The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact: A Conversation with Dr. Ely Ratner
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I'm Bonnie Lin, Director of the China Power Project and Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In this episode of the China Power podcast, we will be exploring Dr. Eli Ratner's new article in Foreign Affairs, The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact, America Needs a New Asian Alliance to Counter China. What would this pact entail and who would be part of it? Why is now the time for a new and robust security alliance in Asia? Will the Trump administration be receptive to this idea and how will different countries in Asia respond?

To explore these questions, we're joined by Dr. Eli Ratner. Dr. Eli Ratner is a principal at the Marathon Initiative, a bipartisan think tank dedicated to preparing the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. He served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs from 2021 to 2025. Prior to confirmation, he was the Director of the DoD China Task Force and a Senior Advisor to China to the Secretary of Defense.

Before arriving at the Department of Defense, Dr. Ratner was the Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, where he was a member of the executive team and responsible for managing the Center's research agenda and staff. Dr. Ratner served from 2015 to 2017 as a Deputy National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Joe Biden and from 2011 to 2012 in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department.

He earned his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Eli, thank you so much for joining me today. Bonnie, it's great to be with you. So you recently wrote a foreign affairs article arguing that now is the time for a specific defense pact. I guess I'd like to start with the question of why now? Why do you think right now is a really good time for this pact and what type of pact are you envisioning?

There's really two parts to that question. One is, what is the demand for this? Why are we talking about the need for this right now? And the other surrounds the question of the viability and why is this possible now in a way that it wasn't before? And we can unpack both of those. But as you know,

The PLA has been engaging in very rapid military modernization. And we have seen, from my perspective, no real abating of China's ambition to refashion the international order and the international system in the Indo-Pacific in ways that

would really affect negatively US interests. So we see a continuation of will and capability growing in Beijing to use its military to achieve its revisionist aims in the Indo-Pacific. And that raises the question of how do we maintain stability? How do we maintain deterrence? And how do we maintain our shared vision with the region?

for a free and open Indo-Pacific. So this proposal is one way in my perspective that is going to be necessary to bring together America's alliances such that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. As it relates to the question of why now

From a viability perspective, this is an idea that has existed for some time, but when it has been tried in practice or at least contemplated in theory in the past, it was perceived as not possible because of multiple reasons. But the biggest being that it's a large region. There's a lot of countries, disparate geographies, disparate interests.

And it was never quite possible to envision certainly a pan-regional organization that could work as a collective defense apparatus that views and perspectives in the region were simply too disparate. I think, and we can get into this in more detail, that times have changed. And the proposal that I put forward was for specifically the United States, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan to work together on a new collective defense pact.

And I will definitely get into the viability a bit more. The four actors that you mentioned, U.S., Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, what do you envision as the different responsibilities of the different actors? Is it like NATO or is it a completely different organization or structure that you're envisioning, at least between these initial four actors?

Well, one of the biggest differences with NATO, of course, is that NATO is a pan-regional organization. And as I was just describing, the concept here is not that you would have all countries in the region from India to South Korea to Southeast Asia in an organization like this, because I just don't think you have the level of strategic alignment that you would need to do that in

In terms of particular roles and missions, it would vary among the partners themselves, but all have a role in hosting both US forces, but increasingly forces from the other partners. They have operational roles as well as command and control roles. So the particular capabilities are specific to their military capabilities and their geographies,

But the idea is the partner militaries would be integrated in a way where they would be able to operate together, to exercise together, be able to do things together.

be able to do command and control together, and all of the functions that allow for military cooperation in a much more effective way. Part of the challenge now is that we have bilateral alliances with these countries, but we do not have, obviously, a multilateral alliance like NATO or a multilateral collective security agreement.

And so part of the result of that is that we have informal ways of cooperating among groupings of partners, but we don't have sufficiently formal mechanisms that allow for the kinds of military cooperation we truly need to deliver combat credible deterrence. And from your perspective, would this defense pact be focused mainly or solely on the China threat? Or could it also be geared towards a North Korea war?

whatever other regional threats that may emerge, particularly from a security and defense perspective? Well, broadly, the pact would be focused on ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific. So that could take different manifestations. I think in terms of the principal national security challenges that are facing these countries, it is the China challenge that most focuses the mind and that all four countries now are evolving and updating their militaries in response to.

