Trump Doctrine: A New Era of Gunboat Diplomacy | Stephen Walt
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What's up, everybody? My name is Demetri Kofinas, and you're listening to Hidden Forces, a podcast that inspires investors, entrepreneurs, and everyday citizens to challenge consensus narratives and learn how to think critically about the systems of power shaping our world.

My guest in this episode of Hidden Forces is Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Stephen Walt. Stephen is a prominent member of what is known as the realist school in international relations. He's been a longtime critic of American adventurism and an advocate for a more restrained approach to American foreign policy.

I asked him on the podcast today to get his assessment of the events that have transpired in the Middle East over the last several weeks, how U.S. policy in the region improves or worsens America's larger strategic position in the world, and what we have learned or can learn from these recent events about the Trump administration's approach to foreign policy and an emerging doctrine, of course, of primacy and gunboat diplomacy.

Between the first and second hours, we discuss America's policy in the Middle East, Iranian intentions and the potential for regime change, best-case solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

American grand strategy, and the long-awaited U.S. pivot to Asia that has failed to fully materialize. If you want access to all of this conversation, go to hiddenforces.io slash subscribe and join our premium feed, which you can listen to on your mobile device using your favorite podcast app, just like you're listening to this episode right now. If

If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius Community, which includes Q&A calls with guests, access to special research and analysis, in-person events and dinners, you can also do that on our subscriber page. And if you still have questions, feel free to send an email to info at hiddenforces.io and I or someone from our team will get right back to you.

And with that, please enjoy this uncompromisingly provocative and insightful conversation with my guest, Stephen Walt. Professor Stephen Walt, welcome back to Hidden Forces. Nice to be here. So I heard you're writing a new book. Is that right? That's correct. So someone told me that the book is about, quote, very big mistakes that leaders make

because they don't understand some basic international relations concepts. First of all, can you tell us anything about what you're writing about? And can you give us a sneak peek, in other words? And to the extent that you can,

What are these mistakes and what are the concepts that you think people could benefit from learning? Yeah, so let me focus more on the concepts, but we'll get to the mistakes along the way. I mean the basic argument of the book is that there are some ideas, fairly simple, straightforward, familiar ideas from the field of international relations that are not particularly controversial among scholars and that are actually frequently acknowledged or at least understood by leaders of countries.

Things like the security dilemma, the idea that things that I might do to make myself more secure tend to make you less secure. And the concept of the balance of power. One country becomes too powerful or too aggressive. Others tend to gang up to try and stop it. The concept of nationalism, which is, you know, a very powerful force in world affairs.

And there's several others as well. And the argument of the book is that if you understand these concepts and you pay some attention to them when you're conducting foreign policy, you're likely to avoid big mistakes. And if you don't pay attention to them or if you don't understand them or if you think that you are somehow magically an exception to these ideas, you're likely to get into lots of trouble.

So an illustration would be, first of all, I think that American leaders did not understand the security dilemma when they kept expanding NATO eastward and didn't realize that this was eventually going to trigger a reaction by Russia. The reaction might be wrong, might be illegitimate, whatever. But the point is that we didn't anticipate that. We kept thinking we could just reassure the Russians and convince them that this wasn't a problem.

Similarly, I would argue that Vladimir Putin didn't understand the balance of power and didn't understand nationalism when he chose to invade Ukraine.

So didn't understand that the Ukrainians would fight like tigers to try and preserve their independence and didn't understand that that would lead countries like Finland and Sweden to abandon decades or centuries of neutrality and join NATO. So those would be two examples of leaders who I think got themselves into trouble because they didn't understand some of these simple ideas. So without necessarily, though, if we have time, we certainly would be useful to go into a conversation about NATO enlargement.

But NATO enlargement took place over several administrations. So to the extent that it would be useful to get some examples of leaders who you felt

were effective in following some of these intellectual concepts in international relations? Who would those leaders be in the post-World War II era? And does it make sense to even go back further? Yeah. Well, certainly you can go back a long way. So everybody's, I guess, poster child for really clever and effective diplomacy would be someone like Otto von Bismarck of Prussia and Germany.

So consider what happens under his leadership. Prussia fights three wars in rapid succession in 1864 and 1866 and in 1870.

It fights each of those wars against only one opponent. Nobody else gets involved. They're militarily successful, but more importantly, in each of these conflicts, the other side gets blamed for starting it, even though Prussia was hardly blameless. And this was all due to Bismarck's really adroit understanding of how to conduct diplomacy and egg your opponents into making mistakes while avoiding them yourselves.

