Deep Dive
Shownotes Transcript
Welcome back to the Battlegrounds Ukraine podcast with me, Saul David, and Patrick Fisher. Every week we try to give you a mix of historical context, expert analysis, and the latest news.
And in part two of this episode, we'll discuss the week's developments on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. But first, we're going to hear from a very experienced Anglo-Ukrainian journalist, Asgol Krushelnitsky, an old friend of mine, as it happens, who in 2006 published An Orange Revolution, A Personal Journey Through Ukrainian History, highly recommended. Asgol's just returned from Ukraine, where he's been for the last six months. He's been in the big cities and on the front lines. And
And we asked him to bring us up to date with what's currently going on in terms of the geographical location of the fighting. There are two main bodies of fighting in eastern Ukraine, in the area which is called Donbass, which comprises of two Ukrainian provinces, Luhansk, most of which is now in Russian hands, and Donetsk.
And the other major area of fighting is in southern Ukraine, in areas around the city of Kherson, which is the capital of the Kherson region, and also in parts of Zaporizhia province and Mykolaiv province. But these are all in the south.
And the battle there is for control of the Black Sea coast and the vital ports that lay along that coast.
So has the tempo changed much in the last couple of weeks or are we into a kind of de facto stalemate, at least for the time being? No, it has changed. In the east, where we recall that earlier this summer, the Russians were making...
slow but steady progress by using their enormous superiority in artillery and other weapons, but mainly in artillery. They have about eight to ten artillery pieces for every Ukrainian artillery piece and much more ammunition. And they were using very crude
but horribly effective tactics, which was just pummeling these areas, just saturating them with rockets and artillery fire and destroying everything in their way. So towns such as Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Lysychansk,
where the Ukrainian forces did make a stand for months, the Russians eventually took them by just destroying them and just laying down huge artillery barrages.
In the south of Ukraine, the battle is different. Whilst in eastern Ukraine, it was about fighting in the cities, house-to-house fighting and artillery barrages, the
The Russians have been trying to use their artillery superiority in numbers in southern Ukraine, but the terrain is different there rather than fighting for cities. It's been fighting for territory and it's low.
low-lying land, it's steppe land, it's where the Ukrainian wheat and other foodstuffs are grown, and the terrain is more or less featureless as it goes down to the
to the Black Sea. So can you describe then what the nature of battle is in that southern area? I think we can all imagine what it was like in the battles for the cities, but this sounds more like a sort of, you know, First World War, Second World War stuff with, you know, long-range artillery exchanges, but eventually ground has to be taken by soldiers at rifle point, at grenade throwing distance. Is that how it actually works out? Yeah.
Well, in the end, as you say, it is down to the infantry man or woman, and there has been close quarter combat. But what's happened in southern Ukraine is that the Ukrainian forces have been able to make
progress because of the arrival in the last two months of Western-provided, chiefly by the US and Britain, sophisticated artillery, some of which uses ammunition that is smart ammunition, can be guided after it's fired. So this is like the M77 howitzers and the HIMARS with the GMLRS munitions. So that's presumably forcing the Russians to
It's disrupting their supply lines. It's making...
just the basic business of supporting the battle much more difficult. It is, and what it's vitally done, the new artillery that's arrived has a longer range than the Russian artillery. So Ukrainians can attack the Russian positions, they can attack supply lines behind the Russian positions, and they can move forward under cover of their own artillery.
sophisticated and very precise artillery. Also, the Russians occupied cities which they said they had liberated, and they found that most of the population opposes them. The Russians have behaved badly, as we know, well, atrociously,
They've executed civilians. They've killed prisoners of war. They've raped, carried out other actions, which has made the population that...
in the occupied areas very hostile to them and this population has been cooperating with Ukrainian special forces who which have been quite successful in entering towns and villages
striking at the Russian occupation forces and then withdrawing. They haven't attempted really to hold these areas, but they've inflicted heavy casualties in Russian men and they've also destroyed Russian munitions depots and hardware. Is that what happened at Saki, at the air base in Saki in Crimea? Is that pretty well...
how it was, in your view, an SF operation rather than a long-range missile operation? I think that that is how it's emerging. It's likely to have been a combined operation where longer-range missiles were used because satellite pictures seem to show three clear marks where missiles fell. But there's also signs that there were...
