3. Diplomacy fails, and retaking South Georgia
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Welcome back to episode three of Battleground for Falklands with me, Patrick Bishop. And me, Saul David. So last time we told the story of the sailing of the task force, which was a hugely dramatic event. For a moment, Britain was plunged back into the Victorian era, a sort of time warp with flag-waving crowds cheering our boys on as they set off to punish some impertinent foreigners.

It all looked very warlike, I seem to remember, but no one in their right mind actually wanted a war and there were high hopes that diplomacy might avert the need for an invasion. There had been a long and largely fruitless history of trying to settle the whole question of who the islands belonged to.

For 17 years, the Foreign Office and the Argentinian government had been going back and forth over the same old ground, trying to solve the problem. At its heart was a very naughty conundrum. Britain, or rather the Foreign Office, was very open to the idea of actually giving the islands over to the Argentinians under some sort of leaseback arrangement whereby they got sovereignty. But we

carried on ruling the place for some indeterminate time. However, they were severely hampered in this aim by the principle laid down over and over again by various British foreign secretaries that nothing was going to happen unless the Falklanders approved, which despite great efforts of persuasion, they were showing no sign of doing it.

So, of course, the Argentinian invasion had brought the matter to a head in spectacular fashion. It presented a huge challenge to the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who'd been in power since May 1979, but had still not stamped her authority on her government.

Today, we're going to talk about the diplomatic offensive Britain launched in parallel to the military initiative and the political atmosphere in London as the crisis progressed. We're then going on to describe the first actual military operation of the war, the recapture of South Georgia. It was, as we will discover, a very perilous moment in the story. It came close to a disaster that might have stopped the whole enterprise in its tracks.

But first, we're going to have a look at the political and diplomatic track. We're very fortunate to have with us Simon Jenkins, who at the time was political editor of The Economist and had terrific access to the politicians' and civil servants' shaping events. Together with Max Hastings, he wrote the first serious book about the war, which very much stands the test of time today. He went on to become editor of The Times and is now one of Britain's foremost political voices. Simon, welcome, and thank you very much for coming on the podcast.

Can I start off by asking you about Mrs Thatcher's position in the spring of 1982 and what immediate challenges the Falklands crisis presented to her? I think it's awfully difficult in telling the story of any war to do so with retrospect. You cannot imagine when you've seen the victory parades what it was like at the beginning.

because we just know what happened next. At the beginning, Margaret Thatcher was in a state, I think, of complete shock. No one expected the invasion. No one was ready for it. It came out of the blue. She obviously thought to herself, this is the end. She was deeply unpopular. She was facing great difficulties with her own party, all sorts of wings of the party. And now she had this catastrophe on her hands. And she was simply in a state of shock.

How much is she led by her own personal instincts and beliefs? And how much is she actually listening to the advice of cabinet colleagues, military personnel and civil servants? I think it was very much herself. I really do. You have to remember that the...

The war itself was the result of a lot of internecine fighting in Whitehall. The Foreign Office was desperate to get rid of the Falklands, in reasonable order, but desperate to get rid of it. The Ministry of Defence was the prime cause of the war. They ended endurance. They refused to put the airport initially into the islands and therefore, in many ways, encouraged Buenos Aires to what it did. Very few people were for the islanders at this stage in Whitehall.

All you had was a tiny group of people on the Tory backbenchers who were fiercely for them and fighting tooth and nail against the mass ranks of Whitehall. Margaret Thatcher was in a very weak position. Any backbench opposition to her, she feared. So she was inclined to go along with the backbenchers. But at that particular moment in time, she really didn't know what to do. And she was, as I said before, she was clinging to straws. And the straws she clung to was the task force.

The assumption was something would turn up. The Argentinians would leave or the United Nations were getting involved or the Americans would help. Something would happen.

But the whole time the task force was sailing down to Ascension Island, the assumption was they wouldn't go any further. OK, and you mentioned the Americans. This is obviously crucially important, really, isn't it? The reaction of the Americans. What sort of support could Thatcher expect to get from the Americans? And on the other hand, what would be the attitude of Cold War opponents and the Third World? I don't think she thought much about the latter. As far as the Americans were concerned, at this stage...

I mean, she was sort of just throwing her hands up in despair. I've got ships at sea. For goodness sake, everybody, rally around.

The Americans, I mean, Galtieri had been to Washington. He had support, tacit support, not in invading the Falklands, but in his claim to sovereignty over the Falklands from Tom Enders and people in Washington. He genuinely thought the Americans would be at least neutral if he did invade. And he had good reason for thinking that. Jean Kirkpatrick at the UN was also sort of on his side there.