And then once he's unified Germany after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, he becomes a very conservative status quo politician. He knows when to stop. They've done enough. If they try for anything more, then the rest of Europe is going to unite to contain now the powerful united Germany. So he would be one example. A second example, someone who I think intuited the security dilemma was Anwar Sadat of Egypt.

when he made his famous offer to fly to Jerusalem and speak to the Knesset. And he did this as a way of trying to break a log jam between Israel and Egypt. And he understood to break that log jam, what he had to do was reassure the

the Israelis that Egypt was not hostile. And if you read his speech to the Knesset, it's actually a brilliant speech where he explains that he understands that both sides have done horrible things to one another. It's time to move past this. He even says at one point, you know, you may think that I'm just doing this to lull you into a sense of complacency so I can take advantage of you. Let me assure you that's not the case.

And the reason it works, of course, is that what he's doing is very risky. In fact, he ultimately paid for it with his life. But that meant it was sincere. He wouldn't have done this if he was just trying to fool the Israelis. And it just plays a key role in then leading to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as well. So there are some world leaders who have understood these ideas. I could give you some other examples if you're interested.

Could you give me some examples of American presidents in the post-World War II era, let's just say that to cover not just the Cold War era, but the period after that. Who would be some examples of leaders that you felt understood these concepts and further to the point were able to leverage their personal relationships with their counterparts to achieve diplomatic victories?

So a couple of examples. One would be George Herbert Walker Bush, the elder President Bush and the diplomacy surrounding the first Gulf War.

which I think was one of America's finer diplomatic achievements. You mean his ability to build an international coalition? Build an international coalition, go to the United Nations, get a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, get some countries like Japan to help pay for the war in various ways. And then very importantly, he also knew when to stop.

So, there were lots of calls after Desert Storm to go to Baghdad, to overthrow Saddam, to occupy the country and create a democracy. And Bush's judgment was, first of all, the Security Council resolution did not authorize that. And they were trying to uphold international law and act within consistent with that. So, to have suddenly gone to Baghdad would have violated the terms under which the use of force was authorized.

But also, I think he understood that that was a bridge too far. And of course, as we learned 15 years later, occupying Iraq led to nothing but trouble. So in that sense, I think this was both recognizing the importance of some institutions, in particular the Security Council, but also recognizing the limits of power. Do I remember correctly that, I guess...

We don't know for sure because Bush wasn't vocal about it, but some of the people who worked for him in his administration, like his, I think, who was the head of the NSC, Brent Scrocoff at the time. And then subsequently when his son was president is the point I'm trying to make. I remember Brent and other members of his administration, maybe even Jim Baker, were somewhat vocal about this, thinking that this was a bad idea to invade Iraq.

Do we know if Bush Sr. thought it was a bad idea also? I know that he didn't want to speak out against his son, but are there any hints that he was actually opposed to this and thought it was a bad idea? I don't think we have direct evidence about Bush himself, but Brent Scowcroft did write an op-ed, I think in either the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal. So quite prominently placed, basically saying that the war was a bad idea. And this was widely, and I believe correctly interpreted as kind of Scowcroft as the surrogate

for the elder Bush. It's worth remembering that Scowcroft and the elder Bush had a very close relationship, very intimate working relationship. After the Bush presidency, they wrote a book together about it, which is quite a detailed sort of joint authored account of their handling of foreign affairs during that presidency. So I think this was widely interpreted as Bush offering his views,

But most presidents are somewhat leery of criticizing their successors. And that was sort of compounded by the fact that this was his son. And I don't think he wanted to be seen as dad weighing in to tell his younger son what to do. So George Bush, George W. Bush, the son, decided to invade Iraq. I guess it was technically a coalition that he put together, but it was

a stripped down version of one that he cobbled together as an alternative to seeking explicit United Nations Security Council approval to use military force in Iraq. So he bypassed the multilateral institutions. But we were a unipolar power back then. There was a sense in which we could do whatever we wanted, we could throw our weight around, no one could say much of anything about it or do much of anything about it. We aren't as powerful today, but in the Middle East, we seem to be acting

the same way without much regard for anyone else's opinion. Is that because we still don't need to consider other powers when using force in that region? Is it because it's even harder to put together multilateral coalitions today or is it because it isn't useful and so it's not worth the political effort to even try?

