Tactical Studies on the Battles around Plevna by Thilo Lebrecht Ernst Michael von Trotha ~ Full Audiobook
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21 plus and present in Illinois. Must be first online real money wager. $5 deposit required. Bonus issued is non-withdrawable bonus pass that expires 7 days after receipt. Restrictions apply. See full terms at fanduel.com slash sportsbook. Gambling problem? Call 1-800-GAMBLER. Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. Translated by Carl Reichman. Edited Preface and Part 1 Introductory Review of the Danube Campaign. Edited Preface.

Among the many books on the Turko-Russian War of 1877-8, two works stand out prominently, namely Green's Russian Campaigns in Turkey, which is universally recognised as a military classic, and von Trotha's Able Work, which though long and favourably known in Germany, is here presented in English for the first time.

of the latter work it is perhaps sufficient to say that in its full and careful consideration of tactical matters it forms a worthy supplement to the former and as such it will doubtless prove welcome to american and english readers u s infantry and cavalry school fort leavenworth kansas may first eighteen ninety six part one introductory review of the danube campaign

the army designated to operate against european turkey and called the army of the south was commanded by grand duke nicholas and consisted of the eighth ninth eleventh and twelfth corps of two infantry and one cavalry division each of the fourth rifle brigade a combined cossack division and a number of separate cossack regiments attached to the corps and divisions

On April 24th, the army began to cross the Romanian frontier, and completed its strategic deployment along the Danube during the ensuing month, mostly by marching, and to a smaller extent, by the use of the railroad, which was largely occupied by the transport of the heavy artillery, the pontoon parks, and other stores of munitions and provisions.

While the greater part of the cavalry held the line of the Danube from the mouth of the Aluta downward, the main body of the army stood, toward the end of May, in the vicinity of Bucharest, the right wing at Slatina on the Aluta, the left wing at Oltenitsa on the Danube. On the lower Danube was one division of the XI Corps, strengthened by detachment of the VII Corps, which

which latter, together with the 10th Corps, constituted the Coast Army for the protection of the northern shores of the Black Sea. Of the three other corps also mobilised and assigned to the Field Army, the 14th Corps was directed to advance to the Lower Danube and relieve there the division of the 11th Corps, which was to rejoin the main army, while the 4th and 13th Corps were to join the main army directly.

Political reasons prevented the Romanian army from active participation in the campaign. This force consisted of four divisions posted in Lesser Wallachia, and in a certain sense, constituted the right flank guard of the Russian deployment in Greater Wallachia.

On account of the complete absence of any fixed organisation of the Turkish army, and on account of the unsettled state of the Turkish Empire, the strength, distribution and special formation of the Turkish troops cannot be given with complete accuracy, although the following round figures may be approximately correct. At the time of the Russian passage of the Danube, there were one...

In the quadrilateral , the main "East Army" under Kerimpasha, 100,000 strong, of which about 60,000 men may be considered available for field operations. In the Dubruja, about 10,000 to 15,000 men. In Nicopolis, Sistova and Turnova, about 10,000 men.

4. At Widden, the Western Army under Osman Pasha, 50,000 strong, of which about 40,000 men, probably marched towards Plevna at the end of June. 5. At Sofia, about 20,000 men, a sort of reserve army, for the most part also marching to Plevna to join Osman Pasha.

6. South of the Balkans, on the line Philippopolis to Adrianople, some 10,000 to 15,000 men under Reni Pasha, who did not assume actual command until after the first passage of the Balkans by the Russians. 7. About 30,000 men under Suleiman Pasha, which had been put in motion toward Romelia from the Theatre of War in Montenegro.

eight the reinforcements of regular troops from constantinople from distant provinces and from new organisations which had been formed with considerable zeal and skill are estimated at not less than forty thousand men most of these were sent to solyman pasha's army

The Tahrir Kesses, an irregular but excellent light cavalry numbering about 20,000 men, are included in the above data. The Mustafafiz, or National Guard, are not included, as their military value is doubtful and has not yet been tested in actual conflict with Russian troops. On the side of the Russians, the infantry divisions may be put down at 10,000 men, the cavalry divisions at 2,500 horses, the Cossack regiments at 500 horses.

The entire field army of seven corps is therefore to be estimated at about 150,000 infantry, 25,000 cavalry, 20,000 special troops and 800 field guns. In addition, there was a siege park of 350 heavy and medium guns. The Romanian army, so far as fit for the field, may be estimated at 40,000 men.

Active operations suffered a further postponement of four weeks through the unusually high and long-continued rise of the Danube, the delay in the arrival of large masses of bridging material required due to defective organisation of the Romanian railways, and the necessity of rendering the Turkish monitor flotilla on the Danube harmless by the use of batteries and torpedoes.

On the 21st of June, General Zimmermann crossed the Danube at Galatz with the head of his 14th Corps, and established himself on the opposite bank after a brisk engagement. The remainder of his corps followed during the next few days, and was subsequently joined by a part of the 7th Corps. The whole constituted the so-called Column of the Lower Danube.

which advanced through the Dubruja, meeting insignificant resistance on the part of the enemy, and reached Kustenji and Krasin's Wall about the middle of July. None but small reconnoitering parties crossed this line. Unfavourable sanitary conditions, difficulties of supply, and the duty of guarding the shoreline caused larger portion of the column of 30,000 men to remain inactive in the Dubruja, and to exercise no influence whatever on the operations in Bulgaria beyond.

The opposing Turkish troops appear to have been greatly inferior. We now turn to the main army. On the 27th of June, the 8th Corps crossed the Danube at Zimnitsa under a sharp engagement with a Turkish brigade posted at Sestova. By the 5th of July, the 9th and 13th Corps, the 4th Rifle Brigade, the Bulgarian Legion and the Combined Cossack Division had also completed their passage at this point.

anticipating somewhat we note here that by the middle of july the eleventh twelfth and fourth corps were also brought to the right bank the yantra bridge at byla having fallen into the hands of the russians on the third of july

General Gorko occupied Ternova on the 8th of July with a mixed advance guard, crossed the Balkans from here by the trail to the east of the Shipka Pass, reached the village of Hankioi at the southern foot of the mountains on the 14th, and turned westward, took Kazenlik on July 17th, where he found himself in the rear of Shipka Pass, which was unsuccessfully attacked on the same day by a detachment of the 8th Corps coming from Gobrova.

The appearance of Gorko in the rear of their position caused the weak Turkish garrison to evacuate the pass on the 19th without resistance, and to retreat by side paths. One of the principal Balkan passes was thus in Russian hands. Grand Headquarters was moved from Sestova to Byela on the 8th of July, and thence to Tenova on the 17th.

The passage of the Balkans divided the Russian army of operation in Bulgaria into three separate groups. The centre, consisting of the VIII Corps and Gorko's mixed advance guard, operated in the Balkans and for some time also to the south of them.

the left wing consisting of the twelfth and thirteenth corps charged with the investment and siege of russchuk and placed under the orders of the tsarevich extended along the lomme from the danube to the osman bazaar with headquarters at

the right wing consisting of the ninth corps under general krudner was charged in the first place with taking nicopolis guarding the line nicopolis plevna lovcha and establishing communications from the latter place with the centre in the balkans the fourth and eleventh corps were at this time in the act of crossing the danube

Meanwhile, General Krudner with the 9th Corps had moved on to Nicopolis. On the 15th of July, the commanding and strongly fortified positions in front of the place were taken by assault and on the 16th the garrison capitulated. Osman Pasha, who marched from Wydyn with his corps about the end of June, had in the meantime reached Plevna without being discovered by the Russians.

A weak detachment of the 9th Corps, dispatched against this place on the 20th of July, was repulsed with considerable loss. The unexpected appearance of this strong Turkish army in the space between the Vid and the Ozma caused a complete change in the situation. Krydna, with the 9th Corps reinforced by a brigade of the 11th and a division of the 4th Corps, attacked Plevna on the 30th of July and suffered a heavy defeat.

Osman Pasha was prevented, probably by the deficient character of his army, from acting on the offensive and reaping the fruits of his victory, and the Russian communications by way of a Sistova, seriously menaced at first, remained undisturbed. Nevertheless, the Russian offensive had not only been checked for the present, but the Russians were obliged to make retrograde movements in the centre and on both flanks. On the left, the Sarovitch, whose forces had been augmented by a part of the XIth Corps,

raised the investment of russchuk and took a defensive position along the black lomme against the turkish army assembling in his front after his successful passage of the balkans gorko extended his troops into the tundja valley called the bulgarians to arms spread terror and confusion as far as philp apollos and adrian

He was defeated at Esquizagra on the 31st of July, and compelled to retreat to Kazenlik by Suleiman Pasha, who had bought his corps, heretofore employed against Montenegro, by water from Antivari to Dedig, at the mouth of the Maritsa, thence by rail to Adrianople, and had advanced from the latter place northward by forced marches.

The 8th Corps, originally designated to follow Gorko across the Balkans, could no longer be employed in the latter's support on account of the unfavourable situation north of the Balkans. He therefore evacuated Kazenlik on the 6th of August and withdrew into the Balkan passes where he entrenched himself. Grand Headquarters was moved back from Ternova to Byela.

the unfavourable situation had demonstrated to the russian leaders that the forces employed were unequal to the task and the attempt was made to remedy this evil in two ways first reinforcements of ten infantry divisions five line three guard two grenadier and two cavalry divisions

were ordered from Russia. Second, a treaty heretofore refused by Russia was concluded with Romania, which made the Romanian army available for use in active operations. The West Army, consisting of the 4th and 9th Corps, was augmented by the entire Romanian army and the guards and grenadiers which arrived later, and the command was conferred on Prince Charles of Romania.

The remaining three Russian infantry divisions were assigned to the East Army under the Sarovitch, as also those parts of the XI Corps not heretofore so assigned. General Radetzky, with part of the former Advanced Guard and the VIII Corps, formed the centre in the Balkans and connected the two flank armies, which were posted with their backs toward each other.

for the present the west army left one roumanian division and the east army left several russian bodies on the north bank of the danube opposite the turkish fortresses the reinforcements ordered had not arrived when at the beginning of august the three turkish armies

the west army under osman pasha at plevna the south army under soleyman pasha at kazanlik the east army under mohammed ali pasha on the line rasgrad osman bazar were in readiness to advance to a concentric attack

The Russian army, which was posted between the Osma, the Lom and the Balkans in the triangle Nikopolos-Gabrova-Rostchuk, was shaken by its reverses, and in an undoubted critical position, having to rely for weeks until the arrival of considerable reinforcements on its own strength, which had been recognised as insufficient.

even the splendid bravery manifested by the russian troops on every occasion would hardly have saved the army from heavy reverses had not a certain unwieldiness of the turkish army in offensive movements as well as a lack of harmony and even open enmity between the turkish leaders acted in favour of the russians

Instead of utilising the open passes to the east of Shipka and advancing with the main body of his army consisting of battle-tried elite battalions against the line Osman Bazar turned over in cooperation with the east army Suleiman Pasha wasted his strength for six days in heroic but useless attacks against the position in the Shipka Pass which was defended by an opponent equally heroic though much inferior in strength

His heavy losses, more than 15,000 men, according to Turkish statements, rendered Suleiman's army unfit for active operations, at least for the present. It was not until September 17th, and after complete reorganization of his troops, and considerable accessions of reinforcements, that he undertook another unexpected attack on the Shipka Pass, which, though successful at first, was repulsed in the end.

During this time, Muhammad Ali advanced from Razgrad against the Russian positions on the Kara Lom. After several small engagements, a detachment of the Russian centre was defeated at Kara Hasankioi, on the right bank of the Kara Lom, on the 31st of August. Another was beaten at Kozeljuo on the 5th of September and pushed over the Lom, whose right bank was completely in the hands of the Turks on September 7th.

To defend the line of the Jantra, the Russian East Army took position on the right bank of the stream, on the plateau between Jantra and the Bani Zekalom, left branch of the Karalom. On the 13th of September, Mohammed Ali crossed the left bank of the Karalom, defeated a Russian detachment at Sinankeoy on the 14th, and on September 21st, made an unsuccessful attempt to force a passage over the Bani Zekalom at Shekona, repulsed with considerable loss.

mehemet ali recrossed the karalam whose passages from kazeljewo downward as far as pirgos were reoccupied by the russians by the middle of october osman pasha's inactivity throughout is surprising by his unexpected approach from whidin and his tactical skill in the defensive actions during july he had made his appearance on the field of war in splendid manner and decisive action might have been expected on his part

an insignificant advance from plevna westward on the fourteenth of august and another feeble unsuccessful attack from lovcha against selvy on the twenty first and twenty second of august are not to be taken for seriously contemplated aggressive movements still the coincidence in time of the latter attack with the beginning of the great attack on the ship kapass by solyman pasha as well as with the advance of mehemet ali against the upper lom is worth noting

More seriously contemplated and more vigorously carried out was Osman Pasha's attack against the Russian positions at Zgalovitsa and Pelishat on the 31st of August. But this attack was likewise undertaken with but half of the available forces and is not to be considered as a last struggle for final decision. Coincident again with Osman's attack was Muhammad Ali's advance against the Middle Lom.

while Suleiman was still engaged in reorganising his army, which was shattered and unable to cooperate with the aggressive movements of the two flank armies. While the Russians were restricting themselves in the Balkans and on the Lom to the defence of their partly maintained and reoccupied positions, the West Army, reinforced by two Russian infantry divisions and the Romanians, proceeded to the serious attack on Plevna.

After the capture of Lovtshch on the 3rd of September, the great artillery attack against Plevna opened on the 7th, and continued for some time after the great assault on the 11th of September, which, though in part successful, must be accounted a failure. The attempt to deprive the army of Plevna of its communications with Widin and Sofia by posting a strong cavalry corps on the left bank of the Vid was without result for a time.

reinforcements with considerable supplies of provisions and munitions repeatedly broke through the weak line of investment on the left bank and succeeded in getting into plevna the investment of plevna did not become effective and make itself felt until after general gorko assumed command of the corps of investment on the left bank of the vid with troops of the guard and had established himself on the line of communication and retreat of the army of plevna

after the capture by assault of the fortified station of gorni dubnik provisions and ammunition ran short in plevna russian detachments which were pushed into the mountains along the iskar and vid cut off mohammed ali's reserve army assembling at sofia and compelled it to be more solicitous of its own defence than of the relief of plevna

Deprived of hope of assistance from without, and pressed by the daily increasing difficulties of his position, Osman Pasha attempted to break through the Russian line of investment westward on the 10th of December. The attempt failed, and Osman Pasha and his entire army surrendered as prisoners of war.

It remains to cast a brief glance at the coincident events on the Lom where the Russian East Army, after reoccupying the line of the Kara Lom, remained strictly on the defensive. Suleiman Pasha, who had assumed command of the Turkish East Army about the middle of October, in place of Mehmed Ali Pasha, attempted to draw the attention of the Russians to their own left flank by attacking the lower Lom on the 19th and 26th of November.

and seriously and unexpectedly attacked the extreme right of the Russian position in the mountains at Marin and Alina on the 4th of December with 30,000 men. The feeble Russian detachment was driven back with severe loss in men and guns, but in the rear of Alina the Turkish advance came to a stop, and on receipt of the news of the surrender of Plevna, the Turkish corps withdrew towards Akhmedli on the 14th of December.

On December 12th, the Turks suffered a bloody repulse at Metzka on the lower Lom, where they made a vigorous attack. With the fall of Plevna, almost coincident with the end of the year, the campaign on the Danube terminated. All subsequent events on the various portions of the theatre of war pertain to a new period, the campaign of Adrianople. End of section 1

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$200 Verizon gift card requires smartphone purchase $799.99 or more with new line on eligible plan. Gift card sent within 8 weeks after receipt of claim. Phone offer requires $799.99 purchase with new smartphone line on unlimited ultimate or postpaid unlimited plus. Minimum plan $80 a month with auto pay plus taxes and fees for 36 months. Less $800 trade-in or promo credit applied over 36 months. 0% APR. Trade-in must be from Apple, Google or Samsung. Trade-in and additional terms apply. Section 2 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevena by Thalo von Trotha

This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 2. Review of the operations around Plevna. The operations of the 9th Corps, which constituted the nucleus of the subsequently formed West Army, began July 15th, with the assault on the heights commanding Nicopolis and the surrender of the fortress on the 16th.

during the struggle at nicopolis the caucasian cossack brigade was pushed into the space between the ozma and the vid to cover the ninth corps against any hostile enterprises from rehovah and plevna according to the statements of prisoners the garrison of nicopolis did in fact expect relief from the west

during the night of the fifteenth sixteenth the cossack brigade had an action with a detachment of turkish infantry which seemed to belong to the garrison of nicopolis and to have escaped from the impending capitulation no hostile bodies made their appearance from the west in these days

but on the seventeenth one of the reconnoitring parties dispatched to the south encountered at selvy a detachment of about one thousand men consisting of turkesses and bashi-bazouks with some infantry which retired on lovcha

On the evening of the same day, reports arrived at Grand Headquarters from the Cossack patrol scouting along the Vid of the approach of strong hostile detachments from the west marching in the direction of Plevna. It seems that the Commander-in-Chief placed little importance on these reports, and certainly did not believe the presence of strong masses of the enemy in that direction.

the only measure taken in this respect was an order to the commander of the ninth corps to occupy plevna with a detachment and to clear the vicinity of such bodies of the enemy as might be there the fact that headquarters rested in such false security as regards the danger threatening from west bulgaria does not throw favourable light on the organisation and direction of the service of information an entire army was assembled at plevna by this time

The date when Osman Pasha started from Widin with the main body of the West Bulgarian army cannot be accurately ascertained. Supposing the movement from Widin to have begun when the passage of the Danube by the Russians became known, Osman Pasha's army would have consumed about 20 days in traversing the distance of about 125 miles from Widin to Plevna.

The heads of these columns were the troops whose presence on the Vid was reported on the 17th of July by the Cossacks scouting there. In addition, a part of the reserve army at Sofia was ordered to join Osman, and it is probable this corps took the great road through Orkani, and thence either the road leading from Telus to Plevena, or from Jabal-en-Izzah along the northern foot of the Balkans to Plevena.

In the former case, the troops with whom the Russians came in touch at Selvi on the 17th may be considered the right flank guard, and in the latter case as the advance guard of the corps approaching from Sofia. Nothing is known with certainty of the plan on which Osman's march was originally based. Had he arrived on the banks of the Vid a few days earlier, the capture of Nicopolis by the Russian 9th Corps would hardly have been possible. We now again turn to the operations of the Russian army.

Pursuant to the instructions from headquarters, General Krudner on the 18th of July ordered the commander of the 5th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner, to move with the 1st Brigade of his division, 4 batteries, and the 9th Don Cossack Regiment from Nikopolos to Plevna, and to occupy the place.

The troops already beyond the Osma and along the highroad from Bulgarini to Plevna, the Kostroma Regiment of the 5th Division with a battery and the Caucasian Cossack Brigade were ordered to cooperate in the enterprise and placed under the orders of Lieutenant General Shiloshudne. The latter permitted two detachments to advance separately from the north and east against Plevna.

where meanwhile a large part of osmond's army probably not less than twenty thousand to twenty five thousand men had arrived and he suffered a bloody defeat on the twentieth of july the three infantry regiments losing three thousand men one-third of their proper strength

the vigorous sign of life given by the hitherto neglected army of osman made a very unpleasant impression at headquarters occupied at this moment by gorkho's surprisingly successful passage of the balkans and probably engaged in plans of an immediate advance on adrianople

The unfavourable impression produced by the defeat at Plevna was to be wiped out as quickly as possible by overpowering the troublesome opponent. General Krudner received considerable reinforcements from the corps recently brought to the right bank of the Danube and was enjoined to attack Plevna vigorously. General Krudner had meanwhile been concentrating on his 9th corps at Brezeljaniza, but one regiment was left at Nikopoulos, which place received a Romanian garrison in addition.

up to july twenty sixth received the following reinforcements the first brigade of the thirty second infantry division and the first brigade of the eleventh cavalry division both of the eleventh corps and under the personal command of prince sharkovskoy the corps commander also the thirtieth infantry division of the fourth corps

Lovcha, temporarily occupied by a Russian detachment, was recovered by the Turks on July 26th, who at this point were distant 50 miles from the headquarters at Tinova and 37 from Grobova, at the northern issue of the Shipka Pass.

Krudner's total strength, including the reinforcements and deducting losses, amounted to about 30,000 men with 176 guns. He had some hesitation in attacking the enemy at Plevna, believing his own forces insufficient in view of the enemy's strong position and large force, for by the end of July, Osman Pasha must have had more than 40,000 men with about 80 guns at Plevna.

reiterated orders from headquarters prompted him finally to proceed to the attack on the thirtieth of july the battle was contested on both sides with great bravery but terminated in a heavy defeat of the russians who lost seven thousand five hundred men in killed and wounded which was one-fourth of their effectives

Strange to say, there was no pursuit on the part of the Turks. Thereby the Russian troops, which were much demoralised immediately after the unsuccessful termination of the struggle, gained time to make front in good condition on the line Trestenik-Porodim, barely 13 miles from the battlefield. A pause now ensued in front of Plevna.

prevented by some cause probably by the defective character of his army from turning his victory to full account by a vigorous attack on the russian communications osman pasha occupied himself with strengthening his position by means of fortifications and converted it into a spacious extremely strong entrenched camp to which it seems a number of heavy guns of position were en route from widn

The only signs of life given by the Turkish army at Plevna was a feeble reconnaissance westward on the 14th of August, which was driven back by the fire of Russian guns, and a movement from Lovtsh to Selvi, which was undertaken on the 21st and 22nd of August, with small forces, without energy, and therefore without result. With Russians past the entire month of August in a waiting attitude,

the arrival of reinforcements ordered was awaited with impatience and it was a matter of gratification that the turks did not proceed from plevna to the attack of the line of the jantra the portion of the eleventh corps which had been present before plevna since the end of july

was detached from the west army and employed farther to the east in its place the entire fourth corps and the fourth roumanian division were assigned to this army now commanded by general zotov the commander of the fourth corps and senior general present the fourth roumanian division which rested on the vid at riben formed the right wing the ninth corps north of the high road to bulgareni formed the centre and the fourth corps south of the high road formed the left wing of the position

after the completion of the diplomatic formalities and military agreements the main body of the romanian army i e the second and third divisions crossed the danube at carabia twenty-two miles above nicopolis during the last days of august the first division remained opposite

The selection of the point of crossing raises the presumption that the Romanians were to operate on the left bank of the Vid and to invest Plevna from the west. But after a few days, the two Romanian divisions were brought to the right bank of the Vid. The Romanian army of three divisions now constituted the right wing of the West Army, over which Prince Charles of Romania assumed command. The previous commander, General Zotov, becoming his chief of staff,

On the 31st of August, previous to the arrival of the Romanian army on the right bank of the Vid, Osman Pasha made a vigorous attack south of the Bulgarini road with some 25,000 men against the left of the Russian positions at Zagailvitsa and Pelechat. He was repulsed after a long and doubtful struggle with a loss of several thousand killed and wounded. The Russians lost 1,000 men.

the period from the beginning of august to the beginning of september which aside from the action of pelashat was broken by no noteworthy event was utilised by the russians for various preparations for the great attack contemplated upon the arrival of reinforcements

the first of these measures was a thorough reconnaissance of the ground which was very much broken and well covered by the fire of the turks but an accurate survey on the scale of three inches to the mile was nevertheless made and the resulting map was manifolded and distributed among the troops hassen's gabions and sealing-ladders were also prepared and the troops practised in escalade approaches to the enemy's position as well as lateral communications were built

many large and small bridges were repaired or newly constructed the existing wells were cleaned and a number of new ones sunk particularly at such points as were designed to serve as future dressing stations lastly a number of siege guns were brought up partly in order to employ heavy calibres against the turkish position partly to give a moral support to the troops which had lost confidence in the field artillery in the action against the turkish works

At the beginning of September the long-expected reinforcements arrived. They consisted of the main body of the Romanian army, which was posted on the right, part of the cavalry of Gorko's former advanced guard, two Dragoon regiments, one Hussar regiment, and two Don Cossack regiments, the siege artillery of 20 24-pounders. Lastly, on the 5th of September, General Prince Emeritinski

With the 2nd Infantry Division and the 3rd Rifle Division arrived from Lovtshch, which he had taken by assault on September 3rd after an obstinate and bloody struggle which severed the communications of Plevenna to the south-east. His detachment for the present took position in the rear of the left of the 4th Corps. The Russian army before Plevenna now numbered 5 infantry divisions and 1 rifle brigade.

a total of sixty-four battalions but it may be safely assumed that the battalions crossed the danube with not more than eight hundred effectives and it is not probable that the ranks could have been filled with recruits by the beginning of september

the losses of the fifteenth twentieth and thirtieth of july and the thirty first of august and at lovchur amounted to some twelve thousand men while the loss from sickness during july and august must at a moderate calculation be placed at several thousand men so that the number of effectives of the russian infantry before plevna could hardly have been more than thirty five thousand and certainly not more than forty thousand

If we add the artillery, cavalry and engineer troops, the total of the Russian West Army was at most 50,000 effectives, to which some 25,000 Romanians should be added. The number of effectives of the Turkish Army assembled at Plevna was probably about 50,000 men, after making allowance for the losses suffered in July and August, and counting reinforcements.

During the night of the 6th to the 7th of September, the Russian troops approached in deep silence, within gunshot, of the Turkish works, and threw up entrenchments for their artillery and cover for part of the infantry. On the morning of the 7th, fire was opened on the Turkish positions and continued until noon of the 11th, almost without any effect whatever, as will be seen later on.

On the left, General Skobolev began his assault on the Green Hills on the 8th, and made himself master of the southern portion of that important point in a bloody struggle of three days. At 3pm on the 11th of September, a general assault was made, on the right by the Romanians and the 9th Corps against the Gravitsa Works, in the centre by the 4th Corps against the Radyshevo Works.

on the left by skobeleff's combined corps against the krinshin works the attack in the centre was repulsed on the right the most advanced gravitsa redoubt on the left the northern portion of the green hills and two redoubts of the krinshin works fell into the hands of the russians

The Gravitsa readout was the only one, however, that remained in Russian hands. After a furious struggle and under great losses on both sides, the Turks made a counter-stroke in force, regained the readouts on the left, and also drove the Russians from the Green Hills.

as it soon became clear that the captured redoubt which had been considered the key point of the hostile position was completely overlooked by the works lying farther to the rear the assault which cost the russians about twelve thousand five hundred and the romanians about three thousand men may be considered a total failure

Upon the unsuccessful and costly issue of this assault, the Russians abandoned the idea of taking Plevna by assault, and decided upon the conquest of Osman Pasha's army by means of investment and starvation. The centre of gravity of the events was thus shifted from the right to the left bank of the Vid. On the 8th of September, General Oshkarev crossed to the left bank with eight regiments of Russian and Romanian cavalry, and made several scouting expeditions.

on the nineteenth general krylov took command of all cavalry corps on the left bank but was unable to effectually check the march of turkish trains and reinforcements from sofia on the road orkany telus gorni dubnik and the whole attempt to invest plevna from the west is to be accounted a complete failure in this quarter the investment did not become effective until the arrival of the guards and grenadiers which for the greater part were assigned to operations on the west side

on the twenty fourth of october general gorko with greatly superior forces assaulted and took gorni dabnik a strongly fortified point on the line of communications which was bravely defended by a few thousand men tellus fell into the hands of the russians on october twenty eighth after a slight engagement and dolni dabnik on november first without resistance the line of investment on the west of plevna was then completed by the building of a series of strong entrenchments

all communications of the army in plevna were now severed moreover to deprive it of any hope of relief by mohammed ali's army which was assembling at sofia and whose advance-guard had reached orkany strong russian detachments were pushed to the west and south toward the west vratza was taken on the ninth of november rehovah on the twenty second and lompelanka on the thirtieth on december first flying detachments advanced toward the direct line of communications with the servians

toward the south teteven on the upper vid was occupied on the second and the rosalita pass on the upper ozma on the seventeenth of november on the twenty third strong detachments took prauez between orkany and etripol and on the twenty fourth the latter place itself whereupon the turkish advance guard at orkany fell back to the main body at sophia

reverting now to events on the east front of plevna we have stated above that no decisive importance attaches to them after the middle of september the question here for the russians was partly one of holding their positions partly of gradually advancing the line of investment so as to shorten it somewhat

On the 17th of September, an attempt on the part of the Turks to retake the first Kravica readout was repulsed. On the following day, an attempt on the part of the Romanians to take the so-called second Kravica readout also failed, whereupon trenches were resorted to for the approach on the Turkish positions, the artillery meanwhile maintaining a slow fire, which failed to elicit any reply from the Turks.

after pushing their trenches to within thirty yards of the enemy's redoubt the romanians made a dash at it on the nineteenth of october but were flung back with great loss on the left general skobeleff occupied the village of brestovets on the night of november fourth the fifth seized the first knoll of the green hills on november ninth and maintained himself in the rapidly entrenched position against two hostile assaults launched against it by the turks on the twelfth and fifteenth of november

the complete investment of plevna meanwhile made itself felt munitions and provisions began to fail and disease made great ravages among the troops which were poorly fed clothed and housed the hope of relief from without diminished more and more and osman pasha was at last compelled to relinquish his stout and protracted resistance

the attempt undertaken with great bravery on december tenth of breaking through the russian line of investment on the west where it was held by two grenadier divisions seemed to be without hope of success and merely for the sake of saving the honour of the turkish arms

on the failure of the attack and after the loss of the partly abandoned and weakly held works on the east osman pasha surrendered unconditionally with his entire army whose effectives may still have numbered some forty thousand men not counting some twenty thousand sick and wounded

For nearly five months, Osman Pasha and his army maintained themselves against a constantly increasing opponent and under the apparently overwhelming fire of a formidable artillery. The entire situation was altered by this obstinate resistance, and the decision of the campaign, which at one time seemed to become ripe during the year of 1877, was staved off until 1878.

the results gained by osman pasha and his army may therefore be justly regarded as surpassing their own expectations on the other hand it cannot be denied that the repeated reverses suffered at plevna helped toward the russian final success timely attention was called to the defective character of the whole russian plan of operation and much greater forces than originally contemplated were brought to the theatre of war which rendered a subsequent successful and decisive conduct of the war possible

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$200 Verizon gift card requires smartphone purchase $799.99 or more with new line on eligible plan. Gift card sent within eight weeks after receipt of claim. Phone offer requires $799.99 purchase with new smartphone line on unlimited ultimate or postpaid unlimited plus. Minimum plan $80 a month with auto pay plus taxes and fees for 36 months. Less $800 trade-in or promo credit applied over 36 months. 0% APR. Trade-in must be from Apple, Google, or Samsung. Trade-in and additional terms apply. Section 3 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha.

this librivox recording is in the public domain read by alistair part three plevna geographical conditions plevna is situated in the centre of a great agricultural district on the great road from sophia to ruszczuk in the valley of the tucinitsa brook a right branch of the vid

From here radiate important roads to Nicopolis in the north, Wydden in the west, to Orkani and Sofia in the southwest, to Lovča and Trojan in the south, to Selvia and Tijanova in the southeast, and lastly, as previously stated, to Biela and Rosčak in the east. Appreciating the importance of Plevna as an industrial and commercial centre, Midhat Pasha, the former governor-general of the Danube province, Tuna Veljet, decided to connect the town with the Danube by railway.

nicopolis was at first intended to be the terminus of the road but closer examination showed this place unsuited for a commercial depot and the requisite harbour construction and midhat pasha decided to establish a new commercial centre to be named port sultani at the mouth of the ozma west of nicopolis

from this latter place the road was to ascend the valley of the ozma for some distance and reach plevna by the way of mechka kojaloza and grevitsa for the construction of the road-bed which consisted for the most part of fillings minhat pasha collected some twenty thousand bulgarian labourers the requisite timber was taken from the forests at the foot of the balkans

soon afterward midhat was recalled from his position the enterprise was allowed to lapse and few vestiges of the work remain we will now examine the communications radiating from plevna a from plevna to nicopolis twenty five miles by way of cali servat and brezel jeniza b from plevna to widin the road from plevna to rhova is thirty five miles across the deep valleys of the isca and its branches

Rehova is a Bulgarian commercial town, situated in a narrow, level valley between receding mountains. The Turks had constructed some redoubts on the surrounding heights in order to make it serve as a post on the communications between Plevna and Vidn. The distance from Rehova to Lompolanka on the Danube is 35 miles, and from there is Vidn is also 35 miles.

