The likelihood of Phase Two - with Amit Segal
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At the end of the day, the end of the conflict, like we used to call it in the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, the end of the war cannot be agreed because Hamas would never agree to be expelled from Gaza and Netanyahu would never, ever, whatsoever agree to end the war.

It is 2.30 p.m. on Sunday, February 23rd here in New York City. It is 9.30 p.m. on Sunday, February 23rd in Israel as phase one of the hostage deal enters its last week. And as Israelis expect the return of four bodies, deceased hostages to be released on Thursday of this coming week. And as the fate of phase two of this deal remains uncertain.

Following Hamas's breach of the agreement earlier this week with the transfer of a Palestinian body in place of the body of the late Sheri Bebas, and after Hamas's psychological torture of two hostages, forcing them to watch the release of other hostages, watching the quote-unquote ceremonies, Israel halted the return of more than 600 terrorists who were supposed to be released from Israeli prisons yesterday.

The prime minister's office said that the decision was made due to, quote, Hamas's repeated violations, including the ceremonies that demean the dignity of our hostages, close quote. The largest stakeholders in this deal, Israel, Hamas, the United States, and a number of Arab countries in the region, especially in the Sunni Gulf and Egypt, have all been sending out different signals, none of which appear to be totally synced up with one another.

With us today to help us get through some of the fog and perhaps offer some clarity around the intentions of these different players is senior political analyst for Channel 12, Amit Segel. Amit, welcome back.

Thanks, Dan. Thanks for hosting me. Good to be with you. I mean, virtually this time. We were in Europe last time, which was a more fun way to be together, but here we are. We are nearing a real fork in the road where a decision needs to be made on whether to resume the war or continue to the next phase of the deal. Before we dive in, I just want to evaluate where the different stakeholders are and what they've been signaling about their intentions. So let's start with Hamas and Hamas's intentions. On the one hand, they're

They are producing these reality horror shows over the past month where they're clearly poking Israelis and Israeli society, which is provoking understandable rage among Israelis to just go finish off Hamas and resume the war and forget about phase two. On the other hand, in these propaganda videos they're releasing, like the one they just did in the last 24 hours,

They have these Israelis, these two Israeli hostages, begging to get them home, which means go to the next phase of the deal. And they're trying to use these Israelis as pawns to get the rest of the deal done. But those two approaches seem paradoxical. On the one hand, they're enraging Israelis. On the other hand, they're doing things that I think

They believe, Hamas believes, will incentivize Israel to go to phase two of the deal. When I was a member of B'nai Akiva youth movement some 30 years ago, you can't just watch a film during summertime. So you are always asked or lectured what the message is. What is the message of, I don't know, Die Hard 3? No.

Now, here's the thing about... A lot of deep messages in Die Hard 3. Exactly. But we'll do a separate episode on that. Yes. But when we watch this weekly hour show, ran on televisions every Saturday from the ruins of Gaza, we should ask ourselves, what is the message which is so important for Hamas to convey? And I think it's a twofold message. One, it's...

is to show how strong they are. And in this respect, let me question how strong they are, because, okay, so they have, they assembled 200 terrorists with Kalashnikov rifles. By the way, I see that they put masks on their face, which signals that they are afraid of the IDF. In the past, they would have shown their faces. And the second more important message is as follows.

is that the only way to bring Israeli hostages back is by deals, that war would prevent hostages from coming back. So what I understand is that Hamas is horrified by the option that Israel would return to war. Now, here's the thing. Yes, it works on the Israeli public. Yes, the images of sort of Holocaust survivors coming back from Gaza are,

50 pounds less than they used to be before they were captured shows or proved to Israelis, according to Charles 12th's poll last week, that they want to bring back all the hostages, even at the cost of ending the war and putting Hamas as a governing organization in Gaza. But...