I think it's still very useful. I mean, first of all, you want to get allies to contribute resources to the enterprise. And we've tended to not be as good at that as we probably could be in some contexts where our allies have more at stake than we do. So one reason you want allies is because they can help you out. They can provide forces. They can provide sometimes

regional expertise and intelligence and things like that. So having allies is usually an asset. Secondly, paying attention to your allies sometimes keeps you out of trouble. If all of your allies think it's a bad idea, maybe they're wrong, but at least you ought to rethink the proposition. You ought to consider whether or not you've maybe misunderstood this one. So having partners, particularly partners that you're generally in agreement with or

generally favorably inclined is usually an advantage as well. And then finally, of course, one reason to have allies is to keep them from going to the other side.

And if you treat your allies with contempt, if you tend to trample on their interests, some of them may decide they can get a better deal elsewhere as well. Or will do things, they'll drag their feet, they'll resist in a bunch of sort of small and not dramatic, but sometimes meaningful ways. So all in all, having allies is a good idea. One final thing, and this again, sounds sort of soft and fuzzy, but I don't think it's meaningless.

The United States has benefited enormously, I think, in much of the post-war period, much of the 20th century, from a broad perception in many parts of the world, not all parts of the world, but in many parts of the world,

that even if the United States made mistakes, even if the United States did some things that were wrong or bad, its intentions were actually generally fairly good. It was trying to do positive things in the world. It was not engaged solely in pursuit of naked self-interest, and it did pay some attention to the interests of others. So for example, the United States has been the leading power in NATO, in the NATO alliance for 75 years.

And when it really wanted to get NATO to do something, it could usually force or pressure its allies to do that.

But by and large, the United States also treated the other members of the alliance with a certain degree of respect, even when it was much more powerful than they were. It was polite to their leaders. It listened to them. It paid attention. It dealt with them with a certain degree of forbearance. And therefore, you didn't get the same level of resentment that you might have gotten if the United States acted in a very heavy-handed, coercive, our way or the highway kind of fashion.

I think the relationship the United States had with its allies in NATO was fundamentally different than the relationship the Soviet Union had with its allies in the Warsaw Pact, which was much more heavy handed, much more coercive. We never had to invade our NATO allies in order to keep them from overthrowing the government, things like that. And that's an asset. Having relations with other countries that are basically positive where you don't have to worry.

that they're going to fall apart, that they're going to be acrimonious, et cetera, is a good thing. And one of the concerns I have about the Trump administration now is that they don't seem to understand this. They treat many of our allies with a rather ill-disguised amount of contempt, disregard. When you talk about making Canada the 51st state or you talk about seizing Greenland from Denmark,

This is not treating your allies with respect. This is treating them as objects to take advantage of. I might add, it's doing it with two of the most pro-American countries in the entire world. And that just strikes me as quite short-sighted. So do you think it's possible for us to describe Donald Trump's foreign policy as a doctrine? And if so, what would that doctrine be? It's hard to do in part because he's such an unsystematic thinker himself.

And he's so inconsistent, right? He will, you know, in his first term, he would threaten Kim Jong-un with fire and fury. And then a few weeks later, talk about how he'd gotten a letter and then fallen in love. He did that recently with Iran and Israel. Yeah, something like that, too. So it's hard to find a coherent doctrine when you get that kind of a mood swing often. But I think there are some themes, certainly through his handling of foreign policy. One is it's not isolationist.

Right. When you've just dropped 14 bunker busting bombs on Iran, you're not conducting an isolationist foreign policy. When you still have troops all over the world, when you're trying to reorganize the entire world economy based on some crazy ideas about tariffs, you're not running an isolationist foreign policy. So he's not an isolationist.

But he is a unilateralist. He's not interested in cooperating with others unless they want to do it on America's terms. When he says America first, he means it. And he's very much a nationalist.

that the only thing that matters is the United States. He's not interested in world order. He's not interested in broader global cooperation in norms, principles, humanitarianism. Gutting USAID, Agency for International Development, is a good indication of that. He doesn't believe in soft power, only hard power. Doesn't believe in soft power. So Trump's worldview is very much a

zero-sum worldview. You're either strong or weak. You're either a winner or a loser. And you measure winning and losing in sort of crude terms. You're a winner if you have a trade surplus with another country. You're a loser if you have a trade deficit. He sees the world in those terms. And then I think also very much part of his worldview is a sense that

The world is run by strong men, almost all of them men, I might add. And the way to manage the world is to cut deals with these other strong leaders.

He's comfortable with people like Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban and Benjamin Netanyahu. These are his kind of people, Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. And the idea is those people get together and they decide what needs to be done without having to worry very much about law or norms or public opinion or legislatures or things like that. I think that's his vision of an ideal world. I called it at one point a concert of kingpins.

