Southeast Asia and the South China Sea
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From Carnegie China, this is China in the World. Engaging leading scholars and former policymakers on China's foreign policy, evolving global role, and relations with Southeast Asia in particular. Brought to you by the East Asia-based Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Hi, welcome to this special five-episode series of the China and the World podcast from Carnegie China. We're looking at Southeast Asian perspectives on the People's Republic of China with Southeast Asian voices from Southeast Asia.

My name's Ian Chong. I'm a non-resident scholar with Carnegie China and an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. In this episode, we will be looking at that flashpoint involving China and a whole number of Southeast Asian states, as well as other interested parties, the South China Sea.

I have with me Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby from De La Salle University in the Philippines, and also a fellow non-resident scholar at Carnegie China. Charmaine specializes in maritime security issues in Southeast Asia. My other guest is Shanantira Nathalang, who is with Thammasat University in Thailand. She works on security issues and the international politics of Southeast Asia. Shanantira also goes by Neen, which you'll hear me use throughout this podcast.

Okay, so I guess without much further ado, let's get started. I'd like to throw out a question for both our attendees today, which is, you know, how do you see the role that the People's Republic of China is playing in the South China Sea, especially as it pursues its claims? What sort of impact do you think this has on Southeast Asia? So, yeah.

Karine, would you like to start? Sure. Thanks, Ian. It's so good to be back here in the podcast and to contribute to Carnegie China again. The role that China seems to be playing in the South China Sea appears to be very much driven by the actions of Xi Jinping and the CCP itself.

So on one hand, it's understandable that it's pursuing what it is currently pursuing in the South China Sea because it is part of their national interest. However, where it gets a little bit more problematic is when those claims that China is making in the South China Sea contrasts with the claims of other countries in the region.

So this is where it gets a lot tricky, not just a little tricky, but a lot tricky because of the contestations that are at play in these waters. Great. And Ni? Yeah, thanks, Ian, for the question. So just to add on to what Charmaine has been saying,

kind of like outlining about China's role in the region. I must say that we don't have a common view on China, especially in regards to the South China Seas. So some may see that China is aggressively expanding its presence in the South China Seas. But however, the non-claimant states, especially in mainland Southeast Asia, with the exception of Vietnam, of course. So Vietnam is in a very unique position where it's...

It's involved in both the South China Seas, but also contestation and problems in the Mekong sub-region. So because China is located upstream, so it's been building dams and all that, it's been controlling the flow of the river, and that affects food security, livelihood, so on and so forth. So we're involved in a different type of conflict. So in a way, we...

We decided to overlook China's actions in the South China Sea, not to impede our relations with China.

Right. That's a really fascinating thing, I think. Sometimes observers forget that Southeast Asia is a big and highly diverse place. Just so that we're on the same page. Charmaine, coming from Maritime Southeast Asia, how do you think Maritime Southeast Asian states look at the mainland issues such as the Mekong? And how do you think they relate those issues to their own questionnaires?

questions about the maritime order in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. Well, for a country like the Philippines, front and center in our perspective is the West Philippine Sea, the South China Sea. To the extent that issues like the Mekong reach into our consciousness, so to speak, it's not really very much apparent because of the gravity and the

the extent to which the West Philippine Sea, South China Sea issue is on the agenda.

I should mention that earlier today, the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, just concluded his annual State of the Nation address. And he did mention that the West Philippine Sea is still on the agenda of the Philippines. I should quote that he mentioned, you know, the Philippines cannot yield, the Philippines cannot waver on this issue.

So in that sense, you know, when it comes to maritime security, it is really just the West Philippine Sea, the South China Sea issue. Of course, this is not, you know, from a scholar's perspective, this is not the only maritime issue out there. There are other tangential issues. But insofar as the Philippines' official narrative is concerned, what really matters is the West Philippine Sea, South China Sea issue. Thanks. Just...

to sort of show you how wide the range of views are. On the nomenclature, there's the West Philippine Sea, which, you know, extends out from the Philippines. It's not the entirety of the South China Sea. And then our Vietnamese friends call the part that extends out from the Vietnamese coast the East Sea. So you might hear these different kinds of terminologies. Just very briefly too, Charmaine. So there was a very recent announcement of a temporary arrangement between the Philippines and

and the PRC to deal with the management of their differences. Just clue us in, listen us in to what's going on. Sure. So in the middle of June last month, there was another very intense incident or situation that happened in the West Philippine Sea.

