Syria After Assad
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This is CNA Talks, the flagship podcast of CNA, a Washington, D.C.-based research and analysis organization. December 8th, 2024, Damascus, Syria. As rebel groups advance on the city, President Bashir al-Assad flees the country, ending his 20-year rule over Syria. The collapse marks a major turning point for the nation.

In this episode, we examine what the fall of the Assad regime means for Syria, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, and how U.S. policymakers should respond to the change. I'm excited to welcome two great CNA analysts to the show today to discuss the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. First, we have Michael Connell, who is a specialist on Russia and the Middle East in CNA's Russia Studies program.

His primary area of expertise is the armed forces of Iran and Russia, and he has published extensively both inside and outside of CNA on these topics. Mike, it's great to have you on today. Thank you, John. I'm also excited to welcome Jeffrey Edmonds, who is an expert on Russia and Eurasia, also in CNA's Russia Studies program.

Jeff previously served as the senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, covering topics in Europe, Russia, the Middle East and Africa. Jeff also served as acting senior director for Russia on the National Security Council. Jeff, great to have you on today. Thanks, John. Good to be on. So just to set things up, on December 8th, 2024, the Assad regime collapsed during a major offensive by opposition forces.

spearheaded by Hayat Tahir al-Sham, or HTS, and supported by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. As the coalition advanced towards Damascus, Assad fled to Russia, where he was granted asylum. The speed of the regime's collapse caught many international observers and reportedly even the opposition fighters themselves by surprise. al-Bashir, a rebel leader affiliated with HTS, has been named as caretaker prime minister until March 1st.

So to start us off, Mike, why do you think the swift fall of the Assad regime caught so many international observers by surprise? Well, you know, John, I think no one had anticipated how corrupt, inept, and I guess you could say dispirited the regime's military and even the Republican Guard, the elite units have become in recent years. So the Syrian military is mostly composed of conscripts and the soldiers weren't being paid. Officers were siphoning off money that weren't training.

So they really weren't an effective force. And I think this took many people by surprise. Now, of course, the regime had already suffered a blow with Hezbollah's drubbing at the hands of Israel. You may recall that Hezbollah and its patron Iran played a major role alongside Russia in aiding Bashar al-Assad in his war against the Syrian opposition.

But nonetheless, I think most observers assume that the Syrian military was still intact and able to exert effective control over those portions of the country not controlled by the opposition. I mean, after all, this is the same military that crushed the Islamist opposition back in the 80s. For those of you who were around then, you may remember the phrase Hama rules, famous phrase developed by Tom Friedman at the

from the New York Times. Among outside observers, there's also been a certain sense of complacency. Not much had changed on the ground in Syria for years. I mean, the boundaries between the factions on the ground, the Syrian National Army, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the SDF and the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army in the US were all relatively static.

And to be fair, it wasn't just outside observers who were surprised. So, regime supporters and even the Syrian opposition were surprised. So, Ahmed El-Shara, who's the nominal head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, more or less admitted this when he said publicly that

Hyatt wasn't really prepared to govern so soon after its lightning march on Damascus. Finally, the regime itself also appeared to be unaware. So from the perspective of the military and security services, the prevailing culture was to obfuscate and to tell superiors whatever they wanted to hear. So basically, everything's okay and we can manage this. So this cover your behind approach worked well in a regime that placed a premium on loyalty over competence.

But once the regime was pushed, the whole thing collapsed like a house of cards. I want to grab on to one point you brought up at the beginning, which is corruption. And, you know, it made me think of the story of the collapse of the American backed government in Afghanistan. And there were similar issues with corruption there. And it seems like that's often a very difficult thing for Americans.

anyone involved to track that like it's something that's kind of the problems with it sort of simmer under the surface and are certainly difficult for people outside of the country to track, but also can catch even people in the government by surprise in a lot of cases.

No, I agree. And I mean, I think corruption in the region is fairly endemic, but it's always tough to tell, you know, is it a moderate degree of corruption where the regime can continue to survive or is it just rotted from within? And that's tough to gauge. Jeff, anything you want to add on this point? No, I think, yeah, I agree with Mike's great points. Part of this whole thing, it is very difficult to watch corruption.

a regime like the Assad regime and know where they're going to fall. A colleague of mine, as famous for his saying, these regimes seem very stable until suddenly they are not. And I think that there are a bunch of converging factors, like Mike mentioned, Hezbollah. Then, you know, there's the Russians were slow to respond in any meaningful way.