A good road leads southward from Rohova to Vratse, 40 miles. From Vratse there is a direct road to Plevna, 60 miles, which crosses to the left bank of the Iska and follows that stream in its further course. All the roads named except the high road Rohova-Vratse are country roads which cross the deep cut valleys of the Ogost, Iska and Skit at various points.

c the great road from plevna to orkani and sofia was built during midhat pasha's governorship and surpasses most of the turkish roads in being well paved and wide enough to permit two four-horse wagons to pass each other at any point a telegraph line follows the road throughout its length

From Plevna the road runs westward, crosses the Vid , runs southwesterly across undulating ground to Dolny , Dubdy and Telos , southward to Luka Vica and Jablonica , westward to Olkani , then southward to the Balkan pass of Baba Konak . From here westward to Sofia .

D. From Plevena to Lovcha and Trojan. From Plevena to Lovcha, elevation 600 feet, 20 miles. From here upstream along the left bank of the Osma to Trojan, elevation 1100 feet, also 20 miles. Trojan is situated at the junction of the Balabanka with the Osma, and numbers 600 houses with 3500 inhabitants, in a district almost exclusively inhabited by Bulgarians.

south of trojan is the wealthy bulgarian monastery which was the centre of the bulgarian insurrection of eighteen sixty seven from trojan the road leads to the pass of trojan which has an elevation of five thousand feet e from plevna to lovcha and tirnova

A high road runs the entire distance, from Plevna to Lovcha on the Osma, 20 miles, from there to Selvi on the Rositsa, left branch of the Jantra, 20 miles, thence to Tirnova on the Jantra, 25 miles. From Selvi a road leads southward to Rosalita Pass, which has an elevation of 1,400 feet, and is distant from Selvi 30 miles, and 6 miles north of Khalifa. The Rosalita Pass is 25 miles to the west of the Shipka Pass. F.

From Plevna to Ruschak. From Plevna, the Great Road, prolongation of the Sofia Road, leads to Bolgareni on the Osma, 25 miles, then to Biella on the Jantra, 30 miles, and lastly to Ruschak, 25 miles. Subsection 2. Topographical Conditions. Plevna was a well-built town of 17,000 inhabitants, one half of whom were Mohammedans, with 3,100 houses, 18 mosques and two Christian churches.

it is situated on the tuchinitsa brook three miles above its junction with the river vid higher up on the brook lies the village of tuchinitsa from which the brook derives its name just below plevna the tuchinitsa brook is joined by the grovitsa brook which comes from the east and is so called from the village of grovitsa on its upper course

the entire country surrounding plevna on the east may be divided into three sections the section north of the grevitsa brook the middle section between grevitsa and tuchinitsa brooks the section between tuchinitsa brook and the vid river

The heights skirting the right bank of the Vid closely approach the river at Bivola and Oppenetz in the northern and at Olchugs in the southern section. Above Plevna, the valley of Tuchinitsa is a steep, narrow ravine, but expands below the town and forms a broad plain enclosed by mountains on the north and south. In the northern section, the great road Plevna-Bulgareni-Biela follows the northern bank of the Gravitsa.

the heights which form the northern edge of the grvitsa and tuchinitsa brooks and whose southern slopes are very abrupt are divided by the ravine of bukova into a western and eastern portion the former lying between the ravine named and the vid river the latter between the ravine of bukova and another ravine extending northward from grvitsa

The plateau forming the section between the Gravitsa and Tachinitsa brooks is furrowed by three smaller ravines. From Gravitsa southward extends the southern Gravitsa ravine. From the Tachinitsa valley eastward, the Radyshevo ravine. And between the two, from Plevna southeastward, the Middle ravine. The eastern edge of the southern Gravitsa ravine and the northern edge of the Radyshevo ravine were covered with brush and groups of trees.

The slopes of the steep and deep Tachinitsa ravine were covered for the most part with vineyards. The southern portion of the southern section has become known as the Green Hills and was thickly covered with trees, vines and high cornfields. To the east it forms three sharply separated knolls which are designated from south to north as First, Second and Third Knoll. The two depressions intervening between the knolls open into the Tachinitsa ravine

The Lovča road follows the western edge of the Ladda ravine and crosses the Green Hills. The northern part of this section, between Plevna and the Vid river, and separated from the Green Hills by a depression running east and west, seems to overtop the entire country around Plevna. From Plevna, the Great Road to Sofia follows the left bank of the Tachinitsa to the Vid, and crosses that river on a well-constructed wooden bridge which is 140 paces in length and rests on stone piers.

Subsection 3 Fortifications At the beginning of July, Plevna was without any fortification whatever.

about the middle of july at the time of the first attack probably but few points of the town itself were prepared for defence as the monastery at the eastern exit of the town toward the end of july the construction of works on the surrounding heights was taken in hand with great energy at the time of the great attack on july thirtieth most of the commanding points in the vicinity were entrenched

and subsequently the whole position was thoroughly fortified partly by the erection of new works partly by completing and strengthening those already in existence to the west of the bakova ravine was the bakova readout a east of the bakova ravine the so-called second gravitsa readout b close in front of gravitsa the first gravitsa readout also called abdul karim tabia c

to the southwest of the last was the eastern radysheva redoubt also called central redoubt or hafiz bey tabia d further to the west on the edge of the tachinitsa ravine the western radysheva redoubt or tachinitsa redoubt e lastly north of the green hills the krishin redoubt

All of these works were very large, of very strong profile, and provided in the interior with large hollow traverses prepared for artillery defence. In front and on the sides of the readouts were several lines of rifle trenches, which partly by the use of natural slopes and partly by artificial construction, rendered defence by tiers of rifle fire possible on a large scale. In second line were a number of smaller works to guard communication between those works and with the town.

Between the Christian readout and the town, two readouts were subsequently built, which were taken and again lost by Skobolev on the 11th and 12th of September. In the rear of the Christian readout was the camp of the Turkish reserves, protected by a number of works. On the west bank of the Vid, a sort of bridgehead was constructed in front of the bridge. The space from there northward to the mouth of the Netropoli Brook was covered by two additional works.

Lastly, let us quote here a brief description of the external aspect of the Turkish works as given by an eyewitness at the beginning of September. As viewed from the Russian batteries, the surroundings of Plevna appeared as a hilly plateau about five miles in width, bounded on the right and left by continuous ridges. The Gravitsa Heights and the Green Hills. In the background, hidden in the depression, was Plevna,

on first sight the entire plateau offered nothing unusual to the eye on closer observation however a series of entrenchments might be seen which looked like yellowish bands on the general green ground even with the aid of the field-glass details could not be distinguished

most conspicuous were the three foremost redoubts on the right the gravitsa redoubt on the left the radashevo works and farther in rear an entrenched camp the action at plevna on july twentieth

Subsection 1. Advance on Plevna on July 19th. On July 18th, Lieutenant General Shildr Shuldnir, commander of the 5th Infantry Division, received orders from General Krudnir to advance with two regiments, Arkhangelsk No. 17 and Walogda No. 18, of his division, four batteries and the 9th Don Cossacks from Nikopolos on Plevna, and to take possession of that place. Additional troops from beyond the Osma were also placed under his orders.

at bulgareni twenty five miles from nicopolis ten sotniers of the caucasian cossack brigade with a battery also one battalion of the kostroma regiment number nineteen at pardim twelve miles near a plevna the remainder of the nineteenth regiment a battery and two sotniers of cossacks

General Schilder-Schuldner gave directions to the Kostroma Regiment to assemble at Porodim, and then to march to Zagailvitsa. Arriving at 2pm July 19th, the Cossack Brigade was ordered to march to Tuchnitsa.

During the night of July 18th-19th, Lieutenant General Schulder-Schuldner bivouacked with the infantry brigade and artillery at the mouth of the Osma, and arrived on the afternoon of the 19th before Plevna, 21 miles. Finding the place occupied by the Turks, he opened fire from his guns and continued the cannonade until dark, and then went into bivouac in front of the town.

The 9th Don Cossacks had started towards Plevna separately from the infantry, bivouacked at Ribben on the night of the 18th-19th, and seemed to have remained there during the forenoon of the 19th. While they were cooking, the sound of guns was heard from Plevna, 10 miles, about 3pm. The camp kettles were emptied at once, and the regiment marched to within 2.5 miles of Plevna, where a small Turkish infantry detachment was encountered.

Half a Sotnia dismounted and began a fight, which lasted until dark. Covered by a chain of outposts consisting of two Sotnias, the regiment bivouacked in view of Plevna.

The Kostroma regiment with the battery and the two attached Sotniers reached Zagailvitsa at the designated hour and sent both Sotniers forward to reconnoitre toward Plevna. In the rear of the village of Gravitsa a hostile camp was discovered from which about 300 men, one infantry battalion and two guns started to meet the Cossacks who fell back on their infantry.

On the evening of the 19th, the troops of Schilderschuldner were posted in four separate groups, as follows. The 9th Don Cossacks, 6 Sotniers, on the extreme right, north of Plevna. The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division, 6 battalions, 32 guns, to the northeast of Plevna. The Kostroma Regiment, 3 battalions, 2 Sotniers, 8 guns, southeast of Plevna at Zagailvitsa. The Cossack Brigade, 10 Sotniers, 6 guns.

south of Plevna at Tuchinitsa. The whole detachment, which did not number more than 9,000 men, was in a crescent-shaped position, 10 miles in extent, facing a concentrated enemy at least twice its strength. Late in the evening, Shildershuldnir issued orders for the attack at 5 o'clock on the next morning. The Kostroma regiment received the order at 2am. Subsection 2. The attack on Plevna on July 20th.

At 4 a.m., Turkish troops advanced from Plevna against the 9th Cossacks and opened fire with artillery. The outposts of the Cossacks were assembled, dismounted, and occupied the edge of a wood on the extreme right. As the Turkish infantry and artillery advanced against this position, a report of the situation was dispatched to General Şıldor Şulnur,

who sent two infantry companies and a battery to support the regiment. The shrapnel fire of this battery soon caused the Turks to seek cover. Without further engagement, both sides remained facing each other until noon, when the Cossack regiment was ordered to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. The regiment, which had for the most part dismounted to fight on foot, mounted and moved to the left to interpose itself between the withdrawing infantry and the enemy.

a turkish cavalry detachment advancing in pursuit was driven back at six p m the regiment was at bryslan the main body posted along the road from nikopolos to plevna brought three batteries into action at four forty five a m against two turkish batteries soon afterward the brigade deployed on the west of the road in the following order

to the left of the batteries one battalion of the arkhangelsk regiment to the right two battalions of the arkhangelsk and two battalions of the wologda regiment all five battalions in two lines of company columns the rifle company fifth company of each battalion was deployed in front as skirmishers one wologda battalion with a battery formed the reserve from which the battery and two companies were soon afterward dispatched to the extreme right to support the cossacks

in front of the russian position was a ravine which opened into the vid valley at ribben the further edge of the ravine was covered with bushes and held by hostile riflemen in the rear of the ravine were heights on which the second so-called grevitsa redoubt and the bokova redoubts were subsequently built

At 5.30am, the Russians advanced the attack all along the line. The Arkhangelsk Regiment on the left encountered obstinate resistance and did not make much headway. The Walogda Regiment on the right and the nearest companies of the Arkhangelsk Regiment drove the hostile skirmishers back and reached the town itself where furious street fighting began.

the turks brought forward reinforcement after reinforcement and the losses of the russians increased at an alarming rate the brigade commander was wounded the commander of the logdor regiment was killed and the commander of the fifth artillery brigade as the senior officer present assumed command the position was held for the present

Up to 9.30am, General Schilderschuldner was without any information of the doings of the Kostroma Regiment. At the time he received a report that the commander of the Kostroma Regiment had been killed and that the Attack of the Regiment was not making headway. Receiving reports from several sides of total exhaustion and great losses of the troops and having no reserves at hand, he ordered the infantry to retire at 11.30am. The 9th Cossack Regiment to cover the withdrawal of the infantry.

upon the withdrawal of the arkhangelsk and wologda regiments seventeen ammunition carts fell into the hands of the turks partly because they were shot to pieces partly because the teams were killed the retreating brigade was relieved by the galitz regiment of same division which was coming up from nicopolis and in the evening both bivouacked at bryslan

At 5am, after a brief preparation by artillery fire, the Kostroma Regiment advanced to the attack, along the high road from Plevna to Bulgarini, against the height on which, subsequently, the 1st Kravica Redoubt, Abdul Karim Tabia, was built. The regiment deployed the 2nd and 3rd Battalions in two lines of company columns, the two rifle companies in front as skirmishers, the 1st Battalion in reserve, the two Sotnias were on the right flank,

three lines of rifle trenches were taken by the regiment one after the other and finally also the entrenchments on the height of the subsequent abdul karim tabia the assailants here captured a gun which had been dismounted by the fire of russian artillery

Thrown back to the town, the Turks offered furious resistance from behind hedges and walls. The losses of the Kostroma Regiment increased from minute to minute. The regimental commander, three field officers, most of the other officers, and a large part of the men were dead or wounded. The ammunition of the infantry and the artillery, which had followed the assaulting infantry to within effective infantry fire, began to run short.

For these reasons, the regiment fell back at 9am, when the Turks were bringing forward fresh reserves to the counter-attack. In order to approach the main body, the retreat was made in a different direction from that of the attack, and the men's packs, which had been taken off before the assault, fell into the enemy's hands. As the action began, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade moved from Turchinitsa to Radyshevo.

Since the ground impeded the movements of the cavalry, and as the mountain battery attached to the brigade could produce no effect on the hostile position owing to its small caliber, the brigade moved more to the right to connect with the Kostroma regiment. At 10 a.m. when the brigade reached Gravitsa, the Kostroma regiment was in retreat, in which the Cossack brigade joined. The Turkish pursuit did not extend beyond the original foremost Turkish positions. Subsection 3: Losses

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division lost one general, 51 field and company officers, and 1,878 men.

It is to be noted here that in the assault on Nikopolos a few days before, the Arkhangelsk Regiment lost 12 men, the Wologda Regiment 6 officers and 256 men. The loss of the brigade, whose effective strength can hardly have been more than 5,000 men, therefore, amounts to almost 2,000 men for the two days of the 15th and 20th of July.

on july twentieth the kostroma regiment which suffered no losses at nicopolis lost at plevna seven officers and three hundred and fifty nine men killed and fifteen officers and five hundred and thirty four men wounded the losses of the cossacks and of the artillery are not stated but they cannot have amounted to much

the turks claim to have captured a russian gun on that day nothing reliable is known about it it may have been a gun of the fifth battery of the thirty first brigade since this battery accompanied the assaulting kostroma regiment to within range of infantry fire comments

Comment 1. That the Supreme Command attached so little importance to the reports which reached Tienova on the 17th of July about hostile columns approaching the Vid from the West, and that it treated the occupation of Plevna as of inferior importance, are matters which can be commented on only with a full knowledge of the idea entertained of

of the whole situation at that time. Why was not a strong body of cavalry, a division, or at least a brigade, dispatched to Plevna in the middle of July during the struggle around Nicopolis? Being an important junction point of roads, 25 miles from Nicopolis and barely 43 from the point of passage at Sistova, Plevna was well worth that much attention.

comment to the advance of general schilderschuldner's weak detachment in two widely separated columns against an enemy of unknown strength was imprudent although in view of the actual positions of the troops a separation could not be avoided an attempt should have been made to unite the two detachments before proceeding to the attack

The march of the Nikopolos column under General Shiloshudna, when considered by itself, invites unfavourable criticism. Instead of sending his Cossack regiment forward at once to cover his march, the general led his infantry directly on Plevna, without caring for the whereabouts of his cavalry and without having given it specific instructions. On arrival before the town on the afternoon of the 19th, he had no cavalry to reconnoiter the ground in front or to establish communication with the other column.

he was unable on one hand to learn anything of the matters in and around plevna and on the other hand he seems to have been uncertain of the whereabouts of the other detachments the cannonade opened on plevna appears to have been a cover behind which he hid his painful perplexity but it had the good effect of informing the other detachments of the whereabouts of the main column

Some time after the beginning of the cannonade, the 9th Cossack Regiment made its appearance. Not only had it not preceded the infantry on the march to Plevna, but it had remained far in the rear. On the night of July 18th-19th, the bivouac of the Cossack Regiment, at Ribben, was but 10 miles from Plevna, while the bivouac of the infantry on the same night was 22 miles from that place.

by proper management the cossacks would have had plenty of time to thoroughly reconnoitre the vicinity of plevna before the arrival of the infantry but at the moment when the infantry arrived and the artillery opened the cossacks were still quietly resting at ribbon and in the act of cooking this can be explained in no other way except that the commander of the cossack regiment was not properly informed of the contemplated movement

And the fact that this infantry, marching at random toward the enemy, did not suffer a heavy defeat on the 19th is probably due to the incredible clumsiness of Turkish troops in offensive movements. Turning to the march of the other column, we find the infantry provided with two Sotniers of Cossacks, which were properly employed in reconnaissance. However, the employment of the Cossack brigade, which was also attached to this column, cannot be considered proper.

The brigade marched 25 miles from Bulgareni to Tuchinitsa, while the infantry column, which marched from Bulgareni to Zagailvitsa, covered almost an equal distance. It is true that small patrols were sent out from Tuchinitsa, but complete information of the situation was not gained.

According to recent ideas on the employment of advanced bodies of cavalry in the Russian army, one would expect the Cossack brigade to move rapidly on Plevna, reach there about noon, make a feint against the town from the south under cooperation of the horse artillery, and endeavour to advance with several Sotnias between the town and the river against the bridge over the Vid. Whether Plevna was occupied feebly or not at all, in any event, sufficient information would have been gathered without exposing the brigade to great risk.

Comment 3. The attack of the two regiments of Arkhangelsk and Wologda on the morning of July 20th was made without sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy's position and without any preparation by the fire of skirmishers. The preparation of the attack by artillery did not last more than half an hour. From the very beginning, five of the six available battalions were led to the attack against the wholly unknown position of the enemy.

the only battalion kept in reserve was very soon called upon to detach two companies to the right to support the cossacks so that there was no real reserve at the disposal of the leader for use in emergencies or after clearer knowledge of the situation the same may be stated of the attack of the kostroma regiment although one-third of the troops was nominally set aside as a reserve it was almost as soon engaged in the conflict as the other two battalions

Comment 4. The expenditure of ammunition in the six hours of this action seems to have been very great, since almost all of the ammunition carts were bought up and emptied. The Russian infantry carried 60 rounds in the pouches, and in addition each company was provided with a three-horse ammunition cart. More than one-half of the ammunition carts of the 1st Brigade fell into the hands of the Turks. End of section 4.

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you save. Go to selectquote.com slash spotifypod today to get started. Section 5 of Tactical Studies on the Battles around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 5. The Battle of Plevna on July 30th. Subsection 1. Position of the Troops on the evening of July 29th.

Bryslan, 9th Lancers, 9th Don Cossacks, 2nd Don Cossack Battery, 10 squadrons and 6 guns. At Koyolorsky, 31st Infantry Division, less the Warrenesh 124 Regiment and 1 battery at Sistova, 9 battalions and 40 guns. At Tristanik, 5th Infantry Division, less Kostroma Regiment, number 19 and 1 battery at Nikopolos, 9 battalions and 40 guns.

At Karagach, 2nd Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division with 3 batteries, 6 battalions and 24 guns. At Porodim, 1st Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 32nd Infantry Division, 6 foot batteries, 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division and 1 horse battery, 12 battalions, 8 squadrons, 54 guns. At Bogot, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with the 8th Don Cossacks and the Mountain Horse Battery, 12 Sotniers and 12 guns.

total thirty six battalions thirty squadrons and a hundred and seventy six guns among which were eighty nine pounders seventy two four pounders eighteen horse and six mountain guns the line brysland pyridin begot was about twenty five miles long and formed an arc of a circle whose radius was about twelve miles and whose centre was at plevna the left at begot was twelve miles from lovcher which was held by the turks

the right at bryceland was the same distance from nicopolis the distance from the centre of the position at porodim to the osmar bridge in the rear at bulgarini was also twelve miles sub section two dispositions for the battle a right flank cavalry detachment under general lochkaerf to start at six a m from bryceland covered the right flank and observed as far as the vid

B. Right wing, under Lieutenant General Wilhelmhoff, 31st and 5th Infantry Divisions, to attack the enemy's position north of the High Road, the 5th Infantry Division in reserve. C. Left wing, under Lieutenant General Prince Shikovskoi, 1st Brigade of the 30th Division and 1st Brigade of the 32nd Division, to march at 5am from Porodim and attack the position between Gravitsa and Radyshevo.

D. Left flank cavalry detachment under Major General Skobolev to march at 5am from Bogot take position on the Lovcha road and watch the country, particularly in the direction of Lovcha. The detachment was reinforced from Prince Chekhovskoy's command by the 3rd battalion of the Kursk Regiment No. 125 and 4 guns. Both cavalry detachments had orders in case of the enemy's retreat to cross to the left bank of the Vid and bar the enemy's road to Sofia if possible.

E. General Reserve, under personal command of Lieutenant General Crudner, 2nd Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 2 squadrons each of the 11th Dragoons and 11th Lancers, 1 horse battery, total 6 battalions, 4 squadrons and 30 guns. Was posted with the infantry at Porodim and the cavalry at Peleshat. Subsection 3. Deployment for battle and the artillery combat up to 2.30pm.

The right wing completed its deployment by 7am. The first line, consisting of the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division, with 6 battalions and 24 guns, in the second line the Kozlov Regiment, number 123, with 3 battalions and 16 guns. About 10 o'clock, the 5th Infantry Division, consisting of 9 battalions and 24 guns, was posted in 3rd line.

at eight fifteen a m the first gun was fired by the turks the twenty-four russian guns in the first line directed their fire on the flashes of the enemy's guns the fog being so dense that the enemy's position could not be seen all that could be observed in front was a wide ravine densely covered with brush and hostile skirmishers and two guns at its further edge

by nine a m the fog had settled so far that the large gravitsa redoubt became visible against which the russian guns reinforced by the batteries in the second line now directed their fire the ground did not permit placing more than forty guns in battery the artillery combat thus opened was continued until two forty p m

The left wing occupied the village of Radyshevo by 9am without firing a shot. The 1st Brigade, numbering 5 battalions and 28 guns after reinforcing Skobolev, of the 32nd Division, deployed on the heights to the east and north of the village. The 1st Brigade of the 30th Division was kept in reserve, and posted at first on the road from Peleshat to Radyshevo, subsequently nearer to Radyshevo.

At 10am the Turks opened the artillery combat which was taken up by the Russians and continued until 2:30pm, the infantry meanwhile not firing a shot. In the course of the cannonade two Turkish batteries ceased firing. The redoubt north of Radyshevo, Hafiz Bey Tabya, had suffered severely. Three Russian guns were rendered unserviceable and the battery had to be relieved from the reserve. Subsection 4: Attack of the Russian right wing.

At 2.40pm, Lieutenant General Krudny ordered Lieutenant General Wilhelminov to proceed to the attack of the Gravitsa readout in two columns, one from the north and one from the east. The north column consisted of the Penza Regiment and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Kozlov Regiment. On the east, General Wilhelminov himself, with the Tambov Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the Kozlov Regiment. The right column was followed by a reserve of six battalions, Arkhangelsk and Vologdo Regiments,

the left by three battalions, Gallitz Regiment. The 1st Panzer Battalion, which led the right column, took the first line of trenches on the near side of the ravine, but was brought to a halt by the murderous fire from a second line just behind it. The 2nd Panzer Battalion advanced on the left of the 1st, carried the second line of rifle trenches, crossed the ravine with the retreating Turks, and approached the readout.

The third line of trenches in front of the redoubt was also taken. The assailants ensconced themselves in it, and a part of them rushed for the redoubt. After the commander of the 2nd Battalion, who had placed himself at the head of the assailants, was killed on the parapet, the attack was repulsed, and the efforts of the rest of the regiment to take the redoubt were equally fruitless. After losing 29 officers and 1,000 men by the murderous infantry fire from the redoubt and flanking rifle trenches, the Penns Regiment retreated in considerable disorder.

the two kozlov battalions of this column then advanced the attack penetrated to the redoubt and apart reached the ditch where the regimental commander fell pierced by three bullets the assailants did not succeed in taking the breastwork but maintained themselves in the ditch both sides keeping up a murderous fire at short range

At this time, Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner brought up from the right the last reserves of the column consisting of the Arkhangelsk and Wologda regiments. He crossed the ravine and took the trenches on the side from whence up to this time the Kozlov regiment had received flanking fire, but the attack of these six fresh battalions on the redoubt itself also failed.

the left column of four battalions under lieutenant-general wilhelminov which moved from the east and more in the direction of the high road came under such severe fire that the attack was stopped without reaching the redoubt the men opening what seemed to be a very ineffective rapid fire the goletz regiment which had formed the reserve of this column having also been brought up the attack was renewed and again repulsed at six p m after the infantry attack had lasted over three hours the situation on the right wing was as follows

the three battalions of the panzer regiment almost destroyed by its losses seemed to have withdrawn from the fighting line altogether the remnants of fifteen battalions shot to pieces and badly intermixed maintained themselves in the space between the redoubt and the ravine partly to the east partly to the north of the former

as early as four p m the whole koloma regiment had been drawn from the general reserve to support the left wing at six p m one battalion of the serpukhov regiment with some cavalry and artillery was dispatched to the extreme right to check the retrograde movement beginning there leaving but two fresh battalions two squadrons and some artillery as a general reserve

towards sundown general krudner ordered a renewed attack to support which he sent forward three companies of the reserve followed subsequently by three more companies three successive assaults were repulsed in the last the commander of the second brigade of the thirtieth division was wounded within one hundred paces of the redoubt

darkness had meanwhile settled down but in the vicinity of the redoubt a wild and disorderly conflict was continued with uninterrupted firing and cheering under these circumstances krudner abandoned all hope of a favourable turn of the struggle and gave the order to retreat

the last sapukov battalion of the reserve the gallitz regiment of the left column which had suffered least and the warrenesh regiment which had just arrived on the field from sistova were ordered to cover the retreat these troops took up the action under the cover of which the wounded were collected by means of the available transportation the conflict raged around the redat during the whole night at daybreak the last detachments retreated and it was not until eleven a m on july thirty first that the troops of the right wing were assembled at tristanic and karagatch

No pursuit took place. Subsection 5. Attack of the Russian Left Wing.

At 2.30pm, Prince Chekhovskoy sent forward the Kursk and Rilsk regiments, five battalions, on the two redoubts between the high roads to Lovcha and Bulgarini. In front of the redoubts, three and four lines of trenches had been constructed. The trenches were taken after a furious struggle, and the Turks thrown back on the redoubts. Whereupon the Rilsk regiment moved on the eastern, the Kursk regiment on the western redoubt. Two guns fell into the hands of the assailants, the Turks succeeding in removing ten other guns from the fortification in good time.

the assault on the western redoubt presented greater difficulties on advancing against this redoubt the kursk regiment was taken in the left flank by the fire of a battery and skirmishes in action on the edge of the tuchinitza ravine while in front on both sides of the redoubt dense lines of closed infantry appeared to receive the assailants with a murderous fire at a range of two hundred to three hundred paces

To support the attack, some companies of the Rilsk Regiment advanced at this critical moment from the captured eastern readout, and the 1st Shuzhoy Battalion from the reserve came up on the left, while the artillery of the left wing, reinforced by fresh batteries from the reserve, advanced at the same time.

The attack was successful, and the Western readout was also taken, but the losses were very heavy. The commander of the Rilsk Regiment, although wounded, retained command of his regiment. The commander of the Shuzha Regiment, leading his first battalion in person, fell mortally wounded, but ordered the soldiers who wanted to carry him off to leave him and encourage his men to advance. Matters had reached this stage by 5pm.

Prince Chekhovskoy received from General Krudny the information that the Koloma regiment and a battery from the General Reserve had been dispatched in support of the left wing. In fact, however, the regiment did not reach its destination, but became embroiled in the general conflict on the extreme right of the left wing without producing a visible effect on the course of the action.

as the turks were proceeding to the counter-attack with fresh forces shikovskoy in hope of using the koloma regiment as reserve brought the second and third suzer battalions from his own reserve to the support of his right which left him but three fresh battalions of the jaroslav regiment in reserve two batteries were brought forward from the right of the artillery position and posted to the right of the eastern redoubt soon afterward the first jaroslav division was ordered forward to support the left

With the beginning of darkness, the Turks made a new counter-attack, this time with considerable bodies of cavalry on both flanks, endeavouring to turn the Russian position. To support the hard-pressed left, another Jaroslav battalion came forward from the reserve, while a battery advanced boldly into action almost on the flank of the Turkish attack, and took it under effective fire. Shchukov's Koi decided to retreat, although the Turkish attack was repulsed. Ten of his eleven battalions were in action and reduced by severe losses.

All the troops were completely exhausted, and no reinforcements were at hand or in prospect to oppose the frequently renewed attacks of the Turks. The retreat was begun in good order, the two captured guns having to be left behind. The troops at first took up position on the heights, close in front of Radyshevo, which they had in the morning, and passed the night there. Next morning they withdrew to Porodim unmolested. Subsection 6. Attack of the Left Flank Detachment

Meanwhile, General Skobolev was making his last attack presently to be described, thereby rendering the position of Zhukovskaya's left less difficult.

under cover of the dense fog skobloff had moved from bogot unmolested to chreshin where he halted his main body and advanced in person with two sotniers and four guns to within six hundred and fifty yards of the edge of the western suburb of plevna from this point he observed some twenty thousand infantry in close reserve formation between the heights of the grevitz zareedout and the town while cavalry were seen in rear toward the vid

At 10am, Shikovskoi's guns were heard, and Skobolev ordered his four guns to open fire, which was at once replied to by six Turkish guns. Shortly afterward, quite a number of Turkish guns took up the fire, and infantry columns with skirmishers in front and cavalry on the flanks moved to the attack of Skobolev. Before this overwhelming attack, Skobolev withdrew to his main position at Krishin and made the following dispositions.