Ukrainian special forces, or they're sometimes called partisans, maybe local people, who also contributed to the attack by perhaps setting explosives.
Yeah, there's some speculation that the SAS, who are definitely training Ukrainian troops, might have been the inspiration for this. How are they being inserted? Are they helicopter-borne operations or are they going in by land? No, they're walking in. Most of it is by foot.
because the Russians still have superior means. In theory, they should control the skies and they have detection radar and other detection mechanisms so that using helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, which Ukrainians have done, is possible.
is very risky. Yeah. So just kind of just bring you back to what you were talking about, the nature of the battle in the south. You mentioned men and women soldiers. What proportion of the ground troops are female?
It's difficult to tell, but it's probably around 10%. Women are not conscripted, but women are free to join. And they have been joining, not just in traditional support roles. There are combat troops that are women and there are tank commanders, APC commanders who are women. But the exact proportion is difficult to gauge. Yeah.
Can we now expand to the bigger picture? Because as you'll be very well aware, Askel's about to go back to Ukraine next week and he's just come, been in the UK for a fortnight after spending an entire period of the war in and around Ukraine. So he's ideally situated to talk about both the small picture and the big picture. But
As you know, there's been lots of speculation about a possible autumn big push from either side. Not just most of the talk has been about a Ukrainian attempt to having apparently held the Russians back now to start reclaiming territory. But there's been sort of counter speculation, if you like, that the Russians themselves may be
further advances or to try to break out from the stalemate they apparently find themselves in. Now, what are your views on that? Well, the Russians must be considering some sort of pre-emptive
attack to prevent Ukraine advancing. They have been taken aback by the ability of the Ukrainian forces to use the new weapons that have been provided, the artillery pieces that you mentioned, and the rocket systems, which are also very sophisticated and have a long range and a very precise...
And they know that more of those are coming. And they have already stepped up attempts to disrupt the supply lines where this stuff comes over from Western Europe into Ukraine. And we can expect probably more attempts to do that. But we know from various sources, from American, British,
and Ukrainian intelligence, and just by piecing together things that are said in public in Russia, that they're having difficulty to recruit new troops to replace the number that have been killed or wounded in action. And the Ukrainians say it's over 40,000, and British and American sources say
say it's probably about two, at least two thirds of that. So these are very significant casualties, as well as equipment that's been destroyed. And it's probably a race for now whether the Russians can replace, can recruit and train people to replace their dead and wounded before sufficient
amounts of the new weaponry provided by the West, but also sufficient numbers of Ukrainian, more Ukrainian troops can be trained to use them, come about and enable the Ukrainians to mount a significant advance or attack to try to recapture the southern areas of their country that were taken in the first few days of the war.
But you do see a big pushback in prospect. That's what you're expecting this autumn, that there will be a counterattack which may, well, the Ukrainians hope will change the direction of the war thus far. Again, British, American and Ukrainian sources keep saying that the second half of August and March,
then September will be very, very important. We'll see battlefield events and other things happening that should indicate how long this war will last and how it will progress. But I know from speaking myself to senior Ukrainian officials
military and politicians, advisers to the government, that the hope is that Ukraine will be able to make some sort of very significant advance in the south and push the Russian troops back into Crimea. That would...
then again prevent the Russians having a direct land route from Russia to Crimea. It would be an overpowering morale boost for Ukrainians and conversely would probably lead to dismay amongst the Russian military and the population in Crimea.
Well, that was fascinating, Patrick, and he makes a number of really interesting points. And the big one, you know, not a statistic I'd heard recently, is the massive superiority that the Russians still have in artillery. I mean, he described it as between eight to ten artillery.
on the Russian side and just one on the Ukrainian side. And of course, more ammunition too. And what this has allowed, as he pointed out, is for the Russians to make gains in the Donbass, where they have been making their most recent gains, albeit at a snail-like pace, by saturating areas with rocket and artillery fire and literally destroying everything in their way. And that is, of course, the Russian way of warfare, or at least as they've shown in recent times, both in Grozny and also in Syria.