So you have a bunch of secondary and tertiary things that happen that suddenly provide an opportunity for a group like HTS to just move as fast as they can. So let's talk about HTS a little bit. What do we know about this rebel group which led the assault on Damascus and currently controls the capital?

HDS is basically it's a Sunni Islamist group. It's got ideological roots in the same Salafi jihadist milieu that gave rise to groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Jabhat al-Nusra. Jabhat al-Nusra, the last group I mentioned, is actually Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's predecessor. And it was formed in 2011 as an Al-Qaeda affiliate. HDS's emir, that's like the head of HDS, Ahmed al-Sharaa,

actually fought in Iraq during the early 2000s as an al-Qaeda affiliate. And he was actually captured and imprisoned by US troops. But when he returned to Syria, he founded Jabhat al-Nusra as an offshoot of al-Qaeda. And they had a falling out with the Islamic State in Syria and also with al-Qaeda as clerics within the movement sought to broaden the group's appeal. And they wanted to form a united front with other Syrian Islamist opposition groups.

So they eventually, Jabhat al-Nusra coalesced and some of the other groups coalesced into what would become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham around 2017. Now like other Salafi groups, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham advocates for a return to a supposedly pure form of Islam, stripped of the theological accretions that have developed over the centuries. It also advocates for an Islamic government, that is, government according to Islamic law, Sharia.

However, unlike Al-Qaeda and ISIS, HTS espouses a relatively moderate form of Islamic government. So it appears to tolerate religious minorities and allow some civic freedoms. It also appears to place a strong emphasis on governance. Hayat al-Tahrir al-Sham, for those who've been tracking in Idlib, it's been fairly successful at managing affairs in that region.

Prior to the latest offensive so I think it was postured to succeed in the offensive because it had placed such a strong emphasis on governance But can you clarify a little bit what you mean about like putting an emphasis on governance and maybe like compare that to a group like Isis and how and how they operate when they control territory Yes, I would say that with Hayat Tahrir Sham Ideology does play a role. I mean they are an ideological group. They're a Salafi group and

But they just emphasized governance to the point that they weren't, they cultivated ties with religious minorities. They were concerned about establishing governance in places like Idlib where they had an effective tax collection. They ran city urban services and things like that that kept the population relatively happy. I think when you're looking at groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,

ideology is definitely at the fore and governance is kind of an afterthought. So I would contrast the two that way. Got it. Thank you for clarifying that. That makes sense. Jeff, I want to turn to you on this next one here. Russia was a major backer of the Assad regime. How will its collapse impact Russia in the Middle East?

I think it's a major loss. I think that, you know, there's in Assad, the Russian leadership had a steady ally and TARDIS and Khomeini, the naval base and air base respectively, are really important for Russian operations, not just in the Mediterranean, but also in Africa. With the closure of the Bosphorus Straits by Turkey with the onset of the Ukraine war,

TARDIS took on an even greater role in supporting not again, not just the Eastern Mediterranean fleet, but the increased operations in Africa. Right. Russia's started to play a much greater role, especially in the Sahel with what used to be the Wagner Group, but in working with various governments in Africa.

as a way of gaining influence. Those operations are harder to support with one without the Black Sea and without TARDIS and Khomeini. That being said, they still have control over these bases. And I think what's interesting is HTS, even though the Russians were bombing these groups not long ago, HTS has actually had negotiations with the Russian government, I think as part of its broader attempt

to build legitimacy internationally. And so it's not clear that Russia is going to lose these bases. But you're getting a lot of pressure from the West, from US politicians, from those in Europe,

that as part of any potential recognition of the new government in Syria, that there be no Russia influence there. And so that story has yet to play out. If they lose TARDIS and who I mean, there aren't a lot of great alternatives. There are some. Russia has close ties with Haftar in Libya. And there are potential other bases near Benghazi and other things. But all of those bases are

are not near where TARDIS is. I remember first covering TARDIS in the CIA, and I think 2012 when there was hardly anything at TARDIS. Whereas now they've really built it up. They have a number of peers, they can support ships, they can support submarines. And that took some time. And so for them to replace that capability is going to be fairly difficult.

