Hamas’ Sponsors Exposed | Iran, Qatar & the War Beyond Gaza
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If Hamas hadn't stopped to rape and torture in the Gaza envelope, and it had just pushed on to Hebron and Jerusalem, it could have gotten to Jerusalem on that day. Hello and welcome to State of a Nation. I'm Elon Levy. What is the difference between ISIS and Hamas? It's not the barbarism of their atrocities or their vision of global jihad.

It's the fact that ISIS was a global pariah and Hamas is not. ISIS was opposed by a global coalition determined to destroy its terror state in Iraq and Syria. Hamas is backed by a global coalition determined to save its terror state.

Today we're taking a deep dive into the geopolitical battlefield beyond Gaza to Hamas's state sponsors, the governments that arm Hamas with the military, financial and diplomatic support it needs to continue its forever war against Israel. We look at the states scrambling to save Hamas from the war it started.

Joining me is Michael Doran, one of the sharpest minds on Middle East security. He's a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, a former US national security official from the George W. Bush administration, and someone who has spent decades studying the forces shaping this region.

We pull no punches in this fiery episode and lock horns on foreign actors' responsibility for this crisis. Together we look at the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also of Qatar and Turkey and Egypt, asking what they stand to gain from propping up Hamas, what their interests are in a rapidly reshuffling Middle East in which Israel is demolishing Iran's ring of fire.

and what Israel should do to make sure that the October 7th war, which Hamas started, cements its status as a regional power in the face of enemies that want to take it down. Be sure to like, subscribe and hit the notifications bell so you never miss an episode. Now let's dive between the lines and beyond the headlines.

Michael Duran, welcome to State of a Nation. Great to be here, thank you. I've been following your work since your essay 10 years ago on Obama's secret Iran strategy. 10 years? 10 years ago, 2015. I can't believe how old I am.

And I can't believe how old you are and how the region has changed beyond recognition since there was a U.S. administration that thought that Iran could be tamed into a responsible regional power. Where did that go? You know, unfortunately, those people are still there. Even in the Trump administration, there are people who think that. That Iran can still be moderated. Yeah, in the Defense Department now there's a network of people who think that. Michael D'Amino.

is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Certainly some appointments there that are raising eyebrows given the Trump administration's commitment to maximum pressure against the Iranian regime. Yeah, those officials are out of sync with the president, for sure. But it just shows you that there's this way of seeing the Middle East that...

We primarily associate it with the Democrats, and I think you can think of it as the democratic worldview or the progressive worldview is maybe a better way of saying it. But those people exist also on the Republican side. Iran is one of the countries that I want to talk to you about today as we shine a spotlight on Hamas, not just Hamas as a terrorist group, a terror organization, but Hamas-Gaza as a terror state.

A terrorist state that, unlike ISIS, has state sponsors. And Iran is one of them. So first off, I want to understand from you, why does a terrorist state like Hamas have state sponsors in the first place?

Well, there's always been in the Middle East since World War II a network that was opposed to – a network including states that was opposed to the existing order and is therefore opposed to the dominant Western power and then also Israel.

As Israel as an extension of the West or they hate the West because of Israel? Which way around is it going? I actually think that's a great question. I actually think I've never really argued this, but because it's we're already there. I actually think that a lot of the heat that Israel takes is is because it is the ally of the United States.

The kind of people that I was talking about before in the Defense Department now, but the people who think that the way to stabilize the Middle East is by reaching out to Iran and reaching an accommodation with it, they would argue that America is taking heat for being Israel's ally. And the key is to put distance between Israel and the United States.

and that will then give the United States greater flexibility in dealing with other states in the region. I think it's the exact opposite. The hostility that Israel takes is hostility to the West. So you think the reason that the Hamas terror state in Gaza has state sponsors is because Hamas is seen as a tool for pushing Western and American influence out of the region? Absolutely. Absolutely. So that's why you get Shiite fundamentalist Iran saying,

aligning with Sunni fundamentalist Hamas and Persian Iran and Arab Hamas. They can overcome any of these sectarian or national differences because they share the same goal, the same ideological goal of defeating the West. Which really underscores the point that

we've been making, and it doesn't matter whether you're saying they hate Israel because of the West or they hate the West because of Israel. It doesn't really matter. The fact is they hate both of them. And it means that Israel's enemies are therefore the enemies of the West. And when Israel is fighting, it's fighting for the West. 100%. Although I don't think it's just academic to spend some time thinking about

with regard to each player, who do they hate more and why? In the case of Hamas, I think Hamas first and foremost hates Israel and then hates the West for supporting Israel. In the case of Iran, I think it's the opposite. Iran hates the West and supports Israel because it hates the West. So let's break down who the dramatist person I hear in this game. Which countries would you classify as being Hamas' main state sponsors? Um...

I would, first of all, say, why are we asking the question? That's the what are we what are we trying to get at? And if we designate somebody as a state sponsor, what's the what is what is the result of that? Well, I mean, what I mean to say is that this is a I take it that you and I are having a discussion about strategy.

not an academic discussion about causality. No, and I think that's a very important question. For me, one of the most disconcerting things over the last year and a half has been that we did not see a global coalition forming against Hamas. We definitely did not have a designation of Hamas as an enemy of humanity in the same way that ISIS was designated as an enemy of humanity.

There have been countries that have been actively supporting Hamas, shielding it through diplomatic, military, legal, financial means, in a way that has hamstrung Israel's ability to fight this terror organization, in a way that has co-opted international institutions, and in particular UN agencies, to stymieing Israel's ability to defeat this terror state.

And in particular, with regard to the hostages, I have been trying to lead the line of argument that says we need global pressure on Hamas telecommunication.

to let the hostages go. And the path to that runs through the countries that provided its oxygen, that provided its lifeline, because they have leverage over Hamas, the West has leverage over these countries, and therefore that leverage should be used to force Hamas to let the hostages go and to relinquish power. That's why I'm interested in this. Okay, so you and I are partially on the same page and partially not, I think, given the way you've said it.

I think the number one goal for Israel and for the United States, the number one goal is to defeat Iran, which is the main state sponsor, if you want to talk about a state sponsor. And I think, let me ask you a question. Who do you blame most for the fact that Hamas has not been designated as an enemy of humanity?

In a way that you would like to see. I would list five major state sponsors. And I gather you may disagree and we'll have an argument about that. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Yeah. Qatar. Turkey under Erdogan. South Africa. Possibly Egypt. Ireland and only half in jest. But definitely Iran, Qatar and Turkey to my mind. Can we agree on this that if...

