to the population. Poverty in Angola is still very high. So what has the Angolan government done? It has said, we don't want to depend exclusively on China. We want to work with the United States.

And the Lobito Corridor project, you know, President Biden, one of his last visits abroad was to Angola. And for him, the Lobito Corridor, which is being financially supported by the United States, you know, this big railway project all the way from the Congo, eventually from Zambia to the Atlantic coast to bring the minerals from Central Africa.

all the way to the Atlantic and then on to the US and Europe. It's a significant example of that. So, you know, again, it seemed to me there are options. The notion, and here this is very interesting, the notion that the United States would be financing a railway project in Southern Africa 10 years ago would have seemed totally outlandish. I mean, the United States can't even build a railway project in California. Right.

The version that is five-sizing one in Southern Africa would have seemed totally outlandish. But today, it is happening. Why? Because there's competition. The United States realized that the Chinese had built significant railway projects in Kenya, from Nairobi to Mombasa, in Ethiopia, from Addis to Djibouti. And they feel, well, we are being left out.

We must do something. You know, again, the Belt and Road Initiative was very heavily denounced, both by the United States and by Europe for many years as debt trap diplomacy, building white elephants that nobody needs. What is this? And suddenly, 10 years on, they realized, well, there is something there. There is an infrastructure deficit in Africa, in Latin America, in Asia.

Chinese are stepping in. We are being left out. So we must do something. So the G7 and the Europeans and the Americans have come up with these various plans to start financing infrastructure projects as well. So competition works, and we're all the better for it. Ambassador, you wrote this book, as I mentioned, before Donald Trump came back to power again. I'd like to close our discussion kind of looking forward. If you were to start writing the book now,

What would you change, if anything, in it, in the approach? Well, I will say this, you know, you are right. We do have an afterward because when the book was about to go to print, President Trump

Trump was elected. And so we have an afterward on the subject. I will say this. The concept of active non-alignment came up. We coined the term with my colleagues, Carlos Portillo and Carlos Ominami, in 2019, 2020, in the first Trump administration. When Latin America was going through a very difficult moment hit by the pandemic,

It's the worst economic downturn in 120 years. And then the U.S. pressure to cancel projects of various kinds. And we said, this is going from bad to worse. We need some sort of conceptual handle on this. Otherwise, the region will be in serious trouble. So that's how the concept originally came up. What we see is that now in the second administration, the term has become, if anything, even more significant. Why?

And, you know, what we do in the book is we extend the argument that we came up with originally for Latin America now to the global south as a whole. And we bring in case studies from Asia. There's a full chapter on ASEAN and also with African examples.

For example, what we see is that in the course of the past three years, since 2022, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, what we see is the rise of the global south. You know, this has been also signaled by BRICS expansion and particularly by the reaction across the world to what is happening in Gaza. And the natural foreign policy in so many ways for this rising global south is active non-alignment.

The book is The Non-Aligned World Striking Out in an Era of Great Power Competition. It's now in paperback, right? Is that correct? Old paperback in hardback, published by Polity Press, published in England and in the US in June. And also Kindle, too. Is there an e-book version of it as well? Yes, there is. There is. Okay. We're going to put links to it in the show notes. This is absolutely essential reading for the moment that we're in because, again, what all of us are trying to figure out is how

How do we muddle through this new world that we're in? And this is a blueprint for what developing countries can focus on and how they can manage these great power rivalries. It's written by, again, our old friend, Ambassador Jorge Haini, also by Carlos Fortin and Carlos Omenami. We want to give them credit as well. Ambassador Haini, thank you so much for joining us again. And just to do a pulse check.

check on where we are in this geopolitical moment that we're in. And your insights are just so important to help us navigate what is a very, very difficult time for everybody. Thank you so much for taking the time to join us today. Thank you so much for the opportunity. What separates Ambassador Heine, I think, from other academics is that this is a man who has spent the bulk of his career studying

in the room where it happens. He has been a diplomat, he's been in the political systems, and so I think when he starts talking about some of these academic theories, there's actually a lot of practical experience behind them, and it's one of the reasons why I entertain his philosophies and his kind of strategic aspirations

outlook much more than a pure academic. And I don't want to kind of despair pure academics, but oftentimes I think they get a little bit on the theoretical side. What I like about Ambassador Heine's kind of points is the fact that they are rooted in much more practical experience. And that's what I think we need right now is what do these presidents and prime ministers actually do?