So I wouldn't say that it's exclusively focused on China, but the specter of Chinese aggression is certainly one of the motivating factors and would be an important part of the deterrent message. And in terms of the different roles and missions that you highlighted for at least these initial four actors, and I know your article talks about also bringing in other actors, which we can talk about a little bit later.

Do you think that these four actors all need to increase their defense spending or significantly change their defense policy in order to allow this pact to form? Because as you know, I think one of the emphasis in the Pentagon right now is not only that our allies and partners need to work more closely with the United States, but they also need to spend significantly more in the region.

Well, I think the good news is that we are seeing already allies and partners looking to step up their own contributions in these alliances. I do think that's the right direction for our alliances, both from a strategic perspective and from a political perspective. If you look at the alliances themselves, they were designed in the wake of World War II in a very different context when the United States had military primacy in the region,

when the threat from China was quite minimal, and when the partners themselves did not have a lot of capability to contribute.

And so they evolved in a relatively asymmetric fashion. I think given that all of those factors have largely changed, that the U.S. military does not have singular primacy in the way that it has had in the past, that the China challenge, the China military threat is so much bigger than it used to be, but also that these partners are now, in some instances, some of the most advanced countries in the world technologically and

and they have more resources to contribute to these alliances, and they ought to be sharing a larger burden.

So part of that is increasing in defense spending. But I also think that's a too limited view of this question of designing a new reciprocity within our alliances. And we ought to be thinking about roles and missions and other types of contributions that our allies and partners can make. So that has been a strong emphasis of the Trump administration. And again, I think that's a useful direction to be taking because I think we want our alliances to be

not only strengthening deterrence, but also politically sustainable. And for them to be sustainable, there has to be a perception in the United States that these partners are pulling their own weight. And so again, we have seen in polling in the United States, strong support for alliances, but also strong support for partners to be paying their fair share. So I think that's

not just a Trump administration priority. I think that's a reality in terms of making our alliances and partnerships more sustainable politically into the future. So how to get there and the way to do that is something we ought to be focused on. But the overall thrust is, yes, more defense spending and larger roles in the region in terms of deterrence and operations and exercises.

So one of the concerns I think folks may have about new PACs or defense relationships is whether that would entangle the United States more. From your perspective, would this defense PAC require more involvement or potentially draw the United States in into more crises or conflicts in the Indo-Pacific?

Well, I don't think so, Bonnie. And I think that's one of the reasons why it is politically viable here in Washington is that, again, the United States already has defense commitments to Japan, Philippines, and Australia. And what we're talking about here is not the United States becoming more entangled or extending new commitments beyond what already exists today, but rather working more closely with allies and partners such that they're playing a bigger role in and of themselves.

and in helping to defend each other. So it is much more about bringing the collective power of our allies and partners together than it is about the United States extending even greater commitment than already exists today.

I wanted to go back to an issue that you were mentioning earlier, which is the viability of the pact. And this builds up of what you just mentioned in terms of how do we get there. In your article, you mentioned the difficulties that we face in the region since World War II and how the same opportunity hasn't presented itself.

What were some of the challenges back then? And do you think right now we face the same issues or challenges when it comes to trying to craft a Pacific PAC today? Well, the principal challenge, which I mentioned earlier, was just the variegated views and national security perspectives throughout the region. And to some degree, those still exist today. So to the extent right after World War II,

or in the decades that followed that there were efforts to try to unite the region in some fashion in a collective defense arrangement, those constantly faltered on the lack of alignment. I think what has changed and the reason why, particularly among this constellation of countries, I do think there are opportunities here are a couple fold. One is that the strategic alignment, I think, is closer than ever.

I was quite encouraged and in some cases surprised in my role as assistant secretary when I would hear partners articulating their perspectives on the threat from China in a way that was synonymous almost with the way US officials and strategists were describing the problem. And that really wasn't the case five to seven years ago, but there has been a transformation in Australia, in the Philippines.