Everybody was keen to get on with Latin America. The foreign officers were desperate to get on with Latin America, which is why they wanted to get the Falklands off their plate. I don't think at this early stage Mrs Thatcher had any idea that it would come to asking the Americans for missiles and that sort of thing. But she assumed she had good relations with Reagan and so on. She assumed that all would be well. But I don't think the question of alliance was in her mind at this stage. It was a bit odd to people who just assumed that America would rally round when you've got this...

strange sort of ideological crossover, Jean Kirkpatrick, who'd started out life as a far leftist and is now, after exposure to Ronnie Reagan's charm, seems to have become a massive sort of anti-communist Cold War warrior, and by extension, anti-British. I don't know if that had anything to do with her Irish roots, but there we are. But against, you know, slightly lukewarm American reaction, we do get this great

in the UN. Can you talk us through the role of Tony Parsons, et cetera, in getting the passing of Security Council Resolution 502? Parsons was a character. He was a great success. Margaret Thatcher adored him in the end. And I think it was very important. I mean, the British have always been very deferential to the UN. It happened again over Iraq. They wanted UN support. They wanted to

And I think that's what they ended up with. I think the crucial thing about 502 is that it basically...

ordered the Argentinians off the island and said they had to withdraw completely militarily and didn't say anything about the British retaking them. So therefore it was kind of opening the door to a military invasion should the Argentinians not comply with the terms of 502. So I think there was a lot of ground to cover before we actually got to war, but it did actually give us this sort of...

international legal cover, which was tremendously important. If you invade a foreign country on provoke, you're on weak ground, whatever the justification for it might be. It was a great help to us. You're quite right. I think the other thing about it is that the UN had for 16 years been trying to negotiate a settlement for the Falklands.

British ministers have been in New York almost every year, getting nowhere in these negotiations. But as soon as the war was over, everyone's forgotten. The UN ordered us back into the negotiations, which we didn't do. So the British relationship with the UN was ambivalent, but always nervous. Rhodesia was going on at the time. The British were very worried to get Rhodesia in the right order to go independent. And the last thing it wanted was trouble in the South Atlantic.

Simon, while the task force is heading down to Ascension Islands and on to the Falkland Islands, there is, of course, this ongoing diplomatic effort, the shuttle diplomacy by Al Haig coming over to London, then going over to Buenos Aires. And Thatcher's government going along with it to the extent that...

They had to, I suppose. They had to see where it might lead. But pretty determined to stick to this principle of self-determination by the islanders, that is. And yet, on the other hand, it seems to me Haig was quite happy with an arrangement that would effectively produce a neutral agreement

interim administration after the Argentine withdrawal from the islands, which was something Thatcher simply wasn't prepared to put up with. So the question really is, was there any hope that that diplomacy could ever succeed? I don't think there really was. You're quite right. All sorts of different things were happening. The whole way the task force was going south was

You had the Al Haig, you had the Belondi-Terry Peruvian proposals, all of these in the final ones after the landings when Reagan came to London and sort of pleaded with Thatcher to do a deal. The whole time and the further it went on, the more Mrs Thatcher became utterly involved in the task force.

And she regarded all this sort of stuff as purely for show. Francis Pym was pleading for her. The cabinet on the whole thought, rather like the UN, we must go along with peace, even as we prepare for war.

And, I mean, Al Haig was a nightmare. I mean, every time he came to London, it was chaos and no one's going to talk to him. And he was a very oddball character. He took advice famously from Kissinger, who'd recently done the Israel-Egypt deal. How do I do it? And Kissinger said, Arab Egypt is easier compared to Britain-Argentina. Yeah.

They're used to doing deals. These people are never used to doing deals and told him it would never work. So I think it was show. It was genuinely show. They were going through the form, going through the actions to try and appear to be keen on peace.

But once she was south of the Ascension Islands, it was all or nothing. And I think from that point onwards, it was only going to be total victory. And this wretched business, you've got a lot of it from Parkinson, I remember, saying once people have started dying, you owe it to them to continue fighting. Well, I don't believe in that, but that's what he said. And that was certainly what the generality of people thought, I think.

We've all seen the pictures. We all remember the pictures of the cheering crowds as the force leaves. But once casualties were being taken, particularly once some of the ships were being sunk, does political support for the war shore up? I think it does. I think most people, it's difficult to remember because of the

We're all aware of the victory. I think at the time there was genuine nervousness. Of course, it was very easy for the government to control the flow of news. I mean, it had absolute control of the flow of news, both through its own spokesman and through having the journalists embedded in their own ships and so on. So I don't think anyone quite took aboard the disaster of the Atlantic conveyor sinking, which is a real, that was a single thing that might have lost us the war.