How do they get through this? And oftentimes they're being forced to make decisions very quick because what's coming out of the White House can be very impulsive, can be very fast, is oftentimes communicated via truth social.

And if you aren't ready to respond quickly, I think you're in real trouble. And we saw this with Kenya, where Kenya did not have a response. And maybe that was their strategy when Senator Rish said there's time for a reevaluation of U.S. ties with Kenya. But boy, they better be ready because this is coming and it comes very fast in times when you don't expect it to.

Yeah, and it also is breaking a lot of the conventions that I think a lot of government people have used to understand the world. You know, kind of like ways that people are going to be talking to each other, ways that news will be announced. All of those kind of unspoken rules are out the window. And so, you know, so it's not only responding fast, it's responding to a set of unprecedented challenges that frequently they aren't really, you know, they kind of run out of playbook, I think, you know, frequently when faced with the Trump administration.

I think developing countries, especially poorer developing countries, would also be well advised to look at how stakeholders in the United States who are also coming under attack from the Trump administration are responding. One of the things that we're seeing now is that universities, for example, are forming these PACs, almost like a NATO, where one gets attacked and they will divert legal resources to protect them, and there is strength in numbers.

And again, countries in Latin America and in Africa, and certainly here in Southeast Asia, have struggled to align their foreign policies vis-a-vis the great powers. They tend to negotiate bilaterally. They tend to pursue their own narrow interests. But this may be a time when you look at how factions in the United States are responding to the Trump pressure and learn from that. And again, I could see a cluster of countries kind of bonding together on certain key issues and saying,

No, we're going to push back, whether that's on the Chinese or whether that's against the Americans. There may be strength in numbers. Botswana out there by itself is a guppy in an ocean, okay? But Botswana, as part of a 10-country coalition, all of a sudden starts to have a little bit more weight. But that requires a lot of knowledge sharing. That requires a lot of coordination. And that also requires concessions, right?

which we have seen in Africa in particular, has been very difficult to come by on a lot of key issues, particularly related to trade, as we've seen the difficulties in implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area. But nonetheless, in great power competition, maybe strength in numbers is something they want to pursue and look at what's happening with the universities in the United States. I think this has been one of the big challenges of the first part of the first few months of the Trump administration has been

that it was very hard to take lessons from within the US because within the US, the Trump administration faced surprisingly little resistance, I think. But that's changing now. That's starting to change. Yeah, definitely. I think it's starting to change now. And I think it is possible to take a little bit more guidance from that. But I think that was one of the very kind of disorienting aspects of that moment was that

he seemed to be just getting a lot of agreement, you know, kind of from people one would expect to be putting up much more of a fight. So I think that actually added, I think, to some of the difficulties these countries faced. I agree that, you know, so far, I think the most kind of potent and, you know, most...

The clearest kind of example of this kind of group forming has been some of the statements that we've seen from the ASEAN Plus Three grouping, which is obviously the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 10-nation grouping in Southeast Asia, China, South Korea, and Japan, the ASEAN Plus Three group. You know, they've come out...

actually talking about collectively rejecting some of the Trump administration's positions and starting to very proactively coordinate, you know, between them. And in the process, you know, kind of reshifting, shifting some of the kind of earlier US alliances with particularly Japan and South Korea. On the African side, we're still seeing a lot of countries

you know, talking about it individually. We're still seeing the national press in a lot of countries talking about what kind of concessions these countries should be giving the Trump administration. Whereas I think, as, you know, Ambassador Heine was pointing out, giving concessions doesn't necessarily work. And a lot less collectivity. Like, you know, African collectivity is very weak, you know, and this, I agree with you, this is a real weak spot for them.

