Substack Election Dialogues: China and the US election
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I'm Bill Bishop and have a great discussion today with Chris Johnson. We are doing this. This is the kickoff of the Substack election dialogues. There will be a series of dialogues over the next three weeks or so into the election. Today's topic, we are going to be talking about

China and the US election and in particular, maybe how the PRC policymakers might see the US election and whether or not they have a preferred candidate. I'm really happy today that we have Chris Johnson. He's president and CEO of China Strategies Group. He served for almost two decades in the US Intelligence and Foreign Affairs committees. And now in addition to his work advising multinational companies on their business and commercial strategies in China and greater East Asia,

His insights on the PRC leadership and the economic, commercial, foreign security policies are, I know, are regularly solicited and sought for by very senior administration officials, congressional folks, military and foreign government officials. So Chris is also now a senior fellow at the Asian Society's

Chris McGuire: Center for China analysis. And one of the great things about Chris, he was recently in Beijing. So I know he came back with some some interesting insights into how some of the PRC policy making apparatus is looking at the US elections. So Chris, welcome. Chris McGuire: Thank you. Great to be here. Great. So we're going to kick off the first question is a is a sort of a broader question which is Chris, how do you think that

Chinese policymakers view the election and what might they see as sort of the risks and opportunities as we go through this process?

Yeah, obviously, you know, that's the topic du jour in all such worlds. And I think what struck me most on my recent trip to China was, in a way, the lack of interest, if you want to put it that way, in our election. Not that they weren't keenly interested, but what was missing, you know, I'd say even compared to four years ago, but certainly in prior U.S. presidential elections, when

when I would go to China just before one, there would be arguably the same fervor that you would see in DC in terms of the parlor game, as we call it, right. In terms of, you know, who's going to be the China guru in, in an X administration and who might get what job. And, you know, well,

what is the policy likely to be? It was a lot more muted this time. And I spoke to a lot of people while I was there. And, you know, I think I was on like, you know, 25 of 40 people I met with while I was there. And I just asked this person the question and said, you know, what's going on here? You know, there's not as much enthusiasm as there normally would be. And he, you know, just very matter of fact, he said, look, the view here is the dais caste, you know, and it might

matter on the margins. Certainly it does if there's a Trump administration versus a Harris administration. But the general tenor of U.S. policy is they're out to, you know, stop our rights, right? And maybe to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party. So it was striking. You know that view is locked in. I mean, you see it, right, in speeches that Xi Jinping and others make. But

But on the other hand, to have it be so palpable was interesting to me. And I think that largely reflects

the fact that for whatever reasons you know we say you know it's all just kind of silly propaganda and so on now it turns out the propaganda matters people listen and also i think the view is look we're on this track then toward um a fortress economy self-sufficiency certainly in critical i.t and food security energy security etc so that was um telling so that's that's um

Not particularly optimistic, but I think realistic. I mean, it's certainly what I've picked up. I mean, there was an article in Foreign Affairs in, I think it was supposed to run in June, and then it was revised when Biden dropped out and Harris became the nominee by Wang Jisun, where basically I think it was, it seemed like almost an official declaration of we don't have a preference. Right.

Where he went through a lot of what you talked about, sort of how the structural issues are there. And so there are just that, you know, there might be gradations of more difficulty depending on the administration, but there doesn't seem to be any real optimism for sort of any policy.

mitigation or relief to the pressures and the structural issues in the relationship. Is that a fair statement? I think that is a fair statement. And what struck me, I remember you highlighting in your newsletter that that article had been sort of commissioned, right, by senior people in Beijing. And, you know, when I read it, I had exactly that takeaway. And my other big takeaway was they're worried about perceptions of influence, right, of efforts by China to influence our election. So they have, you know,

their top America hand, you know, at least in a scholarly world, come out and sort of say we don't have a preference, right? So I think that that was certainly part of that as well and striking. And then I guess the other piece is, we got to be careful here. You know, Beijing may have low expectations. I think our side would tip, you know, for an improvement in the sense that the other big theme that came through on this topic when I was over in Beijing was

You know, sure, we can improve relations. Xi Jinping has two, you know, sort of standards. The first is, you know, somehow the U.S. needs to be able to insert the word partnership into its statements about the relationship, even if it's in the same sentence as competition or rivalry or whatever you want to say. Right.

And the second one is so so, you know, not likely. Right. On that one. And the second one is we need a definition of national security, you know, that allows us to separate national security from, quote unquote, normal trade and and economic activity. Unlikely as well in my estimation.

Well, on both sides, right? I mean, the Chinese have a very – I mean, for all the criticisms of how expansive they see the American definition of national security, their definition of comprehensive national security outlook is pretty broad. Of course. And, you know, I mean, that's a troubling indicator, I think, of the state of the relationship is, you know, we're in this sort of, well, you started it, you know, kind of.

competition on on all so many of these matters i mean all kidding aside i think you take a look at um jake sullivan's recent visit to china right where he met with wong yi and they have this dialogue and you know i think net net it's obviously been a good thing that these two senior people in their respective governments are speaking to each other that's wonderful um but you see a situation where at least the rumor mill is that we had an opportunity

to craft an agreement whereby all of the U.S. citizen and sort of green card LPR people who are held in China under various forms. Or exit control, exit ban. Yeah, mainly exit banning could be released in exchange for a couple of MSS, got Ministry of State Security guys and a few other bits. I think the Chinese wanted State Department to lower their travel restriction warning from level three to two or something like that.

And, you know, we got close, but then unsurprisingly, and perhaps rightly, the US side tried to get, you know, the three, quote unquote, unlawfully detained folks, right, you know, and then the whole thing collapsed. And so, you know, the point being, there are these, as long as we are unable to address the underlying structural tensions in the relationship, you can't have improvement. And then, you know, as I think you and I discussed earlier,

you know, Jake Sullivan leaves and two days later, they're ramming boats in the South China Sea. And, you know, a month after that, they're testing the ICBM for the first time in 40 years. So, you know, that says a few things.