They never quite took aboard what Goose Cream was really about or what the Galahad operation was really about. All of this was really told after the occasion. But certainly something like Coventry and Sheffield, I mean, that was, I remember that being devastating. These are real ships being sunk. And I think everybody was really holding their breath at that stage. They couldn't quite believe we'd lose.

but we couldn't quite see how we were going to win. Do you think, Simon, the initial operation on South Georgia, which we're going to go on to discuss, and comes reasonably close to disaster itself, do you think that was a key moment? Because it was the first proper military engagement of the war, at least in an aggressive sense, as far as the Brits were concerned. And if that had gone wrong, and it almost

And Thatcher's pretty shaken because she hears the news that two helicopters have gone down and, you know, there could be a lot of casualties. I mean, might that have made a difference, do you think? I think to the war, it was either here or there.

In public opinion, it was very important. Of course, we weren't told that two helicopters had gone down. We just told them we got it back. And that enabled us to do this just rejoice moment, which was very important. That was very important. It sort of felt as if that was inevitably going to be the case. So the Falklands are going to be as easy as that, we hope. I think it was significant in those sort of presentational terms. Yes.

Well, that was fascinating, real insight there. I was particularly struck by the way that Simon, who really did know the corridors of power very well at that stage, amazing contacts, etc., his judgment on just how lonely a place it was for Thatcher at that time. There she was, you know, pretty much untried at a great crisis. You had the ongoing crisis, but not anything like this that she could possibly have prepared for.

and how precarious her position was. There were a couple of things that stood out for me. First of all, his portrait of Thatcher as someone really separate from her cabinet, but a person who fitted very neatly in with the military. And this, of course, is crucial. We know many instances in history where, you know,

politicians like Hitler interfere. They have a very bad relationship with their soldiers. They don't really trust them. Uh, but Thatcher seemed to, she seemed to understand them almost instinctively without any kind of, you know, personal knowledge herself of the military. But the other really striking thing I think is that this diplomacy that of course many people in the country hoped would prevent a war, uh,

was never likely to work. I mean, Simon makes it pretty clear, I think, that there was a lot of talk. But unless the Argentinians were prepared to withdraw and concede the principle that the islanders would determine their future, there was going to be a shooting war. So now we come on to the first military clash of the campaign when British forces meet the enemy on the frozen glaciers and mountains of South Georgia.

and very dramatic it was too. Join us after the break. Welcome back to part two. We've had a bit of diplomacy. Now we're moving on to the shooting war as it occurred in South Georgia. Now, the island of South Georgia is quite a long way from the Falklands, nearly 900 miles to the east, in fact.

The decision to recapture it was, as we will discover, both a political and a military one. It showed the Argentinians we meant business. It would provide a secure anchorage for the task force ships out of range of Argentine aircraft. And perhaps most importantly, it would provide the government at home with a

quick and easy victory to satisfy public opinion. We're now going to talk to Bob Hedlund, who, as a member of the British Antarctic Survey team on the island, was actually present when the Argentinians first arrived, both that scrap merchant ruse that they tried in the middle of March and later on, of course, when they actually take the island by force on the 3rd of April.

I was on South Georgia with the British Antarctic Survey, employed as a biologist. Arrived there in 1977, did a couple of winters, so got to know the island well. OK, it's interesting. I was looking at your book and I noticed that there were indications that the Argentinians were, how can I put it, interested in South Georgia a little bit earlier than a lot of people might imagine. And we're really going back to Christmas 1981 now, Bob. So can you tell me a little bit about the first

sightings of Argentinian ships around that time? Well, the Argentine interests in South Georgia, apart from the geographical ones and involvement with the whaling industry, which goes back to 1904, but more recently than when the old whaling stations were closed, there was a vast amount of once useful stuff. Time went on, then it became scrap metal. And a fellow who dealt in that in Argentina, Constantino Davidoff, thought he could make a profit from it.

I think it started as a straightforward commercial operation. But at that time with the military government, it was a useful excuse, if you follow. And it was not a good thing to disagree with the government of Argentina in the late 70s and early 80s. So Davidoff was inquiring about transport. He wanted to see what he had an option to buy. He was even inquiring with private yachts with the British Antarctic Survey.

with charters, but the Argentine Navy decided it could help. That was a bit of a poison chalice. Okay, and do you remember the first sightings of the Argentinian ships coming into South Georgia? The first we knew that Bahia Buen Suceso was arriving was a bit more Spanish on the VHF signals. That was first heard. I understand the Spanish no problem, so something was happening.