the Philippine Navy was trying to do its routine resupply mission to one of our ships, the BRP Sierra Madre, out in Ayungin Shoal or Second Tomah Shoal. But there was an incident involving the Chinese Coast Guard. And

And as a result of that, during the bilateral consultation mechanism between the Philippines and China, which was held in early July, there is now a provisional arrangement to de-escalate tensions. And one of the mechanisms that the two countries identified was the hotline.

um where the two leaders can call each other in times of crisis so that's the background thanks um and do you think anybody's gonna pick up i mean the japanese have a hotline and they've complained that the prc side hasn't been picking up when they try to call that's the problem actually and that's that's the issue having a hotline is one thing but um

it's another if nobody picks up when a crisis hits. So hopefully, you know, the hotline will definitely be used in times of crisis. But I think, you know, a positive twist to this is that at least we can say that the two countries are talking.

that the communications are open and there's commitment from both sides that there needs to be a de-escalation of the tensions that are happening out there in the waters. Great. So I'm going to bring our conversation back a little bit because we've been talking about the diversity in Southeast Asia. Now, it seems that, you know, given the differences in positions, you know,

Southeast Asia and ASEAN, the regional organization, you know, doesn't really quite have a position. What do you think the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea are doing to the region, to regional cooperation? Any thoughts? Neen, perhaps you could start. Okay, yeah. So,

So definitely it's affecting ASEAN centrality, ASEAN credibility as well. Well, let's start with ASEAN centrality. I mean, because there's so many...

tensions. So we've got the South China Seas, we've also got Mekong. We're not on the same page, we meaning like 10 ASEAN member states are not on the same page with either. So I think that's something crucial and that's something that we need to really work on. And in comparison, well, ASEAN has taken quite a bit of a role in the South China Seas.

with negotiations and

in a way, it must be commended for kind of like continuously having this on the agenda. But it's not the same with the Mekong. And it was only until like 2020 when Vietnam was chair of ASEAN and that's when it kind of like revitalized this issue and brought it back on the agenda. But it hasn't received the same attention. So definitely that's affecting Vietnam

unity within ASEAN affects ASEAN centrality but also credibility because ASEAN doesn't have that strong stance it doesn't it hasn't

played a strong enough role in support of its member states, for example, the Philippines. So we need more of that, I think. Okay, I'm going to, since you opened the Pandora's box, I'm going to throw something in there. Can you explain to listeners who might not know what ASEAN centrality is, or perhaps it's not?

or ASEAN in the driver's seat. You see these terms getting thrown around quite a bit, but often there's a lot of ambiguity surrounding them. ASEAN centrality for me would be kind of like ASEAN taking the central role in kind of like managing this conflict. I think...

it's widely accepted that it cannot be easily resolved and probably perhaps not resolved, but we can manage it and contain it. So if ASEAN can keep this leading role, that would kind of like maintain ASEAN's centrality in this issue. So that's a great point to raise. I mean,

We've talked about ASEAN wanting to have a leading role, but it's really difficult to have a leading role where there's very little agreement on what exactly to do. And this is especially important for an organization that works in consensus.

What do you think, Charmaine? Can you weigh in on ASEAN centrality and what it may have to do with managing the South China Sea and other crises in the region? The concept of ASEAN centrality is really central to the ASEAN as an organization. But when it was created in 1967,

There were less than 10 members and the issues that they were dealing with did not have the same range as the issues that we are dealing with today.

And as Neen rightly pointed out, it's very difficult for ASEAN to maintain its centrality, considering all the issues that we're dealing with and the lack of consensus from all the member states.

So instead of harping on ASEAN centrality, maybe ASEAN itself needs to evolve and start looking at perhaps mini-lateral arrangements where these are arrangements that do not really require all 10 member states to agree on something.

That's one way where we can see the direction of ASEAN going. Instead of the entirety of the 10 member states agreeing on something, then maybe we can focus on functional arrangements or thematic arrangements, let's say, how to deal with human trafficking.

or how to deal with biodiversity, protecting the environment, climate change, and all that. All of these, of course, are issues that concern the ASEAN 10, but it's easier to find solutions to these, specific solutions to these problems when there are less members, lesser number of states that are focused on it. Right, but that's...