President Trump's plan for Gaza is carried out, that Ireland should receive a very large number of Gazans. I think it's the least that Ireland can do, given all the damage that they have caused in this conflict. They have to put their money where their mouth is. So you would classify Iran as a state sponsor of Hamas? You would push back on the others? No, no, no. My question was...

Who do you blame for the fact that Hamas has not been designated? We haven't... The West has not... Qatar. Qatar, really? Qatar, yes. I would blame the state...

that hosts Hamas leaders on its soil and has not handed them over to the Americans, extradited them to force them to release the hostages. I would blame the country that is running Hamas's global PR through Al Jazeera, which is just the social media handle of the Qatari royal family. I would blame the country who's...

The mother of the emir mourned Sinawa when he was killed. I would blame Qatar because on October 7th, as Hamas death squads were still rampaging through the Kibbutzim in the south, Qatar condemned Israel. I believe that the most plausible hypothesis is that Qatar told Hamas to keep the hostages. Qatar has never told Hamas to release the hostages unconditionally and immediately. I think that Qatar told Hamas to hold on to the hostages until it gets the ransom arrangement that will allow it to remain in power.

So we do have a very significant disagreement because I blame the United States for the failure of the West to stand as one against Hamas. I think there was a mistaken American framing from day one. The Americans defined, when I say the Biden administration, defined the conflict as a Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

And it never was that. It was always, from moment one, an Iranian-Israeli conflict. And I would even say, on the basis of what we were saying before, it was actually an Iranian-American conflict. Iran is carrying out an asymmetric conflict against the United States. And if the United States, if the Biden administration had defined it that way from the beginning, then it changes the framing of everything. So that then...

For example, just to give one example, all of those protesters on American campuses that were saying from the river to the sea, they're not protesting for the human rights of Gazans. They become a fifth column of an enemy of America on America's campuses. And so that's just one example of how it changes all of the framing. But it also leads to very different strategic issues.

decisions from moment one, because the greatest threat to Israel on October 8th was not Hamas. The greatest threat was Hezbollah. So it would have led to an American-Israeli discussion immediately about how to take down Hezbollah. And the Biden administration worked from October 8th on

A, to distance Iran from the conflict completely, to say that they had nothing to do with it, and to see them as a potential interlocutor for stabilizing the region, and B,

to work for a ceasefire immediately, to leave Hamas in place and just to stop the conflict and get a Palestinian-Israeli negotiation going. So at the same time that they said all this, the administration also said, revitalize Palestinian authority, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Started asking Israel, what's your plan for the day after? Putting an enormous amount of

That's a very important perspective. In fact, I filmed another episode of this podcast with Peter Berkowitz, who former advisor to Secretary of State Pompeo, now at the Hoover Institution. We filmed it in Washington, D.C.,

And he explained the difference between the Democrats and the Republicans as being Democrats understood that October 7th was a result of the failure to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. If only Israel had accommodated the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Palestinian people, there wouldn't have been this eruption. Therefore, the solution is...

get the PA and two-state solution back on track. Republicans, by and large, of course, there's some overlap. Republicans, by and large, saw this as Iran's fault. And he said if he were in the White House on October 7th, he would have gone to the president and said, Mr. President, you need to tell Iran to force Hamas to release the hostages.

or it will have no Navy. Right. I agree with Peter entirely. That's the issue. And I think all of the other issues that we're talking about change. If you get the American strategy right, and Iran is designated as it should be, I mean, I'm not talking about a legal designation. I'm saying if it is identified correctly as the source of the problem, and we begin working together to solve it,

the main source of the problem, and we work together to solve that problem, everything else gets easier. So I want to move on to the other countries later on, and I'm sensing some pushback about Qatar and relish the opportunity to have a little back and forth. Yeah, I'm happy to talk about it, but my understanding of the Qataris is within that framework that we're describing. Let's talk about Iran first.

And set the stage. Iran, you've established, is the Hamas terror state's single biggest sponsor. How extensive is that support? What form does that take? They give Hamas money. They give it training. They give it weapons. They give it weapons know-how. They give it diplomatic support. And they give it the military support of all of the other proxies in their...

resistance axis. That so-called ring of fire. The ring of fire. And what is Iran's strategic interest here? Did Iran build up Hamas, Hezbollah, the other proxies to use as a doomsday weapon with which to destroy the Jewish state? Or was it as, in particular from conversations with European officials, this perspective,

No, this was intended as a defensive measure to contain Israel and allow Iran to dominate the Middle East by keeping its most powerful actor at bay. What is the reason that Iran is backing Hamas? What is it trying to get out of this relationship? Iran wants to destroy Israel, and it wants to undermine the American order in the Middle East. So it has a long-term strategy to drive the United States away

first from the Persian Gulf and then from the entire Middle East. Israel is the greatest regional impediment to that project because Israel is the only power that is really engaged directly in military competition with it and capable of diminishing it significantly as it is done.

How much knowledge, advanced knowledge, do you think the Islamic Republic of Iran had about October 7th? I think they had general understanding, from what we know, and I can only go by what people who have seen the most sensitive intelligence have told me, but it could change. They had a general understanding of what Hamas intended to do. They didn't know about the timing of...

of the attack, and Hamas jumped the gun. There was no clear coordination between Gaza and Beirut, for example, which was a terrible, from the point of view of Iran, this was a missed opportunity. What is absolutely terrifying about October 7th is the understanding that it could have been so much worse.

that if SINWA had not been so hasty and had coordinated properly with Hezbollah, and they had invaded in a pincer movement, Hezbollah had plans to invade Israel 50 miles into Israel. It would have made October 7th look like child's play. And in some ways, as horrific and barbaric as the atrocities of October 7th were, we were saved the worst because SINWA jumped the gun.

And October 7th has blown up spectacularly in the face of the Islamic Republic of Iran. No one could have imagined that Iran's financial, military, moral, diplomatic support for Hamas would lead to a domino chain reaction that would see the complete obliteration of Hezbollah. We're filming this just a day after Hassan Nasrallah's funeral. His successor was not at the funeral. The air force that killed Nasrallah was. Hezbollah is gone.

The Assad regime has fallen. Iran is stripped of its air defenses. And I think that an Israeli attack on the nuclear facilities is almost a foregone conclusion. I don't. And that relates to my objection to your position on Qatar. We'll get to that in a second. Interesting. We'll pause that thought.