No, for sure. And I think also, too, right, there was there was hope after I think the sort of the U.S. side around the Sullivan visit was also sort of pushing out the idea that there would be a leader leader leader to leader call. Yeah. You know, in the next few weeks, really, by the end of September, you know, a call between Biden and Xi. And that apparently now isn't even happening.

and maybe just be from the Chinese perspective, why even bother before the elections? The lame duck president, the election's three and a half weeks away. What's the point? - Yeah, that was my sense when I was in China, that was exactly the view. It's sort of like, why is this in Xi Jinping's interest? Not only that, you know,

There are conflicting scheduling issues. A big part of it is, you know, once you get to, say, a month ahead of the election, it would be probably not in President Biden's interest either, you know, to have that phone call prior to that. So right around that critical timing, let's call it, you know, late September, early October. But the Chinese are also thinking they're going to drop another bomb on us with export controls on semiconductors and so on.

- They're supposed to be the annual update for the October 7th control. - Yeah, so Xi Jinping has a happy phone call with Biden and then they drop a ton of bricks on us. - Well, so that actually raises a question, which is, okay, so Biden and Xi, they aren't gonna talk, it doesn't seem like before the election.

If Trump wins, will there be even any engagement with the Biden administration this year? The Chinese will just basically sort of give the U.S. administration the hand and say, why bother until, and then just start focusing on figuring out who to talk to in the Trump orbit. Well, I think it would be both. I mean, you know, they're...

I would say that despite the difficulties in the relationship, they still, the Chinese still would do their best to approach it with an appropriate sense of, I guess you'd call it decorum or procedural elements. So it seems likely, for example, that Xi and President Biden will meet at the G20 session, right? So we have that forthcoming. Let's say Vice President Harris is successful. I find it hard

hard to believe that President Biden would say, well, actually, you should go because you're the incoming president. Maybe he would. I don't know. That would be very magnanimous if he did. But, you know, if you're Xi Jinping in that meeting, you know, it's become lower really now, the final meeting between President Obama, right, and Xi Jinping, where he, you know, talked about North Korea and, you know, things like that. And I think Xi Jinping's attitude was sort of like your yesterday's news, you know, and

And so I think you would see both those elements. I think in terms of outreach to Trump, though, it would be more likely to see them use, you know, the Wong Chee-sus or the folks like Fu Ying for another former foreign minister. Maybe Dawei too or something like that. Yeah, sure. People with that sort of America whisper, you know, profile would be the ones I think they would use. But it's been striking, right? Those people have already been knocking on those doors and

And no one's answering. You know, it was quite striking and talking to somebody in the Trump campaign who was sort of saying, you know, look, if I'm vying for position X and so is this other person and our, you know, our basic CVs are identical, but I'm talking to the Chinese and that person isn't, I'm not getting the job. You know, I mean, that's sort of the view. So it's difficult then, I think, for those folks to feel comfortable to these inquiries.

without you know being no and i think and clearly i mean i you know i've been trying to figure out like who would be what jobs in depending on the administration i think the chinese in some ways it's you know i think they're really scrambling usually at this point you would have a sense of who the team would be yeah but it seems like there there really is a lot of um

real uncertainty about who would be the team, you know, doing Asia, doing China policy, whether it's the Harris administration or it's the Biden administration or the Trump administration. Yeah, I think that's true. I think, you know, for different reasons, right? With the potential Harris administration, they're just rightly so, so focused on the campaign and winning. You know, they've had this truncated process that they've had to deal with that in their view, I'm sure they think we don't have time to think too much about that. I mean, I think obviously there would be folks

Thinking about this, you see a lot of media attention, for example, around Vice President Harris's brother-in-law, Tony West, right, that he would play some kind of a key role in maybe in the transition team, you know, which obviously those jobs always have a big say in who gets what. But you wouldn't think they're spending a whole ton of time on it. And I think in the Trump universe, it's just sort of everyone knows how fickle he can be. And there are certainly a lot of people, I think, from Trump 1 who are just either out of favor or

out of orbit you might want to say right or even come out against him and so even if even if they wanted to go back in it's it's not going to happen right and and also you have situations where you know certain individuals who held certain posts in the in the trump one administration you know what what's left for them to move up right you know i mean i think uh former usgr bob leifheiser you know is an excellent uh example of that

- Treasuring your commerce is what I keep hearing. - Yeah, you kind of hear those are the two choices. - Right. - Exactly. - And I think Lighthizer and those roles would cause the Chinese a lot of grief.

most definitely, but I think he also probably is smart enough to understand he doesn't really know the treasury world. There could be a big problem in the next four years in the U S bond market. And so I would think it's really more about commerce because, you know, you look at that position, it really has all the tools that Mr. Lighthizer wants to play with, right. Export controls and, and things of that nature. Yeah, I think that is so, so my, my view, I go back and forth sort of who, who does the PRC want? And I think I, I totally agree that,

the sort of structurally it's, I think the view is it doesn't really matter. There may be some improvements or more so on the margin. I do think though that there is with the Trump administration, there is, um,

greater potential for a significant downside on the economic side of the relationship. Oh, sure. Yeah. Although that was striking too when I was in China. What was interesting to me was listening to what clearly is a very intense debate there. In other words, you have the whole picture of Trump versus Harris, which one might be better for us. And then I think you have sub-

David Kramer: Division debates going on, you know, with regard to within Trump. So I think the the dialogue there is about, you know, is a grand bargain, as was often discussed in Trump one, you know, still possible or or is he so angry with us about failing to deliver on the phase one trade agreement and also David Kramer: For covert and David Kramer: Yeah election.