I beg to differ on this decisive decision of the Israeli public, because a question later, when Israelis are asked, what do you think about the Trump plan to evacuate not only Hamas, but every single Gazan from Gaza Strip? So you have 70% support versus 20% who oppose it. So my interpretation is that Israelis want the hostages first,

and then to resume the war as soon, as fast, as conclusive, and as winningful as possible. But they want the hostages first. But what about Hamas? Hamas wants to use the strategic asset of Israeli live hostages...

which are, give or take, not 63, but 22, 22 live Israeli hostages, that's the number to remember at the end of phase one, as a weapon, as a currency in return to which he'll be able to stay in power in Gaza. Now, Israelis are not, I mean, 90% of Israelis agree that we must defeat Hamas in the battlefield. But the only question is when.

30% want to do it now, say, we must act now because Hamas are not to be cheated and they will have international guarantees. And if you bring back all the hostages, you will have to respect the conditions agreed upon. And the other 65% say, no.

Yes, we will cheat them, we'll get back all the hostages or 95% of the hostages and then we'll find an excuse. Once the first tunnel is built, once the first rocket is assembled, we will defeat Hamas.

This is the debate in the Israeli public. It's a tactical one. It's a bitter debate, but a tactical one. It's not ideological. I mean, that is interesting in that it's just another reminder of how the totality of the Israeli public has more or less shifted right. Right. To varying degrees, because you're basically saying they're all of the view that there's no coexistence with Hamas, a remnant of Hamas. Exactly. A placeholder for Hamas. It's just a matter of how you wipe them out.

I want to talk about the Arab countries in the region. This past Friday, the leaders of seven of those Arab nations, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, gathered in Riyadh in an effort to try to hash out a plan for the future of Gaza, which was in response to Trump's proposal for the U.S. to, quote, take over Gaza and remove its residents from the Gaza Strip.

And even if there have been various twists on the U.S. takeover of Gaza, this idea of moving the Palestinian population either out of Gaza or farther away from the Israeli border with Gaza, that entire position, it seems to me, has been getting more and more

much more purchase in every corner I speak to, among Israelis, among American officials. So is the Arab response a serious effort to the Trump proposal? - It's an effort to take it off the table, but to be honest, it's the same commodity all over again. What is the logic behind Trump's initiative? Trump looks at the territories. It's not only about real estate, by the way. This is his way to deliver it to the public.

But the real idea behind it is that if you live in New York or in Jerusalem or in Jakarta or Amman, you as a community, as a country, as a city, as a person have to fund yourself. You have to work in order to get money, in order to make a living. But if you live in Gaza, for many, many years...

It goes as such. The international community, the Arab community, pays for your cost of living. You don't really work. The real unemployment rate in Gaza is 75 to 90 percent. Even those who are employed, they're employed in fake business, in the alleged government fake business. The Arab world pays for them. The international community is through UNRWA. But...

The vast majority of the budget goes to terror, to weapons, to tunnels. So Trump says there is no point in actually creating yet another Marshall Plan for Gaza because unlike Europe, this money of the current Marshall Plan or Sisi Plan or King Abdullah's Plan would go to build another terrorist monster. It's not only about explosives.

Even cement is used to buy tunnels. So you can't differentiate. So Trump says, I heard those ideas, but it won't help me. And so far, we haven't heard from the Arab world something which is utterly different from what we've seen again and again over the last 30, 40 years.

Earlier today, Amit, we heard Steve Witkoff, who's President Trump's Middle East envoy, say in an interview with CNN that, I'm quoting here, we expect phase two of the deal to move forward. Right. Just like that. And he declared it just that matter of factly. And he will be coming to the region, he said in the interview, this Wednesday to hash out details, negotiate negotiations.