In Japan, it's been more ongoing over the last decade. But all of these countries now view the PRC as a primary national security challenge. If you went back a decade, from my perspective, the Australians had a much more benign view of China. That

That has really changed. And now they are transforming their defense strategy to be focused on the defense of Australia in great power competition and from great power challenges. And that's really a different orientation than what they've had in the past. Similarly, with the Philippines, you have a country there that was focused in previous decades on internal security, on intelligence.

on insurgency and terrorism and has over the last several years evolved toward a much stronger orientation toward external security and defense of their periphery, quite in reaction to Chinese pressure and coercion. And then of course, Japan is the primary example here of a country who is evolving its national security strategy in response to the China threat, increasing its defense budget,

changing its interpretation of its constitution, developing offensive capabilities and other changes.

So all of these countries in their own way have transformed and aligned around a common perspective of the China threat. This is not the United States knocking on the door, trying to convince these countries that we ought to be working with them on China issues. So that's really been the first major transformation. And then the other in terms of the trends upon which this proposal is leveraging is the growing cooperation among Asian powers themselves.

You have strategists describing the Australia-Japan relationship as alliance-like. You have the Philippines having concluded a visiting forces agreement with Australia, like a SOFA status of forces agreement that allow Australia

them to operate in each other's countries. You have the Philippines on the cusp of concluding a similar agreement with Japan, and then a whole number of exercises and operational cooperation among really countries throughout the region, but this constellation of countries in particular. So formalization of those ties would be the next step in deepening the military cooperation there.

Because as many of your listeners probably know, the only actual military treaties in the Indo-Pacific, with the possible exception of one between China and North Korea, are bilateral treaties between the United States and its alliance partners. The alliance partners themselves do not have relationships like that with each other. So that would be taking that intra-Asia cooperation one step further toward a formalization of those ties.

So it's a big step, but it is, again, viable today in a way that wasn't necessarily the case in the past. And I'll just say one more time, the Biden administration made some really big steps in terms of building upon that inter-Asia cooperation, building what has been described as a lattice or a network or a web of cooperation among different sets of partners. But at the end of the day, when it comes to military cooperation,

All of those arrangements are quite ad hoc and informal, and they don't deliver the kind of or depth of military cooperation necessary for combat credible deterrence. So it is really important to take these things a step further such that countries can not just be occasionally cooperating and exercising together, but are actually working together, developing plans,

developing integrated command and control mechanisms, doing operations together. That's how you really develop the kind of cooperation you would need for crises and contingencies. And that, at the end of the day, in my view, is what will be required to ensure long-term deterrence and long-term stability in the Indo-Pacific. The third factor is this trend toward

greater reciprocity in U.S. alliances and partnerships, which there is a demand for in Washington. But frankly, I also see action toward in our partner capitals. Well, for instance, leaders in Japan already conceiving of Japan playing a larger role in the region, a

a larger role in the alliance. And so thinking about what does that look like as we're thinking about in this more collective arrangement, it is the greater strategic alignment, it is the intra-Asian cooperation, and it's the growing reciprocity in U.S. alliances themselves.

And in terms of how different regional leaders think, we've obviously seen Japanese Prime Minister Shiba mention possibility of interest in an Asian NATO. Do you have a sense from leaders both in the Philippines and Australia that there's interest in a four-way pact or at least an initial four-way pact?

Well, I think there is a strong interest among leaders in continued U.S. commitment to the region. I think there's a strong interest among leaders in sustained alliance and defense cooperation with the United States. And I think there's a strong interest among leaders in deepening those intra-Asian defense ties. So I think, again, the motivating foundations of this kind of a pact

are absolutely in order. And among the defense establishments, a lot of the efforts that are already underway are building and providing the kind of constituent parts you would need to be able to put something like this together. So the...

political step of formalizing this kind of an arrangement is something that will have to be discussed and negotiated into the future. And frankly, part of my motivation for writing the article was to generate a serious conversation around this because I think it is something whose time has come. It obviously is sensitive. Any discussion of sovereignty and treaties are going to be sensitive and very political matters. But I do think it is time, given the nature of the growing threat

that we have these conversations. And frankly, I've received certainly a lot of private messages from friends and colleagues in the region in and out of government, as well as here in Washington saying, we really support this idea and we want to move forward. That's different than political leaders taking that leap of faith with each other. But I am hopeful that in the coming years, there will be serious consideration of that as an option. And I think there's a question around

In the absence of it, how confident are we that the current arrangements will be sufficient to maintain deterrence? So often this happens in policymaking where folks can come up with a lot of headwinds or challenges associated with any particular option, but it's always important to consider the alternatives. And if the alternatives are, we are just going to maintain a hub and spoke alliance mechanism in the Indo-Pacific, and we are going to have informal ad hoc

mini lateral arrangements, to me, that's not a recipe for long-term success. So I think both deserve really careful scrutiny and on balance, moving forward with a more formal mechanism, from my perspective, is the better move.