That it's going to be hammer and tongs, you know, that come at us with. And I think, you know, my perception was there's still a decent group of people who think a grand bargain is possible. I think it's possible. It's Trump. You know, he can change his mind in 15 minutes. So that was interesting, I thought.

Well, so just switching gears from sort of sitting in Beijing, how do you think they view this whole process and sort of how they might be positioning and pushing out information to propaganda around the world about U.S. election? Because obviously one of the big things, especially under Xi, is really under Xi is this idea of this whole process democracy, which is we're a democracy, too. And actually, our democracy is better because we are a whole process democracy.

And pushing that messaging out, not just domestically, but also really through throughout their sort of global information. Yeah, their infosphere. I mean, so what do you think? Like, how are they messaging about this whole our whole process and our whole system?

Well, I think, you know, that's been something they've been at for some time. It was very striking, right, in the third plenum resolution, how much time was spent on that sort of issue, the importance of whole process democracy. You know, it got a whole chapter, I think, in the resolution. So that's very different and shows, you know, the importance that they place upon it.

I think the other interesting element there, though, is that this might be the one area where the change out of President Biden for Vice President Harris is kind of an inconvenient situation for them, right? The narrative has clearly been, look, these guys are in decline. They're run by old white men who are, you know, geriatric and...

and, you know, weak and so on and so forth. And then, and, and, and doesn't understand, you know, they're colonialists and they don't understand the global South and so on. And then enter, you know, a woman, um, who's half African-American and half, um, uh, she's the daughter. She's the daughter of immigrants from the global South. Exactly. So, um, that's an inconvenient, uh,

narrative for them. In fact, I was kind of wistfully told that by a couple of people not too far from their propaganda enterprise. So it's interesting in that respect, I think, and does create certain problems for the narrative. But I think what they're waiting for is chaos of some sort. It's close, or it takes a while to announce the victor, or there are lawsuits everywhere, or God forbid, there's some kind of violence.

That's probably what they're waiting for in terms of information operations, if you want to call them this.

Yeah, I mean, it's hard as an American voter. It's hard to argue that they might not be right. I mean, that's what's kind of crazy. And especially, you know, you talk about, you know, infosphere propaganda. Propaganda works best when it has at least a kernel, if not a large amount of truth to it, right? Yeah. No, I mean, it's the old adage, you know, every stereotype has its basis in truth, right? Kind of situation, at least some level, so.

Okay. So, yeah, no, it's interesting. And I think that – so another question I heard recently and I thought was kind of interesting is – I wonder if you've heard this – is how do you think they view Elon Musk? Because I've heard some sort of suggestion he could be the next Kissinger given his – if Trump wins, given his obvious access to Trump and support for Trump, but also his access and work in China. Yeah. Yeah.

Well, having known Dr. Kissinger quite well, I'm not sure I would compare the two in terms of strategic mindset. But I mean, I get the analogy. But in terms of sort of a back channel or a front channel, sort of an unofficial way to get to the U.S. president. Yeah, no, I'm sure they would view him that way. And I'm sure he'd be happy to be viewed that way, right? And to be used in that manner. I think they recognize...

though, that with a character like him, you know, it may not be a trustworthy channel. You know, in other words, he'll be more than happy to fulfill it, but whatever he tells them or they tell him, I'm not sure they could be confident it would be relayed, you know, exactly as sensed. I mean, it's just interesting because they do seem to have, I mean, I know you knew Dr. Kissinger, I mean, they seem to have a

sort of a need to find somebody like that, right? There's always got to be the way to get in the back door. Yeah, I think it's something... Send the message. I don't know, just that you saw a colleague a month ago, one of the paper, which is, I think, under the Shanghai government, they had a series on looking for the next Kissinger, where they highlighted seven different Americans who were from Thailand.

and it was it just none of them seemed like they were a Kissinger level it was sort of seemed more like wish casting than something realistic yeah well and I think it also shows that you know they're kind of

Groping, I think, to figure out how, you know, there is this tension, right? On the one hand, you know, Xi Jinping has these firm requirements about what he would like to see if there was going to be an improvement in the relationship. And on the other hand, they're then sort of looking for these old ways, you know, which probably don't apply anymore. And, you know,

In my view, there's only one Kissinger, not just him as a person, but also the timing of what occurred, what made him have that role, you know, so on and so forth. And I think also it's a tricky one for the Chinese because, you know, in a lot of those, my recollection of the candidates in that paper profile was that there were a lot of business people and it's just only been my experience.

fundamental belief that the Chinese, you know, this is Chinese culture, right? Business people are crass. They want to make money. They're not strategic thinkers, right? They're not soldier scholars or, you know, these sort of things and that are venerated in Chinese culture. So I think they'd be struggling and I think they'd see Musk to some degree in that, in that capacity. Look at Jack Ma. He was, whether or not he was official, he, you know, showed up immediately at Trump Tower in 2016. And, um,

You know, maybe he got overseas, but it didn't work out so well for him. No, but they thought it would appeal to him. Right. You know, and so that I could see. Whereas, you know, finding somebody on their side who would appeal to Vice President Harris, I think, is more challenging in that, you know, kind of respect or method of contact.

Yeah. So I'm going to – this is a question sort of in the realm of speculation, and you can certainly say no if it's not. But one of the things I've been trying to understand is like looking on the – starting on the Democratic side –

You know, the Biden team has a, you know, they have their China team. It's actually been pretty consistent, right? You've had people there for almost, I mean, there hasn't, I think, been, like, there's been less turnover in some of these roles than normally you would see. These are brutal jobs. And so these folks on the NSC or over at State Department who's working on China or the other cabinet positions, if there is a continuity into another Democratic administration, right?

It's probably not likely a lot of them stick around because, you know, you got to see your family, you got to make money, you got to get some sleep, right? I mean, it's four years is a long time. What's the bench look like on the Democratic side? Yeah.