But October 7th has exploded spectacularly in the faces of the Iranian regime. This is not what they were planning. This is not what Iran, what Hamas was supposed to do. And so I wonder, you know, is October 7th the case of the dog wagging the tail or the tail wagging the dog? You know, it could have been even worse than you described because... Oh, go on. That's the optimistic scenario? No, no. As a senior Israeli official recently said to me,

If Hamas hadn't stopped to rape and torture in the Gaza envelope, and it had just pushed on to Hebron and Jerusalem, it could have gotten to Jerusalem on that day. And can you imagine what...

the excitement that that would have elicited all around the Islamic world among every hater of Israel and every hater of the West. The idea that if you had Hamas gunmen from Gaza pushing all the way to the outskirts of Jerusalem, it would have changed the whole, I think, shape, the political shape of the country.

It would have elicited outburst of jihadi messianic apocalyptic fervor that would have excited every jihadist in the world. This is a really obvious statement. Now, when he said it to me, it's a very obvious statement, but it had not occurred to me that they could have done that. If they had...

I think they were probably themselves surprised at the lack of Israeli defenses on that day. Looking back, I was in Tel Aviv at the time. I didn't think that I was in imminent danger. I mean, there were rockets. There was a rocket that hit a building 100 meters away from my front door. But apart from that, I wasn't scared that Hamas gunmen were going to rock up underneath me.

my building in Tel Aviv, and in hindsight, I should have been. But I'll get back to this question. Was October 7th the case of the tail wagging the dog, given that the Iranian regime built this network of proxy armies to protect its regime and then ended up going to war with ballistic missiles to try to protect its proxies? I don't, I would, I think, I wouldn't put it tail wagging the dog, because I think that they actually intended to have something like this happen, take place at a time of their choosing.

It's just that Hamas jumped the gun. More and more, we're learning that the plans existed to try to do exactly what you said, have Hezbollah invade the Galilee and for Hamas to carry out an attack of this kind in the Gaza envelope. But Iran's strategy is asymmetric.

I don't think they were trying to destroy Israel in one blow. I think what they're trying to do is, and they have succeeded in doing, this is a very important point. They have succeeded in drawing Israel into a war of attrition.

Because the Israeli military, the Israeli society is not built for a war of attrition. And no Israeli war planner expected that they would be in a war of attrition like this. It's the longest war in the country's history after literally the war of attrition. And it's still not over. And it's still not over. And that's the challenge that we need to solve. When I say we, as an American, Americans and Israelis together need to solve. Yeah.

Given that October 7th has exploded... Which again is why I'm against designating Qatar and Turkey. We'll talk about that in a second. But given that October 7th has exploded so dramatically in the Iranian regime's face, this isn't what it was planning. Iran is weaker, I think, than it's ever been. And Israel is in the strongest regional position than it's ever been.

Are you seeing Iran re-evaluating its relationship with Hamas? Because this was a massive investment that has just gone down the toilet. And there is a question, is the Iranian regime going to try to double down on...

and try to rebuild the Hamas terror state, rebuild the Hezbollah terror state within a state in Lebanon, or is it going to change tack? October 7th has changed everything. What has it changed for the Ayatollahs? I don't think it's changed anything. Well, let's put it this way. I think they're reeling right now. They're totally reeling for all the reasons that you said. They've been... Pardon me. The bigger blow to them...

Then Hamas, of course, is Hezbollah. Hezbollah is the greatest asset that they have in the world, and they have a cultural, religious...

organizational connection to Hezbollah that they don't to Hamas. Hamas is a Sunni radical organization. It's Palestinian. There's a connection between Lebanon and Iran that is much, the Shiites of Lebanon and the Shiites of Iran that's much deeper on many levels, including intermarriage of the elite.

The Hezbollah was the essence, and essence is too strong of a word, the key component, the central component, the axis of

of the Quds Force, the Quds Force being the external arm of the Revolutionary Guard Force. Without Hezbollah, there's no Quds Force, or at least the Quds Force is a shadow of its former self. And Israel has not defeated Hezbollah, but it has taken it down several very large notches. And

To the point that Israeli warplanes flew over Nasrallah's funeral in Lebanon and there's nothing Hezbollah can do. So they can't, the Iranians cannot, they cannot get rid of Hezbollah. They cannot turn their back on Hezbollah. The regime cannot. It is part of the regime. It's an integral component. But what about Hamas?

Hamas, Hamas. How is Iran's strategy towards Hamas changing? Is this an investment they're going to try to recoup or is it a sunk cost and they'll write it off now? Oh, I don't think they will ever...

I don't think they will ever give up on it because it's useful to them in a variety of ways. First of all, the Palestine cause has such... Hezbollah doesn't resonate. The Lebanon cause doesn't resonate throughout the Islamic world. The Palestine cause does. You mentioned Ireland before. You know that the loyalists in Northern Ireland fly the Israeli flag and the...

and Sinn Fein, the

the IRA fly the Palestinian flag. All these kids on college campuses in America chanting from the rivers to the sea, they don't know which river, they don't know which sea, but they're chanting it. So there's this global attention factor, and it's global, but in the Islamic world it's even stronger, of course, that Palestine gets. So Iran is not going to give up on Palestine. But in terms of the military organization,

Hezbollah is much more part of the Iranian system than Hamas is. Let's switch to Qatar. I see Qatar as being one of the Hamas... Before we do, can I say one more word about this? Go for it. About where they are? Just what the Iranians are doing right now. Because as I said, they're reeling. The Israelis have left them naked before any attack. They know that the Israelis...

at will, can hit their nuclear program and so on. So there are only two things that are, there's only one thing really that is preventing Israel from attacking Iran right now, and that's the United States, American policy. So what Iran is going to do, I predict, is they're going to try to draw Donald Trump into a lengthy negotiation about the nuclear program

in an effort to buy time. In the meantime, they're going to try to build up their air defenses again. And they will try to recoup everything that they can, especially in Lebanon, but also with regard to Hamas. It makes sense that the Iranian regime would try to bog the Americans down in the promise of negotiations. The problem is the timetable doesn't match up and there is no time because the JCPOA is set to expire this autumn or fall, as the Americans would say.

That means that the E3 have only until the summer to go to the Security Council and declare that Iran is in significant material non-compliance with the JCPOA in order for the sanctions to snap back. Because if the deal expires come, when is it, October, the sanctions regime disappears and Iran is free to waltz out of the JCPOA and even the NPT, because the JCPOA will be over, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And that means that we're now in February,

We only have a few months until the E3 has to pull the trigger and try to get the Security Council to reimpose sanctions. And here's an additional complication. The Europeans are now in a position where they can demand a much tougher agreement than the JCPOA. Why?