And I don't know if that adds up to a doctrine, but it does suggest how he tends to approach things. Just one other thing. He has, I think, a very, very particular view of the role of military power. And that is, you know, he's perfectly happy to use military force, provided he can do it at essentially no cost to the United States other than money.

So he's willing to drop bombs and send missiles into places where he thinks it will do some good. But he doesn't like sending troops. He, I think, understands that ground wars far from the United States are unpredictable. Once you're in, it's hard to get out. They cost a lot. They ultimately have trouble sustaining public support. So what we've just seen with this bombing of Iran is classic Trump. I'll bomb someplace for a few days and then I'll stop.

and see if I can get what I want. I might have to do it again. I don't mind if I do it again, but I don't want to get involved in anything long or costly or difficult or unpredictable. That seems to me also a theme that was true in the first term and it seems to be true now. So there isn't enough publicly available information to give us a timeline about when exactly and how soon before Israel commenced its bombing campaign on June 13th that the president

was informed and whether he was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea or jumped on the bandwagon later once he felt that it would prove successful. To the extent that you feel comfortable speculating, what do you think informed his decision to involve the United States military directly in this war? And is there any evidence of a larger strategy on the part of his administration? Or could this just be a function of his frustration with how the negotiations were going and his belief that

the Iranians just needed a good kick in the ass to make the necessary concessions. We're all still somewhat speculating. There've been a few long news stories. Yeah, I should mention, this is the date that we're recording. This is Tuesday, June 24th, which is why I also wanted to focus

our conversation on broader themes so it's relevant when it's released. But sorry, go ahead. Well, so there've been some reporting on what his decision-making process was. It's somewhat incomplete. I think first of all, this was a war begun by Israel, not by the United States. And they informed him what they were going to do and he did not tell them not to, which he could have done. Now they might've ignored the order. They've been known to ignore American wishes in the past, but if he'd made it unequivocally clear

that if they did this, he would really be angry and he would sanction them in some fashion, cut off weapons or whatever, they might not have stopped. Once the Israeli attack was initially successful and achieved some of its objectives and didn't seem to be causing big problems for Israel, they weren't having any trouble with the Iranian air defenses, then I think there was a bit of jumping on the bandwagon. Okay, well, this is working.

As I said, he likes winners. He likes to be on the winning side of something. And the problem was that the Israelis didn't have the capabilities to go after the most deeply buried Iranian facilities. You needed these bunker busters to try and do that. And I think he then got persuaded by the Israelis.

that this is a chance to really end this problem once and for all. Look what we've done in the last couple of years. We've really rolled up a lot of Iranian assets around the Middle East. We've greatly improved our strategic position. Mr. President, you can finish the job.

And I think he found that very tempting. Now, I don't think he has a deep, sophisticated knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program, just how vulnerable it is or isn't, just how easy it will be to put it back together again afterwards. But I think he may have also felt that, well, I'll whack them really hard, we'll set them back, and now they'll make a deal.

I mean, I do think Trump likes this image of himself as a peacemaker, as a dealmaker. And if I have to drop some bombs on a country in order to get it to come to the table and finally give me what I want, I'll do that. By the way, you see this, of course, a very parallel approach in the way he wields tariffs. Now, I'll threaten you with 125% tariffs, which essentially means I'll cut off all trade with you.

And then I'll wait. I'll say, no, I'll delay it. He escalates to de-escalate. He threatens and sees what he can get. And then if it looks like things are going badly, if the bond market doesn't like it, he'll back off and say, well, I'll wait another couple of months. It's the same kind of strategy. I'll threaten you or I'll whack you a few times to see if I can get you to do what I want. And one, I think, challenge that Trump is going to face over time is that the rest of the world is going to realize that some of this is bluff.

That yes, he's willing to bomb Iran for a while, but not necessarily for that long. Is he willing to come back and do it again in six months if it appears that they're putting their program back together or if we get some intelligence suggesting that they've dispersed it and hidden it further? Suddenly, this begins to look not like a one-shot deal that led to an agreement, but it looks like something we have to keep doing.