Well, I think that's a question to be thought about. And, you know, you have to, to your point, I think you have to assume that a lot of the folks in the Biden administration, four years is an eternity. And I only ever saw them from the sidelines, you know, working at CIA, but I saw how taxing it was on people. And

So I have tremendous admiration for anyone who's willing to put up with that for any amount of time, particularly for years. So and then, you know, we see reports, right, that there are questions about Vice President Harris's feelings or views about a lot of these people. You know, was she treated with the appropriate amount of respect, not necessarily for her

as a person, but for her office even. And I would imagine there might be some truth to that. And so, you know, you're starting to look around and as you look around to your point, you know, it's what's surfaced so far. And I think it's only been, you know, rather amateurish investigation. I think it was like, you know, South China morning post or something like that. That's not exactly, you know, on the beat in DC, but, you know, they start talking about folks from the Obama administration who didn't serve in the Biden administration and so on. So as you say, you know, kind of where, what's the fresh,

the fresh talent coming up. Perhaps there are people in the civil service, you know, already that could fill some of the more junior roles, you know, deputy assistant secretaries, things like that. But, you know, for high level positions, assistant secretaries, unders, you know, you need people. So it's a challenge. And, you know, to be fair, the Chinese kind of have this challenge, too, not really necessarily in their government bureaucracy. But, you know, we've been talking

a lot about Wang Jisoo today, but who's the next Wang Jisoo? Well, he's what? He's like 75 or so? Yeah, 75, 76, I think. So he's up there, still active, which is great. But so you begin to wonder on both sides, do we have this sort of situation and challenge? Yeah, no, on the Republican side too, it's really, you saw in the first Trump administration, there was a group of the never Trumpers who had, some of them I think were pretty good on Asian policy and China policy who, yeah,

sort of self-selected out because they signed that letter. And then, you know, I think a lot of the folks who were in Trump one, especially working on China for, again, we talked earlier for various reasons, won't be in a Trump two. And so then what is that bench? I mean, it really feels like we, and, you know, I think some people are there and certainly, you know, we'll,

even asking a question, I'm sure people will say that's nuts because, you know, the elites have messed up America policy towards China. So it's actually much better to have like no one from the benches and find new ideas, right? Yeah. Yeah. No. And I mean, I think there's an argument to be made with regard to that point of view. I think the bigger, more fundamental issue is it's, I saw this, you know, too, when I was at CIA, you know, there's a demographic issue, right? Which is the, it seems to me that China fields, you know,

the demographic curve of it is shaped like a pair, right? There's a very skinny neck, which is, you know, the, the more senior people in the field, you know, Susan Shirk, David Chamba, folks like that, who've been doing it for a very long time. And then kind of down a little bit more toward the,

The bottom of the neck, there's probably people like myself, you know, I think my age cohort is pretty small, really, in that community. And then you have, you know, kind of the bulb of the pair, which is a lot of people who are graduating in China studies, you know, in recent years, and so on and so forth. And so it takes time and, you know,

there's a lot of parallels it seems to me but between outside china watching and inside government china watching in the sense that you have to develop certain skill sets you have to develop um what i call texture for the topic you know uh

and learning how to read various things. I think we have a fundamental problem coming with, in my mind, way too much emphasis on textualism and looking at speeches and things like that. And I get it because the problem is Xi Jinping has created an information system wherein it's very difficult to get insight. And so all that's left is the speeches. So you start to see

creeping into the dialogue of the field, you know, it's time to get back to the Pekingology of old, you know, and when we didn't have any access to China and so on. Yeah, maybe. But, you know, those people had been doing it for a long time. They were studying individuals who were around for 40, 50 years. So they knew, you know, what their basic views were. And also they had access to all kinds of

great literature, Hong Kong, you know, stuff that actually mattered and had insight back then. Yeah. These sort of things. I'm not sure how replicable that is. No, I agree. I mean, I struggle with it in doing my newsletter because the information, it's like, you know, you're looking at China through a straw and the straw has increasingly sort of got all sorts of blockages in it. And so, but the challenge too, I think is,

there's a little bit of a tangent from US time, but I think, you know, the problem is inside the Chinese system. I think a lot of people are trying to figure out what Xi Jinping is. Right? I mean, no, honestly, right? I mean, there seems like the information flow, forget to hear, but just inside the system has gotten, has really changed and been constricted pretty significantly. Yeah. I mean, I think I...

often have this conversation with other people like myself who go to China regularly. And, you know, you might be asked by some other person who doesn't do that, you know, why do these guys speak to you? You know, and I think part of the answer is exactly that, you know, they no longer feel comfortable to talk around the water cooler with their colleagues because, you know, it could be dangerous, right? And they

they see someone who has some basic understanding of their system, you know, and maybe they want to try out their own theories on that person, a colleague who might dob them into the party discipline commission or something. Well, apparently, I mean, people who everyone's seen, you probably heard the, you know, the, the Washington journal had the story in English and it was in, I think, um, the Hong Kong papers a few days before this, this cast researcher who was, um, who was detained, um,

And apparently it was, you know, what I'm hearing now is it was because he had sent a private WeChat message to his wife about critical CG pain, which is actually, I mean, that I think is what people told me. So that's what they're hearing other people are talking about. If that's the perception that, gee, even my private messages to my wife are not safe. Yeah, that does have a pretty chilling effect.