Because the JCPOA assumed a breakout time of one year, and now Iran has a breakout time of two weeks. They could have enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb in two weeks. Some people think that it already has that nuclear material.

Iran is also much weaker than it ever was. And that means that any nuclear agreement would mean more restrictions in the JCPOA in exchange for less sanctions relief. But on the other hand, Iran is so much closer to getting a nuclear bomb that really the only strategically sensible option

is for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. And the only leverage that the West has against Iran breaking out towards nuclear weapons is the threat of Israeli military action. It's the only bullet left in the West's arsenal when Iran is two weeks away from getting nuclear weapons. So I'm not optimistic about the prospect for negotiations. And I think the Trump administration will be looking at this as well and saying,

We don't have time for the Iranian regime to string us along with the promise of negotiations because we only have a few months to get this thing in the bag or they can waltz out of the NPT altogether. I hope so. I agree with every word you said, with the slight exception that it's not clear to me what the Trump administration is going to do on any of this. I hope that they see it.

exactly like you do. I hope they're watching this podcast and they'll take my warning. Which is also the way I see it. But I'm looking for the signs and it's just not clear to me what exactly they intend to do. But what I do see is the Iranians trying to rope... The Iranians have launched a charm offensive and they're very good at this. So telling Washington through every channel that they can get

that they can tap, that all problems can be solved by sitting down and negotiating with Iran. And the goal of that...

is to buy time to rebuild their defenses. So the Iranian regime is the Hamas terror state's major state sponsor, huge financial, diplomatic, military, economic backing. You think it is going to try to double down on that strategy because playing the Palestine card lets it vie for leadership of the Islamic world,

rally up the masses around the Arab world. But let's talk about Qatar as well. If they compromise on any of these issues, they stop being the Islamic Republic. I don't think they can. Let's talk about Qatar. Qatar hosts Hamas's leadership.

Qatar has not handed over Hamas's leadership to the Americans, even to the Al Udeid airbase inside Qatar. Qatar condemned Israel on October 7th as the massacre was still unfolding and when Sinwa was killed, the Emir's mother mourned Sinwa. To me, it's clear that Qatar told Hamas to keep the hostages until it gets a ransom arrangement that will allow it to remain in power.

And that's even before we get onto the question of the massive interference that Qatar has been running for Hamas through Al Jazeera, which, surprise, surprise, somehow gets the media exclusive on the first interviews with the hostages because they're the exclusive media partner of the hostage parades that Hamas has been holding inside Gaza. To me, it's been clear that Qatar has been playing a deeply nefarious role, that it is not acting as independent.

mediator. It is acting as Hamas's intermediary. And the fact that it's poured so much money into the West and to its institutions gives it the buy-in of Western actors who are not willing to condemn Qatar because it's basically bought them off. Would you agree with that assessment? No. Why not? I don't. Because of all the things that we said and you and I agreed on up to this point, you pointed out that there is a

that the, the deadline on snapback is coming up in the autumn. I'll use your word. Uh, and, uh, uh, and we don't have a lot of, we don't have a lot of time left. Uh,

I think you'll also agree with me that Iran is the number one enemy of Israel and of the West in the Middle East. Do you agree with that? The Islamic Republic of Iran, I should emphasize, because whenever we say Iran, we get angry responses from Iranians who say, no, the Islamic Republic does not represent Iran. Okay. I'm going to engage in the usual shorthand. Disclaimer, when we say Iran, we're referring to the regime. When I say Iran, I'm talking about the Iranian government and so on.

So, but do you agree with me that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the number one enemy?

Yes. And is not... Yeah, qualified. And is not defeated? Is far from being defeated. The war is still going on? The war is still going on. Hezbollah is still a viable concern? It's been weakened greatly, but it could be... It could come back. It can come back as it's done. It could come back, but Hezbollah has been degraded from being the world's most powerful non-state actor ever.

to being a militia with a leader who is afraid to show his face in public. But it can still come back. Anything can come back, of course. So it isn't completely defeated. No. That has to be our number one goal. And that's what we should be talking about every day. Every minute spent talking about a second or, I would say, third-rate power like Qatar, first of all, is a wasted minute.

Because we need to keep the focus on Iran. That's where we're going to really change the balance of power between Israel and its enemies. Sure, I want to change the balance of power, but I also want to get the hostages out. The hostages who are still being starved and tortured in Hamas's dungeons. And the leaders of that regime are in Qatar. So if you kick the... If we put pressure on Qatar to kick the...

Hamas leadership out of Qatar. Where do they go? Not my problem. But into the sea. It is your problem because they're not going to kill them. They're just going to send them somewhere else. Is the new host... Well, I'll tell you where I'd like to see them go. I'd like to see them... The United States has an air force base in Qatar. I'd like to see them being put on a plane and sent to the United States to face justice.

So you'd hand them over to the United States and then the United States does what with them? Puts them on trial for crimes against Americans. How does that help you get your hostages back? Because the threat of extraditing them, the realization that they have to release the hostages in order to save their own skin, would push them to release the hostages. Right now, Hamas sees the hostages as being not only insurance, but an asset.

I want Hamas to see them as a liability. Do you think it's a realistic possibility that the United States will say that to the Qataris and the Qataris will do it? It's what I'm demanding. Okay, you can demand it. Is it a realistic prospect? I think it should be. If you're saying it's not a realistic prospect because Qatar has bought off enough administration officials and people within the elite circles, then no, but that doesn't mean that should not be the demand. No, my view is that... My view is that...

We're not taking enough responsibility for the situation that we're in right now and putting too much responsibility on the Qataris. The Qataris do what we ask them to do to a very significant... So why does the United States not ask Qatar to hand over Hamas' leaders to face justice? Because I think, first of all, the United States doesn't want to be solely dependent on the Egyptians as the interlocutor between... There has to be a negotiation between Hamas...

and Israel, Hamas, and the United States, right? To the extent that we need to get the hostages out, yes. If the goal is to get a deal on the hostages, there has to be... A ransom. Yeah, there has to be a negotiation. Yes. I mean, we could say, forget it, we're just going to do scorched earth, but then that means... No, we have agreed to a ransom to get the hostages out. So then isn't it better to have two interlocutors...

with Hamas than one. No, I'm not sure I follow why it would be more advantageous to have two interlocutors than one. I think a decision has been made by both the Israelis and the Americans not to have Egypt as the sole interlocutor. Why? Because it gives Egypt too much power over the situation. Egypt has its own interests.

and it pursues its own interests through the negotiations. And so it's better to play Egypt off against the Qataris. How do you think the Egyptians and Qataris are being played off against each other? Well, because there are two different channels from which to talk to Hamas.