And that's the kind of conflict he's always wanted to avoid, anything long, protracted, sustained that involves or requires the United States to stay focused on a particular problem for a long time. So when I was reflecting on this before the interview, I was reflecting on my position as a college student ahead of the Iraq war. And I've often reflected on this and wondered whether my opposition to the war was because

I actually had a more accurate view of the world at that time or a wiser view, or if it was just the happenstance of being a college student, being naive and being pro-peace, et cetera. Because today, for example, I don't know where you stood on the Ukraine war, but I supported trying to arm and help Ukraine fight the Russian invasion because I felt that doing so upheld the norms

that supposedly the United States and the United Nations stood for. I am unnerved by the US's unilateral bombing of Iran because I think among other things, it also further undermines the credibility of American moral righteousness and the rules that we claim to uphold, similar to how we undermined

our leadership with the invasion of Iraq. It's kind of like, well, what are we standing for exactly? What principles are we standing on to justify our actions and to compel our allies to join us? But I also at the same time wonder whether my views on not, for example, bombing these nuclear facilities are a bit naive. That in other words, if, again, I'm just sort of thinking out loud here, I don't have a clear view. If anything, my view on this is that I think it's a bad idea what we did.

But I wonder, I mean, he did kill Soleimani. A lot of people came out at the time and said that was a really bad move. But it turned out that it certainly didn't lead to any kind of blowback. It led to some performative strikes by Iran. And then subsequently, the Israelis, since October 7th, have really decimated Iran's proxies and weakened the regime. And up until this most recent bombing, if you had asked me, I'd have said, I feel like the Americans, but particularly the Israelis,

have done a lot to kick the legs out of the regime in Iran and potentially allow for a peaceful revolution or evolution where the younger people in Iran who are more liberal or want a more liberal government, who are tired of the corruption and then economic failures of the current regime, could push for either a new government

or a new coalition or some sort of government that would be more open to the West and that could lead to better economic growth and most importantly, an abandonment of this poisonous ideology to be a perpetual war with America and Israel. What is your view on that? You're laughing, so go ahead. Well, I have a number of issues with that. First of all, it sounds like you're succumbing to the wonderful regime change fantasy.

No, no, to be clear, I don't. I don't. I'm not. If we whack or if we are the Israelis whack the Iranians enough, eventually the clerical regime will collapse and something wonderful will grow up in its place. And, you know, maybe that's true. Maybe that will happen. But that hasn't.

That isn't what happened in Iraq. Well, to be clear, the distinction is we invaded and occupied Iraq. I'm saying weakening their foreign operations. We didn't invade and occupy Libya and look where Libya is today. The collapse of a regime, even a bad regime, and I'm no fan of the regime in Iran, often produces something worse at a minimum, chaos at a worse

you get even worse leaders in power. So this notion that we from afar can orchestrate the internal politics of a country by dismantling its government, I don't think has a very good track record. And there's actually a lot of-- That's definitely true. Yeah, there's a lot of good evidence on this as well. It's also worth noting here that the--

Which country is doing the most to destabilize the Middle East these days? Is it Iran? Iran is not conducting a genocide the way that Israel appears to be doing in Gaza. Iran's not bombing Lebanon. Iran's not doing ethnic cleansing on the West Bank. Iran hasn't been at war with anyone who hasn't been attacking it. And again- Is that fair though? Because the Iranians have been supporting proxies in the region as part of their effort to exercise power.

and undermine the security of their enemies, chiefly Israel, through groups like Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Hamas, though I would consider Hamas, groups like Hamas and the Houthis more as affiliates than arms of the regime. But the point still stands, is that

Do you not think that that's a fair characterization of their intentions? I think they've been doing all of those things, but compared to what we've been doing to them, right? The Israelis have been assassinating Iranian scientists for decades. We've imposed extraordinarily stiff economic sanctions that have impoverished

Iran for ages. I mean, we have so thoroughly demonized Iran as a regime that I think most Americans have just lost sight of the fact that it's not a great government as well, but it's not been nearly as- Haven't they had an openly hostile-

position towards America since they took over, since the Islamic Republic came into being in 1979? Yes and no. So yes, the Iranian revolution led to the emergence of a very hostile regime. But on the other hand, the Iranians on multiple occasions reached out to the United States

under President Rafsanjani, under some of his successors to try and improve the relationship and do a first approximation. They got stiffed each time by us. The Obama administration then negotiated this nuclear deal with Iran that was working. The Iranians were abiding by it. The International Atomic Energy Agency affirmed that they were in full compliance with the agreement. And it was Donald Trump who tore it up and reintroduced what they called maximum pressure

What was the purpose? To try and bring down the Iranian regime. I mean, the official policy of the US government has been to overthrow the Iranian regime, and that goes back many decades. So what does Iran do in response? Well, they've organized some proxy forces. They're not in control of those forces, but they've backed them in a variety of ways. And I think the easiest way to understand what they've been saying is,

"Look, we're here in the Middle East. You can't organize a regional order here without taking our interests into account. We're not necessarily trying to organize it ourselves, but we're saying you can't exclude us. You can't marginalize us and try and construct a regional order that is run by you and maybe by your Israeli friends. And we're going to do various things to try and make that more difficult."

