Ahmed Kodouda on the spiralling war and humanitarian crisis in Sudan
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The conflict going on today in Sudan has really shattered the old narratives of Arab versus African conflicts. Today we're talking about two broad coalitions that transcend both ethnic ideological fault lines. Today the RSF, which is led by

an Arab militia known as the Janjaweed and its leader, Hameti, is aligned with some of the same groups that it was mobilized to put down in 2003.

Whereas the Sa'af, which has long been dominated by central Sudanese Arab communities, is aligned with some of the African tribes that it has fought for many decades and sought to basically subordinate or marginalize.

Now, the conflict right now is really driven largely by political opportunism. Welcome to Stop the World, the ASPE podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson. And I'm David Rowe. Now, Liv, there's a conflict happening right now that has been fought for more than two years, has claimed 150,000 lives and displaced up to 13 million people. And it's not Ukraine.

No, it's Sudan, which we're covering in today's episode. And to talk us through the conflict, we have Ahmed Khadouda. Ahmed is a humanitarian policy and operations expert who's worked with NGOs, governments and international institutions around the world.

He also served as a senior advisor to Sudan's civilian-led transition government following the country's democratic uprising in 2019. Yeah, we've been wanting to do an episode on Sudan for some time and Ahmed co-authored an excellent recent piece in Foreign Affairs magazine, which I strongly recommend, and that prompted us to get straight in touch with him. We will link to that piece in our show notes.

Ahmed explains the complexities of the conflict, the groups involved, the background, the impact on the country's roughly 50 million people, the influence of outside countries, in particular the United Arab Emirates, and the inadequate response of the international community.

A lot of people will know about the Darfur crisis of the 2000s, but given the general state of the world, might not have been following Sudan closely in the past couple of years. I was admittedly stunned and embarrassed myself to discover that the capital Khartoum had changed hands just six weeks ago, and somehow I'd managed to miss that.

We'll hear from Ahmed now, but just a heads up to listeners, he's speaking from Kabul, Afghanistan, where he's currently working, and the audio is a little compressed. It's also a complex topic that Ahmed explained in some detail, so it's definitely one to concentrate on. Welcome to Stop the World. I'm here with Ahmed Kududa. Ahmed, thanks for coming on the program. Thank you for having me.

So look, the current conflict in Sudan has been going on for about two years. There are approximately 150,000 people dead and up to 13 million displaced, which I understand makes it the world's largest displacement crisis. We've had some very dramatic moments, including the recent battle over the capital Khartoum when it changed hands in March.

Ahmed, can you start by talking us through the basics here? Who are the main belligerents? What are they fighting over? And where does the conflict stand at the moment? The current war in Sudan is primarily fought by two actors. The first is the Sudan Armed Forces, which is Sudan's main military, and one of the militias that it established over a decade ago called the Rapid Support Forces.

which are both fighting throughout the country, both directly and through their proxies. Now, most of the coverage of the war in Sudan has focused on these two actors. However, it's actually more appropriate to describe them as two large coalitions. Each coalition has its own interests and they're fighting over

different localized grievances often, rather than the major narrative of the war, which is described as being a SAF-RSF conflict. Now, these actors on the ground have really been driven away from the

cause of the war, which initially began during the transition to democracy that began in 2019 in Sudan and continued to basically flounder and falter over a period of four years. In the run-up to the conflict, there were conversations about undertaking security sector reform.

the rapid support forces, which were created in 2013 as an amalgamation of different militias, tribal militias that

were initially established a decade prior during the conflict in Darfur in 2003 as Arab groups that were organized by the Sudan armed forces to fight against non-Arab tribes that rebelled against Khartoum because Khartoum was unable to fight these non-Arab groups to basically combat them. It organized rival

ethnic groups and formalized them as something called the Janjaweed, which are militias that were accused of very heinous crimes, including genocide, during the 2003-2005 conflict. Now the war in Darfur really simmered for many, many years and in 2013,

Bashir, the then long-time dictator of Sudan, decided to actually what we call regularize these forces, in many ways establishing them as a formal parastatal militia that was organized under the guise of serving as a border guard.

At the time, you will recall that migration had become a very important global topic and Sudan served as a transit country for many, many millions of migrants who were going from different parts of Eastern Africa through Sudan to Libya and then crossing the Mediterranean.