With Jeff, I think we can't rule Russia out yet, particularly in terms of retaining access to the Tartus naval base. But I think, you know, it'll be interesting. I think if they are to retain any access, I'm sure that

the transition government is going to expect something from the Russians in return. So I'm not sure what Russia can do in that quid pro quo situation, but they're certainly trying. So we can't rule out their continued access to the base.

I've seen some reporting suggests that this collapse of the Assad regime could be considered like an unintended consequence of Russia's war in Ukraine. And I'm kind of curious what the two of you think of that take. Yeah, so I think that one important thing to remember is that the Russian intervention was much more in the air than it was on the ground. They did use, you know, for example, artillery systems and some limited infantry around Aleppo and other places for offensives. But most of it was in the air.

I think part of this, and we've seen this in Ukraine, the Russian military is not the quickest responding organization on the planet, right? It just doesn't respond to emerging events very quickly. And I think being preoccupied with Ukraine, the speed at which the HTS launched its offensive and the success it was having really caught them off guard.

But even had they had a little more time, I'm not sure the Russian government had the bandwidth or wherewithal to really make the kind of effort that would be needed to continue shoring up the Assad regime. Got it. Thanks, Jeff. Iran also supported the Assad regime. Mike, what does this collapse mean for them? Well, for Iran, there's no disguising it. This was an unmitigated disaster, particularly as it came on the heels of Hezbollah's major defeat at the hands of the Israelis.

So Syria was arguably Iran's closest ally in the Middle East. The two countries had a warm relationship despite their relatively opposite ideologies. Syria was a logistics node for Iran to work with Hezbollah. And Hezbollah is really the linchpin of Iran's so-called axis of resistance. So Syria was critical in that regard.

The Syrian government also allowed the Iranians to monitor their arch rival, Israel, from basically right on Israel's border. And finally, I guess you could say as with Russia, the loss of Syria could lead Iran's other regional allies to question whether Iran would be there for them when they need it. So in that case, I'm really talking about non-state actors, groups like the Houthis.

I'd say the only thing that went right for the Iranians is basically they're able to evacuate their embassy and get their troops out quickly and efficiently. Although apparently based on some reporting that occurred with help from the Russian Air Force. So for the Iranians, I'm sure that's kudos to the Russians for that. So how will Iran respond? You know, for the time being, they're laying low. They're focusing on reconstituting their networks in the Levant.

About a week or two after the Syrian regime fell, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a defiant public address in which he basically blamed the fall of the Syrian regime on the evil machinations of foreign powers, including the US, Israel, and the UK, and as he termed it, their regional lackeys. He downplayed the defeat though, essentially claiming that the axis of resistance will return and defeat its enemies.

Without giving too much credence to what he was saying, which contains quite a large element of propaganda, it's safe to say that Iran isn't going away for the time being. Iran remains the protector of the region's Shia, who have looked to Iran as a patron even prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Iran retains its ability to leverage proxies in Iraq and in Yemen.

and its military and its nuclear program is still more or less intact. So from the Iran angle, stay tuned. This is a setback for them, certainly, but it's not an existential defeat. So the last major player in the region I wanted to talk about was Turkey, who have been really involved in the Syrian civil war. Jeff, can you talk a little bit about what this collapse means for them? Yeah, this is really interesting. This is quite a boon for Turkey. They've long...

been struggling with what their perceptions are of threats, especially on their border with Syria. And when it comes to Turkey-U.S. relationships, that's been a bit fraught as well, because the U.S. at times has groups involved in the global coalition to defeat ISIS that Turkey viewed as a threat. And so that relationship has been tense. But with

you know, the potential for the new regime in Syria, greater security. I think that Turkey sees a great opportunity there. It's important to note that, you know, Turkey and HTS for some time were opposed to each other for various reasons. But, you know, Mike had mentioned Idlib earlier. Since that time, you know, there's been kind of a convergence of interests between Turkey and HTS. And so I think that there's a potential there that Turkey sees for positive relationships in Syria, you know,

and greater security along its border. In the broader sense, Turkey has been expanding its influence for a number of years now. I mean, when you look back at their role in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where they're actually counterbalancing Russian influence or gaining influence from Russia's loss of influence.