1. Colonel to Tolman with three Sotnias and twelve horse guns remained on the height of Krishin, fronting towards Lovcha with strong Cossack posts pushed out beyond. 2. One Sotnia sent to the left toward the Vid in observation and twenty volunteers under an officer were charged with discovering a ford for use in case the detachment should have to cross to the left bank to move on the enemy's communications. The detachment of volunteers accomplished its object to Skobolev's complete satisfaction.

3. One Sotnia was detached to the right, with orders to keep up communication with Shikovskoi, from whose position Skobolev was separated by the steep and rocky Tachnitsa ravine. Throughout the day it reported all that took place on Shikovskoi's side. Skobolev advanced with four remaining Sotnias, the 3rd Kursk Battalion, and the 4-foot guns toward Plevna to reoccupy the position he had held before and from which the Turks might direct an effective fire against the flank of Shikovskoi's troops.

at first moved to the attack with one and a half companies two soutenirs and the four guns keeping the rest of his detachment in reserve in case he should be attacked from the direction of lovcha this small detachment occupied the commanding height close in front of plevna and maintained itself there from ten a m to four p m

against eight turkish batteries supported by artillery which made repeated attacks against the russian position by four p m skobeleff had become convinced that no danger was impending from lovcha and he was informed that chekhovskoye was making a decisive attack on receipt of this information he left but a half company in reserve and led three companies forward to support his hard-pressed detachment when within a few paces of the guns the turks were driven back as far as the edge of town by a sudden bayonet charge

Supported by the four guns, the Kursk battalion withstood for two hours the repeated attacks of the Turks. It was only at dusk that Skobolev ordered the retreat. To cover the withdrawal of the infantry and guns, and the removal of the wounded, the Cossacks advanced repeatedly to the attack, mounted and dismounted. Upon the arrival of the detachment at Krishin at 10pm, Skobolev received Shikovskoi's order to withdraw to Bogot and Peleshat. Subsection 7. Losses

The Russian losses in killed, wounded and missing are given as 169 officers and 7136 men. Some details of the official tables of losses are interesting. The regiments of the 30th division lost in killed and wounded: Jaroslav number 117, 238 men. Shuzha number 118, 114 men. Koloma number 119, 85 men. Sapukhov number 120, 214 men.

Details of the losses of the regiments of the 5th and 31st Divisions cannot be ascertained since the losses at Nicopolis and in the two battles of Plevna are not separately given. The losses of the two regiments of the 11th Corps on the left of the first line, which captured the two readouts north of Radyshevo, were quite severe. Kursk Regiment No. 125, part of the regiment that was in action under Skobolev, 336 men killed. Rilsk Regiment No. 126,

seven hundred and twenty five men killed subsection eight the panic at zistova the following events although very slightly connected with the battle of plevna are here stated as forming an interesting contribution to the history of confusion created by a false alarm

At noon on July 31st, the first wounded from the Battle of Plevna reached Sistova from Bulgarini, saying that the battle was lost and that it was rumoured that a transport of wounded while en route had been attacked by Turkish cavalry and cut down. The statement created consternation among the inhabitants of Sistova and among the men of the new Bulgarian Drushinas, which were being formed there. A large portion of these men started for the pontoon bridge below the town with the cry, ''The Turks are coming!''

Here a large number of empty provision wagons were halting on the Bulgarian bank, their destination being Zimnitsa. A drunken Cossack on an unsaddled horse, preceding the swarm of fugitives, galloped toward the bridge crying, "The Turks are in Sistova!" Whereupon a terrible confusion ensued in the train. All the wagons trying to gain the bridge, the swarm of fugitives from Sistova also rushed upon the bridge.

The commander of the bridge, General Richter of the Engineers, who happened to be on the north bank at the time, ordered the small detachments at his disposal to close the bridge by force of arms if necessary. Through his energetic intervention, he succeeded in restoring order. Meanwhile, word came from the commander of Sistova that the report was false and that there were no Turks inside at all. To allay the uneasiness of the inhabitants, the Russian detachment stationed in the town had meanwhile taken a defensive position in front of the town.

The bridge being closed, swarms of fugitives crossed the Danube by boat, in which operation several persons were drowned. They soon spread the false alarm in Zimnitza. The Turks have taken the bridge! The Turks are marching on Zimnitza! The Turks are crossing from the right to the left bank on four steamers!

The entire population and a large part of the wounded in the hospitals began to fly. After much trouble, Cossack patrols succeeded in bringing the fugitives back to town. The confusion was increased by the fact that at the time of the arrival of the first alarming news, a detachment of Turks captured in former engagements happened to be conducted through Zimnitsa. Comments

comment one general krudner although nominally commander-in-chief seems to have occupied himself chiefly with his own ninth corps which formed the right wing and to have left the conduct of the left wing without reservation to prince shakofskoy commander of the eleventh corps this fact became evident in the dispositions made by krudner for the position and attack of the ninth corps although that corps had an acting commander in the person of general wilhelminov while he left the details on the other wing to general

moreover krudner ordered the right wing with which he remained exclusively to attack at two forty p m after shchakowskoi had begun the attack of the left wing at two thirty p m on his own responsibility in uniform conduct of the battle by a common superior general krudner is therefore out of the question

Comment 2. A striking point in the disposition is the weakness of the General Reserve, consisting of one-sixth of the available battalions. The disruption of the unity of the 30th Infantry Division is also surprising. One of its brigades was combined with a brigade of another division to form the left wing, while the other brigade of the former division was held in reserve. The reason may have been a desire of placing under Prince Chekhovskoy's orders the only infantry brigade of his corps present, 1st of the 32nd Division.

the brigades and divisions being posted in lines in rear of each other instead of abreast caused a complete disruption of the larger tactical units in the course of the battle this was particularly noticeable in the ninth corps where it would have been far more appropriate to have formed each of the great wing columns of an entire division

comment three general krudner is said to have reconnoitred the enemy's position in person on the day preceding the battle the same was done by colonel biskupski chief of staff of the eleventh corps in the portion south of the high road bulgareni plevna which was assigned to the left wing as its field of attack

both reconnaissances seem to have been conducted in a very general way for several days the russians had been in comparatively close proximity to the enemy yet a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position does not seem to have taken place sufficient information had not been gained about the details of terrain in front or about the fortifications of the turks

had this been done the dense fog which covered the field during the first hours of the artillery combat and which was not favourable to the efficiency of the russian artillery fire might have been turned to good account by the russians in masking the advance of strong skirmish lines against the turkish position it would have been possible for instance to capture the great ravine in front of the grevitsa redoubt without much difficulty and with comparatively small loss thus securing from the beginning an intermediate position favourable to subsequent attack on the redoubt

skobaleff's bold and skilful mode of proceeding on the extreme left demonstrates that the fog could be taken advantage of for reconnaissance and attack of the enemy's position comment for nowhere was the russian attack ushered in by the fire of skirmishes after the cannonade whose effect seems to have been small the russian infantry which up to this time had not fired a shot moved in dense masses to the attack which was frontal throughout and unaccompanied by any attempt to turn the enemy's flank

The chief strength of the Turkish position did not lie in the readouts, which have attracted the most attention, but in the tiers of rifle trenches in front and the flank of the readouts. In order to capture a position entrenched in this manner, it is evidently not so important to penetrate into the readout as to carry the trenches on the flanks, in which case the readout would have been isolated and unable to hold out for any length of time.

But the method of the right wing in its attack is not based on such an idea. The nine battalions in the first line were formed in two columns, and moved from north and east against the Great Readout in the rear of the village of Gravitsa. The entire second line was attached to these two columns from the beginning and moved off with them so that, properly speaking, all of the 18 battalions of the right wing were out of the hands of the leaders from the very beginning of the attack.

If we examine the details of the action, we find two columns advancing against the redoubt on a narrow front and under effective fire from some rifle trenches at the side.

Of the right column, five battalions advanced successively on the readout. Each battalion reached the enemy when the preceding battalion had been used up. Each battalion lost large part of its men under the fire from the rifle trenches which swept the approaches to the readout. Of each battalion, only fragments got into the ditch of the readout, where they maintained a hopeless and desperate struggle, in which a large part of the officers and the bravest of the men found their death. Further tactical availability of these five battalions was out of the question.

The six battalions of the Arkhangelsk and Walogda regiments, brought up from the reserve to support the attack, at last turned on the rifle trenches, the gauntlet of whose murderous fire the preceding assailants of the Redat had run. These rifle trenches were taken after a furious struggle, but now these six battalions were also expended, for it should be borne in mind that these battalions, whose strength at the beginning of July was probably less than 5,000 men, had lost more than 2,000 men and the greater part of their officers in the bloody actions of the 15th and 20th of July.

Attempts made by fractions of the battalions to take the redoubt failed and added to the losses, and henceforth these battalions were likewise no longer to be regarded as technical bodies.

but as a disorganised mass of more or less brave men on which the higher leaders could no longer exert any influence since most of the officers were dead or wounded. The conditions with the left column were similar. Here also the battalions of the second line became early involved in the action. All frontal attacks against the redoubt were repulsed with great loss, chiefly by the fire from the rifle trenches, which on this part of the field were not captured at all.

All available troops of the right wing, 18 battalions, were expended and out of hand before the Turkish reserves moved to counter-attack. On the whole, the attack of the Russian left wing was conducted more correctly and therefore with more success. The five battalions of the first line made their attack without preparation by fire, but simultaneously on a broad front and supported by one battalion from the reserve and the fire of several batteries also advancing upon the enemy's position.

The battalions of the first line succeeded in capturing both readouts and the rifle trenches in front and on the flank, while five fresh battalions of the second line remained available. The Turkish counterattack, effectively supported by artillery and swarms of skirmishers in a flanking position along the Tchernitsa ravine, was repulsed with the aid of three battalions gradually brought forward from the second line.

At dusk, the Turks began the second counterattack with fresh forces. It was repulsed, it is true, with the assistance of another battalion from the second line, but having a single fresh battalion left to him, and having learned of the complete failure of the attack on the right, Shikovskay did not wait for the third counterattack of the Turks, and began a well-ordered retreat, covered by his last fresh battalion.

the course of action was thus very different on the two wings on the right krud and his eighteen battalions failed to gain possession of the enemy's position and in this wing the turks were not obliged to use their reserves at all in consequence of which almost all of them were sent against

And in order to cover the retreat of the battalions engaged, the last troops of the senselessly squandered General Reserve had to be brought forward. On the left, Shchukovskoi's first line succeeded almost single-handed in capturing the enemy's position, and the second line was only used to repulse two strong counterattacks of the Turkish reserves.

and at the termination of this furious and costly struggle the troops possessed a certain outward cohesion which rendered tactical action and leading possible it cannot be denied that the left wing accomplished much more with far inferior means than the right

in casting a parting glance at the employment of the general reserve we find that shortly after the beginning of the infantry attack it was diverted from its proper purpose by direct orders of general krudner and distributed among both wings as a kind of special reserve at four p m the koloma regiment was detached to the left wing where it became engaged in the general action without plan or effect and the sepukhov regiment was retained in support of the right wing

From the moment of this division, the all-too-weak reserve was no longer able to exert a decisive influence on the general conflict. How the Superkov regiment was subsequently squandered has been stated above.

had the right wing gained the same results as the left compelling the turks to expend part of their reserves against it then a general advance about dusk by the reserve held in hand until the moment either in the centre along the great highroad or on either flank might and probably would have produced a decisive result of this bloody day in favour of the russian arms comment five it becomes evident from the above description that we can hardly speak of a co-operation of the three arms in the course of the battle

the preparation of the attack was left exclusively to the artillery the attack of the infantry received little assistance from the artillery on the left and none at all on the right the russian cavalry took no active part in the conflict of the main bodies the possibility of the cooperation of the three arms in unfavourable terrain is demonstrated by the small left flank detachment under general

The conduct of the action by this general shows a rare combination of prudence and rashness. His personal and thorough reconnaissance of the ground, his careful arrangements for guarding the rear of his detachment, and for maintaining communications with the main army. The bold advance of his small detachment close to the enemy's position, attracting disproportionately large forces of the enemy, and rendering the attack of the main army correspondingly easier.

his stout defensive action in which infantry artillery and cavalry both mounted and dismounted supported one another with great skill lastly upon learning of the beginning of the main attack on the part of chekoskoy's troops his energetic offensive for which he employed his heretofore carefully husbanded small infantry reserve and the skilful and successful retreat under difficult circumstances are certainly worthy of great consideration and thorough study

End of section five.

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$200 Verizon gift card requires smartphone purchase $799.99 or more with new line on eligible plan. Gift card sent within eight weeks after receipt of claim. Phone offer requires $799.99 purchase with new smartphone line on unlimited ultimate or postpaid unlimited plus. Minimum plan $80 a month with auto pay plus taxes and fees for 36 months. Less $800 trade-in or promo credit applied over 36 months. 0% APR. Trade-in must be from Apple, Google, or Samsung. Trade-in and additional terms apply. Section 6 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha.

this librivox recording is in the public domain read by alistair part six sortie battle of zagailvitsa and peleshat on the thirty first of august position of the west army on the morning of the thirty first of august

The right of the army was formed by the 4th Romanian Division, which was posted between the Vid and the High Road to Nicopolis. The 9th Corps formed the centre between the Nicopolis and Bolgareni roads. The 4th Corps formed the left, between the Bolgareni and Lovča roads. The 4th Corps was commanded by General Krylov, in the absence of General Zotov, who was acting as commander-in-chief of the West Army. The following positions were occupied on the morning of 31 August:

the outposts stood on the line bogot tachinitsa radyshevo grovitsa ten miles and were furnished on the left by two squadrons of the fourth lancers on the right by two squadrons of the fourth hussars

The call was posted as follows: On the left at Pelesat, the regiments Sustal No. 62, Uglitz No. 63, two squadrons of the 4th Lancers and probably four batteries. About 2,000 yards in front of the position there was a lunette occupied by two companies and two guns.

At Zgailvitsa on the right, there were entrenched two Shuzhya battalions, two squadrons of the 4th hussars, two foot batteries, 8th horse battery of the 4th corps, the Galitsa regiment number 20, with a battery of the 9th corps, also a sapper company. The regiments Jaroslav number 117, Koloma number 119, Sapukhov number 120, and two batteries were in reserve. The following troops of the 4th corps were absent.

The 4th Dragoons observed the valley of Ozma at Karahasan. The Vladimir Regiment No. 61 was on the way from Zimnitsa to join its corps and had reached Karagach, 8 miles west of Bulgareni, on the Great Road. The Kazan Regiment No. 64 won the Suja Battalion No. 118 and a battery were with the corps of Prince Ameretinsky operating against Lovcha. The position of the 4th Cossack Regiment and three batteries at this time cannot be ascertained.

subsection two turkish attack eight thirty a m until one p m at six thirty a m the russian outposts reported that strong turkish bodies were marching out of the entrenchments south of the highroad and advancing on pelashat and zagailovtse with a thick line of cavalry in front

General Zotov was at first inclined to consider the reported movement a feint to screen a serious attack against either the Ninth Corps or the Romanians. No changes in the position of troops were made for the present. The two squadrons of Lancers at Peleshat, the two Hussar squadrons, and the horse battery at Zagailvitsa advanced to the support of the hard-pressed outposts.

In view of the strength of the Turkish cavalry, which numbered 2,500 horses, the Lancers gradually fell back on Pelechat and the Hussar regiment on Zagailvitsa. At 8am, the Turkish cavalry withdrew to the flank, disclosing a strong line of infantry, which moved to the attack on Pelechat. The Lynette was taken after a brief but fierce struggle. Its garrison fell back on Pelechat, where it was relieved by five companies of the Sustal regiment.

After three batteries had cannonaded the Turks for some time, detachments of the Sustal regiment advanced to the attack and recaptured the lunette,

Toward 9am, the Turks brought up considerable reinforcements. Their right extended more and more, and turned the left of the Russian position. Swarms of bashi-bazooks penetrated into Peleshat and set fire to the village. A new attack on the Lynette was repulsed. Opposite the position of Skalvitsa, batteries came into action, and a cannonade began on both sides.

At 10am, no reports of any hostile movements having been received from the outposts of the 9th Corps and the Romanian Division, General Zotov became convinced that the main attack was against his left wing, 4th Corps, and issued the following orders. A. One brigade of the 9th Corps to advance at once on the high road and attack the enemy's left flank.

b the reserves of the ninth corps three regiments of the thirtieth infantry division to take position north of porodim and hold themselves at the disposal of the commander-in-chief c the vladimir regiment number sixty one which had reached karagach to leave train and knapsacks and to march as quickly as possible to porodim to join the general reserve d the fourth romanian division to assemble at once at

Opposite the entire Russian position from Pelishat to Zagailvitsa, the Turks deployed a long line of infantry. About noon, in front of the infantry, some 40 or 50 guns fired on the Russian position and were replied to by the Russian batteries. Subsection 3. Repulse of the Turkish attack. 1 to 5 p.m.

toward one p m the turkish infantry advanced to a general attack which was made in three principal directions against the position of the lunette against the left flank and against the centre of the zgailvitsa position

A. The attack against Peleshat and the Lynette in front was repulsed in front by the fire of four batteries. The commander of the 4th Corps, General Krylov, advanced against the extreme right of the assailing Turks with four squadrons of lancers, two squadrons of hussars, and a horse battery. The Turks retired slowly and threw their right well back when it was threatened by the Russian cavalry. B. The attack on the left of the Zagailvitsa position struck one Galitz battalion, number 20, and four guns.

this portion of the position was reinforced from the reserve at poredim by two battalions so number one hundred and twenty and a battery the attack of the turks was repulsed c the attack directed against the centre of the zgailvitsa position was carried out with great energy and reached the russian rifle trenches but was repulsed by the counter-attack of the russian infantry posted there

2 Galitsa battalions No. 20 and 2 Shuzha battalions No. 118. 24 guns covered the Turks with a murderous fire during their advance, as well as during their retreat. During the great infantry attack, the cavalry of the Turkish left attempted to turn the right of the Zagalevitsa position. The movement was discovered by the two Hussar squadrons posted there, and frustrated without difficulty by artillery fire.

notwithstanding their previous failure and great loss the turks undertook a second attack at three p m well prepared by artillery and infantry fire the attack was not made with the same energy as the first and failed also

on this occasion the regiments sussdal and uglitz of the left and two battalions each of the regiments galitz and shuzha of the right wing made an attempt to take the offensive but were checked by a turkish counter-attack undertaken partly by fresh troops and supported by severe fire of heavy artillery whereupon the russian battalions fell back to their original positions at four thirty p m the turks began their retreat to plevna under the cover of a heavy artillery fire sub section four in effectual pursuit

General Krylov ordered the ten battalions in first line, and the available eight squadrons of Lancers and Hussars, to pursue, which however yielded no result. The two cavalry regiments had been on outpost without interruption for two months, and they had not been able to either feed or unsettle throughout this day. The Dragoon regiment posted on the Osmer did not reach the core until after the termination of the action.

The infantry pursued for three miles, and returned without having affected anything particular. The result might have been better if the brigade which had been ordered forward to Gravitsa by the high road had been able to take the Turks in the flank. Although directed to advance with the utmost speed in the direction indicated, the brigade did not leave its knapsacks behind, but started with them. This circumstance, in connection with the great heat, so delayed the movement that the brigade was too late to act against the enemy's flank.

Subsection 5. Losses. The losses of the Russians were killed, 3 officers, 171 men. Wounded, 27 officers, 708 men. Missing, 66 men. Total, 30 officers, 945 men. Comments. Comment 1. The outer line of the Russian line of investment, or better, their line of observation east of Plevna, began on the left at the road to Lovtshchia.

and described from there an arc of a circle with plevna as the centre to the vid above ribbon the line had an extent of about twenty miles with a radius of about six miles the position of the russian reserves at porodim was twelve miles to the east of plevna and six miles in the rear of the centre of the russian front it may not be out of place here to cast a glance at the strength of the armies opposing each other at plevna

At the beginning of August, the West Army, in front of Plevna, consisted of the four infantry divisions of the 4th and 9th Corps, which, at the time of the passage of the Danube, may have numbered about 40,000 effectives. Deducting 10,000 men for the losses suffered by these divisions in the actions of July, there remain 30,000 infantry, without counting loss from disease.

To these may be added about 10,000 cavalry, artillery and special troops, and as many Romanians, 4th Division, giving a total of some 50,000 men, deducting losses from disease during the months of July and August, and taking also into account the absence of several bodies included in the above calculation, which were attached to the corps operating against Lovša.

The maximum available strength did not probably exceed 45,000 men present before Plevna toward the end of August. In calculating the strength of the Turkish army, it is perhaps best to figure backwards from the number of men comprised in the surrender. At that time, there were in Plevna some 57,000 men, inclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded. It can be proved that reinforcements to the amount of some 12,000 men entered Plevna during the month of September, which leaves 45,000 men.

estimating the loss from battle or disease for september to december at five thousand men probably much too low we find that toward the end of august the turkish army at plevna numbered at least fifty thousand effectives and was at least equal and probably superior to the investing army which moreover was scattered over a line twenty miles long

comment to the failure of the pursuit after the repulse of the turkish attack renders it proper to ask whether such an attempt was right under the circumstances it would probably be so only in the case it were the intention to enter the entrenchments of the retreating enemy

or in case it seemed practicable to drive a portion of the enemy from the line of retreat before reaching the shelter of the entrenchments if neither is the case pursuit under similar circumstances had better be omitted as it will invariably result in the retreat of the pursuing troops from the works thus raising the morale of the previously defeated enemy end of section six

section seven of tactical studies on the battles around plevna by thilo von trotha this librivox recording is in the public domain read by alistair part seven the capture of lovcher on the third of september advance on

Early in August, General Skobolev was posted at Kakrina on the road from Selvi to Lovce with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and a mixed detachment from the 4th Corps, Kazan Regiment, No. 64, 1 Sousa Battalion and 1 Battery. A portion of these new reinforcements had by this time reached Selvi, consisting of the 2nd Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division with its artillery, the 3rd Rifle Brigade and a heavy Battery made up of four guns captured at Nikopolos.

On the 31st of August, Prince of Meritinsky, commander-in-chief of the forces at Selvy, received orders to attack Lovča. On the 1st of September, Skobolev was accordingly pushed forward from Kakarina to Fontana, about 3,000 yards east of Lovča, with orders to occupy the heights dominating the approaches to the position of Lovča, to reconnoitre the terrain with a view to artillery positions, and to construct rifle trenches and gun emplacements.

The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was to cross the Ozma at Iglaur, seven miles below Lovce, and to reconnoitre the road to Plevenna by which reinforcements might reach Lovce, or by which its garrison might withdraw.

Two Sotniers of the 30th Don Cossacks were to observe the roads from Trojan to Selvy. A single poor road was available for the march of the main body from Selvy to Lovce, 33 miles, so that it was started in echelons. The 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division on the afternoon of September 1st, the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division at 11pm, the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division at 2 o'clock the next morning, and at 4am September 2nd, the 3rd Rifle Brigade.

subsection two preparatory arrangements on the first and second of september general scoble after reaching fontana at two p m september first reconnoitred the country and ordered the first caisson battalion to occupy the height a on the left of the road and the remaining troops of his detachment to take position in rear of that height

Throughout the night the men were at work constructing rifle trenches and emplacements for 24 guns, and one battery was dragged by the infantry to the steep rocky height north of the road, where it opened fire at 5am September 2nd, sweeping more particularly the ground in front of the height A. During the night of the 2nd to the 3rd, the infantry dragged five batteries to the height B, so that, on both sides of the road, 48 guns were in position.

Major General Dobrovolsky, who was to form the right wing of the position with the 3rd Rifle Brigade, arrived at Prosiaka, three miles northeast of Lovtsia, on the evening of September 2nd, and entrenched himself on the heightened front during the night and the following morning. A field battery and the heavy battery heretofore mentioned were placed in position at this point early on the morning of September 3rd.

For the execution of the general attack contemplated for the 3rd, Prince Ameritinsky directed that, after proper preparation by artillery fire, the left wing under Skobolev attack the Red Hill, situated close to Lovcha and forming the key to the enemy's position. That Dobrovolsky, with the right wing, attack the heights on the right bank of the Osmar. The 2nd Infantry Division and parts of the 3rd Division present were to follow in reserve. Subsection 3. Action on the right bank of the Osmar.

At 5.30am September 3rd, the artillery opened along the whole Russian line with 16 four-pounders, 49 pounders and the four heavy guns. On the left, the fire was continued without interruption until 2pm. According to Russian accounts, the Turkish artillery, the number of whose guns cannot be ascertained, but which certainly was much inferior to the Russian, offered a most obstinate and successful resistance.

At 6.15am the Turks opened a brisk infantry fire from the trenches on the heights of the right bank of the Osma against Dobrovolski's rifle battalions in front of Prosiaka. The latter must have been in a faulty position. No other explanation can be given for the loss of eight officers and 150 men in the 11th Rifle Battalion before the Russian infantry in this wing had fired a shot.

According to the plan, Dobrovolsky was not to advance until Skobolev's attack on the Red Hill had succeeded. In view of the great losses which his troops had suffered, and which seemed likely to increase with further delay, General Dobrovolsky at 8am moved against the opposite heights on the right bank, which were defended by two rifle trenches, one halfway up, the other at the crest. The rifle brigade, reinforced by a combined company of the headquarters guard of the commander-in-chief, captured the heights after an action lasting from 8 to 11am.

the turkish left wing fell back behind the ozma the raval regiment was brought forward from the reserve to support general dobrivolski it turned to the left where meanwhile the attack on the red hill the chief point of the hostile position had been preparing

After the Great Russian Battery on both sides of the road had continued its fire against the Turkish position until 2pm, the Kazan Regiment advanced with band playing to the attack on the Red Hill and captured it. Two batteries from the reserve were at once dragged to the top of the hill, whence they opened fire against the line of readouts on the left bank of the Osmar, whose central stronghold was a formidable readout. On the right of the Kazan Regiment, north of the road, the regiments of Kaluga and Lebau crossed the marshy bottom intervening between the Russian and Turkish positions,

and captured the heights north of the Red Hill, leaving the whole right bank in the hands of the Russians. Subsection 4. Action on the left bank of the Osmar. Upon the capture of the Red Hill, the 1st Kazan Battalion took post there, while the remaining two battalions of the regiment crossed the river, penetrated into the town, and captured its farther edge after a brief action.

In addition to the two batteries posted on the Red Hill itself, two more were posted on the high road farther to the north, so that 32 guns brought their fire to bear on the entrenchments of the left bank. The regiments Pokhov No. 11, Eslan No. 8, Revel No. 7, and the 1st Shuzha Battalion crossed the river, so that, inclusive of the two Kazan battalions already there, 12 battalions stood in readiness for attack.

Eight battalions of these troops advanced at 5:30pm against the right of the enemy's position, while the Kaluga Regiment No. 5, together with attachments of the Libau Regiment No. 6 and the rifles, crossed the river lower down and attacked the left of the Turkish position. The latter was taken after a furious hand-to-hand conflict. The retreating Turks were pursued by the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which advanced from the right wing across the Osma. Two Turkish battalions were cut off and destroyed by the Cossacks after brave resistance.

The fire of the Cossack horse battery, which had accompanied the Cossacks, made great havoc among the fleeing Turks. Subsection 5. Losses. The losses of the Russians were killed, 6 officers, 313 men. Missing, 52 men. Wounded, 33 officers, 1,112 men. Total, 39 officers, 1,477 men.

on the part of the turks neither the number of troops nor the losses can be ascertained according to russian accounts two thousand two hundred turks were buried within the captured entrenchments not counting those killed by the cossacks during the pursuit it seems very probable under the circumstances described that the latter number was very great

The statement of Prince Meretinsky at the conclusion of his report, that 3,000 Turks, the number occurs more than once, and is therefore not a misprint, were cut down in their flight, bears too much the stamp of inordinate exaggeration, to be of any value whatever, the more when it is considered that the pursuing Cossacks could barely have numbered more than 1,000 horses. Subsection 6. Events on the 4th and 5th of September.

Late on the evening of September 3rd, reports were received from the headquarters of the 4th Corps that strong bodies of the enemy had marched from Plevna in the direction of Lovche. Soon afterward, patrols reported the appearance of strong hostile detachments. On the morning of September 4th, this column moved on the position of Lovche and tried to gain the Russian left flank by continued manoeuvring to the right. The conflict, however, was limited to wholly ineffective artillery combat, and toward noon the Turks withdrew in the direction of Mikren, 12 miles to the southwest of Lovche.

On the 5th of September, Prince Amaratinsky left the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division at Lovcha and marched to rejoin the main body of the West Army, whose left wing he reached in the evening at Bogot, about 12 miles. Comments

Comment 1. A surprising feature of the order of the march of the corps from Selvy to Lovcha is that the rifle brigade, although intended to form the right of the attack, marched at the rear of the column, and that the troops intended for the reserves marched in front. It is also surprising that the unity of the 2nd Division was broken up on the march by sandwiching a brigade of the 3rd Division between the two brigades of the 2nd.

comment two as the corps had seventy six guns there must have been present a number of field officers of artillery and certainly one probably two brigade commanders yet it was not an artillery officer but captain kropatkin of the general staff who was charged with posting the artillery on the heights on both sides of the high road

The same Captain Kuro Patkin traced the lines for the rifle trenches to be constructed on the left, and the execution of these pioneer works, including the construction for the emplacements of 48 guns, was directed by an infantry lieutenant of the Kazan Regiment. On the right of General Dobrovolski's position, the construction of the rifle trenches and gun emplacements was superintended by an ensign of the Sapper Battalion of the Guard, who, with

with his small detachment of sappers, belonged to the Combined Guards Company, which formed the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters Guard. This corps, therefore, although consisting of 26 battalions, seems to have been practically without special troops. Editor's Footnote by Arthur L. Wagner

In view of the fact that Kuropatkin, although only a captain, was Skobolev's chief of staff, the author's comments seem somewhat severe. Kuropatkin afterwards became a lieutenant general and the governor of the Transcaucasian provinces. He is a soldier of distinguished ability and is regarded by many as Skobolev's natural successor. A. L. W. Footnote End

comment three the attack on the turkish position of lovdsh was purely frontal and its preparation and inception was left to the artillery which to be sure was very much superior to that of the enemy not a musket seems to have been discharged on the russian left before the infantry advanced to the decisive attack on the red hill in doing which it had to traverse a distance of not less than a thousand yards from its sheltered position to that of the enemy

comment for it would appear from our description that the unsuitable position of the rifle brigade on the right made it almost helpless against the enemy's infantry entrenched on the right bank of the osmar instead of opposing the troublesome and destructive infantry fire of the turks with musketry the russian right wing was unable to help itself except by an attack which was contrary to the program and insufficiently prepared but which succeeded through the bravery of the troops and their superior numbers

Comment 5: The vigorous advance of the Cossack Brigade against the defeated enemy's line of retreat resulted in considerable losses for the latter. The question seems not inappropriate here whether in view of the great and undoubted numerical superiority of the Russians in this action, a turning movement below the position by a strong infantry detachment, say a brigade, might not have been decisive and entailed less loss. It appears from the description that the Osmer could have been crossed with little trouble and without using the bridge.