That's in tension with the idea of ASEAN centrality and ASEAN working together. What I'd like to bring our conversation back to then is to talk a little bit about what both Nin and Charmaine see as the greatest risks involved that may involve the South China Sea. Where do you think things could sort of unravel? Where do you think things could escalate? Accidental confrontation. I think that's one.

I don't know, you two might disagree with me, but I don't think anyone wants outright war. But there is always that risk of accidents and accidental confrontation, especially when there's militarization left, right and center. So definitely, I think that's the biggest risk at the moment. I agree with Neen and it's

What you said reminds me of what President Marcos said during the Shangri-La Dialogue. During the Q&A in the Shangri-La Dialogue, President Marcos was asked, "What are the Philippines' red lines? What would trigger the mutual defense treaty with the United States?" And President Marcos said that, "Well, if somebody dies, then that would definitely trigger the mutual defense treaty because that is a direct assault on the Philippines."

But if death is the red line, then that means that there are still so many things, you know, gray zone tactics that can be done before reaching that particular level or that red line. And with, you know, between now and when somebody and if somebody dies, there are so many accidents that can happen.

And I think that's, you know, if I can circle back to the provisional arrangement between the Philippines and China about a hotline, that's where that can become useful.

But like I said earlier, you know, having a hotline is one thing, but if nobody picks up when a crisis happens, then that's another thing altogether. Right. And so with the differences on the South China Sea, I wonder if you also see that the ongoing dispute, the way that Beijing sometimes tries to peel ASEAN members off on a particular issue, such as on statements, I mean, most notably in 2012, Cambodia blocked a statement on

that involved discussion about the South China Sea. I mean, do you see the dispute as posing a risk to ASEAN as an organization? And also, when we look at the PRC's response to the arbitral tribunal ruling, they seem to really disregard UNCLOS. I mean, is there some sort of risk for international order and also rule of law internationally as well? Well, yes, there are definitely risks.

First and foremost, because it highlights the non-centrality of ASEAN. An argument can be made that, well, at least negotiations are still ongoing in the Code of Conduct.

Many observers, analysts, and scholars would argue that sure, the negotiations are stalled, but negotiations are ongoing. So we can claim that we are still talking in terms of concluding or reaching the code of conduct. But other scholars would also argue that the COC is actually dead on the water.

We can keep on talking about it, but it doesn't really solve a lot of the issues that are cropping up, such as it doesn't really solve the contestation between the Philippines and Vietnam, for instance. So it may simply be a code or an agreement for the sake of having an agreement.

Thank you.

All right, so for listeners who don't know, can either of you quickly fill us in on what the Code of Conduct negotiations are about, what the Code of Conduct is about, and also what the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties, the DOC, is about? I like that you turned to someone from mainland Southeast Asia. But okay, so the DOC, the Declaration is non-binding, right? Right.

And it doesn't have any dispute resolution mechanisms. And that we agreed on, I think, 2002, if I'm correct. So I think Ancien first flagged up the idea of having a COC, which will be binding in 1996.

But we actually started negotiations in 2002. And then first of all today, we haven't got there yet. So it's been dragging on for quite some time. Right. So I guess the COC, it's not meant to resolve the disputes, but it's about how parties behave while they're managing the disputes, such as to avoid escalation, avoid unnecessary friction. And that's essentially what it's about. And

And, you know, Charmaine earlier talked about why it's stuck. Can you also briefly explain why that's the case? Sure. The COC negotiations are stalled primarily because the interests of the ASEAN states differ widely.

We've already highlighted that the interests of continental Southeast Asia are very different from the interests of maritime Southeast Asia. There's also a difference in terms of levels of development in terms of, for instance, the Philippines versus Singapore. The differences are really just massive all across the board. And because of these differences...

then it becomes very difficult to reach a consensus or an agreement on the code of conduct. Right, and I think there was some years ago a leaked draft where apparently Beijing had asked for

you know, all military exercises with extra regional actors, non-litoral actors, to have basically approval by all other littoral states. That seems to me as a way, I mean, that's a veto, right? That gives Beijing obviously a veto over what military activities,

Southeast Asian states may have with others, but it also gives Southeast Asian states a veto over what each other are doing. And that, I think, makes things really difficult. I don't know what the status of that is, but that had been a stickler for a while. Have either of you heard anything different since I think that came out, maybe 2017, 2018? I mean, that becomes a complication for...

the Philippines because of its standing alliance with the United States. And the two countries, the Philippines and the U.S., hold their joint annual military exercises. And if the COC is in place, then obviously the Philippines will not be able to hold those exercises with the United States. And that would also put into question the ongoing modernization of our armed forces.