Eli, in terms of the discussions you've had on this, as well as some of the feedback that folks have had with respect to your recent article, do you get a sense right now that among the other three U.S. allies, there's equal interest? Or do you feel there's more interest from one country and maybe one of the countries we might have to put a little bit more effort to get that country on board?

You know, I think it's too early to say in that regard. I think that the most important thing that can happen next, and I'm seeing some of this already, which I think is a good thing, is that experts in and out of government in these capitals are discussing the merits and the challenges associated with moving forward with something like this. Of course, there are political and economic and diplomatic headwinds associated with this. But I think, again, as strategists grapple with

the challenges associated with this and the potential upsides for their own security

in the medium term and in the long term, I would hope that they would come to the conclusion that it's the right thing to do. But I think generating these debates, having serious discussions, wrestling with some of the difficult challenges that these countries are facing, and then designing an arrangement in a way that addresses those challenges as best as possible is the hard work that's necessary forward. So my perspective was never that I was going to write this article and

leaders or governments in the region or here in Washington, we're going to say, thank you very much. We're going to now implement this proposal, but rather it would generate a good policy debate around the upsides and challenges associated with formalizing these kinds of relationships. And in the absence of the ability

to, again, move forward politically at this stage. I would hope that the defense establishments can continue laying the foundations for this kind of cooperation. And a number of the initiatives I describe in the essay present opportunities to do that.

For instance, we have new command and control mechanisms that we're developing in Japan and in the Philippines, and we ought to design those in a way that leaves the door open for the other partners to contribute and participate. Same for some of our maritime domain operations efforts.

In the region, we should be doing that collectively, as well as with our operations and exercises. So a lot of this we can do in practice on the ground, even as the political issues need to be worked out among the leaders.

I would imagine one of the challenges that discussion of this pact would have is how this would be received as well as how China may respond, including how China may either retaliate or coerce any of the members. From your perspective, what have you heard of from either Australia, Japan or Philippines in terms of concerns they might have in terms of actions China may do if this pact was to move forward?

Look, I think it should be expected that Beijing would respond badly to something like this. But the question, I think, for your listeners, Bonnie, is why? Why is it that China would react negatively to this kind of a military arrangement? Because I don't think there is anybody who thinks that the United States is trying to rally its allies and partners

so as to be able to conduct some kind of offensive revisionist activity in the Indo-Pacific. It is a defensive effort to try to prevent China from using its military to engage in revisionist activities to change the status quo in a way that would be deeply destabilizing to the region,

and to the world from an economic perspective. So I guess my response back would, yes, Beijing will respond badly because this will scuttle its plans to use violence to revise the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. I don't think that's good reason for us to back away from it because again, you have to ask the question of what's the alternative? What's the outcome gonna be if the United States says, okay,

because China may react or the partners say, OK, because China may react badly to something like this, we're not going to do it. What do you think the response from China is going to be then? Do you think it's going to be that they're going to abandon their revisionist ambitions to seize Taiwan and control the South China Sea and undermine U.S. alliances?

Of course not. They're going to press ahead with that as they are today. So to me, it's worth looking at the, again, the alternative scenario and to the best that we can prepare for Chinese coercion. We would likely expect to see economic pressure, economic coercion, operational pressure in various ways. But I think we are as a group of people.

allies better off hanging together than we are trying to manage these separately. So I think that is something to be managed in the way these kinds of arrangements are described.

the public rhetoric, the types of activities that they engage in, all of that would have to be managed, as is true today with U.S. bilateral alliances, such that they are not escalatory in a way that is unintended. So one would have to be mindful of that. But I don't think that the protests from Beijing are sufficient reason not to pursue down this course, if one believed, as I do, that it would be an important contributor to deterrence and an important element of stability into the future.