In what way is that finding expression? How has that proven itself and its utility in the last year and a half? Well, the situation is not desirable by any stretch of the imagination, but that doesn't mean that it's going to be more desirable if we have a single interlocutor. Why doesn't Qatar order Hamas to release the hostages?

First of all, we don't believe, I think, that they have the ability to actually force them. I don't agree with you. Do you think if the Qatari police rocked up at the door of the Hamas leaders, whichever hotel or luxury apartment complex they're at, and told them, you have an ultimatum, you have to release the hostages now, or we're putting you on a plane to the United States? I think those guys are not the ones who make the decision ultimately anyway.

So those guys go to the United States, they're prosecuted or they're handed over to Israel. Fantastic. So what's the loss? What's the downside? The loss is that we don't have... Our goal of reaching a deal to release the hostages is not advanced in any way. Because you think that the...

Foreign leadership of Hamas has no influence over the Hamas on the ground? Very little, yeah. So what leverage do you think that Qatar has over Hamas? Not much. This is why I think everything that you're describing is a sideshow. Let's imagine a world in which Qatar had not condemned Israel. On October 7th, right, the massacre is still going on and the Qatari foreign ministry says that it holds Israel solely responsible for the ongoing escalation. Let's assume that Qatar stopped fighting

using Al Jazeera in order to accuse Israel of a genocide and to take Hamas's side and even help it host the hostage parades. Let's say that Qatar did not give Hamas the diplomatic backing and continue to give it coverage. You don't think Qatar would contribute to making Hamas an international pariah? No, I think it would have a negligible effect on the overall situation. The

The Talmud says that we shouldn't blame the mouse that got through the hole in our wall. We should blame the hole. And I think that all of this focus on Qatar is blaming the mouse rather than the hole that we allowed to be created there. The hole being what? The Israelis invited the Qataris into Gaza.

It was part of the Concepcia leading up to October 7th. The Israeli establishment decided erroneously and mistakenly that— A terrible mistake. But a mistake that it made, and the United States was party to the mistake. The United States also made this mistake that Hamas had become the manager of the Gazan economy rather than a jihadi organization hell-bent on the destruction of Israel.

And the Americans and the Israelis, but actually the Israelis were the ones who, my understanding is it's the Israelis were the ones who initiated it to begin with under the previous Trump administration. They encouraged the Qataris to step in and start pouring money into Gaza. So we have to start from there and say, we screwed up. And it's not that the Qataris are this powerful.

are this devilish country that is really trying to destroy the West. We made this mistake. The other mistake we made... So what is Qatar's interest then?

What is Qatar trying to achieve? Why would Qatar condemn Israel while the October 7th massacre is ongoing? I think you have to understand the Qataris as part of a regional coalition. There's the Turks and the Qataris, and then you have the Gulf states. And they are vying for, they are in competition to a certain extent with each other. It's a complex, multidimensional coalition

competition. And a lot of their discussion, a lot of the things that they say about the Palestine question are parts of the debates among themselves about power relationships between them and also what kind of societies they want to build. And it really doesn't have anything to do with a strategy toward Israel per se. What does it have to do with? Just what I said, this multidimensional debate

debate, discussion about what kind of societies they want. What kind of society do they want? Well, one wants a larger role for Islam and the other wants a greater secularism right now. That's where it is at the moment. I mean, whatever kind of societies they want, it's clear that since October 7th,

Qatar has been doing everything in its power to ensure that Hamas remains the government of Gaza after October 7th. The prime minister of Qatar gave an interview. We're talking, there's an unreality to this discussion, right? A minute ago, we're talking about Iran, which has created this whole proxy network around the region, sucked Israel into a war of attrition, which is still going on. It's still going on.

There's a limited amount of time. There's a limited window in which to strike Iran's nuclear program or to have snapback at the UN. And we're talking about a country that doesn't have a military, is completely dependent on the United States for its defense, has a population of...

I don't know how many, I don't even actually know off the top of my head how many Qataris there are, not people living in Qatar. Very few, and it's how they're able to use their insane gas wealth to capture vast waves of West Delalise. What are we talking about in terms of numbers? I wish I had it at my fingertips. A few hundred thousand. But yeah, 300,000 people maybe, right? Yeah.

You and I should not be spending our time talking about a country like that. Well, I wish we had the luxury of focusing on only one threat. The fact is that the Prime Minister of Qatar recently gave an interview to Israeli TV, to Arad Nir on Channel 12, in which he said that Qatar has been pushing for Israel to accept this ransom arrangement since October 8th. Qatar has been pushing what Qatar wanted immediately after October 7th,

was for Israel to perform a mass release of Palestinian prisoners, to leave Hamas on its feet, to leave Sinjar alive, to perform a victory parade through central Gaza. It would have excited jihadists around the world and inflamed their ability to continue waging jihad against Israel, which is exactly what the Iranian regime wants. How many enemies should Israel focus on at any one time?

You've already got Iran. No, it can't. That's a mistake. When people want to kill us, we need to be vigilant. We don't have the luxury of saying Iran is the only country that we have a problem with. The fact is our enemies are coming from multiple angles. When you ask me whether, you know, is the Iranian regime the biggest threat to Israel? And I hemmed and hawed and said maybe. Well, it's also because the Palestinian national movement, which the Iranian regime sees as

as a proxy, as a vehicle for its attack against Israel, they're still there and they're still an independent actor. So number one is Iran, number two is Hezbollah, number three is Hamas. Maybe we flip it. Maybe say Iran is number one, Hamas is number two, Hezbollah is number three.

I would say the Palestinian national movement, I wouldn't necessarily distinguish between Hamas and other actors that remain committed to the same vision of Israel's destruction from the river to the sea. But from a military point of view, you have to focus on those who are able to take up arms against you today. And I'm concerned about the country that was trying to keep the Hamas terror state in the

In power on October 7th. It's, again, 300,000 people. Very far away from the... And a lot of oil wealth. They have money. They have money. But they also are very responsive to what we ask of them. Go on. So American policy toward Iran is X. The Emirati policy toward Iran is X minus 1.