Now, it is also worth noting, just final point here, is in the last several years, the wealthy Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, et cetera, which had previously been rather hostile to Iran, saw it as a potential threat, saw it as a danger, decided that it was time to lower the temperature and have a rapprochement with Iran.

And many of us thought that, in fact, they would be voices counseling the Trump administration to behave with some restraint because they wanted a quiet region. They wanted to focus on economic development, weaning themselves off oil-based economies, doing lots of positive things. And what they want is regional stability.

And so they didn't want the United States to start a war with Iran. They didn't want Israel to start a war with Iran. And many people thought that they would influence Trump, that he liked to listen to them. He had good relations with all of them. That doesn't appear to have worked. That doesn't appear to have been the case.

So again, I'm not serving here as an apologist for Iran, but I think- Of course not. But if you look at which countries have done the most to destabilize the region and so misery in several different countries, it's not the Iranians.

It's us and it's our closest friends in the region as well. Yeah. So I don't know, is there a single country in the Middle East that would like to see the Iranians develop nuclear weapons and also that would like to see them gain more power or more influence? I don't think anyone there wants to see any other countries get nuclear weapons. Okay. I should restate that. On a relative basis, how much worse would it be for the Iranians to

become a more powerful country in the Middle East versus the Saudis versus Qatar? I mean, maybe the only other country I can think of is Turkey that people would find very problematic. I ask that because

I guess where I want to challenge you is that it seems to me that most of the other countries in the Middle East are interested in economic prosperity. They're not interested in empire or regional revolution. The Iranians, I think, and the Turks are the two countries that I can think of that have larger aspirations. Would you disagree with that?

I'd have to think a little bit about that. Turkey, probably. I think Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman has considerable ambitions. You'll recall in his first couple of years as the de facto ruler in Saudi Arabia, they intervened in Yemen, long, very punishing, ultimately unsuccessful bombing campaign against the Houthis. They also were meddling in Lebanese

internal politics as well. At one time, at one point held Lebanese politicians, essentially prisoner within Saudi Arabia as well. They were having a spat

with Qatar. So I think Saudi Arabia has ambitions as well, certainly to develop more economically, but also to play a more active regional role over time. I think that both Qatar and the UAE also have, you know, want to punch above their weight in a variety of ways using the oil and gas wealth that they have. So there are a number of countries with ambitions in the region. I

I don't think any of them, not Iran under any circumstances, not Saudi Arabia, not the Gulf Arabs as well. I don't think any of them are in a position to dominate the whole region, to organize it. Israel would like to too, but Israel doesn't have enough people. They depend on American help to be able to wield disproportionate influence there. So I think there's a lot of ambition here.

in a variety of different places. But I don't think anybody has a hope of establishing what you'd call a true empire in that part of the world. But the Iranians, is it not fair to say that the Iranians have been consistently acting as spoilers in the region? For example, and I don't know what exact evidence there is for this, but my understanding was that Hamas would not have been able to pull off their attacks on October 7th without Iranian support.

And the Iranians were certainly very enthusiastic about the attacks. And the consensus seemed to be, and continues to be, that the Iranians greenlit the attacks because they wanted to undermine the peace talks that were ongoing between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would have led to a recognition of Israel, or at least this was what was being publicly discussed by the Saudis, and a new regional security arrangement that would have included the United States, which would have been a net benefit for peace in the region.

Do you not prescribe to that interpretation of Iran's role in the attacks and their larger ambitions to disrupt what I think could objectively be described as a net benefit for the Middle East? So, I don't think Iran greenlit it in any way. I don't think they were unhappy by it, which was...

unfortunate and short-sighted of them when you consider what's happened subsequently as well. I think in a funny way, you have to go all the way back to the aftermath of the first Gulf War. We were talking about it earlier. After the first Gulf War, where the United States suddenly looks like it's in this wonderful position,

militarily has demonstrated this extraordinary prowess. The Soviet Union is coming unglued and we have kind of all the cards in the Middle East. And the elder Bush organizes the Madrid Peace Conference.