And related to this, what domestic challenges might countries face if they were interested in such a defense pact? Japan, for example, might face either constitutional or legal constraints on what it's capable of doing on the defense side. And also within the Philippines, there may be heightened concern about Chinese influence in Philippine domestic politics and elections, including Chinese funding or buying of certain political candidates. What are you most worried about?

It's a great question. And absolutely for each of these countries, and you mentioned specifically why for Japan, moving towards something like this would be an evolution in their defense strategy. And it would require a belief that working collectively with partners across the region, even if that meant...

increasing one's own contribution and extending their own commitment to other parts of the region was beneficial because of the broader security that would come to their own interests. So they would have to draw that conclusion. And from Japan's perspective, as Japan has been evolving the role of its military and its national security strategy and been evolving

its external relationships. I will leave it to legal scholars to describe precisely what would be required to enable that over time. But it does strike me that the trend of the time is toward Japan having more formalized relationships with Australia and the Philippines over time, particularly if their forces are operating in each other's countries. So to me, it's a big step, but it's also a natural evolution of the way things are going

And as you described in the Philippines, I think that's just another good example of a ways in which the PRC is trying to use all sorts of malign activities to shape Philippines national security strategy. Again, that is occurring today quite intensely in the absence of a

act like this. So would they try quite hard to use disinformation and influence operations and corruption and all of their current activities to try to shape the ability of the Philippines to move forward with something like this or in the future to try to undermine something like this? Of course they would. But that only...

speaks to the ways we should be working together to work against that kind of and expose that kind of malign activity. So absolutely, again, these are very political issues. They're related to sovereignty. They're related to national defense. And I wouldn't expect leaders to take them lightly. And I would expect very robust domestic debates around the pros and cons of something like this. But I would not want to suggest that this step would be taken lightly.

And in terms of how you envision this Pacific Pact either growing or working along many lateral arrangements, we already have the Quad, we already have AUKUS. Of course, we also have growing NATO interest in the Indo-Pacific and a number of European countries involved in the region. So to what extent do you see, at least initially, the Pact forming close relations with all these other actors? And to what extent do you see second wave of countries joining the Pact?

Well, I think you'd want to maintain an open architecture that would be important, such that if there were countries that were sufficiently aligned and had sufficient levels of military cooperation with the other partners, that they would absolutely be welcome. That's

Certainly the case for South Korea, which is an obvious candidate as a participant in something like this. But up until now, as you know, their defense strategy, their military has been almost singularly oriented toward North Korea. So it'd be quite a significant evolution for them to take that more regional approach, in some cases, more China focused approach.

to their military and their national defense. So my perspective there is that's a decision for Seoul to make, but the door absolutely should be open to them. And that's true for others as well. I guess my perspective though is that rather than waiting for all of the stars aligned, some folks talk about India as a potential member over time. I don't think that's realistic

right now that Delhi would be up for moving into a formal agreement like this. So the door should be open, but I think more important to move forward with the core group who are ready to go rather than waiting until everybody's ready, which that day may never come. So that's part of the rationale here of starting with a much more select group and leaving the door open to the future. In terms of how an organization like this would relate to other institutions and organizations around the region,

My position would be that it would be a continuation of what we have described in the past, which is an overlapping and complementary set of institutions. The Quad, as you mentioned, with India does not have a very significant defense and security arm to it that is evolving over time, but is not in and of itself an alliance that would need to be somehow reconciled with what we're talking about here.

AUKUS similarly is a defense technology arrangement. It is not a formal alliance driving toward particular forms of command and control or planning. And similarly, I would add into that the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral mechanism, which absolutely is something the United States should continue to invest in.

I see those all as quite important, as well as, of course, U.S. engagement with ASEAN and an ASEAN-centric approach to the region, which should remain at the centerpiece of U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia. So I would take an all-of-the-above approach.

and with this institution itself, keep an open door to future potential members. And what about the relationship between this pact and NATO? I'm assuming that this pact would be mainly focused on the Indo-Pacific and Chinese operations in the Indo-Pacific, right? So any initial linkages or cooperation with NATO would probably be what NATO countries might be willing to do in the Indo-Pacific and not vice versa.

