At quarter- and year-end, foreign banks reduce their balance sheets to meet capital requirements, a practice known as 'window dressing.' This reduction in funding in the repo market shifts the burden to U.S. banks, which charge higher rates due to their own balance sheet constraints. Additionally, the Treasury market's growth increases financing pressure, further widening the SOFR/IOR spread.
The widening of the SOFR/IOR spread to 20 basis points indicates increased stress in the repo market, particularly at quarter-end. This is driven by foreign banks reducing their balance sheets for regulatory compliance, forcing U.S. banks to charge higher rates. The 99th percentile spread reaching 45 basis points further highlights the strain.
At year-end, U.S. banks are monitored for GSIB scores, which include a component related to repo market activity. This leads them to constrain their balance sheets, similar to foreign banks, to avoid appearing over-leveraged. This dual pressure from capital requirements exacerbates funding stress in the repo market.
While current liquidity strains are primarily driven by capital requirements, the sufficiency of bank reserves is also a concern. As quantitative tightening reduces reserves, banks may face challenges in meeting intraday payment obligations and financing securities, potentially leading to higher SOFR rates.
The Federal Reserve may reduce the pace of quantitative tightening in 2025 to avoid a repeat of the September 2019 repo market blowout, where insufficient reserves caused a spike in SOFR rates. With reserves currently at $3.2 trillion, more than double the 2019 level, the Fed aims to maintain a comfortable buffer to prevent market stress.
The 'ratchet effect' refers to banks becoming semi-addicted to high levels of reserves after periods of quantitative easing. Once banks offer services like transaction deposits and credit lines based on ample reserves, they are reluctant to reduce these services during tightening, leading to a persistent demand for reserves.
The timing of bank payments, particularly when banks receive the first half of their incoming payments, serves as a canary in the coal mine for reserve sufficiency. If payments are delayed by more than 100 minutes, it signals that banks are holding back funding, indicating potential stress in the repo market.
The transition from LIBOR to SOFR increases bank funding risks because SOFR, a risk-free rate, tends to decrease during crises, making it cheaper for corporations to draw on credit lines. This exposes banks to large, unexpected funding needs, particularly smaller banks that rely on wholesale markets.
The U.S. Treasury market is considered a safe haven because U.S. Treasury securities are the largest and most reliable source of safe assets globally. Investors, including pension funds and insurance companies, rely on them to manage liability risks, especially in times of market stress.
High U.S. debt-to-GDP levels pose risks of market dysfunction during stress periods, as seen in March 2020. Additionally, if investors demand higher risk premiums for Treasury securities, it could lead to unsustainable borrowing costs, crowding out private investment and increasing the burden on future generations.
With the end of year approaching and SOFR/IOR spreads widening, Darrell Duffie, renowned and prolific monetary scholar, joins Monetary Matters to share his views on why liquidity strains often appear at quarter- and year-end. Duffie explains his work on the September 2019 repo blowout and shares his findings that timing of bank payments is a better predictor of SOFR/IOR stress than the SOFR/IOR spread itself. Duffie also shares his views on debt-to-GDP levels, the theory that the Treasury has engaged in “stealth QE,” and the impact of SOFR transition on bank funding costs. Recorded on December 27, 2024.
Duffie Piece On Reserves Discussed For Most Of Interview (“Reserves Were Not So Ample After All”): https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr974)
Duffie Piece on SOFR vs. LIBOR impact on bank debt-overhang cost (discussed at end, “Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply”): https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1042)
Darrell Duffie’s website https://www.darrellduffie.com/)
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