So Bashir established the RSF in order to market it as an ally of European countries that wanted to stem the flow of migration. But in reality, it was a force that was used mostly to repress and fight different Sudanese

communities throughout the country that were picking up arms to fight against the dictatorship of Ahmad al-Bashir. Now, between 2013 and 2023, the RSF then played a central role in Sudanese politics. After the loss of South Sudan's oil wealth, after South Sudan became independent in 2011, the Bashir regime faced a significant

economic crisis. It lost about 70% of its state revenues after the loss of southern Sudanese oil. And there was increasing popular mobilization against the regime that culminated in Bashir's removal in 2019 after a popular uprising that was organized by civil society

women groups, youth groups, and was almost entirely peaceful, civilian-led movement to remove a 30-year dictatorship. Now, the removal of Bashir was quite surgical because the leadership of the Sudan Armed Forces have aligned with the RSF to topple Bashir and acting as one unit

calling themselves the security sector, then went into negotiations with the civilian elements of the popular uprising. These are now civil society groups and political parties. Now, during that time, both the RSF and the SAF were acting as hand in glove, really united

oftentimes stifling the transitional government that was led by largely technocrats and experts that were brought in from different sectors for the transitional government. Now, during the 2019 to the 2023 period, the transitional government actually broke apart.

The security sector, both RSF and SAF, decided to undertake a coup d'etat against the civilians, removing the civilian prime minister and the civilian government, and said that the civilians have mismanaged the transition. This took place in October 2021. Leading to the period prior to the war, there was about a year and a half period that really led to increased tension between the SAF and the RSF.

particularly about this question of security sector reform that I mentioned. The question was, what happens to this now quite substantial peristatal militia and how is it going to be integrated into the formal army? Of course, no state can have two armies. And by 2023, in March, the RSF

Really, estimates varied about its size, but there were varying estimates upwards of 100,000 fighters. The international community at the time was putting significant pressure on both the RSF and the SAF and the civilians to come to an agreement on merging the RSF and the SAF into one entity. Of course, security sector reform is a very difficult process.

SAF wanted to do a very quick integration over a period of less than two years, whereas the RSF led by Muhammad Hamdan Daghil and Hamid T wanted a longer process of 10 years. Of course, the RSF itself had very significant economic entanglements as did the SAF at the time.

the RSF was involved in fighting wars abroad on behalf of different client states. And at the same time, the question about integration was really a flashpoint. And all of this was complicated by the elements of Bashir's own regime really trying to

foment conflict between these two actors as a means to come back to power. And that's how the war started in Khartoum. Yeah. So if I could, security sector reform sounds like it was really a euphemism for what was brewing as a power struggle between what was described as the Sudanese armed forces and the very powerful but irregular RSF. And you've got these two fascinating

characters here involved. So the Sudanese Armed Forces leader, General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF leader who you mentioned, General Mohammed Hamdan, known as Hamidty. It sounds very much as if this really

came down to a power struggle between these two very powerful leaders. Is that a fair way of describing it? Yes and no. I would say that certainly the initial spark of the war was about how these two institutions are going to be merged. But you're absolutely right. This war is not an ideological war that has a clear vision by either side.

In many ways, it is more about power and resources.

Sudan is a very wealthy country. It has minerals. It has the second largest share of arable land in all of Africa. It, of course, has a denial, which is very important to particularly Egypt and Ethiopia. And it, of course, also has very important trade routes and geopolitical leverage.

Now, the conflict itself has now actually metastasized beyond this confrontation between these two institutions. Sudan is a very diverse country that had at one point more than 200 spoken languages and hundreds of different tribes and ethnic groups. And each of these ethnic groups

have never really been integrated into a vision of one nation. Now, every different localized conflict now has really simmered to the top and people are fighting, as I mentioned, over localized grievances. Now, what's unfortunately happening now, this is no longer really a two-sided civil war, but this is almost an entire collapse of a state.

Because state institutions have now all but broken apart. We are talking about for over two years now, there have been 19 million children out of formal education. You're talking about an entire generation that will lose its future or has already lost its future potentially. And the impacts of the conflict

are going not to only impact Sudan, but they're going to have ramifications beyond Sudan as well. Of course, there is the Red Sea, which is a very important thoroughfare for international trade. Any further instability there is going to have much more impact beyond Sudan's shores, of course.

I was fascinated to read in the course of my research for this conversation, and I had been dimly aware of it but not fully grasped it, that in fact the

RSF, the Rapid Support Forces, who are, I suppose, what you might broadly describe as the rebel group. I mean, the SAF, you might think of as at least the semi-legitimate national force of the nation. But the RSF has actually been in control of the capital Khartoum for two years until March this year. So any sense of this

being a nation with institutions just really hasn't been the case when there isn't a central government controlling the capital. I mean, that gives you some perspective on just the disarray that has been the case in Sudan for the past two years. That's absolutely right. I think it's important to mention that the Sudan Armed Forces, as you've said, is the legitimate institution that is responsible for maintaining law and order and protecting the country.