Yeah, I think we can get a bit mesmerized by the high tech kit on the Ukrainian side. It certainly it does change the nature of the battle and it's a huge advantage. But at a certain point, even though it allows them to stand off and bombard Ukraine.
the Russians at distance. At the end, you've got to take ground and then you're moving into the killing zones that the Russian artillery can very effectively create. But that northern battle, if you like, is quite different from the southern battle, as we were hearing from Asghold. The artillery is much less useful. And this is kind of classic steppe land, the great grain growing areas.
And so there the battle is, you know, like you were saying, it's going to come down much more to a kind of infantry battle, almost kind of, you know, trench warfare at the end of the day, I suppose.
Yeah. And he, um, he gave us the first really clear indication, uh, from Ukrainian sources, which of course he, you know, he's been speaking to both political and military people recently of the effect that HIMARS, the new long range artillery system, uh, provided by the Americans in particular is making because as he puts it out, um,
Ukrainians can now move forward under the cover. So it's not just striking long-distance targets. And we'll talk a little bit about that as we move through the news later on in the programme. But he's also giving an indication, and this is, you know, makes...
a lot of sense that they're effectively using Heimars as an artillery barrage, almost like a rolling barrage, under the protection of which they can advance. And no doubt this is going to be absolutely crucial for the big push, which we're also going to discuss in the second part of the programme. Yeah. Also, I was struck by his references to partisans using the old Second World War terminology. And we're seeing...
it would appear of local partisan action combined with special forces operations, insertion by road or foot even, he was saying, not by air because that's too dangerous. And that seems to certainly be having an effect. You know, even the Russians are, we had last week that strike on the
The Saki Air Base, very, very significant in Crimea. The picture is not completely clear still, but there certainly seems to have been SF involvement. And that was a significant military blow, spectacular damage done. There's been, in the last few days, on Tuesday, we hear of an ammunition supply depot being blown up in northern Crimea. Now, in the case of Saki, the Russians came out with a usual kind of rather a
It's an unbelievable story that this was an ammunition fire. It was just a kind of one of those things that happens. But in the case of the latest explosions, they're saying they're admitting that there is some skullduggery going on. They're blaming sabotage.
So that sounds very much like it was another partisan slash SF op of some description. I think it's worth saying here that these strikes, as well as having military value, have great propaganda value, especially in Crimea, which is big...
holiday resort area for Russians. So there was lots of stuff posted. People were lying on the beach and seeing plumes of smoke coming up from the air base in the case of Saki and filming it and then taking to their cars and clogging the roads to escape who knows what, you know, throwing caution to the wind. So they were, or rather the other way around actually, deciding that their holiday had come to an abrupt end. So that was going to be posted all over the place on social media and
And of course, that's going to bring the message home to people in Russia that this isn't the fiction, that this is a special military operation. It's looking very threadbare, I would have thought by now. Yeah, absolutely right, Patrick. And it's fascinating to me, really, what's causing these, you know, the exact reason. I mean, Asgore's interesting, wasn't he? He said he thinks it's a combination of both.
long range missiles, which the Americans, of course, have ruled out. They haven't actually given them to the Ukrainians. So what actually are they using to cover this sort of distance, which is about 120 to 140 miles? I mean, it's fascinating to speculate on whether or not they have actually got kit that the Americans haven't admitted. And as Asghar points out, and there's been in the press this week, there are signs of three large craters which would not have been caused
um, by the sort of munitions used by special forces. So is it a combination of the two, as you pointed out, but you know, as you've also mentioned, there'll be more strikes this week, they, the ammunition or munitions supply depot, but also an airport near Simferopol, which is in the center of, of Crimea. And they're really beginning to ramp up the attacks on, uh,
Crimea, as you say, it's partly propaganda, but it is having a military effect. And of course, one of the announcements made by official Ukrainian sources this week is this is an indication we are sooner or later going to take back the Crimea. Yeah, that's absolutely right. That concentration on the Crimea is an indication of future intent. We'll come on to that a bit later about what
Ukrainian ultimate war aims are. Just another point, 10% of the Ukrainian forces are female and they're all volunteers, they're not conscripted.