I agree. I also think anyone in China thinks there's such a thing as a private WeChat. Right. I mean, the fact that you think you can send a WeChat criticizing Xi, I mean, my mother-in-law, well, she doesn't now, but it's, no, she wouldn't. Although I do have to remind her sometimes, just be careful what you say on WeChat because, you know. No, but seriously, it is, back to the bigger question about you, Ashana, it is, I'm worried because I'll say, you know, my generation, we're, I'm a little older than you, we're about the same age. I mean, we had

We had an amazing amount of, we had ability to build lives in China, have a real access, really get, as you so called the texture. That for the next generation and the generation doesn't seem like it's possible. And if it really feels like that, it's gonna be really hard to get people who have a lot of on the ground experience in China,

sort of in the younger generations, you can come back and then become part of the policy community. - Well, you hear this problem all the time in DC and elsewhere. If anyone has set foot on the mainland, it's very difficult, say for example, to get a security clearance. - I had a conversation with somebody when I came back, not that I work in government, but I came back and they're saying, "Don't even bother to apply, you'll never get security clearance."

I mean, you know, I was there for 10 years, right? But I think that is a real thing. And probably, you know, this was nine years ago. I think now it's probably much more so. I think so. And I mean, that doesn't, I want to be clear, that doesn't just apply for the intelligence community. You know, there are a lot of jobs where you would need at least a secret level, you know, security clearance, and that's difficult to come by. And, you know, in the US government, you can argue that the benefits are negatives of it. I think there's

often more negatives, but there's the constant tension between finding people with expertise and security. And, you know, in general, security always trumps in terms of how to think about these things. And that mirrors on the Chinese side, right? I think, you know, the folks, you know, it's, you know, it's now more problematic if you have a lot of, it seems like if you've had a lot of ties in the U.S., and you then...

have I think some folks have come under a bit of suspicion about you maybe you know you you're too pro-US so therefore either you don't work on US or they have to then sort of at least publicly in the system become sort of take a different stance on the US.

Well, you definitely see this scenario, you know, under the guise of retirement. You know, it's convenient. Somebody turns a certain age and then they're, you know, retired. But, you know, as we saw at the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping will keep people beyond traditional retirement ages if he thinks, you know, they're worthwhile. And so we've seen, especially, say, in the economic space, you know, the departures of Leo Ha, the departure of former vice premier and Politburo member who was educated in the West.

departure of Feng Qinghai from the securities regulators. It was kind of, you know, the whisperer, if you will, to foreign markets. And, you know, they were succeeded by people who have, you know, no external experience and have a much more internal looking, you know, approach to life. Well, and that'll be interesting if Trump... Sorry, if Trump comes back, if he'll actually bring back Liu He, at least for some sort of... Maybe he'll send him to Trump Tower. No, honestly, right? Because I think, you know, Liu He had...

seem to have figured out how to at least talk to Lighthizer and Trump.

Yeah, no, it's interesting. I mean, you did have, in part because, you know, there had to be some communication, no matter how minimal, although that changed in the second half of the administration. You know, you had him. You also arguably had Sui Chin Kai, the ambassador to Washington, right, who, according to public reports anyway, and I think valid, had some sort of relationship with Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law, and so on and so forth. He's been coming to the U.S. a lot. He seems like he's sort of their...

I don't want to say they're Kissinger, but he's sort of their U.S. whisperer now. Yeah, he's certainly the messenger. Yeah, no question. As much as probably he probably just wants to retire. He's useful. Well, so back to the election. We got a few more minutes, but just back to the election. I don't know if you saw on Monday, the U.S. Intelligence Committee came out with a briefing talking about foreign interference in the elections. And, you know, for the China, they said China's not, they're not seeing China

Interference around or attempted interference around the presidential level, but local races. Yes. And then, you know, they put out these examples and they look pretty kludgy and sort of, I think you pointed out one of them, they sound like they're using British English like something's what I mean, it seemed a fairly unsophisticated but how much should the should the US officials be worried about that.

Well, I think when we see it happening, and it is, and this spamiflage campaign intensifying, I think one of the more interesting elements of that article, the attempts themselves, as we discussed, I thought were kind of laughable, but what was interesting was

the change in tactic to some degree away from large-scale Spanish to more targeted messaging in particular races. So that's obviously worrisome. What's clear is they're not doing it at the scale that

or their Russian friends are. What's more interesting is why they feel they can more overtly make influence efforts in say Australia or Canada or other US allies, even the UK, there'd been some issues with this.

But they don't quite feel they should try it here. There's some hesitancy. Now, maybe that's breaking down and they're using these small scale races as an ability or an opportunity to try to test market, I guess you could say, certain techniques and so on. But, you know, let's not kid ourselves. This has been going on for a long time. You know, when I was a young buck in the government, I lost two years of my life on a task force about the donor gate.

The one, the Al Gore in the Buddhist temple and that was it. Yeah. And the daughter of Leo Ha, former standing committee member, you know, going to, you know, donor parties and, you know, things like that. There was a lot going on at that time.

It wasn't there was a there was a Malaysian Malaysian Chinese connection or Indian Chinese connection and exactly the company called the lipo group, you know, right, right, right, right. That was what the 90 was that 91 92. No, no, it's more like 96 ish, I think somewhere in there. Yeah, yeah, 97, maybe. But you know, that went on for quite a while with congressional scrutiny and so on. So and it was very unsophisticated and, you know, fairly easy to unravel. But you know, technology, you

makes both those statements less true. So I think, you know, we have to be worried about it. I think we also have to be careful not looking for a Chinese influence operation under every bed. You know, I mean, when I, now I've left government 10 years plus ago, but, you know, when I was in government, we didn't spend a whole ton of time worrying about the United Front Work Department of the party, you know, this influence operation machine, according to, you know, certain people in our community. So, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't care what they're up to, you know, it might be as simple. You see it, you call it out.

hopefully you rely on people in the country to be able to recognize at least to some degree you know when shenanigans are going on such as in what the one piece highlighted by the post article you know calling this guy part of the jewish conspiracy when he's not even jewish you know yeah and that and that and that briefing is on monday then the post article i mean they mentioned

It was really focused on sort of the local like the congressional races and it was really around they just it was mainly making sure that the you know it was it was effectively trying to help the candidates who had the correct percent or correct attitude towards Taiwan, for example. Right. And, you know, duh, of course, they're going to, you know, attempt to do things like that. But but also it did not to get too far on track, but it kind of.