And at the same time, in the same interview, he also said, and I quote here, Hamas certainly cannot be part of the government in Gaza, close quote. Exactly. So square those two because Hamas thinks, as I think you alluded to earlier, that it can do two things, that it can keep negotiating and keep some kind of ceasefire ongoing and I guess continue to return hostages, maybe not all of them, but continue to return hostages.

and stay in power, even though Israel and the U.S. are now saying very clearly there's no way Hamas can stay in power. Exactly. So when Witkoff says we want phase two, but we want Hamas not to be there. So it means that you cannot reach an agreement as long as Hamas refuses to evacuate itself from Gaza Strip. And since we all agree that Hamas won't do it...

So I think what Witkoff really means is not phase two, but phase A.2, which means prolonging the deal for yet another week. Now, here's the number that I repeat for the second time, because this is the most important number, 22 live Israeli hostages.

Hamas, just to give perspective, 62% of all the Israeli hostages from the beginning, from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, were kidnapped by Hamas during 8 a.m. and 11 a.m. on October 7th, 2023.

Hamas kidnapped so many Israelis, children, women, soldiers, that he has a lot, a lot to bargain with. Now he has 22.

Even if he releases, let's say, three a week, for yet another three weeks, he still has 13 living hostages as an asset. Which means that if he puts them in three, four different tunnels, it is far from the reach of the Israeli military operation units.

So he still has the term hostages. And it doesn't matter if he has 13 or 9 or 251. So in my opinion, what Witkoff really wants is to prolong the deal for yet another two, three, maybe even four weeks. And then Israel would return to war with less hostages.

Amit, the Israeli government has been signaling, and I do want to distinguish between the signal and the noise here, but just looking at the signaling, the Israeli government has been signaling a strong willingness to resume the war at the end of phase one, and maybe even before that. What is your read of Netanyahu's intentions as it relates to resumption of the war? I think Netanyahu sees those two aims of the war differently.

Not as binary ones, but on an axis, which means that you can defeat Hamas 100%, 90%, 80%, or let's say 50% like it is now. Gaza is in ruins. Hamas' rocket units do not exist anymore, etc. And the same applies for the hostages. Now, there is something very important that we have to bear in mind. If someone thinks...

that Hamas would just give the last hostage, would bring back every single hostage, dead or alive.

and then it will remain in Gaza with no hostages, in ruins with two million refugees. In my opinion, he doesn't live in the Middle East. They will find an excuse. Just try to remember what happened on this Friday when Hamas released the alleged body of Shiri Bibas, the innocent mother of Ariel and Kfir.

And then at night, at the dead of the night, I got a phone call from someone in the Ministry of Health who told me it's a nightmare. It's not Shiree Bibas. Our workers dealt with the bones of anonymous Gazan female. Now, I suspect that it wasn't a mistake.

It was in purpose. They wanted Israel, or they hoped Israel wouldn't recognize that it is not Shiree Bibas. And then, a few years later, they will claim, we have Shiree Bibas. And the same applies for hostages. They will claim, we don't find, I don't know, two soldiers. We don't find the bodies of 12 Israeli hostages. And they will always have enough hostages in order to prevent Israel from returning to the war.

So that's why Prime Minister Netanyahu will come no matter how many concessions he would be willing to make at the end of the process, be it in March or in May or next year. He'll find himself in a dilemma like any other prime minister to return to Gaza even when there are hostages there.

Okay, but Amit, what you're saying is that there never will be an end to this process we're in right now. In my opinion, no. Right. So then the question becomes, does Prime Minister Netanyahu just do what you said, which is go back to war and just like leave this current phase unresolved or, you know, sort of not closed?

Or does he go before the public and basically say what you just said? One of the things I've been struck by during this entire war is that the prime minister has never, I mean, again, I'll leave it to him to make these decisions, but to go before the public and say what you just said, this is the reality. There is no way Hamas is giving back all of our hostages. Right. So you're basically saying it's a false hope to think that all the hostages will get back. So in light of that, the only thing we can do is finish off Hamas. I mean,