And they're not just in traditional support roles, but they're in frontline combat roles, including, I was very impressed to hear, tank and APC commanders. So that's the Ukrainian side, but we haven't heard anything from the Russian side. Have you read any reports anywhere of Russian female soldiers in the frontline?
No, there's a long tradition of this, as you and I both know from the Second World War, though, significant numbers of women who fought not just in support roles, but in in combat roles. And therefore, you might have assumed that it would be the same today. But I think if you if you go going back to your point about this, you know, this special operation, which is just being carried out by our, you know, our professional military doesn't well, our professional military with conscripts, of course.
doesn't really fit into the idea that it's all hands to the pump and we even need women in front-run roles. So maybe that's also a propaganda element that is counting against the Russians using anyone available. On the Ukrainian side, of course, it is all hands to the pump. It's national survival. And it's extraordinary and really quite impressive to think that women are fighting in the front lines, as you pointed out, as tank commanders. I mean, you know, really amazing stuff. There is a long tradition, not just in Russian politics,
military history, but also all European countries. It's interesting. I had a student many years ago working on women fighting during the Napoleonic Wars, and they fought on all sides and not just in support roles. So there's a long tradition of this, as we well know. But it's really striking to hear that that percentage from the Ukrainian side.
Yeah, on the Russian side, apparently it's 4%. That's of all women serving in all arms of their defence forces. And that compares with 11% in the UK. It's pretty low, that number 4%, but I can see why, given what we've heard about the kind of bullying culture that exists in the Russian armed forces, it's hardly a very attractive career option, I would have thought.
Yes, exactly right. So a combination of culture and all. And also, you know, let's not let's not panic everyone by making it seem that, you know, we need large numbers of women to do the fighting. And I think both of us conclude that the Russians must be considering some kind of preemptive attack.
before the counteroffensive, this much-vaunted Ukrainian counteroffensive against Kherson? So, well, everything is pointing to a big increase in the tempo of the fighting with a Ukrainian big counteroffensive, which they've made no secret of. It's all part of the mind games, of course, that the politicians are playing with their opposite numbers, the Ukraine-Moscow psychological tussle that's been going on.
And in the second half, we'll be talking about what the Russians' options are. They're obviously not necessarily in the place that they pretend they are in. I think there's a lot of kind of underlying weaknesses in their position.
So not just in questions of the rival technologies of superiority that the Ukrainians now seem to be getting, which to some extent counteracts the Russian superiority in numbers, etc. Anyway, we're going to talk about all that in part two, as well as a roundup of all the latest news on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. So we'll be back shortly.
Welcome back. Well, what we've seen in recent days is a clear indication from British, American and Ukrainian sources indicating that the second half of August and early September is going to see significant battlefield events and that those might determine how long the war will last. So we're really getting to crunch events now. We know from speaking to senior Ukrainian military and politicians and advisers to government is that the hope
that the Ukrainians will be able to make a significant advance in the south and push the Russian troops back into Crimea. That, of course, is going to end the land bridge to Crimea and would be a huge morale boost for Ukraine. And, you know, on the other hand, of course, dismay the Russian military and the Russian population in the Crimea. Yeah, I mean, we've said before and we've heard nothing since to contradict Ukraine.
the reports that the morale is pretty low among Russian troops. There were some reports coming out of Kherson, actually, that they no longer send soldiers
the dead soldiers back to Russia, but are incinerating them on the spot in these special trucks that drive around behind the troops. I can't imagine that does much for morale either. Anyway, I think more significantly, they seem to be maneuvering to confront a big offensive. We've seen...