Great. So I guess, you know, given the obstacles, let's turn to the wisdom of our main Southeast Asia friend. So, you know, what do you how do you think the South Tennessee disputes can be best managed? Oh, yes, definitely.

No easy way to answer this. I mean, I think at the moment, our best bet is ASEAN, even though it's been criticised for being ineffective. COC discussions have been dragging on for two decades or so. I think it's our best bet at the moment. I mean, the other options are arbitration. And clearly in 2016, arbitration

you know, China refused to accept this. So that's out of the question. And I guess the other option that has been floated around is joint development. And again, you know, China refused that as well. So, yeah,

I think ASEAN is the best bet at the moment. It's just that ASEAN needs to really step up. I note that what happened in June, the rest of Southeast Asia was noticeably quiet. No one really criticized the Philippines, but no one offered support either. So I suppose Manila might have not sat that easily. Charmaine, what do you think? How do you think the South China Sea tensions can be best managed?

There are several ways that the issue can be managed. Min is absolutely correct that our fate still lies on ASEAN, despite the fact that ASEAN is very heavily challenged. This simply points to the fact that ASEAN really does need to think

very, very closely and very carefully about the role it wants to play in ongoing geopolitical dynamics.

But apart from multilateralism like ASEAN, there are also minilateral arrangements that I mentioned earlier. These are arrangements that can be focused on particular issues like human trafficking, protection of the environment, climate change, and all of civil maritime security, etc.,

That's another way in which the disputes, the tensions can be managed. And then, of course, there's always bilateral platforms where countries can identify and should identify their partners, countries that they are most willing to work with. Right.

Right. So I guess if you could really help listeners out here, what was Manila's reaction with the silence from the rest of ASEAN members and also Timor-Leste when it came to the increasing friction with the PRC? I mean, no one else seems to have said anything. Unfortunately, that has always been the Philippines' complaint against its neighbors in Southeast Asia, right?

In 2012, we've had a similar incident in Scarborough Shoal. We sought the help of ASEAN, but the

organization itself was constrained in terms of the kind of help that it could extend to Filipinos. The lack of assistance or support to the Philippines is what led the country to file the arbitration case against China. So in many ways, really, the filing of the case, the arbitration was a way to internationalize the issue. It was a mechanism for a small country like the Philippines to seek help

and assistance from the international community.

In recent days, unfortunately, and despite the arbitration award that was handed down in 2016, the Philippines would have appreciated if other countries in Southeast Asia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific and around the world would openly support the 2016 arbitration because, after all, this is already part of international law.

Another way in which the Philippines can leverage the arbitration award is if other countries can also follow suit in terms of the, quote-unquote, the transparency initiative that President Marcos is currently pursuing.

There are many faults to the transparency initiative. Of course, this has to be part of a bigger strategy, which the Philippines doesn't seem to have. Or at least it's not obvious that the transparency initiative is part of a larger framework or part of a larger strategy. But if other countries can also call China's actions out whenever incursions or skirmishes happen, then that would...

strengthen the claim that China is doing certain things that are against international law. So also, I mean, does the Philippines...

efforts to enhance security relationships, not just with its longstanding ally, the US, but also Japan, Korea, and Australia. Is that also a function of the feeling that if support's not forthcoming from other ASEAN members, maybe Manila needs to look elsewhere? This is part of what we call in the Philippines the pursuit of an independent foreign policy.

Unfortunately, during the Duterte administration, the administration prior to this current one, President Duterte understood independent foreign policy as simply being independent from the U.S. and being dependent on China. His foreign policy, after all, was a, quote-unquote, a pivot to China.

But President Marcos currently understands the pursuit of an independent foreign policy as diversifying our international relations, which means to say that we are trying to deepen our relations, our partnerships with other like-minded countries. Right. So, I mean…

It's also interesting to hear your criticisms of the radical transparency that the Philippines is engaged in because I think just as an observer, I

I see that it's created a lot more friction, a lot more frequency of challenges between the PRC and the Philippines. But interestingly, we don't see an escalation. So what I'm saying is if we compare to what was happening in the South China Sea circa 2012 to 2016, there was ramming, but the ramming that would sink

There would be the detention of vessels and crew. We're not seeing that right now. There's ramming, there's water cannon, but it can escalate more, but it hasn't. I think there's some concern about, on Beijing's part, that if they were to act disproportionately, there will be a lot more criticism on them that might weaken their position. I don't know what your thoughts are or whether you have similar kinds of observations, Charmaine and me.