That would be a pretty stark thing for the prime minister to say. That is, you're basically saying, is your analysis of what's going on. It sounds to me that's probably analysis of a lot of people in the government. So that to me is not the difficult question. The difficult question is, does anyone ever say this quiet part out loud? When I say anyone, not Amit Segel, but I mean senior government officials. No, but Netanyahu made no precedent in not saying this. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert initiated Second Lebanon War in 2006, which

promising not to end the war prior to bringing back the then two kidnapped soldiers, Goldwasser and Regev. And he never fulfilled his pledge during the war, only two years later. And Prime Minister Netanyahu promised the same in a 2014 military operation that ended up without two bodies of kidnapped soldiers, Goldin and Shaul. And the same applies here. No one can actually say it out loud. But what I think,

that Netanyahu's policy in this non-binary world of hostages, yes or no, is to shrink this devastating problem, this problem that prevents Israelis from smiling. You know that these days in Israel, since October 7th,

You no longer ask Israelis, what's up? Manishma? And they say, achla, sababa? Yeah, but it means everything's cool. Everything's fine. Everything is cool. Yeah. So no one says this. You say everything is fine, considering the circumstances. Everyone has his own way to say it. And it's not only because October 7th. It's because the hostages. Every time, every Israeli...

has a birthday, eating a cake, dying in a restaurant, watching a movie, every single Israeli thinks there are hostages in Gaza that can't do it. By the way, Amit, I just, on that note, I wasn't going to read this, but I will. My sister, Wendy Singer, who lives in Jerusalem, I think lives near you, she WhatsAppped me on Friday morning. She was doing Shabbat shopping, which is common for Israelis, all the hustle-bustle on Friday afternoons of Israelis running around shopping before Shabbat comes in. And

And I had called her and she didn't answer. So she WhatsApp me saying, morning errands just now. That's why I missed your call. The usual cheery din of Friday morning in every little store. Today, it was silent. The butcher, the green grocer, the bakery, the McCulloch, which is what, like the grocery store. Total silence. Wordless transactions with the cashier.

So what she was basically saying is normally it's all this, you know, shopping and Shabbat Shalom and, you know, have a good Shabbat. And everyone was just going through their routine on Friday, silent. Yeah.

And I think you're saying it wasn't just this Friday. This Friday was probably particularly hard because of the Sherry Bebos news, but you extrapolate that out. As long as there are hostages, people are living in this world of silence. But then those specific hostages, because unlike the kidnapping of soldiers in 2006, 2000, et cetera, this time it's citizens. Meaning it wasn't soldiers. They're just innocent women and children. The quintessence of civilians.

Yes, and that's why you feel they were not on a mission, most of them. They just lived their lives. And all of a sudden they were kidnapped from their beds. So what Netanyahu, in my opinion, is trying to do is to shrink this problem to a level in which he can in the future bargain for it or something like this. That's why in contradiction to the accusations made against him and his cabinet,

He actually signed a deal that his base detests. Just try to listen to the right-wing radio stations, to the right-wing TV channel, Channel 14, what they say about this deal. All hell broke loose for him in some shows.

And just think that Trump gave him the ultimate excuse last Friday when he said that he supports unleashing hell on Gaza if all the hostages are not returned. And Netanyahu kept on with the deal. And then came the Bibas family tragedy. And there is a rage that I can't explain enough.

I've never seen in Israel. And yet Netanyahu kept on with the deal. So I think he paid his down payment to show he's serious in this deal. And he will try to prolong it as soon as possible without cessation.

saying that the war is over. This is the most important thing. At the end of the day, the end of the conflict, like we used to call it in the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, the end of the war cannot be agreed because Hamas would never agree to be expelled from Gaza and Netanyahu would never, ever, whatsoever agree to end the war. I want to ask you a difficult question.