The effort reminds me a bit of sort of like the TikTok saga in this respect. The government claims there's loads of reason to believe that it's an intelligence operation or influence or whatever. They don't ever provide that evidence publicly. I'm not saying it doesn't exist. I find it strange, though, that if it really existed, that somebody in the administration, certainly in a Trump administration, who knew about it would have leaked it, right? You know, because you're trying to make the case. So anyway, it's just one of these things where I think we have to be really careful with it.

right and i think um you know it's also i mean going back to the beginning of the discussion in some ways you know if they really don't have a preferred candidate then why would they try and you know because if they really were trying to influence at the presidential level it could really blow up in their faces if they got caught yes absolutely what's the upside and i think you know no matter what if

administration comes in, Trump or Harris, they will make efforts in those people's ecosystems, right, to try to make connections. I mean, Harris's brother-in-law, Tony West, he's a businessman. He used to work for Pepsi. He did where they had extensive operations in China. He was over there in China quite frequently. So, you know, there would be some people in China who would be asked, I'm sure, to reach out to him.

So we just have to wait and see. But that's, I mean, that's, that's, that's normal course of business for any administration, right? Yeah. And that makes, I mean, if you're the only Chinese side, of course, that's what you do. It makes a lot of sense.

I guess just for me personally, I lean toward keep a cool head on this kind of stuff. You know, that's that's that's until we have reason not to. I mean, you know, obviously you see it, you call it out. Like I said earlier, I think maybe before we end, maybe a few minutes on what we think the challenges for either new administration would be, you know, in, you know, facing this.

what's going on. I have to say that, um, as I thought about that question ahead of our talk today, the one that really jumped out at me is the whole nuclear issue, right? Um, and China's massive buildup of its nuclear forces, um, take a moment to give a little, uh, shout out to, um,

the Atlantic Council's recent publication on this topic where they did a really interesting tabletop exercise looking at it. They were asked by DOD to do that. And their conclusions in my mind were very interesting. The principal authors of that were a former colleague of mine from CIA, John Culver, and then also a gentleman named David Schulman, who's now gone back into government in the National Intelligence Council. And I thought the findings were quite stark.

biggest one in my mind the kind of bumper sticker being you know there's a troubling disconnect between how the u.s ecosystem policy ecosystem especially the pentagon think about nuclear risk with russia than they do with china you know with russia i think there's reasons for that we see that uh we're used to them as a as a major nuclear power right you know it goes back to the cold war we understand that their lack of conventional capability

makes the likelihood that they would engage in nuclear use in a conflict with the US much higher. Putin tells us that's what he would do. So we see the US strategic behavior reflecting that, especially in terms of US troops on the ground or NATO troops on the ground in Ukraine or things along these lines.

We're not used to it with China, right? In part because for decades they had a minimum deterrence, no first use nuclear policy. They still have a no first use nuclear policy. And they had the smallest nuclear arsenal in the world, even smaller than Britain's and France's, until well into the 2000s.

So, you know, people just I don't think we're paying attention. And so the conclusion of this study, which I thought was very interesting, was that, you know, that kind of all changed with the expansion where, you know, the official China military power report that DOD puts out every year, you know, one minute.

they're saying the chinese nuclear arsenal is sort of 400 and the next minute they're saying it'll be 1500 by by 2035 so that's a that's a big leap not only that uh moving toward a functioning nuclear triad you know where the chinese can launch missiles from their littoral waters right um that construct significant portions to the united states so i think that's that's very interesting the other kind of

thing that came out of the tabletop exercise there was that, you know, you get the sense that Xi and probably his top brass have concluded that, you know, strong nuclear signaling is necessary for deterrence. And even strong nuclear signaling, you know, may not be working from their point of view. In the tabletop exercise those guys ran,

It was interesting that it was the allies, actually, that had to push the U.S. to go over the nuclear threshold, even after the Chinese had struck Guam with nuclear weapons, right? So it sounds like we've got a big rethink to do, you know, in terms of our policy on that issue. And it sounds like, I remember that was a really good report. It also talked about, I think, in the, you know, going back to sort of the sort of

sort of academic policy community here too is really, as you said, a big rethink is that, you know, there needs to be some updating to the thinking in many ways and just how, you know, there's a scholar at Carnegie now, Zhao Tong or Tong Zhao, I think, who, you know, he writes a lot about it and his, you know, listening to him talk and reading, it's, he really comes, strikes me, he's quite concerned because he sees a real shift in,

at the Xi level, coming from Xi about how they look at their strategic nuclear doctrine, but also how in the Chinese system, they're sort of pushing, they're sort of ignoring the traditional experts.

Yeah. And so there's some real significance underway. Right. There's a real significant underway that we maybe this report is part of that process of sort of catching up to that. And in the meantime, the Chinese, you know, they don't want to really talk about sort of nuclear weapons or armed patrol of the U.S. Right. And so, yeah, it is going to be, I think, whoever is the next president, it does seem like this is really going to be an issue that they have to be able to get

So much more appreciation of very quickly. Yeah, I think quickly a couple of others that'll be interesting to watch is, you know, obviously this administration, they don't talk about it as much as they did at the beginning, but their general framing, right, right from the beginning of the bilateral relationship was democracy versus autocracy, you know. And I think we're certainly not going to see that framing in a Trump administration. And, you know, I think there's real question about whether that would continue under Harris. I think it was a mistake. I