Well, certainly, I don't think it has escalated more, but it also hasn't really ultimately changed China's behavior. So in that sense, you know, that still puts a question mark on whether or not the Transparency Initiative is really a successful initiative.

So how do things look like from mainland Southeast Asia? We're not party to the conflict. So that means it's only, so for the viewers at home who don't know much about Southeast Asia, there's four mainland Southeast Asian states, so Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia. So Vietnam is the only one that's involved in the South China Sea, the rest are

are not, so as non-claimant states. But increasingly, I do see that China's actions have been pulling us more into the conflict in an indirect way. So for example, so China has been upgrading Riem naval base in Cambodia. And of course, that's

That's alarming the United States. The Americans are going to put pressure on Thailand for more access to its bases that they built during the Cold War. So Thailand is close to China, but it's not decisively with China like Cambodia. So it does want to keep that independence from both countries open.

So this is adding the complications for Thai foreign policymakers. But because of that, we're being kind of like sucked into the problem as well.

Well, just to note, I mean, Thailand is also a treaty ally of the United States, right? So the U.S. has two treaty allies in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand. Singapore has very close relations, but there's a strategic partnership, not an alliance. But I would like to really invite your thoughts on what you think

might or should be in place, right, to get us to perhaps more stability or perhaps even to open up the path for some sort of resolution? What do you think needs to, you know, can lead us on that trajectory? Yeah, I just think we should support one another a bit more. So that means as much as

the South China Sea has been on the ASEAN agenda. Maybe the Mekong should be on the agenda too. So it becomes our problem, not a separate problem. So Mekong is a separate problem for mainland Southeast Asia and the South China Sea is for archipelago Southeast Asia. So if we can have both equally on the agenda and not just these two problems, other problems as well, if we can support one another more equally,

regardless of how involved we are or how much stake we have in these conflicts, then I think that's a good start.

before we actually think about resolving the issue. That's a really good point. I mean, the way that I see ASEAN as potentially or prospectively working well when they relate to the PRC, which is so much bigger, so much more powerful, that has so much more resources, is if you think about banding together, you think about how a union might work, right? When workers that might

be less strong and they band together, they can more effectively bargain collectively. That is a possibility, but I just don't see that possibility materializing anytime soon. But it is thought. Xiaoming, how about you? What do you think needs to happen or should happen to get us to a better position on the South China Sea as we relate to Beijing? As important as the issues of sovereignty and territoriality are,

And so in no way am I trivializing the efforts of the claimant states in the South China Sea. I think it's also important to recognize that there are other issues that are not getting enough attention.

So we can speak about biodiversity, climate change, protecting the marine environment. All of these things are also part of maritime security, but none of them get the same kind or the same level of attention as issues on sovereignty and territoriality.

And I think, you know, going back again to ASEAN, this is where ASEAN can definitely play a very big role. Yeah, I think that's absolutely important to recognize. I mean, so much about the South China Sea gets wrapped up in questions of sovereignty and security and stability. Those are very important. But the South China Sea also is deeply entangled with issues of security.

sea level rise of biodiversity, I mean, with the coral reef being destroyed, with the fall or some would say collapse of fishing stocks, especially in the northern part of the South China Sea, that is a big source of protein for many of us in Southeast Asia and for that matter in China. And with that, I'd like to draw this particular episode of the podcast on.

to close. And I'd like to thank all of you for joining us. And in particular, I'd like to thank Nin and also Charmaine for sharing their insights. Thank you all very, very much. Thanks. Thank you. Thank you for listening to the China and the World podcast, a production of Carnegie China, the East Asia-based center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Views expressed are those of the host and guest panelists, and not necessarily those of Carnegie China or the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Subscribe to the China in the World podcast on popular podcast platforms such as iTunes, Stitcher, or wherever you listen to podcasts. Learn more about Carnegie China at carnegiechina.org. Tim Martin is our audio engineer and producer, with help from Hewan Park and Wanyi Du.