The Qatari policy toward Iran is X minus two. It's always that way. That's how it works. Nobody talks... There's nobody in Israel that I've spoken to that's talking about the massive amounts of Iranian money that are sitting in bank accounts in the UAE. Everyone in Israel loves the UAE for good reason. The UAE is doing a lot of very nice things with respect to Israel. But...

it also hedges toward Iran in ways that Israelis turn a blind eye to. And Americans also turn a blind eye to this. If Qatar is so responsive to the United States, I'll get back to the question, why should the United States not ask it to extradite Hamas's leaders? What does the United States have to lose by making that demand? The United States has decided. We can say it's a good decision or a bad decision. It has decided from moment one to use the Qataris as interlocutors.

with Hamas. We could decide. The difference that you and I have here is I don't care if the Biden administration, we don't have the Biden administration, if the Trump administration tomorrow decides, okay, we don't want to use you in that role anymore. Fine. We don't use them in that role anymore. Someone else is going to adopt. Those Hamas leaders, those individuals who are there, if they're killed, they're going to be replaced by some other external leader.

You're saying the United States allows Qatar to host Hamas's leadership so that it can use Qatar as a channel of communication to Hamas? We asked them to.

would not be enough to get them to force Hamas in Gaza to release the hostages, then these are impotent actors. And why do you need a line of communication to the foreign leadership of Hamas? Why do you need Qatar? Why do you think the Mossad hasn't killed them? In Qatar? Yeah. Probably for fear of an American response. Right. So...

Everything takes you back to where I tried to push us. American policy. What should American policy be? And what should the United States focus on? When you and I have a conversation... No, but I still don't understand why the United States needs Qatar as a line of communication to Hamas if you're saying the Hamas leaders based in Qatar aren't the ones calling the shots anyway. Well, we all know the guys in the ground in Gaza are the ones calling the shots ultimately. In which case, how is Qatar, how is the presence of the...

Hamas leadership in Qatar helping? Well, there has to be, if we're going to have a negotiation, there has to be a channel of communication. And you've basically got one other choice. If you're not going to work through the Qataris, then you're going to work through the Egyptians. If you get rid of the Qataris and you work through the Egyptians, then you're completely at the mercy of the Egyptians.

Let's talk about the Egyptians then. Because they tell you what the messages are, and they tell you, and they use it to increase their own, you know, maximize their own interests. Let's talk about the Egyptians. What is Egypt's interest in the October 7th war? Interest in the war or interest in Hamas presence in Gaza? What is its strategic interest? Yes, apropos the Hamas terrorist state. So it has many interests. Number one, it...

Hamas is a Muslim brotherhood. And Hamas is an arm or a wing, an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. So it has an organic connection to the Muslim Brotherhood opposition inside Egypt. It's right on Egypt's border.

Egypt, in terms of international stature over the last 50 years, has grown smaller and smaller and smaller. This is the last issue on which the Egypt played, major international issue on which the Egyptians play a leading role. So they have their internal interests. They have their stature in the international community. It's a question of the...

their border with Israel. They also make some money. But what is Egypt trying to achieve? They make some money off of the smuggling. Okay, yes. Egyptian corruption making... A secondary concern. Egyptian corruption making a huge amount of the humanitarian aid. Fine. I mean, it's a big issue in and of itself, but let's put that to one side. I agree with you. I don't think it's the major issue. Does Egypt want this war to end?

with Hamas in power in Gaza. Egypt wants the war to end, period. How? I want the war to end, but I don't want it to end with people who are promising more October 7th in a position to do it. That's not their number one concern. Egypt has suffered in many ways more than any other country other than Israel because they have suffered greatly economically because the Houthis have shut down or drastically reduced

international trade through the Suez Canal. And why has Egypt not done anything about that? What can it do? I don't know. I mean, this is one of the things that puzzles me. The Houthi pirates have basically shut down Egypt's revenues from the Suez Canal.

And yet the Egyptians don't seem to be treating the Houthis as an Egyptian problem. It's been the US, the UK, and Israel bombing the Houthis. But the Egyptians don't have the capability to project power beyond their borders significantly. They are dependent on the United States to do that. So the Egyptians, this is the genius of the Iranian strategy, is that the Iranians put their...

military power of their resistance axis, all their different proxies behind the global ceasefire movement.

On the basis of the calculation that if there is a ceasefire, then Hamas will remain in power. And if Hamas remains in power, then it is de facto victorious. Because as long as Mordechai Kedar said, if one Hamas fighter at the end of the war climbs on top of one pile of rubble and makes a victory sign, then Hamas is won. And does Egypt want Hamas to remain the de facto victor?

Victor of the October 7th war? I don't think they're thinking about it like that. I don't think anyone other than Israel and people like you and me are thinking about complete eradication of Hamas.

Everyone else is thinking, how do I manage this problem so that I alleviate the worst problems that I have? Or maximize my own... And for Egypt, that's the Houthi issue? Egypt wants the war in Gaza to go away so that the Houthis will unblock shipping in the Red Sea? That's probably their number one concern, I would guess. Interesting. What leverage do you think Egypt has over Hamas?

Not that much. Maybe a little bit more than the Qataris because they can play a role in allowing or blocking the smuggling out of Qatar.

out of Gaza, but they're not in a position to destroy it. And yet I would describe Egypt as being a state sponsor of Hamas, if only because it has joined South Africa's ridiculous case against Israel at the ICJ, accusing it of genocide, a quote-unquote genocide in which Egypt is, of course,

complicit, because if it's charging Gazans thousands of dollars to escape that so-called genocide, then it has a share of the culpability. But that irony seems to have gone over their heads. Why is Egypt co-sponsoring South Africa's case at the ICJ, waging lawfare against Israel, acting as an advocate for the devil? See, this takes us down the same route, as far as I'm concerned, as the discussions about Qatar are.

When you and I talk like this, what are we doing? Why are we doing this? What's the purpose of our discussion? In my mind, at least if I speak for myself, I want to influence Americans to have a certain view of the Middle East so that they focus on the things that are going to be most effective in the quickest amount of time.

Any discussion that we have about the Qataris, the Egyptians, the Turks, anyone else takes away from focus on the thing that is really going to make the biggest difference. But we have to focus on multiple things. We cannot just focus on one power. Strategy is about prioritization. Prioritization, but also understanding how there are multiple overlapping pieces involved.

and tectonic plates that are shifting. All over the Middle East, the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone and so on. But if you go down that route, you get lost. And we're starting... If we're trying to influence decision makers in the United States, we need to keep them focused on one thing and one thing only. I care about containing the Iranian regime. It doesn't mean that I, as an Israeli, can turn a blind eye to the fact that a neighbor that is...

massively profiteering off the trade of humanitarian aid is accusing my country of genocide at the ICJ and poisoning global public opinion against us. I have to care about that too. What is the single greatest thing that Israel did to get the hostages released?