However, unfortunately, the Sudan Armed Forces for many decades has really been fighting its own civilians in a series of civil wars that began even in the days prior to Sudan's independence. Sudan has been at war with itself almost nonstop for over 70 years. Now, what we're looking at is a strategy that was employed by the Saab.

over time to arm different communities and pit different tribes against each other. In particular, over the past 15-20 years since the establishment of the Janjaweed and later transformation into the RSF, the Saab actually almost out-forced its infantry function to the RSF.

The point that you raise about the RSF being able to hold on to Khartoum and really terrorize and displace and commit some of the most heinous and

and vulgar atrocities against civilians, including not only obviously killing and maiming, but rape and sexual violence against civilian populations to terrorize them, was the strategy employed by the SAF itself against those communities in the peripheries for many decades.

That strategy has basically come back to haunt the SAF's own areas of control in central Sudan, in the heart of the state, in Khartoum itself. Now, the outsourcing of RSF as an infantry function has really crippled SAF's ability to outright destroy them in the battlefield because SAF's advantage is an area one.

Up until this week, most of SAF's power was focused on its ability to attack from the air.

And the RSF with its infantry has been largely able to embed itself in civilian populations in urban areas and being able to kind of combat the SAF for the lion's share of the past two years. So Ahmed, just so people can try and get some grasp over what the

I mean, what you're describing is a very complex situation, obviously, and that's what it is in Sudan. But can you just so people can try and get a get a sense of what's going on? I mean, we think of people know the Darfur crisis depending on their age. They either remember the Darfur war or they are at least aware of it in the in the sort of late 2000s and then somewhat into the 2010s. And we think of that as largely a.

non-Arab groups in the western region of Darfur taking up arms because they felt neglected by Khartoum under Bashir al-Bashir, the president who you mentioned, who I note has went on to become accused of by the International Criminal Court of genocide and probably various other war crimes. That mobilized the largely Arab Janjaweed to put down the uprising against the non-Arabs in a genocide.

But the current conflict, it doesn't seem to orientate around either ethnic or sectarian divisions in any kind of consistent way. Is there any sort of way for people to make a bit of sense of what exactly the conflict is organized around? You're absolutely right.

The conflict going on today in Sudan has really shattered the old narratives of Arab versus African conflicts. Today we're talking about two broad coalitions that transcend both ethnic ideological fault lines. Today the RSF, which is led by

an Arab militia known as the Janjaweed and its leader, Hameti, is aligned with some of the same groups that it was mobilized to put down in 2003. Whereas the Sa'af, which has long been dominated by central Sudanese Arab communities,

is aligned with some of the African tribes that it has fought for many decades and sought to basically subordinate or marginalize. Now, the conflict right now is really driven largely by political opportunism. And by this, I mean that a lot of those fighting on the ground, and I'll give you two examples.

One is the Justice and Equality Movement and the other is the Sudan Liberation Army. These two are now aligned with the Sudan Armed Forces, but they actually are largely representing Darfurian communities of non-Arab backgrounds. The SAF itself is claiming that it's fighting on behalf of the survival of the state, but in reality,

What we've seen on the ground, the fighting on the ground, SAF elements and some of the militias that SAF is now employing are attacking non-Arab communities in central Sudan. At the same time, JEM and SLA are coming to the support of these non-Arab communities and combating the SAF militias, although both sides are technically fighting on behalf of SAF.

So the situation on the ground is very complicated and it's very fragmented. One important issue in this crisis is that we have seen and we are likely to see two very destructive elements. The first is side switching. We have seen very powerful militias

switch sides multiple times, going from the SAF to the RSF, then back to the SAF, which is obviously creating extreme devastation on the ground as these fighters are terrorizing civilians on behalf of one side and then again terrorizing the same civilians on behalf of the other. The second really destructive part of this war is that there's a potential for infighting within the two coalitions.

Now, the RSF for its part recently signed an agreement which it called the Establishment Charter, which is supposed to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a new parallel government in the areas that it controls. Now, this coalition is made up of the RSF and some of the factions that it's supporting,

as well as some of the breakaway factions of some of Sudan's historic Sufi sects. These groupings, some of them are calling for a secular Sudan, while others are saying, absolutely not, they believe in some more of a religious foundation for the state. So even ideologically, these coalitions are not coherent.

And then again, SAF itself has largely been dominated by Islamists for the lion's share of the past 35 years since Bashir came to power in the late 80s. And it has also employed and mobilized Islamist militias fighting for a reestablishment of Bashir's Islamist regime. However, SAF is now backed by

foreign actors, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that are staunchly anti-Islamist. So even the international support is incoherent. And that's why this conflict really defies any simplistic narratives.