Yeah, I think when it comes to European participation, NATO as an organization would probably not be the first thought that comes to mind. Whether there were particular countries over time wanted to engage in cooperative activities with an organization like this, with a Pacific Defense Pact, I think, again, the door should remain open to that insofar as the Europeans were fulfilling their responsibilities

in Europe, and there was both military as well as political and strategic flexibility for them to also be contributing in the Indo-Pacific. But I think that would be an over time, not right now consideration in terms of how European partners could be contributing to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. And yes, as you described, I would not

vision a Pacific defense pact as thinking about, in the first instance, harnessing energy in the Indo-Pacific so as to engage militarily on the other side of the world. It is really about maintaining peace and stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

I'd like to close by asking you to think through how this could be either implemented or might be received by the Trump administration. I think it's quite interesting that Secretary Hegseth, when he was at the Shanghai Law Dialogue, had a meeting with his Australian, Japanese, and Philippine counterpart. So it seems like there is quite a bit of, at least from that meeting, interest in this type of arrangement. But I'd love to get your thoughts of if you heard from the administration or you think

that there is appetite in the administration to push forward on some type of specific path with these four countries? Well, what I would say is a couple of things about the Trump administration, because I think there is an initial reaction that I've often gotten, which is how could you propose something like this when we have a U.S. administration that by some reputation is hostile toward alliances around the world or the concept of working with alliances?

What I would say is what we have seen in the Indo-Pacific to date, and you just described part of it in terms of what we saw in Singapore, is that the Trump administration's approach to the Indo-Pacific and to alliances in the Indo-Pacific up until this point has been quite distinct from some of the more confrontational approaches that we've seen in Europe and toward NATO.

As you mentioned, Secretary Hegseth was recently out at the Shangri-La Dialogue and delivered really a message of continuity around U.S. commitment to the region and U.S. commitment to allies and partners. And that was consistent with his first trip to the region earlier.

to Japan and the Philippines, where again, he sent very clear messages about U.S. commitment and the importance of U.S. alliances. And we did see in Singapore, Secretary Hegseth meet with this constellation of partners, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and in his topper ahead of that meeting, describe the organization or those partners as none closer and as critical to, I think he said, manifesting deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

So the Trump administration appears continuing to be interested in this constellation and this set of partners and the defense cooperation with the partners has continued. So there's a version of your question, which is how do you expect partners in the region to be cooperating with a Trump administration given differences on tariffs and economics and some diplomatic issues?

The response there is that to date, we've seen leaders in Washington and also leaders in capitals out in the region being willing to continue to move forward with deepening defense and security cooperation, even as those

economic and diplomatic tensions are quite significant. Now, there's going to be a limit to that. And if the economic or diplomatic issues are not resolved or are not resolved in a way that is politically viable for partners and leaders in the region, then it will be really hard for them to continue the defense cooperation. But for now,

It looks like the defense cooperation is continuing. So what I see is will on both sides to keep deepening, will on both sides to keep strengthening the bonds between our partners. And we'll just have to see down the road how the Trump administration relates to that and whether there is energy for moving toward a more formal mechanism. Related to that, are you seeing any other prioritization of countries in the Indo-Pacific by the Trump administration?

that you think could be brought into this path? At least from what I see, the three countries you've identified are the three countries that Secretary Hex and DOD has identified as the priority countries, particularly vis-a-vis dealing with the China threat. But I just wanted to check with you to make sure that I didn't miss any of the countries that may be a greater priority now in the Trump administration.

Well, I think the Secretary's meetings and travel, as is always the case, is an important signal about prioritization. So the fact that Secretary Hegseth made his first trip out to the region and stopped in the Philippines and Japan is a powerful signal about the importance that they're putting in those relationships. I know the Secretary has also met with Minister Marles, who's also the Deputy Prime Minister from Australia. And there's been a lot of good

working level and senior official level defense engagement with Australia and the Pentagon. Of course, the Pentagon is very interested in the India relationship. I think we've seen that quite clearly, though India continues to have a non-aligned approach to its foreign policy and its defense policy. So it is willing, of course, to engage with the United States on a bilateral basis, to work in the Quad.