Comment 6. The headquarters of the 4th Corps, which formed the left of the Russian army before Plevna, discovered in the course of the afternoon that a strong Turkish column was marching from Plevna against Lovche, where it was known that Prince Ameritinsky was engaged in battle. A report was accordingly sent to him. It does not appear, however, that the 4th Corps made any movement of troops in indirect support of the Corps engaged at Lovche.

An advance of the cavalry and horse artillery posted on the Russian left against the flank of the hostile column would certainly have seriously delayed or stopped that movement,

Comment 7. The constant manoeuvring to the right by the Turkish column which appeared before Lovcha on the morning of September 4th is explained by the Russians as an attempt, threatened but not carried out, of turning their left. The movement is, however, susceptible to a different explanation. The Turkish column from Flevna, whose approximate strength is not known, reached the vicinity of Lovcha at a time when the garrison of that place was in full flight, probably toward Mikren in the opposite direction, on account of the turning movement of the Cossacks in the north.

Under the circumstances, it is not improbable that the Turkish column had good reason to consider the direct road to Plevna, leading as it would past the left of the Russian main position, too dangerous for it to retreat, and therefore executed a sort of flank march past the Russian position under the cover of a rather harmless cannonade, with the view of gaining the road to the upper Vid by way of Mikren.

nor should it be overlooked that the movement was best calculated to cover the road to the Titovan and Jablonitsa passes, which were now endangered by the capture of Lovche by the Russians. End of section 7 Spreadsheets, clunky software, a hundred different logins, just to run your business? There's a better way. Odoo.

One simple, connected platform that handles sales, inventory, accounting, and more. So you can focus on growing, not juggling. Make the switch today at odoo.com. That's O-D-O-O dot com. Section 8 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair.

part eight artillery attack on plevna from september seventh to eleventh sub section one dispositions for the night of september sixth to the seventh at six p m on the sixth the troops left their encampments and took up the following positions against the south front of the turkish

A. General Krudno with the 9th Corps between the Bulgarian and the Pelechat roads, wherein placements were constructed for the artillery and trenches for the infantry. Three infantry regiments and the six batteries were placed in the first line. Three infantry regiments with four batteries formed the Corps reserve. One regiment and one battery formed part of the main reserve. One regiment with one battery was at Nikopolos. In addition, 20 siege guns and two batteries were established in the front line of the Corps.

B. General Krylov with the 4th Corps was on the left of the 9th, on the so-called Heights of Radyshevo, and here also, emplacements and trenches were constructed. The Corps had three regiments of the 16th Division, and five batteries in the first line. The 1st Brigade of the 30th Division, with four batteries, formed the Corps Reserve. The 2nd Brigade of the 30th Division, with two batteries, was assigned to the Main Reserve. One regiment, Kazan, and one battery, were as yet with Prince Ameritinsky.

C. General Prince of Maritinski, with his detachment of the 2nd Infantry Division and its artillery, the 3rd Rifle Brigade, 3 batteries of the 3rd Artillery Brigade, and 4 siege guns, was posted at Tuchinitsa, in the rear of the left of the 4th Corps. The detachments from the 4th Corps rejoined their own corps. D. The 4th Romanian Division was posted north of the High Road, abreast of the 9th Corps. Three regiments of the irregular Romanian cavalry guarded the space between the right of the division and the Vid.

E. General Loshkar F, with the 8th and 9th Dragoons, the 9th Lancers, and the 9th Cossacks, with two horse batteries, was posted on the high road in the rear of the Romanians and the 9th Corps. F. General Leontief, with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, and a horse battery, covered the left of the 4th Corps, and maintained communication with the two Cossack brigades of the Don and Caucasus, which were observing the Lovcha road.

g the general reserve consisted of the second brigade of the thirtieth division the glitz regiment number twenty of the fifth division three batteries the hussar regiments maryupol number four and kiev number nine and a horse battery it was posted west of pelishat at the junction of the grevitsa tachinitsa and pelishat plevna roads h three sotniers of the thirty fourth don cossacks formed the headquarters guard of the commander of the west army who took post with the main reserve

i packs were left behind in the camps each man carried two pounds of cooked meat and four pounds of hard bread each regiment formed a detachment of convalescents to guard the packs and train k the light baggage followed the troops the flying park of the ninth corps at zagailvitsa of the fourth corps between tochnitz and bogot the reserve park of the ninth corps at bolghereni of the fourth corps at lachan baggage of the ninth corps in the rear of karagach of the fourth corps in the rear of

l the dressing station of the ninth corps at three wells two miles in the rear of the fourth corps on the touchinitzer brook as many country carts as possible were collected at the dressing stations subsection two erection of batteries during the night of september sixth and seventh

notwithstanding the darkness of the night the whole movement was carried out with rapidity order and silence the leaders having previously familiarized themselves with the positions to be taken and roads to be followed the troops carried gabions fascines and entrenching tools and constructed emplacements for field and siege guns two thousand to two thousand five hundred yards from the enemy's works

One company of the 3rd Sapper Battalion was assigned to each corps and a detachment of 40 sappers to the Romanian Division. Two sapper companies were charged with the establishment of the siege artillery, one for the 12, the other for the 8 24-pounders. Four infantry battalions furnished the working parties and the other four infantry battalions brought up gabions, fascines and other material. The entrenching tools had been issued to the troops from the Field Engineer Park

the earthworks were completed by six a m and armed with the nine pounder field batteries and the twenty siege guns in each of the two great batteries an observatory ninety five feet high was constructed of ladders subsection three the seventh of september at six a m the battery of twelve siege guns fired a salvo as a signal whereupon all the batteries numbering altogether twenty twenty four pounders and eighty eight nine pounders opened fire which was briskly answered by the turks

the russian infantry lines posted under cover were in complete readiness for battle wherever water was near the infantry cooked a meal at noon the cannonade was continued throughout the day sub section four dispositions for september eighth

In the course of the night the artillery was moved closer to the enemy's works and brought into action some four-pounder batteries which heretofore had not taken part on account of the long range. The 3rd Romanian Division crossed the Vid at Ribben at daybreak, closed up on the right of the 4th Division and brought its artillery into action. The Romanian Reserve Division moved to Vrbitza and formed the Special Reserve of the Romanians.

General Oshkarev, with his full Russian cavalry regiments, reinforced by full Romanian cavalry regiments, crossed to the left bank of the Vyad at Ribben and moved to Lower Dubnik on the Sofia Road. His task was to cut the enemy's communications and to fall upon him in the case of his retreat from Plevna. General Prince Zmaritinsky moved during the night from Tuchinitsa to Lovcha Road to gain the wooded ridge south of Plevna. Subsection 5. The Artillery Combat on the 8th, 9th and 10th of September.

The dispositions for the 8th of September were carried out with precision. The batteries were advanced during the night to within 1,600 yards of the enemy's works. In addition to those previously engaged, five Russian and five Romanian batteries took part. The fire was chiefly directed against the Gravitsa readout and the Radishivu readout. At first, the Turks answered briskly, but toward 2pm their fire diminished and ceased towards evening altogether. In order to disturb the Turks in repairing their works, the Russian artillery maintained a slow fire throughout the night.

Eight of the siege guns, which on the 8th had confined their fire to the Gravitsa readout, were shifted during the night to the position of the 4th Corps to bring their fire to bear on the middle group of readouts. The cannonade was maintained along the whole front on the 9th. The artillery conflict of the past few days had cost the Russians about 300 men.

On the 10th of September the bombardment of the Turkish position was at first continued as heretofore, but it soon became evident that it could not continue much longer for lack of ammunition. Prompt replenishment could not be hoped for, as the fine weather suddenly changed on the evening of the 10th, and the ensuing rain quickly rendered all roads impracticable. The uninterrupted fire of several days had also damaged several carriages of the siege guns, and quite a number of those of the field guns.

under these circumstances it seemed unwise to continue the artillery combat and the assault which was to be prepared by cannonade had to be abandoned or made at once the latter alternative was decided upon sub section six preparatory actions of the left wing on the eighth ninth and tenth of september

During the artillery combat on the 8th of September, Prince Ameritinsky moved his corps from Tachinitsa to the Lovcha road and took position on both sides of the road. General Skobolev commanded the advance guard consisting of the regiments Kaluga No. 5 and Eslan No. 8, two rifle battalions, three Sotnias of Cossacks, four batteries and the four heavy guns.

He occupied Brestovets with the 3rd Eastland Battalion, placed two 9-pounder batteries and the four heavy guns in action on the height in the rear of the town, and opened fire on the Christian readout. After the artillery fire had been continued until 3pm, the Kaluga Regiment was ordered to take the so-called 2nd Knoll of the Green Hills. The regiment advanced to the attack, with two battalions in the first line, the 3rd Battalion, following as a reserve, with a distance of 500 yards.

Nine companies of the Eslan regiment were told off as the general reserve for this attack, and six companies occupied Brestovets.

The Kaluga regiment captured the 2nd Null, carried on by its R-8, continued the attack, took the 3rd Null and penetrated to the rifle trenches between that Null and the Christian readout. Here the regiment was assailed by Turkish reserves and driven back to the 2nd Null, where it was supported by the previously mentioned 9 Estlin companies. The pursuing enemy was then himself driven back. The 3 Sotniers attached to the advance guard had taken an active and skilful part in the infantry action and proved very useful

in seeking out and removing the wounded. The Russian losses in the action amounted to 900 men, 700 of which fell on the Kaluga Regiment.

For the present, the 2nd Null was held by the Russians, but when informed during the night that the general assault, which he expected for the following day, would not take place until some later day, General Skobolev considered his advanced position as too risky and withdrew his right from the captured 2nd Null to the 1st Null, which was strengthened by a double line of rifle trenches. An attack on the 1st Null, attempted by several Turkish battalions at 5am, was repulsed chiefly by the fire of the artillery.

At 8am, the attack was renewed with increased numbers. This time, the Turks penetrated within 60 paces of the rifle trenches, but were again repulsed.

anticipating a renewal of the attack which however did not take place skobeleff remained in his position with the esselin and le bain regiments the latter from the reserve having relieved the kaluga regiment and three rifle battalions his right was on the first knoll his centre was formed by the village of brestovets and the height in the rear with twenty eight guns he was left by a series of rifle trenches to the west of the village of brestovets

In the rear of the position stood Prince Ameritinsky with the Kaluga and Revelle regiments, a rifle brigade and three four-pounder and one nine-pounder batteries as general reserve. In the course of the night of the 9th to the 10th, Prince Ameritinsky received orders from General Zotov, Chief of Staff of the West Army, to gain possession of the 3rd Knoll of the Green Hills next morning. He was reinforced for that purpose by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division of the 4th Corps, which crossed the Tuchinitsa ravine at daybreak and took post on the right of the corps.

Prince Ameritinsky entrusted General Skobolev with the direction of the attack and placed at his disposal the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions and four 9-pounder batteries. As additional support, the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division was placed in readiness. The remaining troops of the Corps, the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division, the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, three 4-pounder batteries,

were posted to the rear of Brezhnevets as general reserve under General Dobrovolsky. At daybreak September 10th, the Esselen regiment captured the second knoll almost without resistance, and Skobolev had it fortified at once. In the construction of the rifle trenches, the lack of entrenching tools was sensibly felt, and part of the men used the lids of their cooking pots and their bare hands. To ensure the best possible feel of fire to the front, the vines of the vineyards were pulled up,

skobelev had the first brigade of the sixteenth division brought up at once and took post with the troops under his command on the second knoll between the road and the tchutchinitsa ravine sixteen nine-pounders were placed in battery in the centre the sussdal regiment was posted in the rear of the first knoll as reserve not deeming it advisable to attempt the capture of the third knoll skobelev postponed it till the general attack ordered for the morrow

To support the contemplated attack, two companies of the Sussdal Regiment escorted twelve nine-pounders and the four siege guns to the east side of the Tsutschnitsa ravine, where they were posted so as to sweep the slopes of the Third Knoll, as well as the Third Knoll itself with their fire. Comments. Comment 1. The fact that the carriages of all the Russian guns were damaged by the fire of several days duration was also met with in the siege of Kars. There it was attributed to the excessive elevation given to the guns on account of the great range.

Comment 2. The number of technical troops employed before Plevna was altogether insufficient. There was but one sapper battalion with five infantry divisions, not counting the Romanians, but 35 sappers were at the disposal of Prince Ameritinsky's corps, consisting of two divisions. Moreover, no entrenching tools were issued to that corps, while the 4th and 9th Corps, as well as the Romanians, received at least a few hundred tools each from the Field Engineer Park. End of section 8.

Section 9 of Tactical Studies on the Battles around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 9a. The Assault on Plevna on the 11th and 12th of September. Subsection 1. Dispositions for the Assault.

the hour for the assault was selected at three p m of september eleventh instead of at daybreak for two reasons first to spare the troops a half-day of battle second to allow the artillery to use the forenoon in preparing the assault by its fire

In order to keep the Turks as much as possible in the dark as to the time of the assault, to exhaust their attention, and to keep up their suspense, it was ordered that the artillery should open up the heaviest possible fire at daybreak, pause all along the line at 9am, to resume its fire at 11, and again suspend suddenly and simultaneously at 1 o'clock. The fire was to be resumed at 2.30pm and continued until further orders. Those batteries alone, whose fire should be masked by Russian troops, suspending their fire for the time,

The attack was to be directed on three points: the Gravitsa works, the Radisheva works, and against the Krishin works. The Gravitsa readout was to be attacked from the northeast by the Romanians, and on the south by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division with two four-pounder batteries. Against the central readout, the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 16th Division were told off. The Krishin readout was to be attacked by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, the 3rd Rifle Brigade, the entire 2nd Division, and nine batteries.

The 1st Brigade of the 31st Division was charged with the protection of the entire line of artillery from Gravitsa to Radyshevo. The 2nd Brigade of the same division and two batteries formed the special reserve for the 1st Brigade and was posted on the right edge of the Radyshevo ravine. The main reserve was posted in the rear of the centre and consisted of the 2nd Brigade of the 30th Division and one regiment of the 2nd Brigade of the 5th Division, three batteries and the 4th Hussars with a horse battery.

The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, with two Cossack brigades and two horse batteries, all under command of General Leontiouf, had orders to cross the Vid if possible and gain the Sofia road, as well as to establish communication with Loshkarev's cavalry. The 9th Hussars were posted on the Bulgarini road between the 9th Corps and the Romanians. A brigade of the Romanian cavalry covered the right of the Romanians as far as the Vid.

general oshkareff who already had four russian and four remaining cavalry regiments on the left bank of the vid in the vicinity of lower dubnik sought to establish communication with leontief's cavalry the rain which began to fall on the evening of the tenth continued without interruption until september twelfth

on the early morning of the eleventh of september a dense fog covered the entire field the ground was thoroughly soaked and everywhere men and horses moved with difficulty still any further postponement of the assault was not advisable section two attack of the right wing on the gravitsa works

The double attack on the Gravitsa readout, from the north by the Romanians, from the south by the Russians, was carried out without any tactical combination whatever. The final meeting of the Russians and Romanians in the captured readout appears in the descriptions of both parties more like an accidental meeting than the result of a bloody struggle carried out according to a common plan.

According to the Romanian accounts, parts of the 3rd and 4th Divisions advanced to the attack from the north at 3pm as ordered, and were three times repulsed. At 6pm there was a lull in the fight, and at 7.30pm, the 2nd Rifle Battalion and the 16th Darabanzas Militia Regiment renewed the attack and captured the readout, assisted by the Russian Arkhangelsk Regiment.

the losses of the roumanians fifty-six officers and two thousand five hundred men dead and wounded give clear proof of the bravery and contempt of death with which that young army had here undergone its baptism of fire the tactical decision of the attack however was probably brought about by the advance of the russian brigade from the south

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division under Major General Rodionov, the Arkhangelsk Regiment, the Wologda Regiment and two batteries crossed the Gravitsa Brook, passed through the village and formed for attack to the west of the ladder. Both batteries were in the centre, on the right the Arkhangelsk Regiment, on the left the Wologda Regiment. Each regiment deployed a rifle company of skirmishers in front and formed three battalions in rear in three lines. The first two in company columns, the rear one in battalion column.

Immediately upon crossing the brook, the brigade received severe artillery fire from the works of the left bank of the Gravitsa Brook. Slightly to the left of the direction of attack, a caisson of the 6th Battery was blown up. The brigade now advanced to the attack. The Archangelsk Regiment straight on the readout, the Warlogged Regiment advancing slightly its left shoulder, past the readout and against an entrenched camp, 500 yards farther in the rear, and connected with the readout by trenches.

twice during the advance general rodionoff halted the troops in sheltered depressions to restore order in the battalions on approaching the redoubt the interval between the regiments through which the two batteries had kept firing was closed

The Arkhangelsk Regiment threw itself on the redoubt from the front, passed the deep steep ditch, and climbed the breastwork which was ten feet high and slippery from the rain. At the same time, a portion of the Wologda Regiment, which had overlapped the redoubt on the left, entered the work from the gorge. The rest of the regiment advanced past the redoubt against the camp, engaged the troops posted there, and prevented them from coming to the support of the garrison of the redoubt.

which was cut down after a furious resistance. From the north, Romanian troops, particularly the 2nd Rifle Battalion, also penetrated into the redoubt. Five guns were captured, the Colonel of the Archangelsk Regiment and the commander of the Romanian Brigade were killed near the works.

At 7:30, the Russian brigade was assembled at the redoubt. Colonel Rakachev relinquished his attack on the west camp, assumed command in place of General Rodionov, who had been wounded, reformed the disordered battalions, and posted them partly in the redoubt, partly in the adjoining trenches. During the night, the Turks made three attacks to recover the redoubt, but were repulsed by fire and bayonet. The loss of the brigade was 22 officers and 1,300 men killed and wounded.

a sapper company an improvised sapper company formed of men of both regiments and on the extreme right as out of flank guard the sixth sotnia of the thirty fourth don cossacks had a part in the action sub section three the attack of the centre on the radyshevo works the troops in the centre between the bulgarian and lovcha roads may be divided into four groups according to their tasks

A. To attack the Radyshevo Works. The Regiments Uglitz No. 63, Kazan No. 64, Jaroslav No. 117, Shuzha No. 118, all under the command of Major General Shnitnikov, Commander of the 30th Division. B. To protect the batteries. The Regiments Penza No. 121 and Tambov No. 122. C. Special Reserve of the Centre. The Regiments Kozlov No. 123 and Waranesh No. 124.

D. Main Reserve. The regiments Galitz No. 20, Koloma No. 119, and Sapukov No. 120. An unfortunate accident disarranged the combination from the beginning. The dense fog, brisk infantry fire on the extreme left, Skobolev, and an insignificant movement in the Turkish trenches caused one battalion of the Uglits regiment to attack prematurely at 11am, drawing after it the rest of its regiment, and also the Yaroslav regiment.

After a severe action, the two regiments captured the rifle trenches of the enemy in front of the redoubt, but were compelled to retire on the arrival of Turkish reinforcements after losing half of their men and nearly all of their officers. Though deprived by this accident of half of his troops, General Shytnikov deemed it advisable to adhere to the original disposition and advanced at the appropriate time with the Kazan and Shuzha regiments.

On the march he met the retreating Uglitz and Jaroslav battalions, which carried disorder into his ranks. It was in vain that the Kozlov and Voronezh regiments and the Galitz regiment of the main reserve were brought forward in support of the attack. The attack was finally repulsed with enormous loss. The seven regiments engaged lost altogether 110 officers and 5,200 men killed and wounded. The greater part of the losses falling on the Uglitz and Jaroslav regiments.

sub section four attack by the left wing on the christian works the task set general skobeleff was to capture the so-called third knoll of the green hills and the line of readouts in the rear of christian which formed the direct protection of the camp of the turkish reserves

To enable him to accomplish this task, the following troops were placed at his disposal. The regiments of Vladimir No. 61, Sustal No. 62, Raval No. 7, the 3rd Rifle Brigade, three 9-pounder batteries, one 4-pounder battery, and four siege guns. Skobolev resolved on the immediate capture of the 3rd Null, and to attack the readouts in the rear simultaneously with the general attack at 3pm.

after the sixteen guns previously posted at the east of the tachinitza ravine had taken the northern slopes of the green hills for some time under fire scobbleff at ten a m advanced and occupied the third knoll with the following troops

in the centre two vladimir battalions in two lines of company columns on their right the tenth rifle battalion on the left three s land companies in the rear as special reserve the third vladimir battalion and three batteries the third knoll was deserted by the enemy but he was annoyed by fire from the turkish infantry in the trenches between this knoll and the readouts

the third vladimir battalion having been brought to the front to reinforce the fighting line its place as special reserve was taken by the sussdal regiment formed in battalion columns in the rear of the fighting line under the best cover obtainable about two p m strong lines of turkish skirmishers advanced up the slopes of the green hills against the troops on the top

The fire of the Turkish infantry increased more and more in strength and inflicted sensible losses not only on the troops in the firing line, but also on the first echelon of the reserves posted a thousand yards in the rear. In view of these circumstances, and of the fact that the general attack was soon to begin, General Skobalev ordered the Sustal Regiment to drive back the Turkish skirmish lines. This was done. The Turks did not withstand the attack and fell back on their redoubts.

From there and from the adjoining rifle trenches, they maintained a brisk and galling fire against the Russian troops.

About 2.30pm, Skobolev's troops had approximately the following position. On the 3rd knoll, in the firing line next to the enemy, the Vladimir and Sustal regiments, and the 9th and 10th rifle battalions. In the depression between the 3rd and 2nd knoll, the Raval regiment. In the entrenched position on the 2nd knoll, two Kaluga and two Estlan battalions, with three batteries. In the depression between the 1st and 2nd knoll, the Libau regiment, and the 11th and 12th rifle battalions. One Kaluga battalion held the village of Brestovets.

At 2:30pm the batteries on the second knoll opened over the heads of the troops on the third knoll. At 3pm, Skobalev gave the order to attack. The troops in the first line descended from the third knoll, crossed the deep depression between the knoll and the height beyond, and began to ascend the steep height on whose crest lay the three strong readouts, the western one of which was known as the Readout of Krishin. The readouts were connected by trenches, and on the slopes in front were a series of rifle trenches.

The attack, which was directed at first against the eastern and middle redoubts, was received by murderous musketry fire from the rifle trenches and redoubts, and also by artillery fire from the redoubts. The attack of the IV Corps on the entrenchments north of Radyshevo having meanwhile failed, the artillery of the western portion of these fortifications then directed its fire across the Tuchinitsa ravine against the troops of Skobolev, which were attacking the Turkish right.

the efficacy of this severe fire and the ensuing losses brought the attack to a stop part of the attacking troops halted in the depression and those which had begun to ascend the further slope tried to find cover and opened a rather ineffective fire against the well-covered adversary

skobeleff now ordered the raval regiment to advance to the support of the troops engaged and the le bain regiment and the eleventh and twelfth rifle battalions posted as reserves between the first and second knoll to take the place of the raval regiment in the depression between the second and third

The Reval Regiment advanced with firm order, crossed the brook, ascended the bare slope beyond, and carried forward with its parts of the troops engaged there. But the attack of this regiment was also stopped halfway up, and the remnants of the Vladimir and Sustal Regiments, and the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions, began to fall back, singly at first, then in crowds. Skobolev now had to decide whether to throw in his last reserves for a decisive attack,

or, in view of the failure of the attack of the IV Corps, to order the retreat of his troops engaged under the cover of part of his reserves.

He decided for the former, the Le Bauer Regiment, leaving three companies in rear, and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions were ordered forward, and were joined by those remnants of the Vladimir, Sustal and Raval Regiments, and the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions, which were still in the firing line. The whole line advanced with a cheer in the direction of the middle redoubt, and captured the rifle trenches in front, the Turks withdrawing within the line of redoubts.

Encouraged by their first success, the Russian battalions continued the attack with great determination, though in disordered crowds. The nearer they approached the enemy's position, the less effective became the enemy's fire. The Turkish line wavered, and the foremost Russian detachments penetrated into the trenches between the eastern and middle redoubts. At 4:25pm, the middle redoubt was in the hands of the assailants, who seized almost the entire line of trench up to the eastern redoubt. One gun was abandoned in the redoubt.

several thousand men of various organizations soon filled the interior of the captured redoubt and trenches those arriving later found no shelter from the fire from the other positions of the turks the captured middle redoubt was moreover open to the rear and its interior exposed to fire from the western christian redoubt

which was making great havoc among the Russians crowded together in the interior. At the same time, strong Turkish reserves advanced to the counter-attack from the entrenched camp in the rear of the line of readouts, partly against the left, partly against the front of the Russians. Captain Kurepatkin of the General Staff gathered some 300 men from those inside the readout, and moving 200 paces to the left, led them against the enemy. This nucleus was joined by other crowds of assailants arriving at this time.

and about five fifteen p m the counter-attack against the russian left was repulsed though not without great loss at five thirty p m when the turkish fire slackened somewhat the russians began to entrench the captured position on the side toward the enemy the almost total absence of entrenching tools was painfully felt the rapid retreat of the turks who had advanced from the christian redoubt against the russian left

had been influenced to a certain extent by the appearance of general leontief's cavalry in the vicinity a horse battery opened fire on the redoubt and a detachment of dismounted cossacks occupied the village of krisin thereby making the turks uneasy for their own right flank and preventing an energetic execution of the counter-attack against the russian left

Meanwhile, a brisk fire was maintained from the eastern against the captured middle redoubt, and part of the connecting trench was still in the hands of the Turks. An officer collected a detachment of about 100 volunteers to drive them out, seized the trench, and carried away by success, advanced against the east redoubt, where most of the men fell, under the murderous fire of the Turks.

Meanwhile, Colonel Shestakov of the General Staff, acting under orders from Prince Ameritinsky, was busy in the rear of the front, collecting the scattered men and forming them into detachments. Thanks to his efforts, the following detachments formed of scattered men arrived in the line of battle at 5pm, in addition to the three Leibau companies, which had been held back at first, two Sussdahl companies, half a Raval company, two and a half Vladimir companies, and one company of the 12th Rifle Battalion.

The detachments belonging to the Vladimir and Raval regiments and the 12th Rifle Battalion reinforced the defenders of the Middle Readout, over which Major General Dobrovolsky, commander of the Rifle Brigade, and, after he was mortally wounded, Major General Tebjenik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division, assumed command. The five Lebau and Sustal companies were led forward against the East Readout, supported by mixed detachments from the Middle Readout.

At 5.30pm, the east readout fell into the hands of the Russians. Lieutenant-Colonel Mozawoy of the Sustal Regiment assumed command there. With the approach of darkness, the Turkish fire slackened somewhat, but never died out completely throughout the night. Subsection 5. The night of September 11th and 12th. As darkness settled down, the troops of the Russian left wing occupied the following positions.

Fractions of the Vladimir, Sustel, Raval and Lebao regiments, and of the four rifle battalions, held the two captured redoubts and the trenches between them. Opposite their front was the entrenched camp of the Turks, between the town and river. On their left, the Christian redoubt was still in the hands of the Turks. On their right, beyond the Tuchinitsa ravine, were the western works of the Radyshevo entrenchments.

in the rear of the line of battle the third knoll was not occupied on the second knoll two eslam battalions and two very weak kaluga battalions covered the great artillery position of twenty-four guns one kaluga battalion held the village of brestovets

To guard the intermediate space of almost 20,000 yards between the captured readouts and the artillery position on the 2nd Knoll, General Skobolev personally took position at dark with two weak battalions in the middle of the space at the northern foot of the 3rd Knoll and deployed two companies to cover his right and left, one fronting east, the other fronting west. The remaining three companies halted with Skobolev and faced north.

Scattered men, singly and in groups, moved about everywhere, some of them returning from the redoubts, where they could no longer find cover, and some coming from the rear and endeavouring to find their organisations in the line of battle. Skobolev had as many of them as possible collected by members of his staff and formed into a battalion, without regard to the organisations to which they belonged. After some hours, the battalion had reached strength of more than 1,000 men, when a new subdivision was made, the men of the several regiments and of the rifle brigade being each formed into a separate company.

The two companies mentioned had hardly deployed on the flanks when Turkish detachments advanced on the left from the direction of Krishin but were repulsed by the company deployed on that flank.

Soon afterward, volleys were fired against the Russian position from the right, and the bullets fell near the reserves. The darkness prevented the firing troops from being recognized, but the patrols reported them to be Russians. Deeming it possible that detachments of the 4th Corps may have crossed the Tutchenitsa ravine to make a night attack, Skobolev forbade his men to fire. Patrols were sent out and made a positive report that the firing troops were Turks, some hundred paces in front of the Russian skirmish line.

Fire was opened on both sides, but, on account of the darkness, nothing but the flash of the guns could be seen. To get his main body out of the line of Turkish slanking fire, Skobolev led it about 1,000 paces to the rear, in the utmost silence, and prolonged his skirmish lines, which had remained in place, by adding a deployed company to each. The fatigue of his men had become such that they would fall asleep as soon as halted. To be prepared for an emergency, Skobolev had them waked up from time to time, and formed.

by accident a soutenir of caucasian and half a soutenir of don cossacks arrived at skobeleff's position at midnight whereupon he immediately sent patrols to the right and left beyond the skirmish lines sixty of the cossacks he retained resolved to oppose them to any sudden attack by the enemy

Upon report that the firing line was getting short of ammunition, Skobolev had ordered up ammunition carts. Two of them reached his position, and he sent the ammunition to the firing line by special detachments. The difference in the armament caused some difficulty. The infantry was armed with the Krenka, the rifles with the Burden Rifle, and the latter were therefore unable to use the infantry ammunition, which alone was contained in the two carts.

A Cossack non-commissioned officer, who with 20 Cossacks was sent after Burden cartridges, finally brought a small supply in the nosebags of his detachment, thus relieving the want to some extent. While the events just described were taking place in the rear of the line of the battle proper, the utmost activity was maintained in the latter throughout the night. The open gorges of the two captured readouts had to be closed. The enemy's rifle trenches had to be arranged for cover from the opposite side.

and some new trenches had to be made to cover the left against the Christian readout, the lines having been marked out during daylight by Captain Kuro Patkin of the General Staff. The execution of the work was extremely difficult, owing to the almost total absence of entrenching tools. The Russian soldiers well understood the importance of the task in view of the murderous character of the enemy's fire, and worked for dear life with bayonets, sidearms, camp kettle lids and bare hands.

With the beginning of darkness, the Turkish fire had considerably slackened, but toward 10pm, strong Turkish bodies rushed on the Russian position, with much yelling and severe fire. But in this, as well as in several subsequent attempts, they were repulsed by the fire of the Russians. In one of these attempts, the retreating assailants were mistaken for Russians by fresh Turkish reserves, which were coming up, and subjected to a severe musketry fire. End of section 9

You're listening to Classic Audiobook Collection. Give us five stars and share with a friend who likes free audiobooks as much as we do. Now back to the show. Section 10 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 9b. The Assault on Plevna on the 11th and 12th of September. Subsection 6. The 12th of September.

Towards 6am, the Turks opened a severe artillery fire from the Christian redoubt, the entrenched camp, and the works beyond the Tuchinitsa ravine, and caused at once considerable losses to the Russians. To engage the Christian redoubt, Skobolev ordered four nine-pounders to be brought inside the middle redoubt and to open fire, which served to encourage the troops in the redoubt.