The debate inside Israel over the, quote, value of the hostages has been at times extremely harsh, at least to me, watching from the outside. Obviously, since October 7th, I've never seen a debate about what to do about hostages or in the case of Gilad Shalit, which was the only real debate I watched as an outsider closely.

which was about one hostage. Now this is what to do about many hostages. But as you mentioned, these are citizens, not soldiers. I think that's why the Biba story hit so hard because they really were just innocent children and a mother versus soldiers who, when they go serve, and even though they don't really have a choice on serving, they take on risk and they know they're taking on the risk and their families know they're taking risk. And they may be thinking they're risking making the ultimate sacrifice for the greater good of Israel.

But where do you come down on the, I guess, the morality for citizens inside Israel to be debating whether their fellow citizens should be sacrificed for the greater good? You know, in a sense, like I said, soldiers, when they go serve in the IDF, particularly those in the combat positions, they know what they're getting into. I don't, I'm not speaking for all of them, but I'm just, I speak to a lot of them and there is that sense. But the idea that there's this debate inside Israel about what to do about

You know, suppose the B-bosses were alive, that there's a debate in Israel among civilians about what to do with innocent civilians like the B-bosses, you know, whether or not they should be sacrificed for the greater good. I don't think there is a debate in Israel between those who want the hostages back or not. There is a debate about where the danger is bigger.

One side says, yes, those are hostages. They are right now in the tunnels of Hamas in Gaza. We can't kill them. We can't let them be killed.

for improving the theoretical security of Israel. And the other side claims that history shows something which is undoubtable, that every time that you release murderers in exchange for Israeli hostages, you do two things. One, you increase dramatically the level of terror, be it in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon.

And second, you signal to all your evil neighbors that it pays to kidnap Israelis. So the outcome is more Israelis kidnapped, more Israelis killed. And that's the debate. Now, how do you manage? I think it's more about philosophy.

How do you weigh, how do you measure those two things? The real people in Gaza and the future people who do not know, and some of them, I guess, are in protests these days to release those hostages. Did we know about the Bibas when we released more than a thousand terrorists in 2011, including Yechir Sinoir?

No, we didn't know them. We didn't know Libby, the Leshem Gonen family, and we didn't know any other. And we didn't know Idan Alexander, the American-Israeli citizen, etc. So this is the debate in Israel these days. That is a very rational argument and analysis. We had Mati Friedman on recently, and he said, I'm not sure he said on our podcast, but he's been saying that

We are trying to get the hostages out, and yet we know because of some of the Palestinian terrorists we released from prisons, to get these hostages back will kill more Israelis. You know, it's the role of the government, I think, to consider all these scenarios. But governments can't do it. I mean, Western governments, and specifically Israeli governments of the Jewish state, can't really have this debate about,

only from a security perspective. Because if you work according to the textbook, you shouldn't speak to families. Those are the recommendations of a special secret report by the former president of the Supreme Court 15 years ago. You should not give more than, I think, nine terrorists in exchange for one Israeli citizen or soldier. And none of this was even written in the books of law. Because...

We live in Israel. We live in a country where everybody knows everybody else.

And there is no chance that the prime minister can take those decisions when the families of the hostages give interviews on a daily basis, when they storm the streets, when people know someone from the army, from the party, from living in the same neighborhood. So we can discuss those theoretical fundamentals and principles, but in fact it never works. So in reality, civilians are going to be drawn into the conversation. It will never just be the government.

Exactly. Okay. One question Israelis are asking their government, or I think some Israelis are asking the government, is if the war resumes, what can the IDF actually achieve that it hasn't managed to achieve in 16 months of war fighting? How do you answer that question?

So I paid a visit to one of the headquarters of the army for a three-hour seminar specifically to discuss those details. Because I think people are not only in the Israeli public, by and large, for the hostage deal, but they are quite tired of waking up at 6 a.m. in the morning to the daily announcements by the IDF spokesperson about yet another soldier that died in battle.

So what would change? And I think there are four things. First, the Israeli army is way stronger than it first invaded Gaza in October 2023. And Hamas is way weaker because Hamas is no longer rockets. It lost 20,000 trained terrorists. Yes, they recruit terrorists, but the average age, for your knowledge, is 16 and six months.