We had a field party in the vicinity which reported the ship there, and that was the 18th of March.

Once this was established, myself and a colleague took a launch across our bay where you could climb a reasonable ridge and get a view of the area of Leith Harbour and Stromness Bay. So there with fairly powerful binoculars, we were seeing what was going on from a reasonable distance. And I was listening to the VHF and reporting back. So we had a good report of the beginning of what was alleged to be

and to some extent was, the salvage operation. So what could you actually see that day? Because if it had just been the commercial operation, it might not have been such a problem. But first of all, they hadn't asked any permission to land, and you had to go through the due process to do that. And secondly, and I think most importantly, they'd raised the flag, had they not. Quite a few things happened. For a start, the ship, which had regularly visited the Falklands, you should have known the procedure, that...

Couldn't get away with things then, but she was an Argentine naval vessel. The flag raising that the field party had detected was an irregularity. It was protected species on the island. In the case of the reindeer, they were getting some of those ready for the barbecue. But the basic operation was landing equipment and personnel to begin a salvage job. The views of the ship we had...

To some extent reassuring. There were no satellite domes or dishes or some sort of communications that in 1982 would indicate naval logistics of a substantial nature. But there were all the equipment for transmitting information and she was in regular contact with BA. Okay, and this information was passed, of course, on to the Falkland Islands. And what kind of information did you get back from them as to what was likely to happen next?

We weren't really well equipped for espionage on a detailed way, so we did it in another way, that is, using low-power VHF and...

doing from the pass where I was observing a short walk behind another mountain, we could transmit to the launch we had. They had another frequency which was transmitting to base, and their reports were transmitted to the governor in Stanley. Originally, that was in plain, but then there were different methods of encryption used.

But it was not a quick process. OK. And what information did you get back from Stanley as to what might happen next? What we could see of unloading and operations, that wasn't the best view because it was on one side of the ship and we were on the other. But the radio was the best traffic we could get. But number of persons who could be seen and basics of what from about a dozen kilometres away happened.

One can see the beginnings of the unloading and preparing for salvage. The flagpole and the raising of the flag, two sources for that, one our own field party, and secondly, a French yacht had gone over. There's a long story about that too. And they described somewhat of a military parade for the occasion.

The flagpole wasn't actually a flagpole. It was a reasonable tower. It held electrical cables around the old quading station, but it was reasonably high and prominent. And we got some good photographs. OK. And the instructions came back from Stanley, presumably initiated from London, that you would send a pretty strong message to the Argentinians as to what they needed to do next.

including the lowering of the flag and an attempt to go through the normal procedure, which is, of course, to not just land at Leith, but to go to the correct port of entry and get their papers in order. Did they follow those instructions? The instructions came from Rex Hunt in Stanley, whereas he was informing the Foreign Office he was acting rather quickly himself.

And they're roughly what you outlined. The question of protected species to report to the port of entry to lower the flag and a brief series of straightforward instructions, none of which they obeyed. There is some indication that they lowered the flag for a brief time. Is there any truth in that? Yes, we've got photographs of it coming down. There was a situation of the small military contingent

were rather keen on the flag, and the scrap workers couldn't give a damn. Now, of course, you then have the changing of the guard, so to speak, as far as the Argentinian ships are concerned. One leaves and another arrives, and I suppose far more sinister in terms of the arrival of the second ship. It's got an Argentine military force on it. Yes, Bayer Buen Suceso left after several days, and we could see activity

on shore. The report was at least 10 men were seen. Later on, by the time that had come back through the BBC, only 10 men were seen. We couldn't see them all. It's a rather large whaling station. But Bahia Paraiso was a major Argentine Navy ship equipped with weapons. Very well built ship. She'd been recently constructed in Finland as an icebreaker for their Antarctic program. So she was the next on scene. Okay, and...

But also at the same time, and I think having arrived just before the second Argentine ship, the endurance had arrived at Gritviken originally with instructions to turf the Argentinians out. And then presumably with second thoughts in London, given that talks were going on with Argentina, that actually just to hold fire and wait off Gritviken. Is that correct? Yes.

Yes. After Bahia Buen Suceso had gone, HMS Endurance arrived. At that time, also, we had a couple of Russian visitors, to use the phrase, I think, from one of the Monty Python things, bristling with aerials. They were doing a fair amount of observation. Then in came Bahia Paraiso. Captain Cesar Trombetta and Captain Nick Barker, the two masters, knew each other. They'd informally met.