Soon afterward, large bodies of Turks, preceded by dense swarms of skirmishers, advanced against the Russian left and penetrated within 300 yards of the Russian position, despite the severe fire with which they were greeted. There the attack was checked, and soon converted into a retreat. At 900 yards from the Russian position, the Turks halted and opened a severe fire.

at eight a m a second turkish attack began which was chiefly directed against the left flank of the russian first line skobeleff who was on the third knoll despatched from there a skirmish line which opened fire at nine hundred yards against the right flank of the attacking turks

A battery was brought up to the 3rd knoll to fire against their right. Notwithstanding the effective crossfire of 12 guns, 8 on the 3rd knoll, 4 in the middle redoubt, the Turks approached the Russian rifle trenches within 500 yards, came to a halt, maintained a brisk fire for some time, and then fell back with great loss. Meanwhile, the defenders of the east redoubt had been engaged since early morning, with the enemy's detachments posted on the outskirts of Plevna and attempting to turn the Russian right.

convinced of the importance of the advantages gained by general skobelev osman pasha utilised the inactivity of the russians opposite his left and centre to send all troops that could possibly be spared to reinforce his threatened right

Leaving a thick skirmish line which maintained a severe fire, in a well-covered position opposite the two redoubts in the hands of the Russians, the Turks assembled their main force near the Christian redoubt to advance from there against the Russian left. The reinforcements, withdrawn from the east, moved partly through Plevna against the right line of the captured redoubts, partly in the Tuchinitsa ravine against the position of the Russians on the 3rd knoll.

at ten thirty a m the third attack began at first from the front and left against the middle redoubt after two turkish batteries had caused great havoc among the defenders crowded together inside these men after an uninterrupted exposure to severe fire for thirty hours began to waver and to leave the redoubt singly at first afterward in crowds

the defenders of the east redoubt followed the infectious example but when skobeleff came galloping up from the third knoll and spoke words of admonition and cheer all turned about and reoccupied the redoubts before the turks were able to take possession of them isolated turkish detachments which succeeded in penetrating into the redoubts were cut down

On returning to his position on the 3rd Nol, Skobolev sent forward some companies formed of dispersed men to support the troops engaged at the redoubts. Meanwhile, Turkish troops were forming partly in the Tachinitsa ravine itself, partly on its eastern edge, north of the Radysheva ravine, for the purpose of attacking the 3rd Nol. A company formed of dispersed riflemen was deployed for the defence of the western edge, while two guns attempted to enfilade the ravine.

the turks nevertheless succeeded in ascending the western edge of the ravine and driving back the russian riflemen and it was only when assisted by two libau companies which had been detached yesterday and had very insignificant losses and a caucasian cossack sotnia that the turks were driven back into the ravine the turkish reserves in the ravine at the sudden exit of plevna fell back into the town

skobelev had become convinced on the eleventh that the capture of the entrenched height between the town and river would decide the victory and on the other hand that he was too weak to gain that result having asked for reinforcements on the eleventh general skobelev expressed to colonel orloff who arrived from grand headquarters to inform himself of the state of affairs his opinion that without reinforcements he would be unable to maintain his position

early on the morning of the twelfth scobleff received a copy of the following order addressed to general prince emeritinsky by direction of the commander-in-chief i order you and general scobleff to entrench and maintain yourselves in the positions captured to-day we cannot send reinforcements because we have none signed zotov lieutenant-general

notwithstanding this discouraging order skobeleff hoped for a favourable turn since the entire fourth corps stood east of the tachinitsa ravine apparently in readiness for battle but inactive at ten thirty a m as the third turkish attack began colonel orloff delivered to general skobeleff the following order

by order of the commander-in-chief if you cannot hold the captured positions you are to fall back if possible not before evening in the direction of tuchnitze covered by the cavalry of general leontief communicate this order which is to be kept secret otherwise to general prince

the gravitsa redoubt is in our hands but the attack is not to be continued and we are to fall back slowly eight thirty a m signed zhotov lieutenant-general even after the receipt of this order skoblev did not give up hope of a general turn for the better he hoped at any moment to see the fourth corps advance to the attack to the east of the tchernitsa ravine

The situation of the defenders in the readout was becoming more and more critical, receiving fire not only from the Christian readout in front, but from the Radyshevo works in rear. At 1pm, two of the four guns in the middle readout had become useless, and the other two were almost without men and teams. Skobolev ordered these guns to be relieved by three guns of the 5th Battery of the 3rd Brigade, posted in rear of the 3rd Knoll.

the movement having attracted the attention of the turks they increased their fire causing considerable loss to the newly arrived guns in the redoubt but the latter now opened up on the christian redoubt

The one ammunition wagon brought along was posted between the breastwork and traverse, the only comparatively safe place in the redoubt. It was nevertheless blown up by a hostile shell, killing and wounding many men in the narrow space of the redoubt. Among the wounded was Major General Tebjenik, who had assumed command in the redoubt after the wounding of General Dobrovolsky, and Captain Kurapatkin of the general staff.

At 2pm, the last available troops sent by General Prince Ameritinsky arrived. Two exceedingly small Kaluga battalions, heretofore retained as protection for the artillery position, and a detachment made up of 200 dispersed riflemen were disposed as follows. Four Kaluga companies proceeded to the redoubts. Three companies covered the right, on the third knoll, against the Tachinitsa ravine. Three companies took post in the rear of the left. The combined rifle detachment was at first post-tribal.

posted in the rear of the second knoll as a last general reserve, but was soon ordered forward to the left, where Skobolev also ordered four guns to proceed and to take up a covered position.

Soon afterward the fourth attack began from the Christian readout. This time Skobolev allowed the Turks to approach within 500 yards and then greeted them with rapid musketry fire from his infantry and canister from his four concealed guns. The Turks halted and replied to the fire but their fresh reserves were not able to carry the attack forward. After three quarters of an hour of very costly fire action the Turks fell back.

at two thirty p m when skobeleff arrived at the redoubt to examine personally how matters stood in his first line the fortifications presented a ghastly spectacle the interior of both redoubts and the trench connecting them were filled with corpses the gorge of the east redoubt open toward plevna was closed by a breastwork made of corpses the three guns of the third brigade in the middle redoubt were dismounted the cannoneers killed or wounded

The two dismounted guns of the 2nd Brigade were removed, and the abandoned Turkish gun was rendered unserviceable by the removal of the breach block. The movements of the Turkish troops were plainly visible as they assembled from all directions at Plevna against Skobolev's right. Those Turkish troops, which had heretofore made several attacks from the Christian readout against the Russian left, departed for the same point.

Upon his return from the redoubts to the Green Hills, Skobolev was informed that the Shuzha Regiment, numbering 1,300 men, had come from the centre to support him. He retained the regiment in reserve and sent several hundred dispersed men to reinforce the defenders of the redoubts. At 4.30pm, the Turks advanced in several lines to make the fifth attack simultaneously on both redoubts. The severe fire which greeted them did not check them.

Though the leading columns resolved themselves into disordered swarms, still they continued to advance with determination, and they were followed in the rear by fresh troops. Before this overwhelming attack, the defenders of the middle redoubt began to give way, and abandoned the redoubt in swarms. The small body of brave men which faced the attack fell after a furious hand-to-hand struggle, among them Major Gortaloff, who had greatly distinguished himself on this bloody day.

Despite the loss of the middle redoubt, Lieutenant Colonel Mozawoy held out in the east redoubt against the attack which was now directed against him from the front and both flanks. To prevent the useless sacrifice of the brave garrison of this redoubt, Skobolev ordered Mozawoy to fall back, and in order to make the withdrawal possible, he advanced in person with the Shuzha regiment and a battery, covering the retreat of all the troops engaged in front.

an attempted pursuit on the part of the turks was frustrated by a splendid charge of two sotniers of cossacks a battery of twenty-four guns on the second knoll guarded by some detachments formed of dispersed men of the vladimir sustal and raval regiments covered the further retreat the troops carrying their wounded along as best they could on the thirteenth of september skobeleff remained almost the entire day on the first knoll and at seven p m fell back by order to

sub section seven losses the total losses sustained by the russians in the attacks on plevna from the seventh to the twelfth of september is stated in round numbers at three hundred officers and twelve thousand five hundred men including sixty officers and three thousand men killed

According to the special lists of losses, the two regiments of the right wing which captured the Gravitsa Redoubt lost 22 officers and 1,305 men. The seven regiments which vainly attacked the Radicevo works in the centre lost 110 officers and 5,249 men, adding about 300 for the losses sustained during the artillery attack on the first day of the attack.

We have for the troops of the left wing under Skobolev, six regiments and four rifle battalions, a loss of 160 officers and 5,600 men. Individual losses cannot be accurately ascertained from the available data. Still, some figures may be given as accurate. The Uglits and Jaroslav regiments, which attacked prematurely in the centre, lost respectively 3,700 and 300 killed.

of skobeleff's troops the vladimir regiment lost two hundred the sestel hundred and fifty killed the former regiment lost thirty-six officers killed and wounded the latter fifteen officers

The 3rd Rifle Brigade consisting of 4 battalions which had entered upon the theatre of war barely 3,000 strong and had lost at Lovča 1 officer and 132 men killed and 17 officers and 400 men wounded lost here its commander Major General Dobrovolski 3 officers and 177 men killed and 20 officers and 666 men wounded.

Of the superior leaders, Major-General Dobrovolskiy of the Rifle Brigade was among the killed, as already stated. Major-General Rodionov, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division, and Major-General Tebjenik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, were wounded. The loss of the Romanians, 56 officers and 2,500 men, has been previously stated. The losses of the Turks are not accurately known. Opposite General Skobolev they must have been very heavy. Comments

Comment 1. The above description of the attack on the Russian Gravitsa readout is based on the official Russian report. Other accounts state that two attacks were repulsed, and that the third succeeded. The difference may be explained by the two halts made by the assailing troops, which practically did interrupt the advance, though it does not imply that the attack was repulsed.

There was no preparation by infantry fire. The tactical form of the attack was about the same as that of the unsuccessful assault on the same works on July 30th. But in this instance, the real result was gained by the advance of portions of the Walogda regiment past the flank of the redoubt, for it seems that the entrance of portions of the regiment through the gorge of the redoubt and the engagement of the Turkish reserves in Riyadh by other detachments brought the attack to a successful issue.

it is not quite clear whether in forming for the attack the first and second line of each regiment consisted of one battalion each or whether two battalions were formed abreast each in two lines of company columns in view of the formation used on other occasions where they are clearly described the latter seems more probable

Since the first two lines are expressly stated to have been formed in company columns, it may be assumed that in the third line the battalions were formed en masse. It would seem, however, that all three lines started at the same time, with comparatively short distances. The two halts seemed to have diminished the distances between the lines. The hull, in the further course of the attack, formed a single mass of unequal depth. Special tactical employment of the lines and reserve was out of the question,

all reached the enemy about the same time although the faulty co-operation of the two columns who were attacking the same work may be attributed to several causes it nevertheless remains reprehensible from the professional point of view proper combination and co-operation of the double attack would no doubt have accomplished its object more quickly and with less loss

Comment 2. The details of the failure of the attack of the centre are still enshrouded in obscurity. No tactical details are known, and the whole thing seems to have been a wild chaos from the beginning.

the fact that an unfortunate accident caused the premature advance of the uglitz and jaroslaf regiments does not provoke criticism but it may well be asked whether the procedure after that event might not have been better contrived obeying the letter of his orders general shetnikov held back the two regiments still in hand until three p m

for three hours he allowed the regiments who had advanced prematurely to fight single-handed it might have been assumed as certain that these two regiments alone would not be able to take the enemy's works on the other hand it could not be presumed that these regiments would be really effective after fighting single-handed for three hours against great odds

Hence, after the advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslav regiments, General Shitnikov should have either pushed the Kazan and Shuzha regiments also forward at once, or the Kozlov and Voronezh regiments should have been brought up in order to undertake the attack with sufficient strength from the very beginning, for, as above stated, the Uglitz and Jaroslav regiments could, under the circumstances, not be counted upon at three o'clock.

under the circumstances there was no good reason for postponing the attack until three o'clock pursuant to the disposition for not only had the advance of those two regiments compelled a large part of the russian artillery to cease firing but the turks had been long alarmed and prepared for the assault hence the contemplated surprise could under no circumstances be realized

did the commander-in-chief posted in the rear of the centre receive any information whatever of the premature attack if yes when did he express no opinion whatever to general shetnikov as to what he should do in what formation was the attack made when and in what direction did the regiments from the reserve advance these are questions which cannot as yet be answered but which are indispensable for any real criticism of the bloody events in the centre

comment three in turning now to the events on the russian left the peculiar mode of command obtained here attracts our attention prince samaritansky was the senior general but he played an entirely subordinate role by the side of the younger skobeleff and was pushed altogether into the background by the latter

During the initiatory actions on the 8th, 9th and 10th of September, Imerytinsky officially had command over all the troops of the left wing. Skobolev was subordinated to him, but acted independently as commander of an advance guard, which was increased to a strength equal to two-thirds of the whole corps. Since a very small part of the troops under Imerytinsky's command was not engaged on the 10th, his initial subsidence is less striking, but on the 11th of September, matters were different.

On this day, Skobolev was charged direct from the headquarters of the West Army with the conduct of the attack on the south front of the enemy's position, and was reinforced by part of Omeretinsky's troops. The latter was left in command of the remaining troops, and ordered to support Skobolev if necessary. In the course of the action, Prince Omeretinsky gradually sent all his troops to General Skobolev's assistance, so that in the end, he had not a company under his command, and was a mere spectator on the battlefield.

and was even favourably mentioned in the junior's direct report to the commander-in-chief for making himself useful in collecting the dispersed men and looking after the sanitary service these are conditions for which our conception lacks understanding and expression comment for method of conducting the action exhibits the traits discussed in connection with the events of july thirtieth on a larger scale

Careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position, general preparation of the attack by concentrated artillery fire, careful formation of the infantry and fighting line, special reserves in the rear of the flanks, and a general reserve in two lines. Special preparation of the attack by brisk fire of strong, well-covered skirmish lines, increased wherever possible by that of some batteries, or at least some guns brought into the front line, advance of the infantry by stages, occupation of the new line reached, and

and renewed preparation by infantry and artillery fire from that point great care for the safety of the flanks wise husbanding of the reserves wherever practicable new reserves were formed from troops heretofore engaged notwithstanding the unfavorable condition of the ground for cavalry the latter was at the right place at the decisive moment was properly employed and took a decisive part in the action

Lastly, the indefatigable efforts in collecting scattered men, which alone made it possible, again and again, to lead formed and half-fresh detachments into the action. To be sure, mistakes may have been made in the details of tactical employment of the individual bodies of troops, but the conduct of the battle as a whole presents a brilliant picture, interesting and fascinating in its smallest details.

Comment 5. It was only by their utmost efforts that the Turks succeeded on the 12th of September in recapturing the redoubts lost on the preceding day, when the complete inactivity of the Russians opposite the Turkish left and centre left the latter free to use most of their available troops for the support of their right. Had the Turks failed to drive Skobolev from the position he had captured, and there can be little doubt that this would have been the case had the Russian right and centre shown any activity whatever,

Had the Russians permanently ensconced themselves on the heights south of Plevna and posted their numerous artillery there, the remaining portions of the Turkish position would, it is presumed, have become untenable.

That the Supreme Command failed to appreciate the importance of the advantages gained by Skobolev, or to do anything for their completion, preservation or retention, is probably due to the fact that the Supreme Command, posted in the rear of the centre, near Redeshevo, was so struck and influenced by the defeat inflicted under its own eyes as to be unable to divert its mind to any other thought.

the complete inaction of the russian centre on the twelfth at a time when but a short distance away the furious action on the green hills was fought out does not admit of explanation by the theory of exhaustion and losses on the previous day there can be no doubt that the defeat witnessed on the preceding day had deprived the supreme command of confidence in a happy result and that the only thought was to find some honourable way out of the battle

At the time when Skobolev's request for reinforcements was denied, four entirely fresh regiments were available in the centre, not to mention the In German Land Regiment of the 3rd Division, which was not mentioned in the disposition and seems to have been the special escort of headquarters. The Shuzha Regiment, which came to Skobolev's assistance at noon on the 12th and covered the retreat of the other troops by an offensive movement, was one of the seven regiments which on the preceding day had suffered defeat in the centre.

It may therefore be presumed that the other regiments, excepting perhaps the Uglitz and Jaroslav regiments, were again fit for action. At any rate, they would have been capable to undertake the protection of the artillery positions, thus setting those four fresh regiments free. It should be stated, however, that the Shuja regiment was sent to Skobolev's assistance not by the Supreme Command, which was opposed to any continuation of the battle, but by the commander of the IV Corps, from courtesy as it were. End of section 10

section eleven of tactical studies on the battles around plevna by thilo von trotha this librivox recording is in the public domain part ten work of the cavalry on the left bank of the vid sub section one general loschkareff from the seventh to the nineteenth of september

On September 7th, General Loshkarev, commander of the 9th Cavalry Division, was posted on the high road east of Gravitsa between the 9th Corps and the Romanians, with the Astrakhan Dragoons No. 8, Kazan Dragoons No. 9, Buglancer Regiment No. 9, Don Cossacks No. 9, and the 16th Horse and the 2nd Don Cossack Battery.

He was ordered to move to Raben, past the night there, to draw himself both regular remaining cavalry regiments, the 5th and 6th irregular cavalry regiments, and one Romanian horse battery, to cross the Vid on the next day with the United Cavalry Corps, to make an energetic advance towards Dubnik, and to threaten the communications of Osman Pasha's army by taking suitable position on the left bank.

Pursuant to this order, the eight regiments of cavalry and three batteries were assembled by 9pm September 7th at Ribben, on the right bank of the brook which there emptied into the Vid. At 6am September 8th the Vid was crossed, and at 11.30am Smolet Trestnik was reached, 8 miles west of Ribben, and about the same distance to the north-west of the bridge over the Vid at Plevna.

Wheeling to the left, the cavalry corps took front toward the southeast against Plevna. Thence the Rossiori regular brigade, with the battery, moved to Dolny , with instructions to observe Plevna and the road leading thence to Rehova. The main body of the corps marched through Gorni to Dolny Dubnik, where it went into Bivouac at 1:45pm. On the march, the Cossacks of the advance guard captured a small herd of cattle, whose armed escort fled to Plevna.

Nothing further was seen of the enemy.

The line of outposts of the Romanians at Lower Netropoli extended from the Vid opposite Byvalar to the Sofia Road, facing the west front of the Plevna position. At the Sofia Road began the Russian outpost line, formed of two Lancer squadrons and a Sotnia of Cossacks, which extended at first southward along the heights between the Vid and the High Road, turned off to the west halfway between Lower and Upper Dubnik, crossed the road, and fronted toward Upper Dubnik. The length of the entire line was about 13 miles.

a separate detachment was posted in the rear of the whole position in observation of the road from lower dubnick to rehovah the distance between lower dubnick and lower netropoli is about six miles the former place is four miles from the bridge over the vid at plevna the latter about two and a half miles

At 4pm reports were received from the outposts that from 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry, followed by three battalions of infantry, were approaching Lower Dubnik from Plevna. At the same time the Romanians reported that about four battalions of infantry, with some cavalry, were approaching Lower Netropoli, and that the works of the west front of the Plevna position had opened an artillery fire.

The Romanians were ordered to maintain themselves at Lower Netropoli as best they could. The balance of the 9th Lancers, 1st and 2nd Squadrons, a Sotnia of Cossacks and four Cossack guns were dispatched to support the Russian outposts. The main body was posted in readiness at Lower Dubnik.

the turkish infantry halted within the range of protection afforded by the works the one thousand to one thousand five hundred cavalry advanced against the russian line of outposts which fell slowly back on its supports of the latter one half of the first squadron supported by the formed detachments of the outpost squadron third and fourth advanced against the turks from the front the other half of the first squadron took them on the left flank

a platoon of the second squadron on the right flank after a brief hand-to-hand conflict the turks fell back on their infantry and the pursuing lances were received with infantry fire and retired the turkish cavalry left seventy dead on the ground the turkish detachments which had been advancing against the romanians retired to the works after a brief artillery fire without having made a real attack

after the outposts had taken their former positions and the four cossack guns had been posted under cover to one side of the highroad the turks again advanced to the attack at six p m with infantry at one thousand five hundred yards the turks were greeted with shrapnel fire from the heretofore concealed guns and retired at once the total russian losses on this day were three men and nine horses killed nine men and twenty-two horses wounded the roumanians suffered no loss

early on the ninth of september patrols were sent out westward toward the iske southeastward along the high road and southward up the vid upon report of the appearance of tahrkeses west of upadubnik two sotnias of the ninth cossacks were dispatched in that direction at two p m

at three thirty p m the outposts reported the approach of strong hostile bodies against the position of the rossiori at lower netropoli and that bodies of hostile troops were assembling at the bridge over the vid opposite the russian position upon receipt of this report the whole corps was placed in readiness

At 4:30pm, bodies of hostile troops appeared on the heights on the left bank of the Vid, and farther to the south, dense skirmish lines, cavalry on the flanks, closed infantry and artillery in rear, amounting to about six battalions, one cavalry regiment and four guns. The attack was supported by artillery fire from the works of Oppenetz and was made with great determination. The regular brigade retired from Lower Netropoli.

With a view of utilising the favourable situation for a successful attack, General Loshkarev ordered the Romanians to fall back to the heights of Upper Netropoli in order to entice the Turks as far as possible from their works. As soon as the main body took the enemy in the flank, the Romanians were to attack in front.

The 8th Dragoon Regiment on outpost south of Lower Netropoli was to push two dismounted squadrons under cover of the High Corn and a depression of the ground against the left flank of the Turks advancing on the Romanians. The attack was to be supported on the left by two mounted squadrons of the 9th Dragoons with two guns of the 16th Horse Battery. Two Lancer squadrons and the remaining four guns of the Horse Battery were posted on the right as protection against any Turks who might advance from the bridge over the Vid.

two sotniers of cossacks having been dispatched to upper dubnik and two squadrons of the eighth dragoons and probably also a sotnier of cossacks having been deployed on the extensive outpost line there remained in general reserve four squadrons of dragoons and lancers three sotniers of cossacks the cossack battery and probably two kalorashi irregular regiments

of whose special employment nothing is known. The attack directed simultaneously against their front and flank caused the Turks to fall back to their works about 6pm, whereupon the troops at the bridge also withdrew. While this engagement was in progress, the detachment of Cossacks dispatched to Upper Dubnik reported that it had encountered Turkesses, and that an infantry camp of some 10,000 men had been observed in the rear of the wood west of Upper Dubnik.

Loshkarev now ordered his outposts into their original positions and moved with his main body to Lower Netropoli. The 9th Cossacks remained at Lower Dubnik with instructions to light a large number of campfires with a view of deceiving the enemy at Upper Dubnik as to the strength of the troops at Lower Dubnik, and at the same time lead the Turks in Plevna to believe that the reinforcements from Raben had arrived at Lower Netropoli in the evening.

The aggregate loss of the Russians and Romanians on the 9th of September was: 1 man and 11 horses killed, 1 man missing, and 25 men and 31 horses wounded.

Early on September 10th, the Corps took up the following position: The regular brigade between Upper and Lower Netropoli, facing Plevna. All four Russian regiments, with both batteries, and the 5th Militia Regiment at Lower Dubnik. Their right resting on the High Road. Their front facing south, covered by the Dubnik Brook, a branch of the Vid. The 6th Militia Regiment, south of Upper Netropoli, connecting the two bodies.

The Turks could be plainly observed increasing and strengthening the works of their west front. A number of guns were placed in battery. The Turks were evidently expecting the beginning of a serious attack from this direction.

besides several small patrols which reconnoitered the ground on both sides of the highroad between the vid and the isca as well as the ground beyond the isca two strong patrols were dispatched with instructions to seek communication with the cavalry of the left wing of the west army and to cross to the right bank of the vid above plevna if necessary for the accomplishment of their object

The 4th Squadron of the 9th Lancers crossed to the right bank of the Vid at Medivan, 6 miles above the bridge, and scattered in an easterly direction as far as Kebel, 2 miles southeast of Medivan, without meeting either Turks or Russians. A sultania of Cossacks which attempted to cross at Desawitsa, 3 miles above the bridge, found the village held by Turkish infantry and cavalry, and fell back.

The reports of all the patrols agreed that small bodies of Tahir Qaisas were roaming between the Vid and Iskar, and that beyond the Iskar they were in greater force.

On September 11th, a squadron of regular Romanian cavalry was ordered to cross the Isca at Magaleda, west of Lower Dubnik, and send patrols as far as possible in the direction of Rehova Wydden. For the purpose of establishing communication with the left flank of the West Army, a second squadron of the Ninth Lancers was sent out with orders to find the Russian troops under all circumstances and, if possible, to communicate directly with the Commander-in-Chief.

the squadron accomplished its object and returned the next day by the same route capturing a turkish officer on the road moreover a squadron of the fourth dragoons despatched by general iontieff commanding the cavalry of the left wing of the west army arrived during the day

during the night of the eleventh to twelfth skirmishing took place along the entire line of outposts with small bodies of turkesses and bashi-bazouks who endeavoured to steal through to the west and south and lost some killed and prisoners in the attempt at the same time many bulgarians with empty wagons were leaving on the twelfth of september the turks began construction of a new battery along the highroad to sweep the approaches of the bridge

at oponetz also a four-gun battery was built against the romanian battery at lower netropoli on september thirteenth the romanian squadron dispatched to magaleta reported that the patrols on the previous day found the neighbouring villages full of tahirqueses and bashi the total losses of the romanians in this reconnaissance consisted of one man wounded

A detachment of two squadrons of Lancers which advanced on the high road toward Tellus and dispatched small patrols to the right toward the Isca and on the left to Rakita and Radamurtza found in all the villages plundering Taharqueses and Basi-Bazooks who retired on the appearance of the Lancers. Patrols sent out on the 14th and 15th of September rendered similar reports.

on the latter day seven souteniers of the don cossack brigade of general chernovsevov with the fifteenth don cossack battery arrived at lower dubnik and brought an order for the ninth cossacks to move to bogot south of plevna on the road to the patrol sent out on the sixteenth everywhere had skirmishes with the herkesses and armed inhabitants the romanians at magalera lost one man and one horse killed

During the night, an attack was made from Plevna against the 5th Irregular Regiment, which was on outpost along the Vid. The attack was repulsed without loss to the Romanians. The patrols sent out southward on the 17th and 18th of September no longer met with hostile detachments. In the evening, an attack on the outpost north of the high road was repulsed with the loss of one man wounded. The Turks had two men killed.

The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, having arrived on the evening of the 18th of September, General Loshkarev started for Bogot at 10 o'clock the next morning, with the rest of his division, the 9th Lancers, the Dragoons, and the 9th Cossacks preceding him there. The 9th Hussars had throughout this period been at the east of Plevna. General Loshkarev, then with his 9th Cavalry Division, guarded the left of the West Army. Subsection 2. General Krylov, from September 19th to October 7th.

General Krylov, the newly appointed commander of the Combined Cavalry Corps on the left bank of the Vid, arrived at Lower Dubnik on the 19th of September. Reinforcements consisting of a Don Cossack Brigade, a Caucasian Cossack Brigade and part of the 4th Cavalry Division, which had heretofore been posted on the left of the West Army near Bogot and toward Lovtshch, arrived at Lower Dubnik partly before, partly at the same time with Krylov.

The task of the corps was to cut off all supplies from the Turkish army at Plevna, to save the troops as much as possible, to prevent entirely any cooperation of the troops in Plevna with operations on the left bank of the Vid, or to entice the troops from Plevna to such a distance as to temporarily weaken the garrison. About the time of the arrival of Krylov and the main body of his corps at Lower Dubnik, reports came in of the approach of hostile columns from Magaleta.

These reports proved erroneous, but still Krylov bestowed special attention to the country of Magaleda and west of the Iskar. On September 20th, Colonel Stackelberg, with two squadrons of hussars, two squadrons of irregulars, and two guns, scattered toward Telus in order to reconnoiter the country between the Iskar and the High Road as far as Rokita. Near Telus, he encountered strong hostile detachments and fell back after a brief engagement.

In order to more accurately ascertain the strength and position of the enemy, Colonel Stolman, with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, two squadrons of regular cavalry, and the 8th Don Battery, was again dispatched toward Telus. His vigorous attack developed about 10 Turkish battalions ensconced in rifle trenches, and about two regiments of cavalry.

Three guns were covered by entrenchments, and several others were in the open. While the action was taking place, a general staff officer made a sketch of the enemy's position. The enemy's strength was estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men. On the 22nd of September, the outposts reported that considerable hostile forces were approaching Lower Dubnik from Upper Dubnik, and that the strong Russian patrols were falling back fighting to Lower Dubnik.

General Krylov at first decided to make a stand at Lower Dubnik, but on receipt of information from Loshkrev on the right bank that he was marching on Telus, Krylov decided to attack the enemy in front, while Loshkrev, as he supposed, was attacking in rear. After Krylov had opened the action by a brisk artillery fire, the sound of the guns of Loshkrev's detachment was heard at three o'clock. Not, however, in the enemy's rear, but in prolongation of the Russian left,

At the same time, reports came in from the outposts at Lower Dubnik that strong bodies of hostile infantry were advancing from the bridgehead against the Russian position. In view of these circumstances, Krylov led his corps to Smolet-Trestnik, leaving a strong advance guard, the Don Cossack Brigade, and the Irregular Brigade at Netropoli. The infantry advancing from the bridgehead retired within the works toward evening.

On the morning of the 23rd of September, the advance guard at Netropoli reported that the hostile forces at Upper Dubnik had marched into Plevna during the night under the fire of the 15th Battery attached to the Don Cossack Brigade. On the 24th, Krylov was ordered to cover the right of the army by taking position abreast of Brestovets, midway between the Lower Vid and the Lower Iskar.

and to fall back in case of necessity to Riben. At the same time, reports arrived from the west of the presence of bodies of turkesses collecting provisions for the Turkish army. On the 25th of September, Krylov marched to Rehova with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, the Romanian Regular Brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, the 8th Dragoons, and 3 Batteries. A flank detachment marched to Bielos Latina.

Bodies of Turkesses were driven from several of the villages of that vicinity. The telegraph line between Witten and Plevena was cut. On the 26th of September, the three redoubts covering Rehova were bombarded, and one Turkish gun dismounted. Krylov made no attempt to capture Rehova, since he would not have been able to hold it. Nor did he desire to set it on fire by shells, as the village was chiefly inhabited by Bulgarians.

On the 28th, Krylov retired to Ribben to replenish his provisions and ammunition, and on the 30th, the corps again stood at Smiret-Trestenik. During the absence of the main body, the detachment at Netropoli captured two wagon trains of twenty and a hundred wagons loaded with flour and barley respectively, and on another occasion relieved a Turkish foraging party of a part of the hay collected.