In the last week or so, reports coming in that they're actually shifting significantly their posture around the Kherson area. So very significantly, I think there were reports which haven't been contradicted that they're moving command posts from the west bank of the Dnipro, the river that really divides Ukraine in two,
to the east bank but leaving substantial numbers of troops on the other side on the west bank now that makes them very vulnerable uh the three bridges across the uh denikpro in the kerson area two road bridges and one rail bridge have been very severely damaged by long-range rocket artillery
to the point where they're kind of impassable. So actually getting supplies to these soldiers is going to be really down to getting trundling trucks across some pontoon bridges across the river, which are also very vulnerable. We've seen images before of those being smashed up by Ukrainian artillery. So the logic, I suppose, is that they're moving the command post back so that there is actually someone in charge to tell the soldiers
what to do on the ground, but it can't be very much fun if you're stuck there knowing that your superiors have decided to retreat beyond rocket range and that you're expected to now try and hold up what would be
any day soon, a huge Ukrainian attack. That's right. And it also hints at a bigger possibility, and that is that the Russians have already decided they're overstretched and given their difficulties with manpower and equipment, possibly have gone as far as they can. Also, that they've no real prospect of increasing their gains and therefore are preparing to fall back to secure land they already have in the Donbass.
This fits, of course, with another plausible theory of how Putin sees the war playing out and a possible endgame that may be high on the list of the options that the Kremlin is considering.
Yeah, we touched on this last week, but I think this is going to be an ongoing question, which is very much a part of Putin's calculations. And that's whether public enthusiasm for the Ukrainian cause, which is very strong in Britain, very strong in the US, but is perhaps a bit more nuanced in continental Europe, will start to slacken. And the main reason being suggested in some quarters for this is
is that the cost of living crisis, which is being felt everywhere, will actually start impacting on the political decisions being made in the West. I mean, Saul is currently in Greece at the moment aboard his yacht, which he bought with the proceeds of our last podcast on the Falklands. LAUGHTER
What's it like there? So I'm just kidding about the, this is a labor of love, a labor of love. Anyway, but you know, but Greece is one of the poorest countries in Europe. And, you know, they're going to feel energy price rises harder than almost anyone I've ever thought.
Is that having a political effect? Have you picked up anything like that in your travels? Yeah, it's interesting. I mean, they haven't stepped out of line yet in terms of public opinion turning against the wall for the reasons you've already pointed out. But it is tough here. They rely hugely on tourism. I'm trying to do my bit, of course.
And they were hard, very hard hit by by covid. And therefore, the rising fuel prices, which everyone needs to get about and supplies and economy in general, is the double whammy, really. So, yes, there is a danger that places like Greece, there's no obvious indication of it yet. I've seen a lot of Ukrainian flags around, although at the same time, there are also plenty of Russian tourists, which you may or may not be surprised to hear,
Patrick, I sometimes think, you know, they might be sensible to keep their actual Russian identity a little bit quiet because they may not be that popular, but they're proudly flying their Russian flags from their yachts. But yes, there's no indication that they're stepping out of line yet. Yeah, I think this is at this stage speculation. My feeling would be that
you know, public anger is more likely to be directed at the energy companies and the huge profits they're making rather than the Ukrainians for the rising energy bills. But I think that, you know, Putin's obviously calculating that once winter comes,
This will become an issue and will translate into political pressure on European governments to tone down support for Ukraine, which will then find itself in
increasingly isolated. That's the danger. We get a scenario where Putin can claim victory and declare a certain area of captured Ukrainian territory has been restored to Russian sovereignty. I mean, that's clearly this sort of irredentist claim. I mean, that's clearly one of the end games. Um,
He'll magnanimously announce that the operation is now at an end. No more territory will be taken. But of course, I think we know, Patrick, the Ukrainians in their current mood will never accept that. So they will keep on fighting and...