I know it was a mistake because, you know, the message you send with that immediately is regime change, you know, and that Xi Jinping's mind shuts off. And it's also just so easy to be luckily or hypocrites because, yes, but then you're friends with, you know, X, Y, Z country that's not really democracy. No, and it's exactly it's unpopular to say this in D.C., I think these days, but that approach also is.

strongly incentivizes the administration to pull the Taiwan card, you know, whenever they want to jerk Beijing's chain and the guise of, well, they're a democracy, we have to help them. I'm not saying we shouldn't help Taiwan. I'm saying it has to be in the U.S. national interest when we do so. And actually the democracy, I mean, it was a little bit in Lai Ching-te's 1010 speech yesterday. Yeah, exactly. Right. It sort of flows back. And so that, I think,

Again, that may be true, but it certainly, to your point about sort of it just sort of puts Xi in more of a sort of a, I don't want to call it defensive crouch, but sort of immediately just basically says this is a, like, how do you not end up at a point where you say, well, the U.S., really, their view is like the sort of the end game for the U.S. relationship with China is they want regime change.

No, for sure. And, you know, I think maybe we don't know, but I think maybe with Vice President Harris, she might see that kind of framing as a bit anachronistic in terms of, you know, Cold War toned and President Biden having, of course, having that framing. And I want to be clear, it's not like she's going to come out and embrace China's global security initiative. Obviously, she will be a strong defender of the rules-based international order. I think that fits very neatly with her experience as a

a prosecutor and you know law enforcement person so in other words she has a certain in a way there's kind of an interesting parallel there between her and the former taiwan president taiwan and that they're lawyers right so they think like lawyers and and so that's interesting but you know there could be a difference there and i think the chinese if that did happen

you know, maybe one year of Xi Jinping's two years starts to open a little bit. If, if the people around him can persuade them that that's an opportunity we'll see. And then I guess maybe the bit, obviously the third big issue is what's going to happen with trade and, and all of that, you know, the tensions we have with overcapacity and so on and so forth. I think there's at least a possibility, probably more in a Harris administration than Trump that, that there could at least be an opening for having a fundamental, um,

you know, what in government we would call a zero base review, you know, of the effectiveness of certain elements of U.S. technology export controls. You know, I mean, nobody in D.C. talks about it or says it. The Economist and others have done some compelling things about the Huawei campaign very objectively, right? You know, as to how successful or not this has been in what we're

everyone presumes to have been its goals, right? Which is to maybe not kill Huawei, but certainly kneecap it rather aggressively. And that just hasn't happened, right? And as you've been pointing out in the newsletter recently,

the whole ecosystem of industry lobbying around, you know, commerce's efforts and so on and so forth. And it is very challenging. Right. So I think when you add all that up, those are some big issues for whichever, you know, candidate is successful. I actually think, I think we, we, we may actually be, we,

at peak export control. If Harris becomes president, I feel like there's a real push certainly on the industry side, but I think more so on the Democrat party side to basically say these export controls have failed. I think a Trump

unclear on Trump administration. I think you may see more arguments that they have not been working just because they haven't been really pushed. Aggressive enough. Because they've been so watered down. For example, Huawei, the administration has known for a year, almost two years now, that Huawei has been setting up all these additional fabs with very shell companies and investments. The government knows about them. They're full of equipment that they're not supposed to be getting. The U.S. is just not

Pretty much. Yeah. So I think that's one of the, that'll be one of the, one of the questions, one of the tensions. I do think though, from what I'm hearing, and I could be wrong, and I think also what we're seeing with what looks like a delay in the October 7th updates, that, you know, it really could be that it's just sort of like, we don't want to deal anymore. It's not working and it's too hard to do what needs to be done. And it doesn't make sense anyway. Yeah.

And right before an election, you can't admit that the policy was wrong, right? You know, or at least has flaws. Right. And so I think that will be, and of course, that's an area where, you know, I think if the U.S. were to

um you know say the next administration if the harris administration were to say okay we're going to do this zero you know rethink exact port controls and the conclusion is that they didn't work not that they didn't work because we didn't try hard enough but they're just you know for you know they're all very stakeholders and and i think the the ones with more of an interest in selling more to china are the ones who are winning out right now um you know the question then is how do the chinese react because i don't think they're even if the us said tomorrow we're done no more export controls the chinese aren't gonna

stop their sort of restructured bureaucracy. They have an entirely new bureaucratic focus on breaking through the U.S. technology chokeholds. Absolutely. And that's not going to change. It just gives them maybe more time to fill the gap. That's right. And you certainly wouldn't see them saying, okay, I guess we don't need the, you know, Central Science and Technology Commission anymore. I can't see that happening. And, you know, that would be, to your point a moment ago, that would be the argument of some of those hogs, right, would be,

they're not going to change so we just need to hammer them harder you know and the reason they haven't been as effective as we might like is that there were too many loopholes so close the loopholes i mean i think it's definitely true that a trump administration would lean toward we haven't fully tested this so be tougher than they would yeah maybe this isn't working let's go another direction but but you know just on that though too and i think it's important maybe it's a good place for us to near the end you know

if it's Trump, we're dealing with Trump. You know, people forget, you know, they're like, oh, you know, he'll have maybe Pompeo, former Secretary of State Pompeo in there. He'll have this guy, he'll have that guy and they want, you know, independence for Taiwan or they want to recognize Taiwan. Well, he never did any of that despite the fact that they were pushing, you know, and so on. And the reality is, yes, I think those who are

who were pro a different style of engagement with Taiwan in the administration, they had their wins, but it was at the margins largely and in areas that they directly controlled. Anything that actually required President Trump's approval, he tended not to do it. And that can perhaps apply to technology restrictions, trade, you know, it's all a movable feast. Remember what he did with ZTE, right? The telecommunications company, you know, one day they're sanctioned, the next day they're not.

So I think there's a lot. My friend, Xi Jinping, called me. We had a call and it's... Yeah, and it's all good. But it caused too many people to lose their jobs. So therefore, you know, we're going to...