Well, it's interesting that there's a lot of talk now that some countries like India, for example, may follow China's example in their negotiations with the United States, where the Chinese were credited with taking a tough line against the Trumps and forcing them to back down, forcing the White House to back down a little bit in the U.S.-China trade talks. And so there's talk now in India to say, listen, we need to take a similar line.

And I go back to an op-ed that was published by your former foreign minister. I'm spacing her name right now. She was an amazing diplomat a couple of years ago, and she wrote a column. Naledi Pandor. Exactly. Naledi Pandor. She wrote a column in the Washington Post, which basically threatened the United States that says we have something like 17 of the critical resources that you depend on. And should you push us too far, we could cut those supply chains off.

And I wonder if there's a point where South Africa may get to to say, you know what, if you push us too far on these issues, you know what, we're just going to cut this off. And now again, that's a very difficult thing to do in a country with 60% unemployment among youth. But maybe that's what it takes. I know a lot of people want that because you want to stick it to the bully, right?

But at the same time, again, the Chinese have shown that if you take a tough line, you might get more results out of it than if you kind of give in, as what Ambassador Heine said, if you give in a little bit, they keep coming back for more.

And interestingly, there's been more and more people saying that in public, including, for example, some Japanese politicians saying that, which is a real surprise to me. But yeah, like on the South African side, the thing is with the US-South Africa relationship is, you know, the US could have picked a fight with South Africa over a lot of stuff, right? Kind of, it could have called it too close to Russia, too close to China. The fact that the substance of the actual issue that the real conflict that it's taking with South Africa is significant.

the very nature of post-apartheid restitution, you know, around like the way South Africa has been trying to more equitably distribute land, for example, that that has really been the center of the dispute, pushes South Africa into a position where it really, you know, this is the raison d'etre of post-apartheid South Africa is to unmake apartheid. And

you know, so in that sense, there's a limit to how much South Africa can give up there without fully losing what post-apartheid South Africa means. So in that sense, yeah, I think there is the danger that South Africa could be pushed in a position where it feels like it has no other option but to kind of make this kind of big swing. You know, it's

Critical minerals, strategic minerals is one, like South Africa, I think, has 90% of the world's platinum family metals, for example. But it's also shipping is another big one. You know, kind of now as we're talking about, you know, again, ongoing kind of disruptions in Red Sea shipping, the only other, you know, kind of east-west route is past the Cape of Good Hope, past Cape Town.

So, you know, again, that is, of course, you know, another kind of very significant leverage that South Africa has. But, of course, you know, playing that card is a big play. You know, kind of like you're then really like painting a target on your back. And I think a lot of small developing countries still worry about how much money

China, India, other kind of global south, major global south powers are going to back them up in these cases. You know, it's easy to say, yes, you know, kind of like stick it to the US. It's different when you actually do it. And we have not seen this coalition of global south countries bonding together to form a group that can stand up to the United States or to China. That isn't happening. So it may happen, but it isn't happening now. Two recommendations for everybody. One on...

What Coppice was talking about in terms of how the U.S. is going after South Africa on specifically on racial issues and the Daily, which is the New York Times podcast, did a fascinating episode last week, which go into their archives and you'll hear why this has nothing really to do with South African politics and everything to do with U.S. politics.

white fragility and white concerns about white racial politics in the United States. Very interesting discussion that was there, if you want to understand why the United States granted refugee status to about 50 white Afrikaners. Also, I want to draw your attention to a fascinating article in this edition, the May-June edition of Foreign Affairs by Naguere Woods, who is a professor at Oxford and

Order Without America, How the International System Can Survive a Hostile Washington. I'll put all of this in the show notes, but it speaks a lot about the reconfiguring of the global system around the United States. An interesting little factoid that I did not know. Apparently, the headquarters of the World Bank is...

is only to be located in the country of the largest donor. According to Project 2025, which is out of the Heritage Foundation, that the Trump administration has been adhering to quite closely. They recommend cutting off funding for the World Bank, and there are murmurs that that is going to happen or reduce it significantly. And in that case, then Japan would then be

the new home base for the World Bank as they would become the largest donor country. That would make a major shift in international development finance. Kobus, it is very possible that we wake up in four years and the world looks nothing like it does today.