It's really kind of an interesting thing to see about what the opportunity for Turkey could be in a new, more legitimate Syrian government. Mike, anything to add on Turkey? I would say with the U.S., I think it'd be ideal if diplomatically we could reach some modus vivendi between the Syrian National Army and the SDF.

But I think the prospects for that are kind of limited, at least in the short term. I mean, there have already been clashes between the SNA and the SDF when the former tried to encroach on Kurdish territory. So it's going to be difficult. But I think that's something that our diplomats are going to be hard at work on.

So we were talking a little bit about the Syrian Democratic Forces and which are backed by the United States and the Syrian National Army, which is backed by Turkey. And, you know, there's this you kind of started to talk about this need for the diplomats to sort this out. But can you talk a little bit about Turkey's history with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF, and, you know, how how their view of them differs from how the United States sees them?

Well, yes, the US worked very closely with the Kurds, both in Syria, combating the Islamic State and also in Iraq. The problem is that Turkey regards the SDF and its affiliates as working hand in hand with the PKK. So this is a Kurdish separatist group working

that operates inside Turkey. So they regard the Kurdish groups in Syria as essentially a terrorist organization, which the US and the EU do not. So that's a real sticking point, I think, between the US and Turkey. I remember some of that being brought up as like sticking points in the negotiation for Finland and Sweden joining NATO even. It was because I think Turkey's trying to

leverage its position to veto NATO membership to apply pressure on the U.S. to stop working with the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. So it's a leverage issue. And the Turks consider this as a major factor and they're willing to apply pressure accordingly. Got it. Thanks for that. Any final thoughts from either of you on the fall of the Assad regime and what this means for the region? Jeff, we can go to you first.

It has a potential to be a real turning point. I mean, the weakening of Hezbollah, the weakening of Iranian influence, and the rise of what could potentially be a legitimate government in Syria – I mean, that's where I think this is trending –

But you also have, you know, positive movements in Lebanon. And so I think you could see over the next couple of years, you could really see a change in the region for the better with an influx of humanitarian aid, financial aid, infrastructure building, and just more diplomatic relations. I think this is a real opportunity for us. And I hope that, you know, from a policy perspective, I hope the United States takes advantage of that.

and that we don't get in our own way because of HTS's background, but look at this as an opportunity to really shape the region. Mike, what about you? I guess I agree with everything Jeff said. I'll play the glass half empty approach as opposed to glass half full. I'd say that there's a danger that if stability isn't restored, that you may see a resurgence of groups like the Islamic State

and you may see a lot of fighting too. And Iran may be able to exploit some of that as well. So I think that moving forward, it's essential that governance, good governance needs to be established in Syria. The economy is a real mess. The food shortages, Western sanctions are still mostly in place. Some have been lifted for humanitarian purposes, but the majority are still in place. So we need security, we need rule of law, there needs to be a tamp down on vigilante justice.

And we need to work, I think, to the extent that we can, we need to work with a new regime in Syria to counter ISIS and other extremist groups. All right. Well, we're just about out of time, but I want to thank you both so much for coming on. I've learned a lot. Thank you, John. Thanks, John. I really appreciate it.

For our listeners, Jeff and Mike are both part of our Russia Studies program, and they've got a lot of great research on all kinds of different topics, including the war in Ukraine, but also Russia's influence in the Middle East. We'll have a link to their webpage in our show notes. So please check that out if you want to learn more about our work in this area. But I want to thank you all so much for listening, and we'll see you next time on CNA Talks.

The views expressed are those of the commentators and do not necessarily reflect those of CNA or any of its sponsors. CNA Talks is produced, edited, and mixed by John Stimson. Our theme music is by Edward Granga. If you enjoy our show, we'd love it if you could give us a five-star review on Apple Podcasts and tell your friends about us. Thanks again for listening, and we'll see you in two weeks. ♪