On the 30th of September, Colonel Levis advanced with four Sotniers of the Vladdy Caucasian Regiment, two squadrons of Charkov Lancers, two squadrons of Mariupol Hussars, and the 8th Horse Battery on Telos and Radomertsa. He reported on October 1st that he'd encountered Baschi Bazooks and pursued them to Lukovica, that his detachment had captured 1,000 head of beef cattle, 80 horses, and a wagon train loaded with salt and quinine.

and that the bridge at radomerza and the telegraph line had again been destroyed as far as lukavica on the first of october general chermatt commander-in-chief of the romanian army appeared and informed general krylov that he had arranged for a reconnaissance in force on the next day by a body of romanian troops against the position of obonetz and requested support

in compliance with the request general krylov ordered the detachment at netropoli to advance on october second against obanetz learning of the advance of a strong turkish corps of all arms from the bridgehead against lower netropoli he sent forward all the troops at smarak-tresternik

On reaching the detachment, General Krylov found the 15th Don Battery engaged with Turkish infantry and artillery, which had advanced to lower Netropoli. The Romanian and 8th Don Batteries came at once into action on the right of the engaged battery, and took part in the conflict. One of the enemy's guns was dismounted, an ammunition cart blown up, and Netropoli was set on fire by shells. The 15th Don Battery being seriously molested by the fire of Turkish skirmishers ensconced in the outskirts of the village,

two squadrons of the fourth dragoons dismounted and drove them away the retreat of the turkish infantry was covered by an attack of a body of turkesses and to cover the dismounted dragoons two sotniers of the cuban regiment advanced and threw the turkesses back on their infantry

at one thirty p m the roumanian colonel cherkas reported that the reconnaissance against opinets could not take place and as it would have had no purpose under these circumstances to continue the action general krylov withdrew to his right about three p m an attempt of the turks to take the russian detachment in left flank was frustrated by a counter-attack of the cuban regiment

Meanwhile, the detachment of Colonel Levis had advanced southward and its patrols had established communication with General Loshkarev's cavalry, scouting on the right bank of the Vid.

Having burned the bridge at Shevenibreg on October 2nd while en route from Radomertsa to Sumakova, Colonel Levis moved from Sumakova on October 3rd and assembled at Lukovitsa in the evening, having skirmished with Turkesses on the way. The bridge at Lukovitsa was demolished. Sir Mayle was captured and sent to Krylov, and by him to the commander of the West Army.

On the 4th and 5th of October, Levis remained at Radomertsa with the main body, and sent patrols in all directions. On the 6th of October, he was attacked by some 4,000 or 5,000 infantry and turkesses from Lukavica. Up to 2pm, he repulsed the attacks on his front, but at this hour, an equally strong body, which left Plevna in the morning, appeared in his rear. Covered by the fire of his artillery and dragoons, Levis withdrew, crossed the Iska, and moved to Sumakova.

On the 7th of October, Levis moved to Magaleta, from which point a detachment sent against Telus reported Upper and Lower Dubnik occupied by the Turks. By entrenching Lukavica, Telus, and Upper and Lower Dubnik, the Turks protected their line of communication from Orkani to Plevna so effectively that the Russian cavalry was compelled to abandon, for the present, all attempts to cut the line. The investment at the west of Plevna, which for a time seemed successfully established, was completely broken. Comments

The task of the Russo-Romanian cavalry was to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Plevna. The task might have been accomplished by defensive or offensive means. Id est, the cavalry might bar the road to an approaching relief corps in some favourable position, or it might go to meet the relieving troops and try to overthrow them by a vigorous and unexpected attack. The latter method is more in keeping with the tactical ideas of cavalry than a pure defensive in which the inherent strength of the arm

modern armament and training notwithstanding, cannot be fully developed. In the period described above, the Russian cavalry made no attempt whatever to solve the problem by offensive action, and the very weak defensive attempt failed completely. The work of the Russo-Romanian cavalry may be divided into two portions. The period of the attempted investment up to the successful movement of the Turkish Relief Corps, September 23rd, and the period of simple observation subsequent to that day.

within the latter period fall the movement on rehovah from september twenty fifth to twenty eighth and the expedition of colonel levis to lukavitsa from september thirtieth to october seventh on the eighth of september the day when loschkareff was dispatched to the left bank of the vid the artillery preload to the great attack on plevna was beginning

At this moment, it was not so much Loshkarov's task to cut Plevna from a leave without, as to facilitate the attack on the east by demonstrations on the west. And, in the case of the capture of Plevna, to cut off the retreat of the fleeing Turks on the left bank. It is evident that the appearance of the strong body of cavalry opposite the west side of their position attracted the attention of the Turks in no small degree, but we fail to note any sensible effect on the events of the east front.

on the receipt by loschkruf on september ninth of information that a hostile corps of some ten thousand men was in the vicinity of upper dubnik it was to be expected that a strong advance would be made at once in that direction to verify the correctness of this important information loschkruf however contented himself with taking up a defensive position so close to plevna as to expose himself to the danger of being attacked simultaneously by the relief corps and by the garrison of plevna itself

Upon the abandonment of the idea of a capture of Plevna by assault after the failure of the attack on September 11th, the investment, particularly on the west, became the important feature. Loshkarev, with part of the cavalry, was withdrawn from the left bank to the right bank, where he covered the left of the army. In his place, Krylov made his appearance with considerable reinforcements so that the total strength of the cavalry corps operating on the left bank must be put down at not less than 6,000 or 7,000 effectives.

Krylov had very pertinent instructions from the commander-in-chief to meet any relief corps at as great a distance as possible from Plevna. Yet when the approach of a strong hostile corps from Telus became known, Krylov remained close to Plevna and, upon the appearance of the enemy, fell back without offering any serious resistance so that the Turks had no difficulty in getting their large train of provisions and ammunition into the town.

the task demanded of general kryloff and his cavalry was the cavalry task of the most common sort he failed completely and made no attempt to solve the problem by force of arms the passage in kryloff's orders to save his troops as much as possible in the solution of his dusk may perhaps be admitted as an explanation though by no means an extenuation of his feeble action that phrase was not well chosen and served no clear purpose

That a general should save his troops, as much as possible, is so elementary a rule that it would be trivial and unnecessary to call attention to it. If it is used, it is apt to lead a careful and prudent man into such exaggerated caution as to render any success impossible, because real success against an active enemy will rarely be gained without bloody sacrifices.

If Krylov had been compelled to leave the road open to the Turks after losing a few hundred of his horsemen in a fruitless defensive action, or in a vigorous though hopeless charge, the Russians might have consoled themselves with the idea that the fortune of war is variable. But it is hardly to be assumed that the Russian commander-in-chief was satisfied when the Turks were able to accomplish their object almost without any shedding of blood in the face of 6,000 to 7,000 eager horsemen.

It is interesting to note how Krylov in his report seeks to vindicate, not to say excuse, his action. In the first place, he claimed credit for delaying the arrival of the relief corps in Plevna by 48 hours. Since no decisive events were taking place in Plevna at the time, it was a matter of indifference whether the Turkish corps arrived 48 hours sooner or later.

He justified his retreat from Lower Dubnik to Smirret Trestenik on September 22nd by stating that the point was but a little further from the high road than Lower Dubnik and much closer to the line of retreat of the core. Ribben ended the posting of the detachment at Netropoli, furnished the means for observing everything that passed in and out of Plevna.

to watch the turks from a distance carrying provisions into plevna did not we should say require the presence of a body of seven thousand cavalry if the entire affair could be repeated with the difference of having skobeleff or gorko at the head of the cavalry corps a comparison between their action and that of kryloff would be as interesting as it would be instructive

The very interesting events during the first week of October could, unfortunately, not be described in full, owing to the lack of reliable information. The expedition of Colonel Levis was the first attempt, though undertaken with insufficient force, to accomplish the investment of Plevna by offensive movements, and the idea of opposing an attempt at relief at Lukovitsa rather than at Dubnik was certainly correct.

But there is a certain obscurity in the accounts before us as to what the main body of some forty squadrons was doing while Levis was advancing southward with twelve squadrons and eight guns, and how a comparatively small Turkish force should find it possible under his very eyes to advance against Levis's rear. The numerous tactical details which it was possible to interweave in the description are of interest in judging the tactics of the Russian cavalry.

It is much to be regretted that information as to the tactical details and losses in the two most important actions, at Netropoli on the 2nd and at Lukovitsa on the 6th of October, are scant in the case of the former and lacking altogether in the case of the latter.

Part 11a. Investment of Plevna from the West. Subsection 1. The Communications of Plevna to the Rhea. As early as the beginning of hostilities, an army of newly formed reserves was assembled at Sofia. About the time of the Russian passage of the Danube, part of it was put in motion and effected its junction at Plevna with Osman Pash's army from Winn.

when after their repeated failure to capture plevna by force the russians threatened to cut the communications of the army posted there it became the duty of the force at sofia to keep the communications with plevna open and to look to the safety of the trains of provisions and ammunition destined for that place

Crossing the Balkans with part of the army assembled at Sofia, Shevket Pasha moved to Orkani and thence with about 10,000 men to Telus. And, after slight engagements with reconnoitering Russian cavalry, succeeded, on September 22nd, in driving back General Krylov and getting his large convoy of provisions and ammunition into Plevna, where the greater part of his troops remained. He himself, however, returning to Orkani.

At the beginning of October, Shefket again started out with a large convoy and 5,000 men. A corps of equal strength marching from Plevna to meet him. Colonel Levis, who blocked the road at Radomertsa, was driven back on the 6th of October, and the convoy of 2,000 wagons succeeded in reaching the left bank of the Vid, opposite Plevna, on October 8th, the lighter vehicles crossing it at once by a ford above the bridge, while the heavy wagons waited for the damaged bridge to be repaired.

In order to protect the march of further convoys against Russian scouting parties, the Turks fortified three stations on the northernmost part of the road between Plevna and Orkany.

Dolny Dubnyk, Gorny Dubnyk and Telus. These stations were garrisoned by a division consisting of 20 battalions and 15 guns. According to other accounts, 18 battalions and 24 guns. And a number of Turkesses under Chivsi Pasha who established his headquarters at Gorny Dubnyk. Other bodies of troops stood echeloned on the section from Lukavica to Orkany.

very considerable supplies were collected at sofia and orkany for osman pasha between whom and shefket pasha there was an agreement that every two weeks a convoy with provisions for a month should be despatched general gorkho's task and disposition for the twenty fourth of october

The arrival of the Guard having considerably increased the number of available troops, it was decided to adopt the plans of General Todleben, now appointed assistant to the Commander-in-Chief, and to undertake the investment of Plevna from the west in a manner that would ensure success. General Gorko, heretofore commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard, was entrusted with the task and given the greater part of the Guard, in addition to the masses of cavalry on the left bank of the Vid.

at this time about the middle of october the following troops under general arnoldi krylov having been relieved were on the left bank of the vid northwest of plevna in the vicinity of trestinik and riben the fourth cavalry division numbering eighteen squadrons and soutenirs with twelve guns

A Don Cossack brigade of 12 Sotniers and 6 guns. This is the organic strength. On their arrival on the left bank of the Vid, the account mentions but 7 Sotniers. Lastly, 4 Romanian cavalry regiments, the 2 regular, and the 5th and 6th militia regiments, of 16 squadrons and 6 guns. 62 squadrons and Sotniers with 30 guns.

At the south of Plevna, on the right bank of the Vid, was Loshkarev, with the 9th Cavalry Division, 18 squadrons and 12 guns, scouting southward on both banks.

In addition to these bodies of cavalry, the following troops of the Guard were placed at the disposal of General Gorko to enable him to accomplish his purpose. The 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions with 32 battalions, the Rifle Brigade with 4 battalions, the Battalion of Sappers, the 2nd Cavalry Division with 24 squadrons, the Personal Escort of the Emperor with 4 squadrons, 12 batteries with 96 guns, and 3 horse batteries with 18 guns.

All these troops were south of Plevna, between the Vid and the high road to Lovce. In addition, General Arnoldi's cavalry was reinforced by seven battalions of Romanian infantry and a Romanian foot battery, while the 4th Don Cossacks, though belonging to the 4th Cavalry Division, were attached to the Guard Corps to serve as guides on account of their knowledge of the terrain gained from their protracted presence in the locality.

On the 22nd of October, each of the six cavalry regiments of the Guard sent a platoon to the left bank of the Vid to reconnoiter. At the same time, General Gorko was reconnoitering in the direction of Telus, accompanied by the superior officers of cavalry of the Guard and escorted by two squadrons of the Emperor's escort and one Sotnia of the 4th Cossacks. From that point he rode forward on the high road toward Gorni Dubnik, accompanied by a few officers, and reconnoitered the enemy's position under a brisk fire.

As a first step in the accomplishment of his task, Gorko decided upon the seizure of the fortified position of Gorni Dubnik. While the main attack was to be directed against that point, the enemy's forces at Telus and Dolni Dubnik were to be kept busy, and a sortie from Plevna as well as the approach of reinforcements from Orkani had also to be provided against. The disposition drawn up to this effect by General Gorko for the 24th of October divided his forces into five groups.

Group A. The following troops were to make the direct attack on Gorni Dubnik. The 2nd Infantry Division of the Guard, with 15 battalions. The Rifle Brigade of the Guard, with 4 battalions. The Sapper Battalion of the Guard. Two squadrons of the Imperial Escort. Four Sotniers of the 4th Don Cossacks. And 6 foot batteries of the Guard, with 48 guns. In addition, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, 12 Sotniers with 6 guns,

was to advance from abasgoi and take post west of gawne dubnick to prevent any retreat westward one battalion of the second infantry division of the guard and a foot-battery of the guard were to remain at the ford of medivhane to cover the passage there group b

The following troops were detailed to make a demonstration against Telus and repulse any troops of the enemy that might be advancing from Orkani: The Chasseur Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard with 4 battalions, the 1st and 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard with 16 squadrons, 1 Sotnia of the 4th Cossacks and 1 foot and 2 horse batteries of the Guard with 20 guns. In addition, 4 Max Militia Brigade, 8 squadrons,

was moved from magaleta partly on the right bank of the isca to chevenibreg partly on the left bank to sumacova forming as it were the western flank guard of the detachment operating against tellus group c the following troops under general arnoldi were told off for the demonstration against dolny

The 4th Cavalry Division, without the 4th Cossacks and another squadron detached with two guns, with 11 squadrons and 10 guns, and the Militia Brigade with 8 squadrons, 6 guns, and two battalions of Romanian infantry. In addition, a detachment was to be dispatched by the 9th Cavalry Division from Medivan against Dolny Dubnik to establish communication with General Arnoldi.

group d to meet any sortie from plevna general shinosabov was to occupy the position of netropoli with seven sotnias of his brigade five battalions of romanian infantry and six russian horse and six romanian foot-guns

Group E. The General Reserve was posted between Upper and Lower Dubnik and consisted of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard with 12 battalions, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard with 8 squadrons, 2 squadrons of the Imperial Escort, 1 Sotnir of the 4th Cossacks and 4 foot and 6 horse batteries of the Guard with 44 guns. Subsection 3. Capture of Gorni Dubnik on October 24th.

Gawney Dubnick is situated on the Dubnick Brook, about 1,000 yards west of the High Road. At the highest point west of the road and south of the village, a spacious redoubt was built, with a cavalier in the interior. A smaller redoubt lay east of the Great Redoubt. Both redoubts were surrounded by rifle trenches. On the north, the level and open ground sloped almost insensibly towards Dawney Dubnick.

Toward the east the slopes were gentle and covered with a young and very dense growth of timber. The distance of the smaller redoubt from the edge of this wood was about 400 yards. To the south and west the ground sloped steeply into a depression about 200 yards wide. About 1,800 yards south of the small redoubt there was a clearing in the wood which the Turks had begun to fortify.

The troops detailed for the direct attack on Gorni Dubnik crossed the Vid during the night near Shcherikova by three fords with knee-deep water and were divided into three columns as follows: Right column under Major General Ellis, four rifle battalions, two batteries, two squadrons and one Sotnia on the road from Shcherikova to Kruschevitsa, 2000 yards from the former place.

middle column under major-general baron zedler first brigade of the second infantry division of the guard with seven battalions the sapper battalion of the guard two batteries and one sotnya on the road from shirakova to sumikovitsa five hundred yards from the former place

left column under major-general rosenbach second brigade of the second infantry division of the guard with eight battalions and two batteries was the last to cross the vid and took position three thousand five hundred yards west of the river in the ravine of swinar two soutenirs of cossacks cannot be accounted for

The two flank columns which were to advance from the north and south against the enemy's position were to start at 6:15 a.m. The middle column, which was to attack from the east and had the shortest route, was to start at 6:45 a.m. The latter column entered the action at 8:30, the two flank columns at 9:00 a.m., their movements having been somewhat delayed.

the artillery of the middle column was posted about the centre of the position of that column on the left of the artillery was the bodyguard grenadier regiment with its fourth battalion in first line the second and third battalions in second line to the right of the batteries was the bodyguard moscoe regiment in the same formation the first battalion of the grenadiers and the sapper battalion formed the reserve

At 8.30am both batteries came into action in the clearing above referred to, and opened fire at a range of 1,600 yards. The Grenadier Regiment, advancing through dense undergrowth, lost direction, went too far to the left, and touched the left column, whereupon General Siedler moved the regiment some distance to the rear, and then to the right oblique to approach the batteries.

the gap caused by the oblique movement had meanwhile been filled from the reserve by the first battalion of the regiment on renewing the advance the grenadier regiment reached the western edge of the wood and was about abreast of the mosca regiment on the right of the artillery at this time nine o'clock the two flank columns appeared before the enemy's position and opened fire from their artillery

at nine thirty o'clock the caucasian cossack brigade appeared west of gorni dubnik and also opened fire from its battery so that the turkish position where there were but four guns was receiving a concentric fire from fifty-four guns

Shortly after ten o'clock, the Grenadier Regiment attacked the East Readout, which was captured in spite of the murderous fire from this as well as from the Main Readout. The garrison of the East Readout fell back on the Main Readout. An attempt of the Grenadiers to enter the Main Readout at the same time with the retreating enemy was frustrated by a severe fire, whereupon the Grenadiers ensconced themselves in the captured Readout.

While the attack of the Grenadiers was in progress, Major General Zeidler ordered the batteries and the Moscow Regiment to go forward. The first battery approached under a severe infantry fire to within 800 yards of the main readout, but, being unable to maintain itself, fell back to its original position after firing a few rounds. The Moscow Regiment advanced until abreast of the Grenadiers and ensconced itself in the rifle trenches to the right, north, of the captured readout.

Meanwhile, the right column had gained the high road leading from Dolny to Gorni Dubnik, and advanced against the Turkish position from the north. The two Cuban squadrons of the Imperial escort, marching at the head, drove bands of Turkesses before them and cut the telegraph line, which ran by the side of the road. Leaving one battalion opposite Dolny Dubnik, General Ellis formed his remaining three battalions for the attack. One battalion on each side of the road, the two batteries in the centre, one battalion in reserve.

At 1,700 yards from the main redoubt, the artillery opened fire, the rifle battalions continuing the advance. In consequence of the loss of the east redoubt, the Turks also abandoned the northern line of advance trenches. The rifles of the guard took cover in them and opened fire at a range of from 600 to 700 yards.

As the rifles were directly in front of the artillery and masking their fire, both batteries, notwithstanding the severe fire of the enemy, came up almost to the position of the rifles and again opened fire at 800 yards. The 1st Division of the Guard, having meanwhile arrived between Gourney and Dolnedubnik, and having deployed with front toward the latter place, the rifle battalion heretofore opposite Dolnedubnik was ordered to join its brigade

gorko had ridden to the foremost line of the rifles of the guard to reconnoiter the great redoubt and there about noon received report of the failure of the attack of the left column

The left column started about 6:15 o'clock from the ravine of Swynar and was considerably delayed in crossing a narrow but deep water course. It advanced on the road leading from Tellus to Gawne Dubnick and did not arrive before the enemy's position until nine o'clock. Two batteries placed in the centre opened fire at a range of 1,800 yards but soon closed to 1,500 yards and were reinforced by the fifth horse battery of the guard.

The Finland regiment advanced on the left, west of the road, against Gorni Dubnik, through dense underwood. The Polov regiment on the right, east of the road, on open ground. After crossing the ravine in front, both regiments moved to the attack on the main readout, but were repulsed by a severe fire and rallied in several places where the terrain afforded cover in rear.

the rifle battalions meanwhile utilising the depression opening into the valley of the dubnik brook were bleaking more and more to the right so as almost to face the west front of the turkish position gorka ordered forward two battalions of the ismailov regiment to fill the gap between the rifles and the artillery on the road which belonged to the right column

at the same time he reinforced the middle and left column each by one battalion of the same regiment having made these arrangements gawker repaired in person to the batteries of the middle column at about two p m

Having learned that the Chasseur Regiment of the Guard had been repulsed at Telus and was retreating, Gorko feared the arrival of Turkish reinforcements from that direction, and decided to bring the affair before Gorni Dubnik to a conclusion by a simultaneous assault from all sides. The middle column received verbal instructions to that effect. A written order was dispatched to the right flank column. The following arrangement was made to ensure a simultaneous attack.

As soon as the left column had completed its arrangements and stood ready to attack, its artillery was to fire three salvos. The same was to be done by the middle column when everything was in readiness there. And lastly by the right column. As soon as the artillery of the right column fired the last salvo, the assault was to begin from all directions. The space to be crossed by the assaulting troops differed at the various points, from 100 to 400 paces.

having himself seen to the arrangements of the middle column gorko went to the left column to personally see to what was needful but before this was accomplished the salvos of the right column resounded and its troops advanced to the assault which misunderstanding rendered a simultaneous attack impossible

In order to support the assaulting troops of the right column as much as possible, Gorko dispatched orderlies in all directions with orders for every detachment to advance to the attack without waiting for the signal, with the natural result of provoking a series of individual attacks which were anything but simultaneous. Received by a murderous infantry fire, none of the detachment was able to reach the redoubt.

and the assailants ensconced themselves at various distances from the readout where they found shelter. The Finland regiment, finding no shelter at all, fell back to its original position on the rear slope of the hill. The attack came to a standstill about four o'clock. Gorko decided to leave his troops in their positions for the time being and to renew the attack at dusk. The artillery was compelled to suspend its fire everywhere in order not to fire on its own troops.

As darkness set in, two battalions of the Izmailov Regiment advanced creeping to within fifty paces of the redoubt and threw themselves on it simultaneously from all sides. After a brief struggle, the redoubt was taken. The Turkish commander, Ahmet Çiftipaşa, surrendered with his whole garrison, which still numbered fifty-three officers and twenty-two hundred and thirty-five unwounded men.

Four Krupp guns and large quantities of cartridges were also captured. The main body of the General Reserve did not become engaged.

subsection four events at tellus on october the twenty fourth to the troops detailed to operate against tellus and which crossed the vid at shirakova toward morning the tasks were assigned as follows the first cavalry brigade of the guard to block communication between tellus and gorney dubnick the second brigade the chasseurs regiment of the guard and a battery to move to the direct attack of tellus

The latter detachment started at 6:15am from the ravine near Swynar where it had remained for some time after crossing the Vid. At its head, the Dragoon regiment with two horse guns moved to the height of Rekita to cover the left and rear of the troops on their march to Telus. The Hussar regiment with four horse guns moved to the left in order to advance against Telus from the south, and the Chasseurs with the foot battery advanced from the east.

the works of tellus consisted of a large redoubt built across the high road a smaller redoubt more to the west and a series of rifle trenches in front the detachment arrived before tellus at nine thirty a m and the eight foot and four horse guns opened fire at a range of one thousand yards

The Chasseurs' regiment having been drawn up in two lines of two battalions, the first line advanced across the perfectly level and open ground to attack the foremost rifle trenches. The latter were captured with the bayonet about 10 a.m., but unfortunately they offered no shelter whatever from the fire from the enemy's main position in rear, so that the Chasseurs suffered great losses in the captured position.

in order not to expose themselves idly and uselessly to this murderous fire the two battalions of the first line tried to attack the main redoubt and were followed without orders by the two battalions of the second line not heretofore engaged but the attack did not approach the redoubt closer than within one hundred paces where the assailants sought such cover as they could find

a sortie of the turks was repulsed by a brisk fire but as the capture of the redoubt proved impracticable and as report was received from the dragoons at rakita that bodies of hostile infantry and artillery were approaching tellus from the south the order to retreat was given

During the unsuccessful attack of the Chasseurs, the Hussars advanced on Tellus from the south. Some of their detachments galloped into the foremost rifle trenches and drove out the Turks. An attack made by a strong body of infantry from the Turkish main position was repulsed by the fire of the horse artillery and the dismounted fire of some of the Hussars. The retreat of the Chasseurs was covered by the Hussars.

The Dragoon Regiment dispatched to Rakhita was skirmishing with swarms of Turk-S's. Bodies of infantry and artillery appeared near Ademertsa, but did not advance further. Subsequently, the regiment joined the retreat of the troops that had been engaged at Telus. Part of the regiment, in conjunction with a squadron of Hussars, assisted in the removal of the wounded. At dusk, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard halted in touch with the enemy.

The 1st Brigade of the Guard started from the Vid about 7 o'clock and reached the high road between Telus and Gorni Dubnik at 10 o'clock. Communication was established with the column moving on Telus and with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which had arrived west of Gorni Dubnik. The 2nd Horse Battery of the Guard, which belonged to the Brigade, was dispatched in support of the left column moving on Gorni Dubnik and took part in the fire against the Turkish position.

On learning about noon of the failure of the attack on Tellus, the regiment of mounted grenadiers was dispatched to meet and support the retreating troops, but no assistance was required as the enemy failed to pursue. During the night, the brigade remained in its position between Tellus and Gorni Dubnik. Subsection 5. Events at Dolni Dubnik on October 24th.

Leaving Trestnik early on October 24th with his detachment, consisting of 19 squadrons, 2 battalions, and 16 horse guns, General Arnoldi reached 3,000 yards north of Dolny Dubnik about 7am, being greeted with artillery fire from two readouts in front of the place. Arnoldi moved to the southwest, turning Dolny Dubnik, and continued the march under the cover of the 4th Dragoons, whom he left opposite the town.

When the detachment had almost reached the high road, a third readout was encountered. Covered by the 4th Hussars and two militia regiments, the Romanian and 1st Russian Battery came into action against this readout, and opened fire. Meanwhile, the 4th Lancers with four horse guns advanced at a trot on the high road between Gorni Dubnik, where the rifle brigade on the right column arrived about the same time.

A hill which commanded the redoubt was captured by some dismounted dragoons and occupied at once by the Russian artillery. A daring charge of the Russian cavalry against Dolny Dubnik was repulsed by infantry fire. The two Romanian batteries arrived and threw up entrenchments on the left of the artillery position. The cannonade was kept up by both sides until late in the evening without visible result. The Turks in Dolny Dubnik numbered six battalions and four guns.

While the action of General Arnoldi's detachment against Dolny Dubnik was in progress, General Loshkarev ordered six of his squadrons and a horse battery from Medivan to cross to the left bank, dashing against Gorni Dubnik without result. The action of the detachment was thereafter limited to maintaining communication between the troops of General Arnoldi, the General Reserve, and the troops on the right bank of the Vid. Subsection 6. Capture of Telus on October 28th.

After the capture of Gorni Dubnik, the 1st Division fronted toward Dolni Dubnik, covering the 2nd Division and the Sapper Battalion while they entrenched the captured position of Gorni Dubnik on the side toward Plevna. Meanwhile, Arnoldi's cavalry was watching Dolni Dubnik and the bridgehead of Plevna. The cavalry division of the Guard was south of Gorni Dubnik toward Telus.

Dolny Dubnik and Telus were each occupied by six or seven battalions of infantry, a few hundred Turkesses, and four guns. The guardhouse on the high road three miles south of Telus was also entrenched, surrounded by rifle trenches, and occupied by infantry.

at ratamurtza there were strong bodies of infantry and cavalry under chef ketpasha who was approaching from orkani with twenty battalions ten guns and several thousand horsemen to succour the atappan posts who had halted and faced about on learning of the capture of gorni dubnik

From the 25th to the 28th of October, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard were stationed at Rikita with outposts towards Rademurtza, the Guard House and the south side of Telos. The outpost service was very exacting and skirmishes with the enemy were incessant. The horses of the 2nd Brigade remained saddled for almost three times 24 hours. The 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Guard was in the ravine of Swinar with outposts towards the east side of Telos.

The 3rd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard at Gorni Dubnik, with outposts toward the north side of Telus. The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was farther to the west on the Iska, and observed Telus from the west.

On October 28th, Gorko advanced to the attack on Telus. While the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigade were observing toward the south, Telus was surrounded on all sides by 16 battalions of infantry and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and subjected to a concentric fire from 6 foot and 2 horse batteries between 11am and 2pm.

Gorko then sent some Turks, captured at Gorni Dubnik, into Telus with a demand for immediate surrender, and the threat that he would destroy everything with his artillery if the surrender did not take place within half an hour. Ismail Hakipasha now surrendered with his garrison of seven battalions, still numbering 100 officers and 3,000 men.

Four guns and very large quantities of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians, whose entire loss consisted of one man killed and a few wounded, while on the other hand many dead Turks lay about in the badly damaged works. We now turn to the events of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades of the Guard, which during this time were posted at Rokita to check the approach of reinforcements from that direction and to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Telus to the south.

The Dragoon regiment was at Rokita, fronting south. On its right, the 5th Horse Battery, escorted by a squadron of mounted grenadiers, came into action against the guardhouse. The 2nd Horse Battery, escorted by two squadrons of lancers, was firing against the south front of Telus. The rest of the two brigades, i.e. three squadrons of grenadiers, two of lancers, and four of hussars, were posted in reserve in rear of the Dragoons.

The 5th Horse Battery opened fire about 10am, and soon compelled the Turks to leave the rifle trenches in front of the guardhouse. At the same time, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade advanced from the west against Radomertsa under a brisk engagement with Turkish infantry and cavalry, and was joined by two squadrons of Lancers sent toward them from the reserve.

The brigade was, however, ultimately forced to fall back, followed by the Lancers, who thus became separated from the main body of the cavalry of the Guard. Having repulsed the attack on their left, the Turks advanced against the enemy opposite their right. Turkish infantry began to advance from the Guardhouse through the brush against the 5th Horse Battery, and dense swarms of Mounted Turquesses threatened the 2nd Horse Battery, which was firing on Tellus.

the two squadrons of lances which formed the escort of this battery and were posted with front toward tellus changed front against the turkesses and seven squadrons posted in reserve at rakita also advanced against them in the space between the batteries

The Lancers charged before the arrival of these reinforcements. The 3rd Squadron followed in second line at a trot. The 4th Squadron charged at full speed against the Turkesses, who received the charge with a brisk fire from their magazine rifles, and suddenly wheeling to the right and left, unmasked a line of infantry which had been posted under cover and now greeted the Lancers with a severe fire. The Lancers galloped around the flank of the infantry, and charged from the flank, and cut down the greater part.

On proceeding further, in the direction of the guardhouse, the Lancers received fire from the infantry posted in the dense brush, and turning about, regained their original position at a short trot. Meanwhile, the main body of the cavalry reached the high road between Tellus and the guardhouse, when the news of the capture of Tellus arrived. Small detachments of the garrison, attempting to escape to the south, were overtaken and cut down by the cavalry.