But the circumstances were very different. OK, so at this stage, Barca has instructions not to do anything. I mean, certainly to take no military action. So we then get a bit of a standoff, don't we, until the actual invasion of the Falkland Islands on the 2nd of April, which is the point at which the Argentinian military force on South Georgia begins to take aggressive action itself. So can you describe where you were and what happened next?

in that situation, Bob? The original plan that we had from Stanley was that the base commander has the post of magistrate. There was to be a police operation assisted by the Navy. That was quite practicable at the time. But then Whitehall became involved and that was countermanded. They knew the position of Baye Paraiso and the power she had was far more than anything we could deploy at that time.

Then Whitehall was issuing more to Stanley than Stanley was doing directly. That was a time when the threat to the Falklands became more apparent and endurance started heading in that direction. She could make, I think, about 12 knots on full wax. She's built for the ice, not for speed, but was unable to get there in time. By then, Bayer Paraiso was established in Leith Harbour.

Gorico, a quite effective little corvette, was in the vicinity. That was the time when it was realised that Endurance would not be able to assist with Stanley. There was far too much against her. So she was returning to South Georgia. She arrived just as things were finishing and good observations were made. But with the Gorico and Baye Paraiso

It wasn't appropriate to, or endurance to interfere. That was on the 3rd of April, the Battle of Griccon, as I like to call it. So from your perspective, can you give us an indication of what happened that day? There was a lot of things happening, signals going backwards and forwards on the 2nd. Then Rex Hunter surrendered and Stanley was taken by the Argentines.

That's at a time when one did what had to be done with code books and prepare for problems the next day. But that day, 2nd of April, we had a semi-blizzard gusting at times to about 80 knots, so there was no way of getting to launch helicopters or anything else. 3rd of April, we'd heard the news. It was a state of emergency on the night of the 1st of April. The news from Falklands was Patrick Watt was relaying news as to what was happening in Stanley, and our communications team

Not that there were a lot of them from elsewhere. It was a brilliant day on the 3rd. Bahia Paraiso came into the harbour. The situation at King Edward Point with Keith Mills and the Royal Marines putting up as much defence as they could. The circumstances of Goriko placing herself in a dangerous position and Carl Gustav, anti-tank rockets being useful on a ship that comes far too close to you.

The eventual remedy that the Argentines had was bobbing 100mm shells on from a distance and there was no remedy for those. Keith Mills surrendered the Royal Marines before too much damage was done to the base.

And about two hours later, I did the same thing for civilians. And you and most of the other civilians were where during the heart of the battle, or at least the... Redwick in itself was the name for the whole bay and the main part of the base. King Edward Point was the scientific station. And there was the abandoned whaling station about...

a bit less than a kilometre away. Of the various buildings there, the most intact was the old Whaler's Church, which seemed an appropriate place, so that's where the Sewellians were.

Two reasons, of course, it's a shelter. And secondly, the RMs didn't want civvies when they were going to have a fight. They'd only get in the way. Yeah, I understand that. And so when you were finally taken into custody, shall we say, because I don't think really you can be described as prisoners of war, but you are obviously, you occupy some kind of middle ground. I think so. The term war wasn't used. It's a little bit like we're not supposed to say the Russians aren't saying they're having a war somewhere more recent. Ah.

So would you say you were prisoners of war? There's no question about that. No question about that. Interestingly, civilians and military were together, ourselves and the Royal Marine. Marines first aboard Valle Paraiso and second in a rather hastily constructed prison camp in Puerto Bagrano. Before you were taken off the island, your first...

with the Argentines. I mean, how did they treat you? I mean, what was your impression of them? The fellow in charge of the station remained on King Edward Point, but a fellow of the name Astiz with a rather dubious reputation, who I didn't have a clue who he was at the time, which is probably rather good, accompanied by Keith Mills and quite a lot of Argentine armed forces, the Busso Tactico, fairly efficient, some of the others,

Didn't look so. And I approached them from the church, informed of the military result, and a civilian surrender was handled. After that, the British Antarctic Survey personnel, one by one, were called out and paraded. Some of them were better at parading than others.

And we went back to the base, sitting around the empty flagpole. There's various stories about that. Would you like to elaborate at all on that? My Spanish is fairly respectable. Astiz was basically, he spoke good English. He'd learnt it in South Africa very much from the accent. And some of the military situations he'd learnt there were not inappropriate for his reputation.