And Jim Baker is really critical to all of this as Secretary of State. And the idea is this is going to develop a framework for a lasting Middle East peace. Israeli-Palestinian peace is part of that, but also a sort of regional security order that will be brokered and orchestrated by the United States. And the United States at that moment makes the decision to exclude Iran

from that proceedings. They're not invited. So this is the United States saying, "We're going to reorganize the Middle East along our blueprint and you're not part of that. Your interests aren't going to get listened to. We're going to do what we want." And prior to that moment, there really was hardly any relationship between Iran and any of the Palestinian movements. They didn't care. It wasn't an issue they cared about.

And it's at that moment that they start cultivating ties among the Palestinians and then elsewhere in the region, because it's a way of saying to the United States and to others, you can't exclude us.

We're 90 million people. We're in the region. We're going to be part of this. You're going to have to listen to us. You're going to have to include us. We're not going to get everything we want. We're not telling you that we have to dictate it, but you've got to give us a place at the table. And the United States, for its own reasons, has never been willing to sort of acknowledge that Iran might have legitimate security concerns of its own, might have a position that needs to be listened to.

That doesn't mean that we should give Iran everything it wanted. But the United States has always been lined up against Iran, has never been willing to engage in a real rapprochement. I think the Obama administration was trying. The nuclear deal was step one.

And their hope was that they could then build on that and start lowering the temperature, unwinding the spiral between Washington and Tehran. And of course, that got blown up when the United States left the nuclear deal as well. And we are where we are today.

One final thing is about the most recent events. A very interesting question that none of us know the answer to is, first of all, has the recent war, even though it was short, has this made it much more likely that Iran will now try to pursue an actual weapon? American intelligence has believed for many years that Iran was not actively trying to weaponize, that they wanted to be close to having a bomb, but they weren't actually trying to make one. Right.

And it would take them months to actually do that if they ever tried. The question is, is this now going to make them say, all right, fine, we were going to stay on this side of the line, but now we see what happens when we don't have nuclear weapons. People leave North Korea alone because they have the bomb and everybody knows it. People leave Israel alone. They don't try to destroy Israel as a society because Israel has the bomb. We need one too.

That's one question. Will they now make a push for it? And certainly there's a coherent argument for them to try if they can get away with it.

Second question would be, what would be the effects of that? The standard view in the United States and many other places is this would be horrible. If they got the bomb, they would use it. These are crazy people. They're religious fanatics. They would fire it at Israel or Saudi Arabia or maybe the United States itself. This would be horrible. We can't allow this to happen. So Democrats and Republicans all agree Iran can never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.

But I don't find that particularly compelling. Iran couldn't fire a nuclear weapon at Israel. It would be committing suicide if it did. Israel has dozens of nuclear weapons and would not be bashful about retaliating. I think that's abundantly clear. And we have felt this way about every country.

that approached the nuclear threshold. Before communist China got the bomb in 1964, we thought Mao Zedong was a crazy radical and if they ever got the bomb, this would be horrific. You could find speeches by American politicians back in the 60s.

Once China got the bomb, they didn't build very many of them and they behaved themselves. They never threatened to use nuclear weapons. They never came close to it. And one could make the argument, this is a very controversial argument and lots of people disagree with it. So listen.

Listeners don't have to accept what I'm about to say. Well, I'm sure there are many people that have been angrily typing in the comments section since this interview started. Right. But there's a coherent argument, might be wrong, but coherent argument that, in fact, if Iran had nuclear weapons, the Middle East would be more stable.

Right. Because Israel would have to behave itself a little bit more, couldn't act with impunity. And Iran would have less need to then rely on proxy forces. Its security would be- Well, it hasn't made the Asian subcontinent more stable that Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. Oh,

Actually, I would argue that it has. That Pakistan and India fought several major wars before India tested its so-called peaceful nuclear device. And they've had some skirmishes since then, but nothing as large as the war they fought in 1971 or the one they fought in 1965.

So even there, I think it's had a stabilizing effect. It doesn't eliminate all conflicts. Israel has nuclear weapons and it's fought wars since then. But the argument, and again, it's I think a logically coherent argument, which needs to be taken more seriously than it is.

that an Iranian bomb, which I'm not recommending, but wouldn't be the catastrophe that people think it would be. And the question you want to ask is how far are you willing to go to prevent this from happening? Are you willing to keep bombing Iran every few years? Are you willing to eventually try to overthrow it in some other way to prevent this from happening? Or do you want to try and over time

build a more constructive relationship with Iran such that either an Iranian bomb wouldn't be a big problem or they decide they don't actually need one after all, which might be the best possible outcome. So I'm going to move us to the second hour. The thing I would say just to cap off this part of the conversation is I don't think that the Iranians want a bomb just for deterrence. That doesn't mean that I think they want it so they can use it.