No, I mean, that is not a chocolate cake. So I honestly, I think from a Chinese perspective, you know, as, as, as, you know, and they bring it up in every call, you know, while one time the minister of commerce had a conversation with Secretary Raimondo a few days ago, of course, they bring up the sort of the export controls and, you know, the abuse of national security. I honestly think on the, from the Chinese perspective,

they might start seeing there's actually reason for some optimism because it does feel like the tide is turning in DC. And so, I mean, again, we'll see, but I do think that, you know, it's a structure as we did these export controls and then folks say, oh, they didn't work, they failed.

And again, you know, even if the argument is, well, we didn't really do all the things like somebody just messes me. We didn't use OFAC on Huawei, for example. You know, we could have done a lot more things to Huawei. We didn't do that. And then so the answer isn't going to be we didn't try hard enough. It's just like, let's move on. And it's just not working. It's a, you know, and so I think that that, though, again, doesn't potentially change the Chinese trajectory on how they're building out their whole technology. It might, though,

allow for some improvement in the relationship from a Chinese perspective, right? At least in the short term. But then, you know, again, one last question just before we get going is you saw ahead of the newsletter this piece from Zhang Yongan, this scholar that came out in September. World War III. And it's like, you know, he's...

he's out there, but you never know what to believe. And then, you know, heard earlier this week from, you know, someone I consider to be a usually pretty good source that actually this thing had been going viral inside the system and had reached senior levels where there was discussion about why it was a good article. And this idea was that Asia is likely the next flashpoint for World War III. Yeah. And that she thinks, agrees with this. And so he feels like he needs to prepare to show the U.S. that there's,

basically no point in continuing on this path, then we need to find a way of peaceful existence. Yeah, I think that latter part is true. I don't think it took Zheng Nong-Yi Nan's article to... In other words, Xi Jinping would just see that as affirming of a view he's had for 12 years. You know, I mean, the shift...

as we've discussed so many times before, came almost straight away in his administration, if we want to call it that, when they had one of these, you know, highly authoritative central foreign affairs work conferences. And he dispensed with Deng Xiaoping's, you know, famous so-called, you know, bide your time, keep a low profile. And it was bloody obvious. I was amazed.

Getting warned by friends like you should leave. There's a different view of Americans. So, you know, that's been going on for a long time. And of course, he would be interested in that article because it supports his crash nuclear modernization program and so on and so forth. So that shouldn't surprise anyone, I don't think. What is interesting about the tone of the article was that

this view that a lot of Asians aren't awake, you know, to the issue that this could be, you know, the place for World War III. I think that would resonate, I could see with Xi Jinping in the sense of,

forget about the average Chinese, his own military, right? I think his response, I think to these massive corruption scandals in the military that we saw last year, which are related to corruption in the defense industries and so on and so forth, two defense ministers, a current and a former go down.

You know, his reaction isn't so much, oh, the military is not loyal. I think it's more I have told you to get ready by 2027 for this conflict. And you're not showing me you're serious. You're just sitting around making money. So, you know, in other words, I could see where he would feel, yes, not only the public, the Chinese public, but also my own bureaucracy needs to get a lot more serious about the prospect of this.

So is there a way to end on a positive note? Well, maybe tomorrow, tonight, our time, press conference from the finance ministry will make markets happy. No, I mean, the problem, but, you know, again, it's like, it's, you know, I'm in D.C., you're in the U.S., you know, you hear sort of all, you know, the sort of D.C.'s the problem, D.C.'s too negative. It's, you know, I remember hearing from Beijing contacts that,

years ago right you know right when trump did it howard's basically like today's the best day in u.s time relations for the next several decades right really depressing like from because understanding from in their system how things had shifted in their system towards the u.s and so this sense that we are on this trajectory and and it's sort of like i mean i i i don't i mean i it really i am worried i think we all should be worried but at the same time there isn't

there isn't sort of a kumbaya moment, which is, oh, we're just like, we get nicer than everyone will be fine. It's how do we manage, I think, what is going to be just an increasingly difficult relationship over the next several decades. I think that seems to be- And avoid catastrophe. Yeah, I think that seems to be the path forward. And, you know, while we're advertising studies, you know, CSIS, where I used to work, put out a very interesting study just a few days ago on that topic. And, you know, this whole debate about steady state versus, you know,

aiming for victory and so on and and so you have to think about it in that context um and it's very challenging you know and as long as neither side is willing it's it you know i hate to make this analogy but it's something akin to the you know ongoing and forever going contest in in the middle east people have to decide that they are tired of whatever the status quo is or that it's not working for them and make a change you know

I want to maybe it's a good positive place to close. You know, I hate these things like the Thucydides trap and other teleological arguments about, you know, the U.S.-China relationship. Of course, it can change. It requires leadership and people matter and there's human agency and so on and so forth. And that's on both sides. So I agree. Well, thank you for that. Thank you, Chris.

There will be an edited recording that will go up in the next day or so. And I know we mentioned a couple articles. I'll post those in that so people, I saw some comments come through so that people could see the articles. But thanks, Chris. I really appreciate your time. This has actually been a really, I think, good conversation. And I hope everyone else appreciated it. And thanks for being here.

Being the, we are the guinea pigs for the Substack election dialogues. I recommend, I mean, the Substack has a really interesting slate of people discussing various topics around the U.S. election in the next few weeks. I really recommend folks tune into the next conversations. They won't be about China, but there's still some really good,

some good, uh, sub stackers and guests. And I think it could be, um, you know, it's a much, much more interesting conversation than what you get on say sort of the soundbites on CNN or not to pick on CNN, but any of the sort of the TV network. So thank you, Chris, really appreciate your time and thanks everyone for tuning in later. Cheers. Thank you.