I answered in Spanish because I rather thought the chaps pointing quite a lot of weapons roughly at my heart should hear that I was giving in. We carried on in a bit of a mixture of languages. But around the flagpole was interesting. The Argentines had suffered a bit and there was a fair amount of military comradeship and some of the Royal Marines were also there.

Little things like a fellow lighting up a cigarette and failing to realize he was sitting on a drum of petrol that was leaking and complications of this nature. The requests to gather some property, civilian or military, were given. We were given, civilians were given about 20 minutes to go to the cabins in the main part of the base.

and try to pack a few things. Some of us, myself included, had listened to the radio and seen what was happening and had done packing some days before. But then most persons were taken aboard by a Pariso directly. There's a couple of other things that needed to be done that the Argentines requested were done before I was one of the last to be aboard.

We did have things like radioactive chemicals and one or two other things on base that it was appropriate to let the Argentines know some of the things they had just come to acquire for several reasons. General safety was one.

And the fact that I was rather thinking that they might not be there all that long. So we didn't want too much of a mess to clear up. It's interesting you say that because talking to people in the task force who are heading down around about this time, obviously a few days later, were very much of the opinion that they felt it's probably not going to come to a shooting war. It might, you know, presumably there'll be a diplomatic settlement, but

It did seem at that stage that it was a bit far-fetched in a military sense that the British forces would be able to retake the islands, including South Georgia. Were you reasonably confident that would take place or at least some settlement would come about that would allow you to return? There was much news going around and things we heard and we were incommunicado for a lot of it.

But the idea that the Argentines would be long-term at King Edward Point seemed unlikely, especially the way they were kitted and things like that to start a war just at the beginning of an Antarctic winter isn't all that good. And knowing the instability and problems of the government, then a long-term occupation seemed unlikely. The aspect of Falklands seemed to me to be a much stronger one for any action than South Georgia.

But after all, South Georgia was the back door to the Falkland Islands. Yes, and it's interesting, isn't it, that the claim, as far as the Argentinians are concerned, was...

for South Georgia is really only directly connected to the Falkland Islands. It's almost a historical accident, really. Is that not the case? I mean, in the sense that if South Georgia had never become one of the Falkland Islands dependencies, it's unlikely that the Argentinians would have made a claim for it. That is a difficult one. And if you specialise in it, you'll get a good job in the Ministerio de Santos Extravergüenza in Buenos Aires. But

But with some of the early claims where you can construct a claim for the Falklands, for instance, the Treaty of Tauracius, when that placed the Spanish and Portuguese limits. If you take that one as a basis, as the Arge do for the Falklands, you draw your line, you suddenly find that South Georgia's Portuguese, which makes it Brazilian, and the Treaty of London would have handed that to Britain. So you can get all sorts of convolutions with ancient international law.

The fact that the UK has had a magistrate on it, administered it and made formal claims from 1908, and the Argentine Antarctic claims in 1943, and the fact that with Antarctica, including South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Britain had put a case before the International Court of Justice in 1954 to try the case between Britain and Argentina and for the Antarctic Peninsula, Chile.

and was bound in advance to accept the decision of the court, and Argentino wouldn't contest it.

does indicate that their claim might not be all that sound. Yes. OK, so the garrison and the civilians on the island of South Georgia have now been, as you say, taken into custody. They're now prisoners of war and you're heading for Argentina, I imagine, to begin with. What happens next? How long does it take you to get back to the UK? From Gryffincon, we were accommodated in cabins beneath the helicopter deck of Bayer Paraiso.

sailed to Leith Harbour, sailed on a far southerly course to Rio Grande off Tierra del Fuego, where the wounded were landed, then coasted between Falklands and Argentina when there was a lot of helicopter operations. Our ship was being used for landing aircraft on their way to the Falklands, which seems to be the Geneva Convention requiring prisoners to be out of the war zone seems to be a little different.

Then on to Puerto Vagrano, where we ended up in a hastily arranged, interesting prison camp. It was part of the area with the conscript swimming pool and all the changing rooms and areas behind that. There we were being told we were getting out mañana. We had quite a lot of mañanas. Eventually a mañana came true and there were night flights, a couple of Fokker F27s,

towards going north, we could see quite a bit of Argentina and eventually recognise the Montevideo, the old Spanish fortress floodlet in Montevideo. So there we were released, the aircraft surrounded by Uruguayan police, and when we walked through them, their weapons were still pointing at the Argentine aircraft. On to Coches, into the centre of Monte, and at the very early hours of the morning, in the Hotel Casino Carrasco, to be

Very well looked after in strange circumstances. The Uruguayans were making a comment in this that you can rely on them to be strictly neutral, and prisoners of both sides passed through Uruguay.