I mean, really nothing like it does today. And so what's possible is absolutely fascinating to watch unfold. And again, I think this article, Order Without America, paints a picture that it's not necessarily a bad thing. And again, we have to keep an open mind there.

Yeah, I mean, the order that we know, the good and the bad from the US is very entwined in the current order. You know, it's protected very large parts of that order at great cost to itself. It also extracted a lot of value from that order in ways that makes America money while it sleeps, essentially.

And those aspects of the international order has been criticized by the global south for decades and decades. So in theory, there is the opportunity to have a serious conversation about what a new, better order should look like. And I think, you know, Ambassador Heine's book is very much a very significant kind of contribution to that conversation.

But there needs to be more conversation. There needs to be like big talk between these kind of like particularly non-Western countries in what they actually want and how it's supposed to work. Because at the moment, like we're still stuck with a kind of a strong countries, weak countries division that, you know, that isn't really helping anyone.

I don't know if we're ever going to get away from that. I mean, that may be just human nature the way it is. We've always had strong countries, weak countries dynamic in global affairs going back to the early days. But again, the way that the world is changing is so fascinating. Just a couple of weeks ago, the

The EU and Britain started coming closer together and maybe not bringing Britain back into the EU, but certainly coming a lot closer. And we may end up seeing a day where the United Kingdom has a relationship like Sweden or Norway does with the European Union. Again, a world that we did not see. Maybe the euro will become the new reserve currency. And then the US just becomes a normal country. Just...

a country where all of a sudden borrowing money is very expensive for the Americans. And so that is it, you know, so we didn't get a lot of China talk in the back half, but all of this, of course, ties back to China. And because it's just the nature of where we are today in the world. But if you go to our site, and again, I want to invite everybody who's listening to the show to check out the site, it's changed a lot.

in the past just few weeks alone. We've got so many more contributors. I also want to give a shout out to the Sino-Arabica Project, which is a fantastic initiative of young Chinese and Middle Eastern scholars who are putting together this fantastic analysis. We showcased their first piece on our site about China's role in Syria's reconstruction today. We've also got some great analysis on critical minerals coming from our new critical minerals editor, Obed Boray.

And then, of course, Njenga Hakina, our Nairobi-based climate editor, is hosting the Africa EV Show and doing some fantastic reporting on Chinese EV technology in Africa. So many amazing things. Go to ChinaGlobalSouth.com. You'll check it out. A lot of it is now available without...

a subscription, but most of the good stuff is behind the paywall. And we do that because we're trying to build a sustainable business here that can continue to employ journalists around the world and editors and scholars around the world to do this important work. I just want to bring everybody's attention that Politico just shut their China newsletter down.

This comes on the heels of Axio shutting theirs down, the China Project shutting down over the past couple of years. So many publications have closed covering China. This is a space that is getting smaller and smaller and smaller. And that's why the work that Kobus and Zhihou and the rest of the team are doing is so important. But it needs your support. ChinaGlobalSouth.com slash ChinaGlobalSouth.

Subscribe is the best way to help us do this important work. And if you want agenda-free, fact-based journalism, this is the way to do it. So let's leave it there, Kobus. We'll be back again next week with another edition of the China Global South podcast. For Kobus Van Staden in Cape Town, I'm Eric Olander. Thank you so much for listening and for watching.

The discussion continues online. Follow the China Global South project on Blue Sky and X at ChinaGSproject or on YouTube at China Global South and share your thoughts on today's show or head over to our website at ChinaGlobalSouth.com where you can subscribe to receive full access to more than 5,000 articles and podcasts. Once again, that's ChinaGlobalSouth.com.