Other than military pressure, what put Hamas in a position, if you want to think about changing Hamas' calculations so that Hamas will release hostages, what was the thing that changed their calculation the most?

It was the removal of Hezbollah from the Gaza front, or distancing it from the Gaza front. Nasrallah had said all along, as long as you, Israel, are engaged in warfare in Gaza, then your north will know no quiet, and your citizens, Israel, will not be able to go back to the border communities.

It was the destruction of the, it was the degrading and destruction of Hezbollah to such a point that Hezbollah felt it had to drop out of, it had to renege on that promise that left Hamas with the realization that it's alone on the battlefield.

The way you got Hezbollah to make that calculation was by hitting Iran hard and leaving it naked. That's the connection where the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone that we need to focus on. If Israel takes out, or Israel and the United States together, take out the Iranian nuclear program,

The task of destroying Hezbollah completely and encouraging other actors in Lebanon to rub Hezbollah's face in the dust becomes that much easier. If that happens, then getting a better solution in Gaza becomes that much easier.

As long as Israel has this Iranian network arrayed against it in one form or another, its room for maneuver in Gaza is restricted greatly. And that's not because of Egypt and it's not because of Qatar. And anything we do to Egypt or Qatar is not going to change that essential equation. I want to process that a second. Before October 7th,

Foreign observers could have claimed that an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities would ignite the Middle East, cause an escalation, that it would be dangerous and escalatory. What you're saying now is that at this point of the October 7th war, an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be de-escalatory in as much as the

removal of the Iranian regime's influence, liberates other actors to crush the remnants of Hezbollah in Lebanon, leaves Hamas even more bereft of its main state sponsor, forcing it to accept an arrangement it would never otherwise have considered because it was alone. And

And therefore, this move that I think is likely, if not certain, this year will be the pièce de résistance.

That pushes Hamas towards its eventual defeat. Do I understand your thinking correct? Yes. Yes, that's it And just just think about it if Iran goes down I'm not talking about the regime But I'm saying if it is seen by the world to have its nuclear program the jewel in the crown of its Of its resistance Network if that is if that is destroyed

Hezbollah will be seen to be weak. The Houthis will seem to be weak as well. And that will embolden other actors. Also, let's not forget the Iran-backed militias in Iran.

In Iraq. In Iraq. Everyone in Iraq right now is afraid. All of the Iran back militias are afraid. They're afraid that the United States and Israel are going to start targeting them, and they're defenseless before this network.

If we wait too long and Iran is able to buy time and start to rebuild and reconstitute its network, they will be emboldened. The Iran-backed militias in Iraq will be emboldened once again. Iran will perhaps have a new or a strengthened front in Iraq.

The Houthis will not be subdued and so on. This war is a war with Iran and it is only half over and we have to finish the war. And Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, they have nothing to do with it. Where does Turkey fit into this then? Erdogan has been vocally supportive of Hamas. Erdogan's Turkey treats Hamas terrorists in its hospitals unkindly.

Erdogan's Turkey has even threatened a conquest of Jerusalem. What's Turkey's interest here? Why does it back Hamas? You know, American hospitals have treated Hezbollah, very significant Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon. How so?

The American University in Beirut has a hospital and a number of very significant Hezbollah fighters have sheltered, have taken shelter there with the knowledge of the Biden administration. Nothing was done about it. I've never heard of this before. I know. I'm revealing it now to your audience. Why is that happening?

I'm not sure this is happening now. It happened under the Biden administration. Why did it happen? Because the Biden administration was reaching out to Iran in an effort to try to de-escalate. That was their de-escalate and de-conflict. That's their language. In order to get to a ceasefire in Gaza. That's deeply disturbing.

And yet Turkey's support for Hamas goes far beyond treating its enemies

in their hospitals. It was only a few weeks after the October 7th massacre that Turkey's President Erdogan said, Hamas is not a terrorist organization. It is a liberation group. It is a mujahideen waging a battle to protect its lands and its people. There appears to have been coordination between Erdogan and the Iranian leadership as well, repeatedly denying that Hamas are terrorists, publicly mourning Sinwa while comparing Netanyahu

to Hitler, reports that Hamas leaders are in Turkey. In fact, when Khaled Mashal called for a resumption of suicide bombings, he did that from Turkey, from the territory of a NATO member state. So why is Turkey backing Hamas? So again, just as I said about Qatar,

And Egypt. Before going into all of the intricacies of the Turkish relationship with Hamas, where does this lead if we start talking about it this way? And what effect does it have on our regional strategy?

One of the greatest things that happened to Israel in the last, since October 7th, one of the greatest successes, strategic successes that Israel had in its war against Iran was the toppling of Bashar al-Assad. That delivered to Israel a great strategic prize because no longer,

No, because it immediately gave Israel an opportunity to bomb the whole Assad military, its stockpiles of WMDs, destroy its air force, destroy its navy. And what had been a major military threat on Israel's northern border was gone overnight. And all of the Iranians were expelled entirely from Syria, and Iran no longer had the conduit from Damascus to...

to Beirut, to build up Hezbollah. Truly we live in biblical times. Yeah. So who handed Israel that strategic coup de grace? Go on. Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Why? Because the Turks are the ones who toppled the Turks in support of their proxy, HDS, are the ones that toppled Assad.

So the expansion of Turkish power worked greatly to the advantage of Israel. I would start, before I'm going to start talking to you about all of the horrendous things that Erdogan has said about Hamas or all of the ways in which the Turks have hosted Hamas and so forth, I want to talk about the overlapping strategic interests between the Turks and the Israelis.

And if we start focusing, if we make the center of our policy toward Turkey, their position on Hamas, what effect does that have on the benefits that we get from Turkey with respect to the Iranian network? So what overlapping interests are there between Israel and Turkey that means we should turn a blind eye to it harboring?

The October 7th monsters. Iran and Turkey are today in strategic competition and in greater tension than at any time since I have been watching the Middle East. And when I talk to Israelis and to many of my American colleagues in Washington, there's not even any awareness of this.

there's a tremendous amount of hostility coming from Tehran now toward the Turks. And is it obvious that Israel's interests are aligned with Turkey?