They have no great alliance with Argentina. From there, a couple of days, flew to Ascension and Bryce Norton. Was there any welcome for you at Bryce Norton? Rex Hunt, for example, was welcomed by various senior members of the British cabinet. But what about you and the other prisoners from South Georgia? Stuart Prignall, OCRM's, was there. Foreign Office was represented.

And if I'd have known better, I'd have come off that aircraft wearing dark glasses because of the flashbulbs. And were you were you able to talk to the press or did you, you know, did you talk to the press or was there was were there instructions really, you know, can you can you, you know, hold fire for the moment on on anything to do with what happened on South Georgia?

We were into customs and immigration and looked after fairly well from then. Transport arranged. Many of us weren't very keen on talking to anybody. By my count, it was about 30 hours since I'd been reasonably sleeping. The press then got names and details of all of the Antarctic survey personnel, and there was a little bit of what you could call, well, if you're being critical, it would be press hounding.

The RMs had a lot of other things to do, but we had many inquiries as to people, MOD and others, wanting details about the structure of buildings in various parts of South Georgia. And with a combination of the British Antarctic Survey and Scott Polar Research Institute,

we could provide a lot of useful detail quickly. So that was Bob Hedlund, a member of the British Antarctic Survey, who was actually on the island of South Georgia when it was captured. And as we've just heard, dramatic stuff, really. The so-called Battle for Gryffigan, in which he took the civilians to the church and the Royal Marines under Keith Mills battled it out. I particularly love the detail about the use of the Carl Gustav anti-aircraft,

tank grenades that were actually used against one of those two Argentinian ships and clearly did a substantial amount of damage. There's also some interesting stuff about him in captivity and his relationship with the Argentinians. But we now move on because, of course, South Georgia is in Argentine hands, as indeed is the rest of the Falkland Islands.

And the decision is taken to recapture the island first. Which all starts off quite rapidly. It's only 10 days after the

that British ships now kind of around the Ascension Island, really the halfway point between Britain and Falkland, start assembling for an operation to retake South Georgia. At its heart, there are a couple of British warships, the Plymouth and the Antrim. They've got a resupply ship with them, and they'll be joined by HMS Endurance. Now, on board are a mixed force of Marines and

and special boat service troops. And they're going to be joined, unbeknownst to them, by D Squadron of the SAS, who suddenly turn up. They've more or less gone on their own initiative, as one person puts it in a command position. They gatecrashed the operation.

So they then head south with the intention of, first of all, getting into position and then launching the operation. The diplomacy is going on the whole time, so the trigger actually hasn't been pulled on the operation yet. But they steam south at a rate of nuts and by around the 2021st of November.

They're there. The conditions are pretty, they're a long way south. The conditions are pretty appalling. Very high winds. The actual islands themselves are very much Antarctic sort of landscape of mountains and glaciers, etc. So they got their work cut out.

Yeah, and I've got an absolutely fascinating document here, Patrick, written by an SBS operator who has written an account of this early stage of the campaign. He was in this operation. It was called Operation Paraquat, interestingly enough, the recapture of South Georgia. And he writes,

During the period 14-21st April on board Antrim, brainstorming sessions were carried out utilising all the commanders and special forces teams' knowledge on what were the best options to retake South Georgia. The biggest factor that was underestimated by all concerned was the climactic and sea conditions, especially on the glaciers.

The katabatic winds on and around the glaciers ranged from 70 to 100 miles per hour, combined with a cold and wind chill. Any team deployment at that time of year would turn quickly into a survival exercise. D Squadron SAS, although advised, did not heed the advice of Guy Sheridan, the mountain leader, or the wealth of experience from the skipper of HMS Endurance and other suitably qualified individuals on their options for survival exercises.

inserting by sea or landing on the glaciers. And Patrick, it's a dramatic story, isn't it? What happens on the Fortuna Glacier? Do you want to tell us what happens next? Yeah, well, before that, I just want to say something about the kind of military activity

at large here. This is something that civilians don't really think about very much, but there's a huge amount of rivalry between units, between regiments, and often, even in quite extreme circumstances, they seem to spend a lot of time squabbling in turf wars rather than getting on with fighting the enemy. We see a bit of that here because...