The 2nd Horse Battery now also directed its fire on the guardhouse, which was soon after abandoned by the Turks. All Turkish troops that had come under observation so far were withdrawing southward. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard, arriving from Telus, relieved the outposts towards Radomertsa and Ligovitsa. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were assembled at Rokita. The Turkish Brigade at Dolny Dubnik evacuated the place on October 31st, and withdrew without further action into Plevna.

Dolny Dubnyk was occupied on November 1st by the Russians, who advanced their lines 2,000 yards beyond the village toward Plevna, and at once entrenched their position. Plevna was now completely invested on the west side, and deprived of all communication with the army posted at Orkany and Sofia. Subsection 7. Losses. The accounts of the losses of the guards and the actions on the left bank of the Vid toward the end of October are very complete. A.

Capture of Gourney Dubnick October 24th Killed 18 officers 811 men Wounded 3 generals 95 officers 2384 men Total loss 116 officers and 3195 men Action of Tellus on October 24th Chasseur Regiment of the Guard 26 officers and 907 men killed and wounded

2nd Cavalry Brigade of the Guard. 1 officer, 1 man and 2 horses killed. 1 officer, 15 men and 18 horses wounded. C. Action of Tellus on October 28th. Infantry. 1 man killed and 15 men wounded. Lancers of the Guard. 5 men and 14 horses killed. 4 officers, 11 men and 31 horses wounded.

No special data are given for the losses of the 4th Cavalry Division, the Cossacks and the Romanians during this period, particularly in the action of Dolny Dubnik on October 24th. The losses, however, were very slight. Nothing accurate is known of the losses of the Turks in killed and wounded in these actions.

The garrisons of Gorni Dubnik and Telus contained 13 battalions of infantry and about two regiments of cavalry, or 8,000 men at the most. Since not less than 5,500 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians and a few hundred men seemed to have escaped from Telus, the losses of the Turks in killed and wounded in the two actions of the 24th and 28th of October were probably not much in excess of 2,000 men. The losses of the Turks engaged at Radomertsa on the 28th cannot have been heavy.

Comments. The actions described above are, in more than one respect, worthy of attention. Comment 1. In the first place, they were the result of a correct strategic idea after repeated previous mistakes. Then, as regards tactics, they were planned with great prudence and skill, and executed with much awkwardness.

Lastly, the Russian guards appeared for the first time, which apparently, very indifferent fact, is of importance for an understanding of many features. The strategic importance of the operations described we will not discuss here, as considerations of this character will find a place later. We turn to the conception of the operations directed by Gorko up to the investment of Plevna on the left bank of the Vid.

The enemy's troops encountered here numbered 12,000 men at the most, about equally distributed among the three fortified Etappan stations: Dolny Dubnyk, Gorny Dubnyk and Telus. Under certain circumstances, they might hope for assistance from Plevna or Orkany. The insufficient supply of artillery with these troops deserves special mention. There seem to have been but four guns in each of the fortified places.

To overcome these three points, General Gorko was given considerable forces. 36 battalions of the Russian Guard, 7 battalions of Romanian infantry, about 80 squadrons and sotniers of the Russian and Romanian cavalry, and 150 guns, a total of not less than 32,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry.

Leaving out a few small detachments, we find about one half of the cavalry, seven Romanian battalions and 30 guns employed to observe Dolny Dubnik and Plevna. One quarter of the cavalry, 20 battalions and 60 guns, were detailed to attack Gorny Dubnik. One quarter of the cavalry, four battalions and 20 guns, observed Telus. Lastly, 12 battalions and 32 guns stood as a general reserve between Upper and Lower Dubnik.

The force detailed against Gorni Dubnik was so large in comparison with the garrison of that place that the defeat of the latter, as long as it had to depend on itself, could not be doubtful. The General Reserve may therefore, from the beginning, be considered as intended for use against Dolny Dubnik and Plevna. Any attack from Plevna in the direction of Dolny Dubnik would therefore encounter not less than 4,000 cavalry, 19 battalions and 62 guns.

the enterprise against gorney dubnick may therefore be considered as well covered on the side of plevna to be sure considerably smaller forces were posted toward tellus but in the first place the appearance at this point of superior forces of the enemy was much less probable in the second place the approach of such a force would have been discovered at quite a distance so that the proper countermeasures might have been taken the enterprise against gorney dubnick may therefore be considered sufficiently covered toward the south also

When we consider that according to the disposition, Dolny-Dumnik and Telus were to be merely observed and not attacked, it is safe to say that the plan was bound to succeed, and that there was no reason to fear a check. The large number of troops available for these operations might have been a source of temptation to make a decisive attack against all three points at the same time, and the relative strength of the opponents would justify the Russians in expecting certain success in that case also.

Gorko restricted himself to the attack on one point in order to make it with an overwhelming force, and this extreme prudence, which approaches timidity, may be explained in several ways. In the first place, the confidence of the Russians in their own strength was undoubtedly weakened after the many failures suffered before Plevna, and in the second place, it was his intention to prevent any failure of the Russian guards in their first action, and to preserve their unshaken self-confidence. Comment 2

Gorko's plan bore with it all the conditions for certain, quick and easy success, and it is solely due to the awkward tactical execution that the success, though ultimately attained, was gained only after a protracted, variable and bloody action.

A field entrenchment held by 4,000 men and four guns was surrounded by 20,000 men, subjected for half a day to concentric fire from 60 guns and, after repeated failures, ultimately captured with a loss to the assailant almost equaling the total strength of the defenders. This cannot be explained by the single assumption of extreme bravery and skill on the part of the defender.

and anyone is warranted in saying that great tactical mistakes were undoubtedly made by the assailant. In turning to the details of the attack on Gorni Dubnik, we miss uniformity of instructions as to the method of execution of the attack by three infantry columns advancing separately against the Turkish position. Each of the three detachments moved to the attack without regard to the other two. Moreover, the attack was fairly executed only on the part of the right column,

The conformation of the ground was here utilised, and the advance made by rushes, and an attempt was made, though without much success, to prepare the attack by infantry fire. The attack of the middle and left column makes the impression of having developed itself not in accordance with some well-defined plan, but under the influence of a precipitate advance from the beginning, and of an irrepressible ardour on the part of the troops.

At any rate, all the troops were almost simultaneously engaged, and there was practically no preparation of the attack by infantry fire. The attack itself was made without a formation of several lines, and without utilising the terrain. The dense masses threw themselves, with a bravery which despised death, from a great distance, a thousand paces, against the murderous frontal fire, and of course, suffered terrible losses.

It is surprising that the middle column failed to utilise the small eastern readout, which was captured at the beginning, as an intermediate position from which to prepare the further attack by artillery and infantry fire.

it is stated in extenuation as it were that the captured position afforded no shelter from the fire from the main position in rear to be sure this is a notable proof of the skill of the turks in planning and locating the fortifications which also becomes manifest at tellus but would not the entire sapper battalion which accompanied this column and was undoubtedly equipped with entrenching tools have supplied the means for converting the captured position into good cover

The employment of the Sapper Battalion, which seems to have been held as a closed reserve to the last, like ordinary infantry, must certainly be set down as unusual. In view of the noise and excitement of battle, it is not surprising that Gorko's attempt to secure combination in the renewed attack by a seemingly well-devised, though complicated, signal failed in execution. It might have been better to fix a certain hour, not too near the time of the order.

In the attack of the Chasseurs of the Guard on Telus, we miss plan and direction even more than in the attack on Gourney Dubnick.

Not only was the attack of the first line made without due reflection and contrary to the general disposition, but the second line, the last available body of infantry, ran away from the superior leader and threw itself into the action without orders. The detachment was sufficiently strong, but the attack was contrary to program and premature, and its severe loss diminished the defensive strength of the detachment to such an extent that a vigorous counter-attack of the Turks from Tellus might have exercised a

A bad effect on the entire Enterprise against Gourney Dubnik.

Nearly all the defects in the Russian attack may be somewhat extenuated by the fact that the troops were on that day under fire for the first time, and that they felt that, being a specially privileged corps, they were expected to do something quite extraordinary. The Russian guards may certainly point with pride to the fact that they failed in no enterprise, and that, upon their appearance, the war took a brilliant turn. Nevertheless, a little more steadiness and coolness on the day of their baptism of fire

would certainly not have diminished the success, while on the other hand it would have greatly reduced the losses. Comment 3: The behaviour of the Turkish garrisons in Gorni Dubnik on the 24th and in Telus on the 28th shows a striking contrast. On the 24th Gorni Dubnik was cannonaded for half a day by 60 guns, yet the garrison repulsed several furious assaults of a greatly superior enemy and did not succumb until after a protracted struggle.

On the 28th, the garrison of Telus surrendered, though its tactical situation was exactly the same as that of their brethren at Gorni Dubnik, after being cannonaded for two hours and without waiting for an assault. On the part of the Russians, the reason is a sign that the garrison of Telus was so disheartened by the fall of Gorni Dubnik as to lose all heart for resistance. But that fact alone is not sufficient to explain the striking contrast.

If on the 24th Gorko had demanded the surrender of the garrison of Gorni Dubnik after a cannonade of five or six hours, without moving his infantry to the attack, I believe that very probably the garrison would have surrendered. On the other hand, if on the 28th Gorko had sent his infantry to the attack instead of opening negotiations, I believe it very probable that the garrison of Telus would have offered an obstinate resistance. End of section 13

section fourteen of tactical studies on the battles around plevna by thilo von trotha general measures for the investment

it having been determined by the russians to avoid any attack entailing useless loss and to overcome osman pasha's army by a close investment all requisite steps were taken with great care under the direction of general tod lieben the line of investment was strengthened by a series of rifle trenches and artillery emplacements

the most important points were secured by lunettes or redoubts between the positions of the investing troops commodious communications were constructed and their use facilitated by signposts lastly the line was connected throughout by a line of telegraph the line of investment which measured forty-four miles was divided into six separate and to a certain degree independent sectors

the first sector extended from bivalar on the vid to the grevitsa redoubt commander general shemat troops the main body of the roumanian army exclusive of the fourth division

The 2nd sector extended from the Gravitsa Redoubt to the Galits Redoubt near Radyshevo. Commander General Krudny, Troops 31st Infantry Division with the 31st Artillery Brigade and the 2nd Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with 4 batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade. Total 18 battalions and 10 batteries.

The third sector extended from the Galitz Redoubt to the ravine of Tuchinitsa. Commander General Zotov. Troops, 2nd Infantry Division, 12th Rifle Battalion and 30th Artillery Brigade. Total, 13 battalions, 6 batteries.

The 4th sector extended from the ravine of Tuchinitsa to that of Kartushevn. Commander General Skobolev. Troops, 16th and 30th Infantry Division, 9th, 10th and 11th Rifle Battalions and the 16th and 2nd Artillery Brigades. Total, 27 battalions, 12 batteries and a Cossack regiment. The 5th sector extended from the Kartushevn ravine to the right bank of the Vid at Tienan. Commander General Katali.

Troops. 3rd Infantry Division of the Guard, 2 squadrons of Cossacks of the Guard, 3rd Foot Artillery Brigade of the Guard, and 10th Don Horse Battery. Total, 16 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 7 batteries.

The 6th sector extended from the left bank opposite Tien Nen to opposite Baivala. Commander General Ganetsky. Troops. 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Divisions with the 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with 2 batteries of the 5th Artillery Brigade. 4th Romanian Division with its artillery. 9th Dragoons, 9th Lancers, 9th Hussars and 4th Cossacks. 7th Horse Battery, 2nd Don Horse Battery and a regiment of Irregulars. Total.

thirty battalions eighteen squadrons sixteen batteries besides the romanians the commanders of sectors had exact instructions in the various possible cases of an attempt on the part of the turks to break through some days before the sortie of the turks took place the marches prescribed were carried out under todd lieben's direction in the fifth and sixth sectors in order to ascertain the amount of time requisite to carry out these concentrations

The remainder of the troops heretofore belonging to the West Army, 1st and 2nd Infantry Division of the Guard, the Rifle Brigade of the Guard, Cavalry of the Guard, part of the 4th Cavalry Division, several Cossack regiments, and some Romanian detachments, were united under Gorko's orders, pushed to the south and west, and engaged in seizing several passes over the Balkans and opening communication towards Serbia.

Subsection 2 Signs of the impending attempt to break through. Russian dispositions for December 10th. From the reports received on December 9th, from all parts of the line of investment, and from the statements of numerous deserters, it appeared that Osman Pasha was preparing for a decisive attempt to break through. The fire from the Turkish works had been quite weak on the 8th, and almost completely silent on the 9th.

deserters stated that shoes and a supply of hard bread as well as a hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition per man had been issued and that rifles had been inspected much movement was discernible on and along the highroad between town and river large bodies bivouacked there and large trains were parked since all these statements and signs pointed to an attack against the sixth sector general todleben in concert with the prince of roumania made the following dispositions on the evening of december ninth

Disposition 1. At daybreak on the 10th of December, General Skobolev to cross the Vid with one brigade of the 16th Division and three of its batteries, and one brigade of the 3rd Division of the Guard. The brigade of the 16th Division, with the artillery, to move to Dolny Dubnik and remain in readiness to support Gnetsky's troops until the situation should be cleared up.

the brigade of the guard to remain close to the river on the left bank so as to be available for reinforcing either in the fifth or sixth sector disposition to the fifth sector to remain occupied by a brigade of the third division of the guard the fourth by a brigade of the sixteenth division and the whole of the thirtieth division general shitnikov to assume command in skobeleff's place disposition three no changes in the troops holding the third sector

disposition for the three rifle battalions belonging to the garrison of the fourth sector to move to the village of grevitsa to help reinforce the second sector disposition five the main body of the romanian army to occupy the first sector early in the morning four battalions and three batteries to cross to the left bank and move to demira coi to support the troops of the sixth sector four battalions and two batteries to remain in readiness to follow

Subsection 3. The Events on the Left Bank of the Vid. On the morning of December 10th, the following was the situation on the left bank of the Vid. The line of Russian entrenchment began near Tienan and extended east of Dolny Dubnik and Gorni Netropoli to the ground opposite Baivola. In addition to a number of connected rifle trenches, it seems there were two readouts east of Dolny Dubnik, three east of Gorni Netropoli, and a sixth readout north of Gorni Netropoli.

The entrenchments of the right wing of this position, including the 1st and 2nd readouts, were held on the morning of December 10th by the Grenadier Regiment Kiev and the three 9-pounder batteries of the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In their rear was the Grenadier Regiment Taurus as 1st Reserve. The 2nd Reserve, posted at Dolny Dubnik, consisted of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division, the Samogitia and Mosko Regiments, and the three 4-pounder batteries of

of the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. The entrenchments of the centre, including the readouts, were held by the Grenadier Regiment Siberia and three 9-pounder batteries. In rear stood the Russia Minor Regiment as reserve. The Fana-Goria and Astrakhan Regiments and the three 4-pounder batteries were posted at Gorni Netropoli as second reserve. The left wing of the entrenchments north of Gorni Netropoli was held by the Arkhangelsk Regiment and two Romanian divisions.

in their rear were the vologda regiment and two russian batteries as first reserve farther to their rear near dimiracoyi the fourth roumanian division was posted as second reserve one brigade of the sixteenth and another of the third guard division were expected to arrive in the rear of the right of the entire position the reserves in rear of the left were to be reinforced by four roumanian battalions from the right bank

during the night cavalry patrols reported the concentration of turkish forces on the banks of the vid under the cover of a dense fog the turkish masses crossed to the left bank at daybreak over the main bridge a newly constructed bridge near openetz and several fords

The Turkish troops deployed in a large fold of the terrain. The artillery took position on the high ground and opened fire, and at 7:30am the attack began in the direction of Gorni Netropoli. A dense skirmish line was closely followed by small closed bodies. The main body followed at a greater distance. The artillery, keeping up its fire, advanced abreast of the infantry, the guns halting to fire one round, and then galloping forward again.

On the part of the Russians, a 9-pounder battery posted in readout number 3 opened fire. General Danilov, commander of the 3rd Grenadier Division, ordered the Russian minor regiment closer up to the line of entrenchments and also directed the brigades at Gorni Netropoli to advance. Meanwhile, the Turkish masses, projecting a terrible hail of bullets to their front, reached the Russian position about 8.15am.

The losses of the six companies of the Siberia Regiment, which held Redoubt No. 3 and the rifle trenches in the vicinity, were very great. The trenches on either side of the Redoubt were lost first. The battery in the Redoubt had lost nearly all of its men and horses. And when the Redoubt had to be abandoned, but two guns could be removed, the remaining six falling into the hands of the Turks.

at this time about eight thirty a m the turkish attack was directed against readout number four which was held by the rest of the siberia regiment

The nine-pounder battery posted in the redoubt continued to fire for some time, but when the Turks, after the capture of redoubt number three, turned the right of the position and at the same time attacked in front, the remnants of the Siberia regiment fell back, and redoubt number four with the adjoining rifle trenches was lost with two guns which could not be removed because the teams had been killed.

At this hour, the Russia Minor Regiment reached the battlefield. Formed in two lines of company columns, it advanced in the interval between the redoubts number three and four, and checked the attack of the Turks, but not without great losses. Within a few minutes, all three battalion commanders, and more than half of the company commanders, were killed or wounded.

The situation of the two Grenadier regiments, which, though almost annihilated, were alone opposed to the vigorous attack of the hostile masses, was very critical. About 10:30am, the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Grenadier Division arrived from Gourney-Netropoli in support of its 1st Brigade, and the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division, posted in reserve at Dolný Dubnyk, approached the battlefield.

The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division still held the entrenchments on the right, east of Dolny Dubnik. The debris of the Siberia and Russia Minor Regiments joined in the advance of the Fanagoria and Astrakhan Regiments. The attack of the division was successful and the two readouts and adjoining rifle trenches were recaptured, as well as the lost guns. The Astrakhan Regiment, moreover, captured seven Turkish guns and a stand of colours.

During this successful attack, two war-logged battalions arrived from the left and attacked the Turkish right. At the same time, the Samogitia Regiment of the 2nd Grenadier Division appeared from the right and took part in the recapture of the lost entrenchments, taking three Turkish guns. Having recovered all the lost positions, the Russian battalions halted and reformed. It was about noon when the Turks finally gave up on the attack and fell back toward the bank of the Vid.

All the batteries of the 3rd Grenadier Artillery Brigade were now placed in the front line with the infantry and covered the retreating Turks with a brisk fire. The lost and recaptured guns were being served by men from the infantry. General Danilov now advanced to the attack with the entire 3rd Grenadier Division, followed and left by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division and on the right by the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division.

the first brigade of the latter division heretofore holding the entrenchments of the right was also brought forward and took the turks in left flank one battalion each of the turidia and kieff regiments of this brigade forwarded the vid the water reaching to their waist belts and seized the height of blasevats the garrison of the turkish redoubts at this point surrendered without firing a shot

upon request of general ginnetski the six battalions of the third infantry division of the guard under general kurloff having crossed to the left bank by a pontoon bridge started at ten a m for dolny dubnik arriving there the brigade received orders to advance against the left of the turks general skobeleff however who arrived at this moment ordered the brigade to delay its advance until the arrival of the brigade of the sixteenth division

having given the order general skobeleff repaired elsewhere neither the brigade of the sixteenth nor further orders having arrived by two p m korloff on his own responsibility advanced along the highroad when the brigade reached the bridge over the vid the battle was already at an end sub section four the events on the right bank of the vid

in the course of the night of the ninth to the tenth of december general skobeleff was informed by outposts that the christian works had been abandoned by the turks a party of volunteers was despatched at once to investigate and found the redoubts and trenches in rear of christian empty they were at once occupied by the troops of the thirtieth infantry division

Simultaneously with the report of the occupation of the Christian works, information was received at headquarters at 9am that the so-called 2nd Gravitsa readout had been abandoned by the Turks and occupied by the Romanians. General Todd Lieben immediately ordered all the troops on the east front of Plevna to move to the attack on the Turkish works. The brigade of the 16th Division, which was still on the right bank in the 4th sector,

as well as the three rifle battalions which had been ordered to the village of grevitsa but had not yet reached their destination were directed to cross to the left bank as quickly as possible and to place themselves under skobeleff's orders who we know had been sent with two brigades to support ginnetski advancing on plevna from all directions the troops found a large portion of the works evacuated by the turks others were held weakly to deceive the enemy and were easily taken

the romanians approaching from the north found the works of oppernett still occupied after a brief engagement the turkish garrison of two thousand men surrendered three guns were captured in these works on perceiving the withdrawal of the turks toward the river general catali commander of the fifth sector led those battalions of his division of the guard which were still on the right bank against the turkish entrenchments to the west of

By 1pm all the works of the entrenched camp between Plovina and the river were in his hands. One pasha, 120 officers, 3600 men and four guns were captured here by the Russians, whose losses did not exceed 3 killed and 15 wounded. Subsection 5. The Surrender.

Crowded together from all sides against the banks of the Vid, and helplessly exposed to the fire of the Russian guns, the Turks had to give up, not only the idea of renewing the attack, but of prolonging the resistance. Osman Pasha dispatched officers in all directions to seek the Russian commander-in-chief, and inform him of the cessation of resistance on the part of the Turks.

general ginnetski riding toward the bridge over the vid met osman's chief of staff and demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole army osman who was wounded having acceded to the demand the turkish troops everywhere laid down their arms

Exclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded, the army surrendering here to Russian captivity still numbered 40,000 effectives. Among them, 10 pashas, 128 field officers, and 2,000 officers of lower grade. 77 guns, 70,000 rifles, and a great quantity of cartridges fell into the hands of the Russians. A number, about 30, of heavy guns, which were buried by the Turks before the beginning of their attempt to break through, were

were not discovered until later. Subsection 6: Losses

The losses of the two Russian grenadier divisions were as follows. Killed, 2 field officers, 7 company officers, 409 men. Wounded, 1 general, 3 field officers, 47 company officers and 1263 men. By far the greater part of these losses fell on the Siberia and Russia minor regiments. The next greater loss was suffered by the Astrakhan regiment. 1 officer and 72 men killed, 1263 men.

12 officers and 346 men wounded. The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division lost 1 officer and 47 men wounded. The 3rd Division of the Guard lost 3 men killed and 15 wounded. The losses of the two batteries posted in the readouts which were for some time in the hands of the Turks must have been heavy but cannot be ascertained. The loss of the Romanians was trifling. The Turks lost about 6,000 men killed and wounded. Comments

Comment 1: The troops available for the investment of Plevna during the last six weeks numbered eight Russian infantry divisions, third division of the Guard, second and third of the Grenadier Corps, second, fifth, sixteenth, thirtieth and thirty-first infantry divisions, and the 1st Rifle Brigade and some cavalry and Cossack regiments, and 48 foot and three horse batteries. Total, about 75,000 men with 400 field guns, to which should be added 25,000 Romanians.

the total strength of the investing army was therefore a hundred thousand men with about five hundred guns while the effectives of the turkish army during the last few weeks may be put down at fifty thousand men with little more than one hundred field and position guns the russian line of investment measured forty-five miles the turkish line of defence about twenty-five miles

A brief comparison of the investment of Plevna with the successful investment of Kars by the Russians under Moraviev in 1855 is not without interest. The Russian Army of Investment numbered 30,000 men. The invested Turkish Army, 20,000 to 25,000 men. The length of the Turkish line of defence was about 13 miles. That of the Russian line of investment, 50 miles.

The methods of investment pursued in these two sieges differ materially. General Moraviev posted his entire infantry with some cavalry south of Kars on the line of communication with Erzurum, and the investment proper was maintained by five strong detachments of cavalry, consisting each of one or two cavalry regiments with some artillery, which were posted in a circle around Kars and kept up communication with each other.

after an investment of several weeks the turkish army surrendered on account of lack of provisions without making an attempt to cut its way out the investment of plevna was of nearly equal strength at all points the greatest importance attaches to the fourth and sixth sectors which were traversed by the great roads which might be used by osman on his retreat

in comparing the extent of the line of investment of plevna with the two great investments of the franco-prussian war we find the german line of investment of metz had an extent of twenty five miles that of paris fifty three miles the circumference of the enceinte of paris measured nineteen miles the line connecting the forts about thirty five miles

comment to the sixth sector of the line of investment of plevna embracing the left bank of the vid was geographically the most important portion of the line and had from tia nen to dolny dubnik and from gorni netropoli to opposite biavola a length of twelve miles this portion of the line was held by two grenadier divisions which had not yet been engaged one brigade of the fifth division which had suffered considerably and several thousand romanians

Total 25,000 to 30,000 infantry, giving about five men for every three yards of front. As a matter of comparison, we state here the following.

About the middle of November 1870, when the Great Sortie from Paris was expected, the investment was so arranged that the Third Army guarded the left bank of the Seine, extending 15 miles, with 100,000 infantry, and the Meuse Army guarded the right bank, which measured 37 miles, with 80,000 infantry, giving the Third Army about 13 men for three yards of front, to the Meuse Army about four men for the same front.

comment three the two points of dolny dubnik and gorni netropoli where the main reserves of the sector were posted were distant six and four miles respectively from the bridge over the vid the line of investment consisting of readouts and rifle trenches seems to have been two thousand or three thousand yards farther to the front

the beginning of the turkish attack was discovered by the russians about seven thirty a m whereupon it seems general daniloff at once issued orders for the two rear echelons of his division to move up to the line of defence held by the siberia regiment

as the russia minor regiment did not reach the firing before nine a m and the second brigade coming from gorni netropoli not before ten thirty a m there must have been delays whose nature cannot be ascertained with the lights before us the distance was not such as to prevent those troops from arriving much earlier

peculiar ill-luck also seems to have attached to the movements of the troops dispatched under skobeleff to the left bank in support of ginnetski since both brigades were on the further bank of the vid by seven a m there is no reason why they should not have arrived in good time at the assailed front either in direct support or still better have advanced against the left flank of the turkish attack

but it seems that owing to some misunderstanding the brigade of the sixteenth division never reached doldy dubnick and that kurloff's brigade of the guard was held at doldy dubnick by contradictory orders during the decisive hours

skobelev's ordered call off to wait for the arrival of the sixteenth division is due to a justifiable desire to undertake the decisive attack of the day not with an isolated brigade but with all his available troops on the other hand gandetsky's order to that brigade to advance along the highroad was perfectly proper for he was in position to know that the attack of even a comparatively small detachment in the direction indicated would no longer encounter serious resistance

comment for the number of effectives of the turkish army on the morning of december tenth must be set down at forty five thousand men and the strength of the corps led to the attack on the left bank of the vid at thirty thousand to thirty five thousand men with sixty guns

the passage of the vid was effected before dawn with surprising rapidity by means of two bridges and a few fords the deployment on the further bank was also effected with great rapidity so that the attack made in dense closed formation could be begun at seven thirty a m the passage as well as the deployment for the attack challenged an interesting comparison with similar events during the investment of metz

during the night of the twenty fifth to twenty sixth of august marshal bazenny issued the necessary orders for a sortie to be undertaken next day on the right bank of the mosul against st barb with a view of marching thence along the river to thionville the troops encamped on the left bank of the mosul were put in motion at five a m in broad daylight although four bridges were available for the passage of the mosul crossing was not completed until three p m

at that hour when everybody was waiting for the beginning of the attack marshal bazaine assembled his generals in council and it was decided after protracted consultation to defer the attack whereupon the troops returned to their camping grounds

the events of the thirty first of august preceding the battle of noiseville were of similar nature early on the morning of the thirty first bazane ordered the army to deploy in front of the forts coulou and sainte-juliane the arrangements differing but little from those of the twenty sixth but although an additional bridge was thrown that day near fort coulou it was two p m before the deployment on the left bank was completed again bazane assembled his lieutenants this time to communicate to them his orders for the attack

and it was at four p m when the attack began even making allowance for the fact that the number of french troops crossing the mosul was three times that of the turks crossing navid still a comparison between the two leaders and the two armies with reference to the point under discussion is decidedly in favour of the turks

comment five the turks attacked the russian position with a bravery that despised death and at first with surprising success considering that the russians must have been more or less prepared for the attack as soon however as the first check was suffered and the attack brought to a halt the heretofore convulsive tension gave way to a total relaxation the turks ceased all resistance before the capitulation was officially concluded

the feeble action of the garrisons on the right bank of the vid is hard to understand and must in part be called shameful though not strong enough to permanently hold their works they might undoubtedly have checked the russians for hours and inflicted on them very sensible losses if those thirty guns instead of being buried had remained in the works on the right bank they would certainly have paid for their ultimate loss many times over

comment six lastly a negative answer must be given to the question did the turkish sortie have any prospect of success the garrison of a small place of a few thousand men if led with determination and prudence may cut its way through an investing enemy by piercing the line of investment by a sudden attack and escaping through the gap men in seventeen ninety five al media eighteen eleven

This method of escape, however, without assistance from without, is out of the question for an invested army.

A merely temporary piercing of the line of investment will probably, in most cases, be followed by a defeat in the open field. Escape is only possible if the investing army is beaten. On that eventuality, the Turks could under no circumstances count, for, even if it had been possible to overthrow the Russian troops on the left bank, the Turks would, beyond a doubt, have been surrounded and crushed within 24, or at most,

forty-eight hours in this particular there is considerable similarity between the conditions at metz and plevna as long as a so-called relief army stood at orkani osman's retreat if difficult was possible but the fate of the army of plevna was sealed as soon as gorko's bold operations in the passes of the balkans compelled the turkish army at orkani to fall back to sofia chapter

Section 15 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 13a. Comments. Subsection 1. The Operations. By what plan of operations the Russian commander-in-chief was originally guided will probably never be known with exactness. At any rate, not until after a long time.