Israel's number one enemy and the West's number one enemy is Iran. And anything that weakens Iran or counterbalances it is a good thing. Unless it just replaces it with another enemy. But there's no sign that that's happening whatsoever. There's no... The Turkish policy on Hamas is...

highly objectionable. There's no doubt about that. And their rhetoric towards Israel has been highly malicose. It's come to a point of threatening to invade Jerusalem. Talk about neo-imperialism. Erdogan's rhetoric toward Israel is also objectionable.

But there's a difference between rhetoric toward Israel and putting together a network of proxies all around the Middle East that are pulling Israel into a war of attrition. There's no sign whatsoever that the Turks have decided on anything even remotely like that. And that's a good thing. And that's where we should hope to keep Turkey right now. If I can recap.

Iran is the Hamas terror state's number one state sponsor. Yes? Yes. You think that Qatar, Turkey, Egypt actually have very limited leverage over Hamas? Although I would disagree. Yes. And you think that Israel's number one strategic interest lies, therefore, in continuing to weaken the Iranian regime and

and put everything else aside towards this goal of knocking the Iranian regime out of the regional map in order to pave the way for the final dissolution of its network of proxy armies, including the Hamas terror state that is still holding hostages right now? Basically, yes. I wouldn't say put everything else on hold. I would say prioritize that over everything else.

Prioritize the destruction of Iran and its proxies over everything else. The entire Middle East changes. It's already changed. Israel and Turkey together have significantly reduced the power of Iran. I see your prediction for the future of the Middle East if Israel is successful in knocking the Iranian regime out of action. I wonder if you could offer another alternative analysis.

of where the Middle East will go if Israel is pressured into accepting a ceasefire deal that leaves Hamas in power. That as the UN General Assembly was demanding an immediate, unconditional ceasefire that would leave the Hamas terror state in power,

and that this war does not end with Hamas's removal from power. What does that mean for the broader Middle East? I don't, I think that that was a possibility if Kamala Harris had won, because I think the Biden administration was planning to try to come down on Israel like a ton of bricks to get the ceasefire. It looks like the Trump administration is,

in principle is much more, and that just looks like, clearly the Trump administration in principle is much more supportive of the idea of destroying Hamas in Gaza. But I don't see, and this is, by the way, another issue where I was talking about the hole in the mouse. Can you tell me what the Israeli plan is to destroy Hamas in Gaza? I think that at this point in the war,

It is impossible to destroy the Hamas terrorist state within the rules of the game that the international community has dictated. And I'll explain what I mean. There was a scenario at the beginning of the war when Israel went to UN agencies and asked them to cooperate with the evacuation of civilians from Gaza City. The UN refused. They insisted on keeping Gazan civilians in a Hamas stronghold. And it is impossible...

to burn Hamas to the ground while there are civilians running among their feet and the UN is pressuring Israel to let in aid trucks that we know are resupplying Hamas. In order to destroy Hamas, we needed to get civilians out of the way, burn Hamas to the ground, and then there can be reconstruction afterwards. As long as we are playing this game where we go into an area and can never fully finish the job with Hamas because there are still civilians there, Hamas is going to grow.

The prospect that the Trump administration has raised now of the evacuation, removal of people from Gaza out of the Strip opens the possibility of being able to target the Hamas terrorist infrastructure that they deliberately hid underneath civilian areas and buildings in order to shield it. So I think if there is a way to get the civilians out of the way to IDP camps, out of the Gaza Strip,

so that Israel can burn Hamas to the ground, like the international coalition burned ISIS to the ground. And no one said, no, civilians have to remain inside Raqqa and Mosul, and you need aid trucks to go into the center of Raqqa and Mosul while the whole world is fighting ISIS. If that's possible, there is a viable path to defeating Hamas. As long as civilians are still running around under Hamas' feet, I'm not sure how it can be done. So that should be our number one priority.

Our number one priority should be, well, our number one priority together with destroying the Iranians. We need to actually dismantle Hamas in Gaza so that we need to take the aid away from it. So aid goes through some alternative network and is not used by Hamas to control people and also to enrich itself.

I don't see any. And that's a that's a plan that has to precede. Let's say let's say that Trump's aspiration of removing all of the Gazans and sending them to Albania or wherever is actually realistic and starts and could be made to happen then in a in a reasonable amount of time before we can get there. Israel has to be able to Israel has to be able to

to identify the people who are ready to leave and to move them out. No Gazan is going to raise his hand and say, I want to go as long as Hamas is in control on the ground, because Hamas will shoot him, will shoot his family or anyone else. So something like what you described has to be the number one priority. That's completely in Israel's hands or Israel and the United States.

The evacuation of the population. Well, the sifting out, the moving all... Right now, Hamas controls the economy of Gaza because the economy of Gaza is entirely based on supply of humanitarian aid.

Taking that away from Hamas, creating alternative networks, creating spaces inside Gaza where you can have people who are able to raise their hand and say, I want to go without being killed. That has to be the number one goal in Gaza while going after Iran. None of that has anything to do with Turkey, Qatar, Iran.

Yeah, the Hamas terror state's economy is driven by humanitarian aid, which means we can call any country that is donating humanitarian aid in some way a state sponsor of Hamas. No, no, no. Again, that's the hole in the mouse. Israel has it within its capacity. If it decides to do it and it has the support of the United States, it has the ability to shift the humanitarian aid from one network to another.

Mike, this has been an on-ra-truck-sized dose of food for thought. Understanding how the different, I came up with that just now, how the different jigsaw pieces in the Middle East fit together. But you know, if we're talking about tectonic shifts, these are jigsaw pieces that fit together and then click and overlap and you never know how the region is going to change, focusing on how

Israel needs to focus on the destruction of Iranian influence inside the Middle East and create a new regime.

Certainly we live in biblical times. Mike, how can people follow you on social media and your work? I'm at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., and I tweet at Duranimated. Duranimated? Yes. Why is that your handle? I don't know. When Twitter came out, I just didn't want to be... Probably at Duran was taken, so I wanted something that would be...

Mike Duran, thank you very much for coming on State of a Nation. Thank you. And that brings us to the end of today's episode of State of a Nation with Mike Duran. You can also follow him on his own podcast, Israel Update, a production of Tablet Magazine, together with Israeli writer and historian Gadi Taub.

As always, if you enjoy these episodes, and I hope you do, we're producing them for you, please give us a like and subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, wherever you are following. Share the link with a friend who will be educated and enlightened by our conversations between the lines and beyond the headlines. And until next time, I'm Elon Levy, and thanks for joining us.