The initial plan is that it should be in the hands of Guy Sheridan, the Marine commander. This is someone who knows a hell of a lot about Arctic conditions. He's a great mountaineer. He's been on endless exercises in Norway, as have all the Marines, how to cope in these conditions. They've got the right kit. They've got the right attitude. They've got all the know-how. However, the plan is sort of hijacked by the SAS commander, one Cedric Delves.

who decides that they're going to go ashore and land on this glacier, the Fortuna Glacier, in order to carry out an initial recce of the Argentinian positions on that part of the island. Now, Sheridan is bitterly opposed to this, but he's overruled. And off the SAS go in these Wessex helicopters, which then have to fly in, in practically white-out conditions, dump them on the island,

on the glacier and then return. Now, after about 12 hours ashore, these plaintive messages start coming through from the SAS saying, it's hell out here, please can you get us off? Not really what one associates with the SAS or with their propaganda anyway. So Wessexers have to return

to try and pick them up, which they successfully initially, it seems they do, but then flying off, two of them crash and they're lost forever. They're lost to the task force, which is a huge gap in the logistics because there's very little helicopter lift. Anyway, ultimately, a third Wessex goes back, manages to pick up. No one's hurt, thank God.

pick up the survivors and the crews of the crashed Wessexes and massively overloaded take off. It requires a huge gust of 80 mile an hour wind to actually get them airborne and they stagger back to the ships.

and a huge potential disaster is averted. Yeah, I mean, and interestingly enough, Thatcher in her memoirs notes that she receives information that those first two helicopters have gone down. And this is a real key moment in the campaign because they're expecting disaster. They're anticipating not only the loss of those helicopters, but also all the men that were on board them. So when they hear shortly after that actually a third helicopter has managed to get everybody off

and the operation to recover South Georgia is still on, they breathe a sigh of relief. And this could have been a real hinge moment in the campaign. Yeah, it's not the SAS's finest hour, and there are more blunders lying ahead. We'll just tell you the next one briefly, which is when, after this, they decided to go ashore by rigid radar, by these kind of, you know, landing craft with outdoor motors attached. Two or three of the boats, the engines fail...

And they sort of find themselves drifting out to sea. One of them gets ashore, but another is sort of just carried off into next stop South Australia.

Well, it doesn't quite get there, as we will relate in a moment, but they're definitely missing for a few days. And of course, there's concern that everyone on board that inflatable three operators are going to lose their lives. But the turning point effectively is a bit of luck, really, because on the morning of the 25th,

They pick up radar signals that a submarine is in the vicinity, an Argentine submarine. An Argentine submarine turns out to be the Santa Fe. And they launch attack helicopters to take it out. And that attack is very successful. It doesn't sink it, but it forces it back into the harbor of Gryffindor.

where it's effectively scuttled by its crew. And it should also be mentioned that Santa Fe has literally dropped off more men for the Argentine garrison. So there are now more people on shore to defend the island. But it's also in the wake of the success against Santa Fe that the decision is taken that the Royal Navy vessels can now move closer in and not worry about any counter-strike, bombard the shore, while at the same time they're going to insert...

team of soldiers. In fact, it's a mixture of soldiers from the SBS, the SAS, but most importantly, led by that the hero, frankly, of the Guy Sheridan to try and force the Gryffindor Argentine garrison to surrender. Yeah, so it's really the kind of demonstration of naval gunfire, I think, that changes the psychological equation. The Argentinians are

among them one Arturo Astiz who is actually already notorious to the world as being a torturer and murderer a commander of the death squads waging the dirty war he's actually in a command position there and he's told his troops that this is a test of Argentinian honour they're going to fight to the last drop of blood when it comes to it though he comes out with his hands up the white flag is run up literally

And he's off signing a total surrender document. So great game set match really to the Brits there, but not without a lot of potential moments for disaster. Fortunately, everyone came home alive, including the errant SAS boat team. They were, as you say, they were an inflatable Gemini, not a rigid ranger, as I said earlier.

So this is the moment for a bit of political triumphalism. Yeah, I mean, back in London, we've recaptured South Georgia and we haven't lost a single man. And it's a tremendous political pick-me-up for Thatcher. She says famously to a team of reporters who are asking her, rejoice, rejoice, when she announces or she and John Nott announce the recapture of South Georgia.

But interestingly, there's a tiny bit of hubris, I think, from the commander of the task force, the naval commander, that is, Sandy Woodward, who gives a very rare interview after hearing the news to a reporter on his flagship HMS Hermes. And he says South Georgia was the appetizer. Now, this is the heavy punch coming up behind.

My battle group is properly formed and ready to strike. This is the run-up to the big match, which in my view should be a walkover. Well, there were words that I think you may have come to regret slightly because on the horizon are looming two huge events which completely change the atmospherics of the war. Triumphalism gives way to trepidation. We'll hear all about those in the next episode. Please join us. Goodbye. Goodbye.