Putin maybe hopes, start to look like the intransigent ones. So it's all going to be very interesting to watch how this aspect develops. And I think if governments want to forestall this development, they would be wise to start presenting the crisis as an opportunity that will eventually wean Western Europe off its dependency on Russian oil and gas. And this certainly seems to be happening a little bit. Yeah, but not enough in my view. I mean, I think there is a huge...
strategic tilt going on here, which I don't think the politicians make enough of and say, look, you know, this is okay. It's a crisis, but it's also an opportunity. And the world, you've always got to try and accentuate the positive in any war and what good may come out of it. But good may come out of this war in some
So far as well, two things. I think one is from our own kind of selfish Western perspective that we do actually end our dependency on autocratic regimes like Russia for our energy. Of course, there's another one in Saudi Arabia, which we don't talk about. And the other one, of course, that the principle is re-established that aggression doesn't pay.
But these ends are a long way off and we've got a lot of fighting to do before we get to that point. Yes. So let's talk about some of the significant developments in the last week. We've already mentioned a few, but there was an announcement by Britain. I'm pleased to say the defence secretary, Ben Wallace, saying that the UK is going to send further multiple launch rocket systems or MLRS similar to HIMARS to Ukraine and
And also, and this is important, a significant number of precision guided M31A1 missiles, which can strike targets up to 50 miles away. And of course, this is all going to help Ukraine to defend itself against Russian heavy artillery. As we've pointed out, they also talk about or Wallace also talks about Britain's commitment to train up to 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in infantry battlefield skills over the coming months.
And quite a few other countries, including Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, have announced they will be supporting that programme.
Yeah, that's quite interesting, that one, isn't it? Because you sort of wonder where the trainees will come from. You know, Ukraine's a pretty militarized society by now. We were hearing from Irka last week that the best and the brightest, you know, people, university lecturers, IT whizzes, they're all out there on the front lines doing the fighting, you know. So I wonder what capacity there actually is that needs to be trained up.
Well, on top of that, there's also an announcement at the Copenhagen conference last week that Britain is going to put £250 million
of the recently announced one billion it's pledged into the International Fund for Ukraine, which is a low bureaucracy fund, which will be used again to provide military equipment and other support. And the fund is really about keeping this flow of money and flow of new weaponry in. That's one of the great fears of the Ukrainians is that as the enthusiasm for the war or weariness generally sort of sets in,
those supplies will start to dry up. So this is a kind of indication that Ukraine's supporters are in for the long haul. Yeah, and there's also an interesting report earlier this week by the Reuters correspondent Natalia Zinets. And she talks about this really grim story about the Zaporizhia nuclear plant in southern Ukraine. And
and the call by the US Secretary General Antonio Guterres for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. Now, what seems to have been going on there, and it's confusing, Patrick, because there are lots of conflicting reports, is that the Russians have been shelling the plant in an attempt to cut off the electricity supply to Ukraine's remaining territory, thus risking a nuclear catastrophe. We mentioned this last week briefly, I think,
in some of the calls that were happening on the British side to, you know, we really need to take a note of this. This is a really serious issue. And the plant dominates the south bank of a vast reservoir, the Dnipro River, with Ukrainian forces controlling the towns and cities on the opposite bank. And not only have the Russians been shelling part of the plant, they've also moved kit in quite close to the plant, which sounds a bit of a contradiction in terms.
in the hope that they can fire from those positions and the Ukrainians won't fire back. So it's really a scary situation at Zaporizhzhia. And the sooner something is done about that, as the US Secretary General has called for the establishment of a demilitarized zone, the better. But whether that's actually going to happen, given Russian intransigence, is another matter.
Yeah. On the diplomatic front, Russia's isolation has, of course, naturally driven it closer to international pariahs like North Korea. In July, North Korea recognised as independent states the Russian-backed
so-called People's Republics in Donetsk and Lugansk. And on Monday, President Putin told, apparently, according to North Korean state media, that Putin told Kim Jong-un that the two countries would expand comprehensive and constructive ties. So I don't think that's something to cheer about. If I was a Russian, I wouldn't be particularly excited.
excited by that. Incidentally, there's also been an arms fair in Russia. I don't know where it is exactly, but the Russians are still flogging kit to potential buyers and 70 representatives from 70 different countries turned up. And I'm amazed that you would actually want to buy anything off the Russians in these circumstances because their performance of their armour, everything they've
thrown at the Ukrainians. Yeah, I mean, it's effective in a, like we were saying before, in a kind of Second World War, Stalingrad sort of way, but it doesn't really sort of seem to bear much relevance to the modern world. But there we are.