It seems to me that they want it so that they have freedom of action in a way that other countries in the Middle East don't. But I think there does seem to be a consensus that is formed today among not only the Gulf countries, but also the United States, that extremism is a dead end and that turning the Middle East into an attractive destination for capital

and as a region that can provide sustainable economic growth and a future for its citizens is a desirable objective. And it seems to me at least that the Iranians have political ambitions that run counter to this objective and which lead them to actively undermine regional cooperation and progress.

and that allowing them to develop a nuclear weapon would not suddenly resolve the problem. If anything, it would make things worse. Well, first of all, I mean, this idea that Iran is a revisionist power. I mean, is the United States a revisionist power? We've done more revising than the Iranians have in terms of overthrowing other governments, declaring that they should all be democracies as well. That's true. I agree with that, though I think the distinction that I'm trying to make is that the United States has been at least a

a champion of the international system. And to the extent that other countries have sought to undermine that system, they are by definition revisionist powers. Yeah, well, we're proponents of a rules-based order provided that we get to break the rules and we get to ignore them when we see fit.

So, you know, I wouldn't want to single out the United States as this wonderful law abiding country at this point. No, for sure. But the second point is this idea that Iran is not interested in economic development, et cetera. I think that's just wrong. No, no, no. Of course they're interested in economic development, but not at the expense of their own political influence. No, no, no, no, no. They've tried multiple times to, you know, they signed this nuclear deal with the United States and the deal was we'll stop our nuclear program. We'll cut waste.

But then why were they funding their proxies in the region? The deal was not about the proxies. The deal was about the nuclear program and what we agreed to, along with several EU countries and China and Russia. We all agreed. And there was a UN Security Council resolution enforcing this.

was that Iran would cut way back on the number of centrifuges, dismantle them, and would give up a whole bunch of the enriched uranium. So cut back its stockpile. And in exchange for that, they would get sanctions relief.

All right, they could rejoin the world economy. They could get investment again. They could start doing commercial deals just the way you wanted. And what happened? We did the deal. We signed it. Donald Trump came in, tore it up, and we began going around to the other countries that had signed it and saying, if you invest in Iran, if you do commercial deals with Iran, we will sanction you. If you France, if you France, if you go do a deal with Iran, we're going to sanction you, even though you're our ally.

And so we're the reason why Iran's not developing. In fact, if you wanted to bring down the clerical regime, the easiest way to do that would be open it up to capitalism in a big way. Make the Iranian middle class more powerful, more wealthy over time, and kill it with kindness. What we do instead is we confront Iran, we drop bombs,

on them. We let the Israelis, you know, do various things to them as well. And surprise, surprise, we discover that the hardliners are still in power. So again, I'm no fan of the clerical regime. I'm very glad I don't live in Iran, right, etc. But it seems to me we've had 40 plus years of pounding our head against this one. We've created enormous misery for Iranians when we haven't made ourselves or anybody else in the region more secure. No, I...

I don't disagree with that. I think in our first conversation, you had said we've made quite a mess of the world. I think that it's a pretty accurate description of an activist American foreign policy. Though again, I do think, and I think it's good to tie this into a bow so we can get to an easier topic like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a much easier geopolitical challenge to discuss in the second hour, along with America's larger strategic competition with China and how

the events in the Middle East make that easier or more difficult. But I think, yes, you're right that the funding the proxies wasn't part of the deal, but that's not really my point.

My point is that Iran sought sanctions relief, not just to invest in building up their domestic economy. They sought sanctions relief also to build up their proxy network and their influence and their ability to project power, which is different than deterrence, which was my point about seeking the nuclear bomb, not just as a way to protect themselves from the United States and Israel, but also as a way to allow them to act more freely

in seeking to undermine other countries. And I think that's a problematic way to behave in the region, especially if you're signing a nuclear, the JCPOA and

entering into good faith negotiations about sort of moving towards a peaceful state of relations with your neighbors. But as I said, we're going to get to a much easier conversation in the second hour. For anyone new to the program, Hidden Forces is listener supported. We don't accept advertisers or commercial sponsors. The entire show is funded from top to bottom by listeners like you. If you want access to the second hour of today's conversation with Stephen, head over to hiddenforces.io slash subscribe and sign up to one of our three content tiers.

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