It may be assumed that the program of the campaign was carried out up to the passage of the Danube,

The forcing of the passage of the Danube, with comparatively small difficulty, and still more, Gorko's unexpected passage of the Balkans undertaken with a bold appreciation of the situation, impressed upon the heretofore prudent and methodical leadership a new and somewhat hazardous character. It appears as if political considerations had previously exercised a greater influence upon the conduct of the war than purely military considerations.

the low estimation placed upon the opponent led to a precipitate advance and exacted a severe penalty successes easily gained and existing more in appearance than in reality produced a complete intoxication which made the most difficult objectives seem to be within easy reach it is interesting to draw a rough outline of the development things might have taken with a high degree of probability if the incident of plevna had not happened

the first possibility was that the sudden appearance of the russians south of the balkans would have created such consternation in constantinople as to cause further resistance to be abandoned and the road of negotiations attended by inevitable sacrifices on the part of the turks to be entered upon

should turkey have made far-reaching concessions and placed the execution of the promised reforms in the hands of a european commission russia would to a certain degree have been disarmed the object for which russia had drawn the sword would in appearance at least have been accomplished and the rivers of russian blood would not have washed out the peaceful protestations of unselfish and humane sentiments

perhaps it might still have been possible to allay the justifiable impulses of russian self-confidence with formal concessions in one word the solution of the oriental question that bugbear of the peace of europe might again have been postponed for a shorter or longer period

but the events connected with the name of plevna removed that possibility and rendered the long-impending oriental catastrophe unavoidable therein lies the great political importance of the conflict which for five months raged around

a second possibility is that of the war continuing after the russians had passed the balkans when they might have been so carried away by the intoxication of easily gained successes at the beginning as to transfer the centre of their operations beyond the balkans with their totally inadequate forces

In that case, the reverse might have come at Sofia or Adrianople instead of Plevna, and would have been quite unavoidable in view of the wholly inadequate Russian forces and the Turkish power of resistance which surpassed all expectations. This result would have come independently of the numerous mistakes in the conduct of the war on the part of the Russians, which were counterbalanced by the equally heavy errors on the part of the Turks. The new preparations to surmount this crisis, which entailed on the Russians'

Such unusual difficulties, and enormous sacrifices of treasure and blood before Plevna, would of course have been more difficult on account of the greater length of the communications, and the obstacle presented by the Balkans, and it seems quite possible that the campaign of 1877 might have ended with a failure for the Russian arms.

the great strategic importance of the conflicts around plevna lies in the fact that they open the eyes of the russians to the impending danger cause them in good time to make a suitable change in their entire plan and force them against their will to employ the amount of force indispensable for decisive success

the question then would be whether the turks made a mistake in fighting at plevna since that campaign notwithstanding its primary disadvantages did certainly confer very considerable advantages upon the russian cause this is a point worthy of reflection

upon the appearance of osman pasha on the right flank of the russians the strategic situation of the latter was decidedly unfavourable and it became highly dangerous by krudner's defeat at plevna on july thirtieth

Had Osman Pasha been able to follow up his victory with an immediate and vigorous pursuit, and to drive Krudno's morally and materially weakened troops across the Osma, all conditions would have been favourable, in case of fairly proper and combined action on the part of the East and West armies, to involve the Russian army in a defeat which was bound to be decisive for the campaign of that year.

in that case the detention of the west army at widdon and its subsequent skilful advance on the decisive point at the right moment would justly stand as a brilliant and successful example of strategic calculation and old abdul kerimpash's secret plan often derided and maligned to the extent of having its existence denied would have been vindicated

yet these claims to consider the advance of the west bulgarian army from widin on plevna as the efflux of a brilliant strategic reflection are seriously weakened not by the ultimate failure but by another factor the above-described decisive role could not be played by osman's army except by way of the most vigorous offensive

osman's inactivity after his second victory at plevna on july thirtieth proves that his army however stout on the defensive must have lacked every trace of offensive force a general as able as osman pasha would not have allowed the favourable situation as it existed at the beginning of august to slip by without turning it to account

If Osman Pasha considered his army capable of carrying the offensive to the point of seeking a decisive battle, his advance from Wydden to Plevna was a well-planned operation. If he did not credit his army with this offensive capacity, his advance must be accounted an error. In spite of all the defensive successes attributable in part to the lack of skill of the Russian leading, the mere stay of his army at Plevna was not only useless, but an advantage voluntarily considered to the Russians.

that they failed to turn the advantage to account until very late and after many mistakes and sacrifices and that the tenacity with which the turks held out at plevna came near giving the whole campaign a turn unfavourable to the russians was due to circumstances which were beyond osman pash's control subsection two combat fire of masses and rifle trenches

The great wars of the 17th and 18th centuries bear to a certain degree a peculiar character in which the personality of one or several leaders is strongly impressed. To be sure, a long series of improvements has been made in the course of time, partly in armament and equipment, partly in tactical arrangement and employment of troops. Still, grand innovations which influence the character of the whole method of fighting do not appear.

and the technique of fighting has remained essentially unchanged for a long time.

the period of the napoleonic wars forms the transition from the period just mentioned to that of modern wars it is true the introduction of the dispersed order of battle brought about a complete modification of the entire fighting technique but the armament and equipment of napoleon's infantry cavalry and artillery differed in nothing from the armament and equipment of his opponents and leaving out some trifling matters it was not different from the armament of the times of frederick eugene and turenne

an entirely different picture is presented by the great wars of the quarter of a century just past compared with former times the individuality of the leaders though still decisive of the final result of the war is placed in the background on the other hand each of the great wars of recent times is characterized by improvements which mark an epoch in the character of weapons and a resulting transformation of the methods of fighting

The Oriental War produced the rifled musket, the Italian War the rifled gun, the American War the armoured ship and monitor, the Austro-Prussian War the breechloader with moderate rapidity and range, the Franco-Prussian War the chassez-pont, a far superior rival of the old breechloader. Lastly, the Turco-Russian War produced the new systems of rifles of surpassing rapidity of fire and range up to the repeater and, as a result, field entrenchments on a grand scale with

which are now not the exception but the rule editor's footnote by arthur l wagner it is surprising that a military writer of von trotha's attainments should speak of field entrenchments on a grand scale as an outgrowth of the durco russian war

had he given even the most superficial study to the war of secession he would have known that the great armies engaged in that contest made a more extended use of field entrenchments than was made by the turks more than twelve years later the battles at kenesaw mountain had indeed the entire campaign from chattanooga to atlanta

the battles of the wilderness in spottsylvania and the long struggle at petersburg might be studied with profit by von trotha cleary and other european critics who labour under the delusion that field entrenchments on a grand scale were particularly unknown until the turks brought them to the attention of the military world

moreover the american war produced a breech-loader which was superior in range accuracy and rapidity of fire to the prussian needle gun of eighteen sixty six and which was largely used by the union troops especially the cavalry in the last year of the war a l w

The waste of ammunition predicted by the opponents of the Breachloader on its first introduction was happily prevented by the fire discipline of the Prussian troops. The surprisingly small consumption of ammunition, two millions, in the campaign of 1866 proved conclusively that the capacity of the new arm, as regards rapidity of fire, needed to be fully utilised only in exceptional circumstances, and then, for very brief periods,

as a rule the fire delivered was aimed fire at short range and of moderate rapidity quite different was the use made in eighteen seventy by the french army after a brief peace training of the rapid firing long-range arm fire was opened at enormous ranges in part before the opponent came in full view

the latter sometimes suffered considerable losses at very long ranges but a real success was never gained by this kind of fire it is not our intention to discuss here the much mooted question of the long-range fire of masses but we feel safe in stating that the procedure of the french in this particular was ill adapted and not based on clear reflection and calculation but chiefly on lack of fire discipline and obscure conceptions of the real value of the new arm

After the Franco-Prussian War, the long-range fire of masses became the frequent topic of theoretical disquisitions and practical experiments in the great armies of Europe. But while the contending parties were still deeply engaged in their controversies, and no final settlement of the necessary transformation of fire tactics had been reached, the question had been very simply settled in Turkey, without much previous inquiry, and the most extreme conclusions had been drawn from the armament with long-range, rapid-firing arms.

at the beginning of the war the turkish army developed a system of fire tactics complete in its simplicity as soon as the enemy was known to be within reach of the rifle the space supposed to be occupied or about to be traversed by him was covered without regard to distance and probability of hitting or consumption of ammunition with a fire whose severity and duration were without example

intimately connected with this system of fire tactics is the use of field entrenchments which were probably never heretofore employed to this extent or in this manner the turkish method of fighting in this war rests therefore on two to a certain extent new factors and although many objections may be raised or improvements suggested as to the application of the system in detail still the soundness of these new factors and their influence on any change of fighting tactics cannot be denied

in turning now to the active factor of the turkish tactics we find that experience has silenced those objections which were formerly frequently raised against the practicability of such rapid fire the new and complicated systems of small arms have proven efficient in the hands of untrained men nor was there any difficulty encountered in the handling of magazine rifles formerly condemned as a weapon in war

the supply of ammunition which was consumed in incredible quantities was effected on the part of the turks without difficulty to be sure as regards to the latter point the turks were greatly favoured by the fact of being almost everywhere on the tactical defensive but even in the rare cases where the turkish infantry made great attacks the thorough organisation of the ammunition supply can be traced up to the very firing-line

in nearly all the turkish positions which the russians captured enormous supplies of cartridges were found frequently spread out in shallow boxes for convenient use between the prostrate skirmishers it was not at all rare to find two hundred to three hundred empty cartridge shells by the side of a dead turk instances occurred where individual turks expended as many as five hundred rounds in a single action

even in those cases where the turks moved to the attack on the russian positions it has been proved that some turkish skirmishers covering themselves in front of the russian line fired away a hundred and twenty to a hundred and fifty rounds in a comparatively short time we may supplement this by the assertion of the russians that in the course of the war they took altogether in the captured positions and in several surrenders five hundred millions of cartridges

It may be interesting to state here that the total supply of a German army corps, inclusive of the ammunition columns, amounts in round figures to four and a half millions of cartridges. Nor should the fact be overlooked that the distances in front of the Turkish positions were frequently measured by pacing and marked. We now turn to the passive factor of the Turkish tactics, the employment of field entrenchments.

here we have to do two things which though intimately connected must be separately considered construction of the entrenchments proper and the shelter afforded by the rapidly constructed rifle trenches

wherever the turkish infantry took up a tactical position it sought cover for deployed lines utilizing to the fullest extent any advantages offered by the ground where it became necessary a shallow rifle trench was constructed wherever the ground permitted tiers of fire were arranged for several lines of infantry covering themselves at short distances one above the other on more or less steep slopes

the turkish infantry seems to have possessed great skill in the construction of these trenches the first hasty construction was accomplished with great rapidity and technical troops were not employed in this work where there was ample time the shallow trench was deepened and the breastworks strengthened if the position was to be occupied for several days traverses against enfilading fire were added and shelter for part of the men constructed by digging obliquely down under the counter-scarp

thus obtaining better shelter whenever the garrison of the trench was not engaged. As a very good arrangement, we commend the placing of numerous vessels filled with water in the trenches, the latter in some cases being also fully supplied with provisions, so that neither hunger nor thirst would compel the men to leave the trench even temporarily. The latter case happened several times on the Russian side, causing in some instances tactical disadvantages, and in every case, useless losses.

when preparing to hold a position for some time the lines just described were strengthened by redoubts constructed at the highest points of the position and armed with guns they served particularly to sweep the front of the trenches in preparing the line of entrenchments great care was taken that the advanced line when carried by the enemy gave him no protection from the lines still held in rear

having endeavoured to give a brief outline of the two new factors of modern fighting fire of masses and field entrenchments we will subject the tactical employment of the several arms to a brief consideration sub section three the infantry

The Russian infantry on the European theatre of war is organised into regiments of three battalions of five companies each. The fifth company of each battalion is styled rifle company and is intended for skirmishing, although differing neither in armament nor equipment from the remaining companies. The regiments of the guard have four battalions of four companies each. The rifle battalion has four companies.

When preparing for battle, the battalion usually forms four company columns in two lines with short distances, the fifth rifle company being deployed in front. A regiment formed for battle usually has two battalions abreast in the formation just described, and the third battalion is held closed in mass as reserve in rear. From the description of the several actions, it is plain that there was no preparation of the attack by the fire of skirmishes, and that all preparation was left to the artillery.

the attack was mostly undertaken from a great distance a thousand paces and over and carried out in such a manner that the skirmish line the two lines of company columns and frequently the reserve started almost at the same time and with very small distances and became intermixed in the advance so that the attack in a favourable case approached the enemy in the shape of a more or less disordered swarm

If the first advance failed to bring the troops to the enemy's position, they found shelter on the ground and opened a lively, but for the most part ineffective, fire. The tactical arrangement was greatly loosened and the tactical leading rendered difficult, frequently impossible. Fresh reserves were required to get the halted lines again in motion. The attacks on the enemy's positions were almost invariably frontal and attempts to turn one or both of the enemy's flanks rare.

when on the defensive the russian infantry frequently advanced to the counter-attack too soon without having fully utilised the destructive effect of rapid fire at short range the pursuit of the defeated enemy was also sometimes made with the bayonet though pursuit by fire would have been far more effective

The tactics of the Turkish infantry on the defensive has been noticed in connection with the discussion of the Turkish fire tactics. In addition, we note on the defensive a persistent holding back and usually a skillful employment of the reserves. On the offensive, a dense skirmish line was followed by small closed detachments, which in turn were followed by larger bodies at greater distances. They

They opened a terrible fire and endeavoured to utilise the terrain in delivering the decisive blow against the enemy. In most cases, the flanks of the advancing infantry were covered by more or less cavalry. A few words more on the armament of the opposing infantry. The Russian guards and rifles were armed with the Burden Rifle, the remaining infantry on the European theatre with the Krenk Rifle, and the Turks with the Peabody Martini and partly with the Snyder.

The following table gives a comparison of the different arms. Weight of the rifle and bayonet. 10.27 pounds. 10.84 pounds. Peabody Martini: 14.30 pounds. 11 pounds. Weight of the rifle without bayonet. 9.37 pounds.

Crank, 9.9 pounds Peabody Martini, 9.5 pounds Snyder, 9.9 pounds Calibre Burdan, 0.42 inch Crank, 0.60 inch Peabody Martini, 0.44 inch Snyder, 0.57 inch

Weight of cartridge. 608 grains. 841 grains. Peabody Martini: 636 grains. 708 grains. Initial velocity: 1450 feet per second. 1,082 feet per second. Peabody Martini: 1349 feet per second. 1163 feet per second.

Dangerous spaces for infantry. At 600 paces, Burdan 170 paces, Krenk 75 paces, Peabody Martini 135 paces, Snyder 100 paces. At 1200 paces, Burdan 46 paces, Krenk 28 paces, Peabody Martini 45 paces, Snyder 36 paces. At 1600 paces,

bernard twenty five paces crank disappears peabody martini twenty paces snyder disappears end of table in connection with the field entrenchments which we have discussed above and which have gained greatly in importance and more particularly in connection with entrenchments thrown up in the course of the action the entrenching tool comes to the fore as a point in the infantry equipment

In the actions here described, one becomes painfully aware of the frequent lack of entrenching tools on the part of the Russians. It is partially explained by the fact that in many cases the Russian foot soldier threw away his entrenching tool as a troublesome burden. But, leaving this out of consideration, the equipment of the Russian army with entrenching tools seems to have been too small to satisfy the requirements of modern combat. Editor's Footnote by Arthur L. Wagner

after the bitter lessons of plevna the throwing away of entrenching tools by the russian soldiers seems to have ceased referring to the march of skobeleff's division from plevna to constantinople greene says otreman carried an implement of some kind about eighty five per cent being spades or shovels ten per cent picks the rest axes etc his division marched with these on their backs from plevna to constantinople

they were slung over the back the handle projecting above the left shoulder and the spade below the right hip and were attached to the shoulder with a piece of string strap or a piece of old tent or anything else that was available they were heavy weighing over five pounds they were uncomfortable they were in every way inconvenient but each man had learned by hard experience to feel that his individual life depended upon his musket and his spade

and he took good care to lose neither one nor the other a l w several means are available for having the requisite entrenching tools on hand at the decisive moment by an addition of special troops by carrying the tools on wagons and issuing them to the troops as required and lastly by making the entrenching tool a permanent part of the infantry equipment

the detail of special troops for the construction of such works would seem to be inadequate on account of the great extent to which hasty entrenchments have been and will be employed in modern war and on account of the intimate connection of these works with the tactical action of infantry

some one in the russian army has proposed to equip a company of each regiment with entrenching tools and to compensate the company for the extra weight by reduction in another direction in other words to give each regiment a pioneer company and to enormously increase the special troops aside from many disadvantages entailed this plan would still fall short of its aim

it is wholly impracticable to carry the tools on wagons issue them to the infantry before the action and have them turned in afterward so that nothing remains but to permanently equip the infantry with such a supply of entrenching tools as to enable it to meet any demands of battle a supply of entrenching tools would of course have to be carried on the wagons as a reserve and for the construction of extensive works

the infantry should be wholly independent of the assistance of special troops in the execution of all purely tactical trench work and the turkish infantry in spite of its defective training has shown that this is feasible some voices in the russian army oppose the permanent equipment of infantry with entrenching tools on the ground that they are too heavy and are sure to be thrown away

yet a tool suitably contrived and carried aided by proper instruction of the men in the great value of the tool supplemented by historical examples would for the most part deprive these objections of their force it is a fact that the russians were deficient in entrenching tools before plevna unfortunately the author has no means for ascertaining what the supply of entrenching tools in the hands of the troops was but the number must have been very small

at the beginning of the great artillery attack in the early days of september when emplacements for more than one hundred guns had to be constructed as well as advanced rifle trenches and other trenches in ria as cover for six divisions there were issued to the troops from the field engineer park one thousand six hundred small spades and several hundred large spades and picks

but the tools issued from the field engineer park formed the bulk of the tools on hand for scobbleff's three brigades which received none of these tools were almost completely destitute of entrenching tools

As a matter of comparison, we will state here that in addition to the tools carried by the cavalry, artillery and trains, the German Army Corps of 25 battalions has immediately on hand for entrenching purposes 5,000 small spades, 3,000 large spades, 1,000 picks and pickaxes, and 250 hatchets and axes. The 5,000 small spades and part of the hatchets are permanently carried by the infantry. End of section 15.

Section 16 of Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna by Thilo von Trotha. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Read by Alistair. Part 13b. Comments. Subsection 4. The Cavalry.

Some adverse criticisms, commenting with some justification on the defective work of the cavalry in the first part of the campaign, remark that the work of the cavalry was all the more unintelligible since the Russian cavalry was not only proportionally strong, but also superior to the weak Turkish cavalry. Both of these assumptions are wrong.

At the beginning of the war the proportion of cavalry to infantry in the army of operation was one to six, which is about the normal proportion in the German army and may be deemed sufficient and not unusually large. The reinforcements brought to the theatre of war in the course of the campaign amounted to 10 infantry divisions numbering at least a hundred thousand men. The cavalry of the guard and Cossacks numbering not more than 8,000 men changed the above proportion very much in favor of the infantry.

It is wrong to speak of a great numerical superiority of the Russian over the Turkish cavalry. The so-called "regular" Turkish cavalry, to be sure, was not more than 8,000 strong, but the 20,000 Turkesses formed not only the most numerous, but also decidedly the best portion of the Turkish cavalry. The relative strength of the Russian and Turkish cavalry is therefore approximately the same, and at first slightly in favour of the Turks, subsequently slightly in favour of the Russians.

Aside from the cavalry of the guard which had a special formation, the entire Russian cavalry of the line and the 20 Don Cossack regiments in service were, under the most recent organization, formed in 15 permanent divisions. 14 divisions were composed each of one Dragoon, one Lancer, one Hussar and one Cossack regiment. Two Cossack regiments did not form part of the divisions.

in view of the experiences of the german army in eighteen sixty six and eighteen seventy it was deemed advisable not to organise larger bodies the divisions were to be used independently and closed in one body and their tactical training corresponded thereto the service with the infantry divisions was to be performed by don cossack regiments which did not belong to any cavalry division

these principles were however soon deviated from at the beginning of hostilities the fifteen cavalry divisions were distributed among the fifteen corps so that each cavalry division became an integral part of an army corps to the exclusion of all independence and the strategic usefulness of the cavalry divisions

At the beginning of hostilities, the Army of Operation numbered seven army corps and as many cavalry divisions, besides the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and ten Don Cossack regiments, which latter, not belonging to any higher unit, were intended to perform the service of divisional cavalry. Immediately upon the passage of the Danube, the divisional organization was wantonly destroyed for the purpose of forming a new and larger unit for General Gorko's advance across the Balkans.

The Caucasian Brigade and three Combined Brigades formed this corps. The Dragoon Brigade, composed of the two Dragoon regiments of the 8th and 9th Divisions. The so-called Combined Brigade, consisting of the Hussar Regiment of the 9th Division and a Don Cossack Regiment. Lastly, the Don Brigade, consisting of two regiments.

Three of the ten Don regiments were thus taken up, and but seven Cossack regiments remained for the fourteen infantry divisions. This number, of course, proved inadequate at once. A large number of regiments belonging to cavalry divisions were thereupon taken from their divisions and attached to individual infantry divisions and brigades. The cavalry divisions soon disappeared in name also, and their commanders were assigned according to rank to the command of mixed bodies of troops.

on the other hand a large cavalry corps under krylov was formed at the beginning of september for the purpose of investing plevna from the west the strategic task of this corps was manifold it was to observe the army of plevna reconnoitre the country to the west and south and oppose any relief coming from these directions as far away from plevna as possible

The task necessitated a repeated division of the Corps and proved that this clumsy mass formation would have entailed difficulties of leading, even had the latter been more vigorous and appropriate than it was. Two or three independent cavalry divisions, with special instructions directly from the Commander-in-Chief of the West Army, might perhaps have been better able to accomplish the object contemplated by the Supreme Command.

The idea of repulsing by cavalry alone any relief coming from the south or west implies an overestimation of the fighting capacity of the cavalry unsupported by infantry. And, although in our above discussion we were bound to find fault with Krylov's retreat with so little fighting, it is doubtful whether the cavalry could have succeeded in keeping an infantry corps of 10,000 men permanently from Plevna.

None of the facts or statements point to any plan of giving Krylov's cavalry timely support by infantry. The tasks imposed on German cavalry in 1870-71 never implied the carrying through of a decisive action against large bodies of the enemy's infantry. At this point, the following reflection is, perhaps, not out of place.

the attitude of osman pasha at plevna in july and august may have convinced the russian leaders that osman's army was incapable of a sustained vigorous offensive it was therefore desirable for the russians to entice the turks in some way to leave the entrenchments of plevna and fight the russians in the open field

Supposing the Russian West Army took post in September, not to the east, but to the west of Plevna, with two strong bridgeheads on the right bank above and below Plevna, perhaps at Medovan and Ribben, while 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry were watching the east side, the following would have been the situation.

No relief army coming from either the west, Widen, or from the south, Orkany, could join hands with the army in Plevna without first defeating the Russian army. But the latter, wholly aside from proper entrenchments and a far superior artillery, was strong enough to repulse simultaneous attack by the relief army and the army inside Plevna.

should osman turn this position of the russian west army to account in order to march suddenly eastward and threaten the line of the jantra there was the greatest probability that he would be overtaken by the main body of the russian west army before reaching the osma and forced to give battle in the open field under very unfavourable conditions

Returning to the actual conditions before Plevna, we find that the investment on the west side did not become effective until General Gorko took command, and considerable forces of infantry had reinforced the cavalry. Lastly, in casting a glance over the tactical employment of the cavalry, we notice the exaggerated use of dismounted fighting. Its modern role will certainly place cavalry often in positions where it must fight dismounted, and on that account it should be trained correspondingly.

still dismounted fighting will and must be an unwelcome expedient and more or less opposed to the nature of the arm not so in the russian cavalry dismounted fighting there has become a perfect mania it is used on almost every occasion and even without cogent reasons

this is no doubt due to the peace training of the russian cavalry in which an exaggerated value seems to be placed on dismounted fighting for exaggerated it must be called considering that in the grand manoeuvres of eighteen seventy six more than once entire cavalry regiments dismounted for village fighting and that cavalry assaulted considerable towns held by strong infantry garrisons

The Dragoons are still looked upon in Russia as real double fighters, as in the days of Emperor Nicholas, who sought to realise the centaur combination of infantry and cavalry in the creation of his Dragoon Corps. Although this creation of the Dragoon Corps failed completely at the first test in the Oriental War, still the underlying idea has, within narrower limits, been preserved in the Russian army up to this day.

The Dragoon regiment of each normal Russian cavalry division is to represent, in a certain sense, the infantry element of that division.

Dismounted fighting of the Russian cavalry is an essential factor of its action. The dismounted fighting of the German cavalry is never more than an expedient. The Russian cavalry division, viewed from the ideal standpoint, is intended to be a combination of all three arms, capable of any kind of action, and equipped for the greatest possible celerity of movement. The German cavalry is meant to accomplish all that is possible for cavalry proper, while as a single arm it must renounce complete independence in battle.

these latter acquirements are decidedly more in keeping with the law of the equal division of labour which is becoming more and more predominant in every sphere and which results in an increased efficiency of the whole many features of war which according to our ideas are surprising and bewildering may be explained by the difference in principle just stated between the russian and german cavalry subsection v the artillery

The Russian field artillery was armed with breech-loading guns of two calibres. The so-called four-pounder had a calibre of 3.4 inches and fired a projectile of 11 pounds. The barrel weighed about 614 pounds, the limber contained 18 rounds, and there were two ammunition wagons for every gun.

The so-called 9-pounder had a calibre of 4.2 inches, the projectile weighed 22 pounds, the barrel weighed about 1250 pounds, the limber contained 12 rounds, and there were three ammunition wagons for every gun.

Both these Russian guns surpassed the corresponding calibres of the German field artillery, as regards weight of projectile and barrel. As regards weight of projectile, the 9-pounder was but little inferior to the German 4.7-inch gun. The entire field artillery was provided with wrought iron carriages. A gun was drawn by six horses. The batteries of the foot artillery consisted of eight guns, half of them four, the other half nine-pounders.

The horse artillery had four pounders only and six guns to a battery. A brigade of six batteries with 48 guns was permanently attached to each infantry division. There were four guns for each infantry battalion, slightly more than provided in the normal strength of the German Army Corps. Each cavalry division had two horse batteries with 12 guns.

in view of the great numerical superiority of the russian over the turkish artillery it was to be expected that its influence in action would be dominant and that its effect would vigorously prepare and support the attack of the infantry but we find little of the sort most actions give the impression that the cooperation of the artillery had no influence on their course worth mentioning

there are two reasons for this first the method of its tactical employment second the tasks devolving upon it in this war as compared with its inadequate effect in glancing back over the tactical employment of the artillery in the actions described we find the following

1. The available batteries were mostly, from the very beginning, evenly distributed over the line of battle. Part of the artillery was not held back for the purpose of using it en masse at a certain point of the line of battle, in the sense of a corps artillery. 2. Fire was opened on the enemy's position at very long ranges and was almost invariably frontal. Seldom do we find an endeavour to flank a position.

An exception is the position of the artillery taken by Skobalev's orders on the east side of the Tsuchinitsa ravine for the purpose of enfilading the Turkish position on the 3rd knoll. 3. In most cases, the numerically inferior Turkish artillery soon gave up the fight against the Russian artillery and withdrew to cover, only to reappear in efficient condition the moment Russian infantry moved to the attack.

4. The frontal position of the artillery compelled it to cease firing as soon as the infantry attack began. 5. Those cases are exceptions where batteries followed the attacking infantry and endeavoured to support it from positions in front. The artillery remained for the most part in its original position and played an inferior role in the second phase of the action. While, on the other hand, the inferior Turkish artillery was very much in evidence in that second phase.

A vigorous advance of the artillery to support the infantry attack is seldom found except under Skobolev's direction. The battery attached to the Kostroma regiment on July 20th furnishes an example of that kind, and so do some of the batteries of the Russian left under Shakovskoi on July 30th. The batteries which advanced with the infantry under the enemy's infantry fire suffered such losses in men and horses as to be put, entirely or in part, out of action in a short space of time.

if we investigate the material effect of the russian artillery we fail to find any thorough and successful effect in any of the actions excepting that of tellus on october twenty eighth

The Russian artillery seldom found an opportunity to fire on troops not under cover. The fire was mostly directed against lines of infantry under natural cover, against rifle trenches, or more or less regular entrenchments. And the fire had hardly any effect. Despite its preparation, continued for hours, by the fire of a formidable mass of artillery, the infantry attack, invariably, encountered an unshaken opponent.

It is a fact that the small effect of the Russian field artillery in the actions of July and August against the sheltered and entrenched Turkish position shook the confidence of the troops in their field artillery so severely that 20 24-pounders from the siege park were used in the preparation of the great attack on Plevna in September, but the latter were likewise unable to produce a result in any way satisfactory.

The first fire was opened at an average range of 2,500 yards, at which distance the four-pounders were deemed inefficient and the nine-pounders alone were used by the side of the heavy guns. Upon approaching within 1,600 yards of the enemy's position, some of the four-pounder batteries took part in the firing. The result of the bombardment of the Turkish position, which was carried on for several days with great energy, was almost nil.

unless the fact of the Russian gun carriages becoming unserviceable is considered a negative and doubtful result. The effect produced October 24th by the concentric fire of 60 guns on the readout of Gorni Dubnik cannot be considered satisfactory. One would have thought that such an overwhelming fire, 60 guns against four, would speedily break any resistance.

having withstood this seemingly terrible fire for several hours the garrison of the redoubt was still able to repulse several assaults made by superior numbers the surrender of the redoubt of tellus is the one success that is to be credited to the artillery alone

Presuming that in the future, extensive field entrenchments will play the same role as in the Russo-Turkish War, the following demands may be made on the artillery. First demand: an appreciable portion of the field artillery must consist of considerably heavier calibres than are at present numbered among the field artillery, in order to sufficiently destroy the enemy's cover at greater ranges. Second demand: the light calibres of the field artillery will be employed not so much in rearward positions as in direct connection with the attacking infantry.

the task of the light artillery is partly to accompany the assaulting infantry in small bodies partly by skilful and bold manoeuvring in larger bodies to take the important points of the enemy's position under a massed fire during a brief space of time in fulfilling these tasks great losses in men and horses perhaps even of guns become unavoidable but the responsible leader if aiming at decisive results will not shrink from such losses

a battery which fires at the decisive point with destructive effect for five minutes or even one minute and is then lost has done better service to the whole command than ten batteries which from well-chosen rearward positions have maintained a well-aimed but in the end rather useless fire sub section six fortresses and field entrenchments ardehan nicopolis and kars all armed with numerous guns of the heaviest calibre succumbed to the open attack

the field entrenchments of plevna built in the face of the enemy and partly under his fire armed with comparatively few guns of small calibre held out for five months and ultimately succumbed to hunger alone that contrast is naturally the first thought engendered by this war relative to fortifications

to be sure adahan nicopolis and kars did not fall so quickly because they were real fortresses but in spite of that fact plevden did not offer such protracted resistance because its works were field entrenchments but notwithstanding that fact and lastly these instances but serve to furnish additional proof of the old established fact that a fortification receives its importance and value from its defenders alone

It cannot be denied that, as compared with fortresses, field entrenchments played a more important role in this war than formerly, and that the same condition will probably obtain in the next few wars. The principle of fortresses and entrenchments is the same, that is, to form a battleground strengthened by all available means. The difference lies in the means available in each case.

In the construction of fortresses, the limits of these means are fixed by considerations of finance. In the construction of field entrenchments, circumstances vary each case, the amount of available time being a very important item. It is, of course, impracticable to convert into fortresses all points of a country which, under certain circumstances, may become decisive in the conduct of a war.

that is rendered impossible not only by financial considerations but by many other conditions military and non-military such places alone as possess permanent strategic value under all circumstances can be taken into account and it is left to field fortification to supplement the skeleton of defence formed by the fortresses by additional fortifications closely conforming to the situation of the moment

greater demands than formerly are made on all fortifications in consequence of the great improvements in weapons and means of transportation rendering it possible to rapidly bring up comparatively heavy guns and enormous supplies of ammunition

in the construction of fortresses in peace the element of time can easily be satisfied by utilising all imaginable technical means but in the construction of field entrenchments there will invariably be a dearth of time and in most cases one of hands and it will become a question what preparations will best facilitate a suitable and rapid construction of field entrenchments when the moment for doing so arrives these preparatory measures may be divided into two classes

intellectual and material to the former belong the preparations of plans of fortification for all such points as may easily become important in certain situations and the practising of troops in the construction of large fortifications

the material measures consist in a sufficient equipment of the army with entrenching tools and the preparation of all wood constructions required in such works as blockhouses powder magazines gun platforms revetting material bridges ramps and cantonments the component parts of which should be kept in store in the great fortresses ready for shipment end of tactical studies on the battles around plevna by thilo von trotha translated by karl

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