Yeah, well, slightly more encouraging news about the grain consignments. We mentioned last time that the first one to leave had been rejected by its buyer as past its sell-by date. And that might have led people to conclude that, well, it's all going to be inedible. Well, the latest news this week is that more convoys have left the Ukraine bound for Syria and Ethiopia, where the food is really needed. And all we can say, Patrick, until we hear the
More updated news is that these consignments are edible and that they can help to relieve what is potentially a famine situation.
Yeah, that story is a very interesting story because it sort of did actually give us a glimpse of how complicated these transactions are. You know, you'd think it'd be a fairly straightforward process, but there were all sorts of middlemen involved. In the case of that first consignment, it was a Lebanese buyer who then rejected it on the grounds of quality, but it was then actually bought up elsewhere. So there was actually a sort of happy ending to that story. But the great thing about that was it proved it could be done, even with all the kind of potential dangers of shipping issues.
these consignments, it got through and that encouraged other people, I think, to follow suit. Now, 99-year-old Henry Kissinger has been giving us the benefit of his wisdom on the kind of global situation lately. And he seems to be arguing for a less absolutist, if you like,
by the Ukrainians and saying that, you know, the aim should be everyone should be encouraging negotiations rather than stiffening the Ukrainians' resolve to hold out for the recapture of all their stolen territory. What did you make of his intervention there? Well, he drew a lot of flack for that, of course, because... And actually, it's a little bit more nuanced than that, Patrick, because...
His original argument was that he felt that the reason we're in this mess is because of the way Ukraine had behaved after the fall of communism. It had been very, you know, sort of triumphalist. And also it expanded its remit, of course, much closer to to Russia in contravention of an alleged sort of verbal agreement at the end of the end of the Cold War.
And therefore making Russia more paranoid and that this in some senses has contributed to the situation we're in at the moment. Well, that was controversial, but he seems to have changed tack a little bit because he's recently published an article in The Wall Street Journal that that suggests he no longer thinks that Ukrainian alignment with the West was the problem.
On the other hand, he now thinks it's the solution. So, you know, the long term future for Ukrainian security is, I think he's arguing, he now believes, joining NATO. I think I've got some sympathy with the view that we didn't really seize that wonderful opportunity after the collapse of the communist system when there was, it's clear, you know, widespread support
optimism in Russia that this could really be the moment when they do actually break out of their sort of historical addiction to tyranny and embrace the West. I mean, I didn't say that in a kind of, you know, I mean, Russia must, of course, hang on to its cultural traditions, its wonderful history and identity. But, you know, it was basically moving forward together rather than them suddenly all becoming Western European Democrats. And I think we did actually...
bungle that opportunity. And of course, that window closed very quickly. So I've got some sympathy with that view. But very rapidly, it became clear after Putin's takeover that this was a man who didn't in any way conform to the sort of bedrock values that we share in Western democracies and that he was to be treated with huge caution. And of course, that didn't happen. There was endless appeasement and endless attempts, really just cynical attempts
attempts to exploit the Russian economy and to enrich individuals and corporations. And so, yeah, the sort of capitalist greed, if you were being a Marxist, I think has a lot to answer for. Well, we're going to end with some happier news, and that is that the mayor of Kiev, the former world champion boxer Vitaly Klitschko, is calling on residents to return to the city as it's now far better defended than it was before.
At the beginning of the conflict, it's got much improved air defences and anti-rocket systems, etc. And Klitschko said, I can tell right now that everyone who's ready to come home is welcome. He added that he couldn't guarantee their safety 100%, but that life there was much, much more secure.
OK, well, that's all we have time for this week. But do join us next time when we'll round up the latest news and hear from Orlando Fages, one of the world's leading authorities on Russian history. And he'll be telling us about the long enmity between Russia and Ukraine, Putin's decision to go to war and the likely outcome. Do join us then. Goodbye.