This is the average age of the new recruits for Hamas. They no longer have rockets. They no longer have 90% of the strategic tunnels that they used to have.

And they no longer have the knowledge, the assurance that they will always have humanitarian aid that would be sold in the markets of Gaza and the money will go to Hamas pockets. Because we have a promise, a pledge from the Trump administration that Israel can distribute it. I'll give you an example, okay? During the first negotiations, Hamas demanded the release of terrorists from Israeli prison. Nowadays...

What's most important to Hamas is caravans for families and D9s to actually take over the garbage, the ruins, etc. Which means that Hamas is terribly worried from the response of the civilian population in Gaza. Which means that if Israel re-invades northern Gaza, thus evacuating yet another half a million Gazans there,

I'm not sure that, I don't know, even from a psychological perspective, that they will stand another evacuation, another deportation. And that's why I believe that this round of four will be more important, will be more successful. And one last thing. During the last 16 months,

Israel had to designate a lot of its forces to the northern border because there was a war against Hezbollah. It's not the situation. It's no longer the situation. So you can actually invade Gaza from two, three, four areas simultaneously. That's why I think the next phase of the war would be different.

Amit, before we wrap, I just want to ask very directly, until, you know, since the early days of the war, it's been pointed out time and again that there is this inherent conflict between the two major war objectives, destroy Hamas and return all the hostages.

And I think until now, it's been very, you could argue it either way. It's been, it's a debatable proposition. But at this point, as the government has to decide between seeing the hostage deal through the next phase, extending the ceasefire or resuming the war, have we arrived at a juncture where those two objectives are just indisputably completely at odds with one another?

They're not completely at odds. Let's take it from a statistical point of view. 80% of the hostages are in Israel. I would say 50-60% of the power of Hamas has been eliminated. So you can achieve both of them, but not 100%.

I think at the end of the day, in a year from now, either Hamas is not there and 90% of the hostages are back home, or 100% of the hostages are back home, almost 100, 95% are back home, and only 70% of the power of Hamas is taken from him. That's the thing. But I think there is one most important lesson to be learned from what we saw. You quoted your sister about the saddest Friday in Jerusalem since October 7th.

Now, there is a thing. People define it as a heinous murder, right?

We keep hearing it, but it assumes that there is a murder which is not heinous, that there is a regular murder, something that Hamas can get away with it. And this was the case. I don't know how many people are aware of the fact that 250 Israelis were murdered from rockets from Hamas or Hezbollah over the last 20 years. 250. But people got away with it.

because we got used to the idea that this is how the world works. They fire at us, we response or vice versa, and we got away with it. Every once in a while, there was a heinous murder. In 2011, two terrorists stabbed to death five from the Fogel family, including a four-month-old baby.

So we were shocked for a few weeks, and he just went. Shalevet passed, the baby was murdered 22 years ago in Hebron from a sniper. He saw her, and yet he shot her. So we were shocked for three days, and we forgot.

I think the lesson from us, from this thing, is that there is every murder is heinous. And we must put an end to the culture of death that flourish one mile from our borders. We can no longer live with this culture. And the problem is, like in 1992 Clinton campaign, it's the education, stupid. As long as they are educated...

that every Jew is a future soldier and he should be killed with bare hands, like Phil and Ariel Bibas. As long as it happens, there won't be a peace in the Middle East. And that's why once we end this war, be it the Trump plan or something else, the education system must be changed in Gaza.

in Judea and Samaria, in the Palestinian Authority, because the situation these days is that President Abbas, the alleged moderate leader, never really condemned the October 7th massacre. And that's why we must, and of course, never condemn the murder of the Bibas family. If we don't change the education system, and if we don't take over the way Palestinians are educated, we'll find October 7th again and again and again in the future to come.

all right a meat on that optimistic note yeah dreary dreary note uh thank you again i know it's late there in israel so uh appreciate you coming on as always and i will look forward to being with you soon thank you so much good night

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