But India maintains also a global south orientation and relationships with other parts of the world, including with Russia. So even as the United States and the Trump administration deepen ties with India and see it as quite an important partner, I would not expect

folks who are knowledgeable about that country and that relationship to believe that it's going to be possible in the near term to somehow flip India into a treaty ally akin to Australia or Japan. But that doesn't mean that it's not a priority and a major area of focus for the Trump administration. So I would expect continued efforts with India and other countries in the region. But I think based on what we've seen in terms of engagement and in terms of travel,

Secretary Hegs says priorities and working with partners has been focused on the allies in a way that demonstrates continuity and with India as well. And from your perspective, would a pact between US and these three allies also be to a priority of the Trump administration of having our allies and partners do more in terms of burden sharing? Or do you think there may be some hesitation within the Trump administration to create any structure that could be viewed as NATO-like?

despite what we mentioned before, that this is not exactly natal light because it's not pan-regional. Do you think there may be any concern within the Trump administration with respect to deviating from the hub and spokes model? Well, I can't speak for the Trump administration, but I do think that part of the appeal for me of an organization or a pact like this is I do think it's consistent with the direction of U.S. politics and approaches toward rethinking the

our alliances and the sustainability of our alliances into the future. And some of that is related to the Trump administration. But it's important to note that a pact like this in the context of potential aversion to greater alliance commitments, that a pact like this from the U.S. perspective is one in which allies are doing more, are contributing more, and one in which the United States is not being asked to extend new commitments.

The United States already has treaty alliances with Japan and the Philippines and Australia, and we've already committed to defending those countries. So in many ways, from the U.S. perspective, the most significant innovation in a pact like this is both

the allies stepping up and willing to do more, and then the mutual obligations between the allies themselves. We are not asking here the Trump administration to extend new obligations to partners with which we don't already have alliances. So I think in that sense, it is moving with the trend of the times in the region in terms of inter-Asian cooperation.

but also here in Washington, where I think, frankly, on both sides of the aisle, leaders are going to want to see our allies stepping up in a way commensurate with their ability.

And I think that's a key point that should be emphasized, that this is not about asking the United States to extend new commitments. I think that would probably make it more feasible for the Trump administration or any U.S. administration in which it's not requiring the United States to do significantly more. So let me close, Eli, by asking you, what do you think are the next steps that should or could be taken by the Trump administration to move forward on this path? And relatedly, this might be a bit hard to think through, but how long do you think it might take

to formalize this pact? Are we talking about a couple of years or are we talking much longer, a decade or more?

Well, I don't think it should take a decade or more, but it would take likely a few years to put the pieces in place, to do the negotiations and to work out a number of the details that you'd have to work through with the partners in terms of the specific mechanics of headquarters and command and control and planning mechanisms and whatnot. But in the interim, I guess I would like to see a couple of things happening moving forward.

One, as we talked about earlier, I think a healthy debate in Washington and in Manila and Tokyo and Canberra and frankly around these four countries about the merits and managing some of the challenges associated with moving forward with something like this would be important.

I'm seeing some of that happening already, but doing it in more depth and really taking the time to think through the benefits and the challenges would be a great next step. And again, one of the motivating factors of writing a piece like this. And then while that happens...

The defense establishments and the military is continuing to find opportunities to deepen integration among these four partners is really important. And the article in Foreign Affairs lays out a number of places where we can do that, harnessing initiatives that are already underway, whether it relates to force posture, operations, exercises that we do with

various combinations of these partners. We can increasingly include the others. Some of the new command and control mechanisms that we're establishing in Japan and the Philippines can be developed in a way by which

The other partners can be contributing and participating in the near term, as well as some of the maritime domain operations. So I think there are a lot of ways in which as we are doing things bilaterally, trilaterally, quadrilaterally with this group, we can continue to do the baseline military cooperation that will facilitate a pact like this. So there's a lot of work to be done.

And while the political and policy debates are worked through, and it could be a few years and a subsequent administration that ultimately ends up taking this thing over the finish line.

Perfect. Thank you so much, Eli, for joining me to discuss your ideas for this defense pack, as well as unpacking how it could move forward, some of the challenges, and what you see as the benefits for this. This is a super important article in Foreign Affairs, and I hope that you will help move this debate forward one way or the other.

I also personally believe that a pact like this would be quite instrumental in terms of boosting our deterrence of China in the region. So thank you very much for joining me today. Bonnie, thank you for that message of support. That means a lot. And thank you for a great discussion.