Yeah. Yeah. In fact, I want to get straight onto the question about outside players, and there are a number of them. So audience, please bear with us here. It seems to me that the UAE is probably, it's certainly the one that gets talked about most as an outside influence. And you mentioned the considerable resources wealth that Sudan has, as well as having the second largest share of arable land in Africa. It also has

very considerable mineral reserves and in particular large reserves of gold, most of which seem to end up in the United Arab Emirates. UAE is supporting the rapid support forces. And then there is Russia, who is also very relevant because they're interested in building a Red Sea or establishing a Red Sea base for themselves. There's also Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, perhaps Iran as well.

Just as concisely as you can, just give us a bit of a snapshot of what those outside influences are and what impact they're having on the conflict, particularly the UAE, because I do think that's a very interesting one. I think you've given a very high-level picture of what this war is from the international involvement perspective. You're right. There have been numerous reports, including in the New York Times, of the United Arab Emirates providing military support as

And material support to the RSF. The RSF, between 2015 and 2018, served as mercenaries for the United Arab Emirates in Yemen.

And the UAE had nurtured that relationship and continued it throughout the past decade. Now, the UAE is also one of Sudan's largest trade partners. Even despite the ongoing conflict, it continues to receive the lion's share of Sudanese gold.

And at the same time, it has nurtured relationships with all of Sudan's neighbors, including Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. And a lot of these states are now really siding with the UAE's narrative of providing both material and political support to the RSF.

Egypt, for its part, really sees Sudan through two lenses. The first and most important lens for Egypt is the Nile. Obviously, there have been increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile Renaissance Dam, which may potentially put significant pressure on Egypt if Ethiopia continues to control the flow of the Nile waters.

Egypt wants a very reliable ally and wants the staff to maintain control over the entirety of the Nile corridor for its own security. At the same time, Egypt relies heavily on Sudanese raw materials, often smuggled, to prop up its economy. So for them, it's really a question about Nile water security and economic interests.

Russia, as you've said, had already maintained a strong relationship with Sudan during Bashir's regime and a few months ago had also renegotiated an agreement to establish a naval base on the Red Sea, which would be only its second large base outside of its immediate sphere of influence, second to the base it maintains in Syria.

And at the same time, you know, Iran has supported the staff with drones and other military equipment because it's

It's interested in basically having a client state on the Red Sea. At the same time, you know, Turkey is also involved for its own strategic maritime reasons and also wanted to establish a military base. So every major player regionally is trying to basically carve out its own interest during this state collapse that we're seeing in Sudan.

So you actually worked as part of the transitional government. You were an advisor. You can tell us a bit about that and during what period it was. But I'm interested in particular, what has been the fate of, I guess, the pro-democracy movements and the elements of that transitional government that were trying to work towards a stable, central and democratic system? What has actually happened to that transition?

process and those elements and those groups? I think Sudan has had a very long history of pro-democracy movements. Over three times, the Sudanese people have come together to organize popular protests to topple longtime dictators. In 1964, in 1985, and again in 2019, these political social movements

are very much rooted in Sudanese civil society through trade unions and student groups and women's groups and have really learned and accumulated their experiences over decades. The 2019 pro-democracy movement, I think, really was crushed in stages.

First, the security sector, both the SAF and the RSF, really strategically tried to choke the transitional government by making sure that it was not able to implement some of the very difficult economic reforms by actually

you know, creating fuel shortages and bread shortages that really made the population become slowly antagonistic against the transitional government. And then very abruptly in 2021, both Hamiti and Burhan, acting in unison, decided to cool out the transitional government.

The civilian forces have been largely been sidelined and mostly exiled. Many actors are right now outside of Sudan. Others are basically being co-opted and their legitimacy is being put into question. There's really been a lost momentum, I think, of that mobilization and that transitional movement for democracy.

Let me be clear, the 2019 revolution and uprising was historic, but the international community also played a very problematic role during that period. It failed to support and nurture the potential transition to democracy, I think because there was very little interest in seeing a democratic, peaceful Sudan.

Just explain that a little further. Why do you think there was not? I think we saw from the outset of the 2019 transition, there were various attempts at integrating Sudan into the financial economic system, lifting sanctions. For example, the Biden administration dragged its feet in removing Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism listing, although the Sudanese people

mobilized in unison to topple the 30-year dictator that had committed genocide against the Sudanese people, that had been a source of international terrorism, having sponsored bin Laden in the 1990s and then committed very heinous attacks against various countries.

The Sunnis people came together to remove that autocrat, and then the Biden administration decided to take well over a year and a half, almost two years, to remove that designation, which really crippled the transitional government's ability to show the fruits of the uprising and the revolution economically.

At the same time, we saw the United Arab Emirates, which is now basically acting as a patron of the RSF, really supporting the security sector much more than it did the civilians at the time. At the same time, Egypt

Egypt has no interest in seeing a democratic transition, does not want to give the region another example of a potential popular uprising that creates a democratic momentum or some sort of snowball effect in the region. And both, I would say, regional and international actors really did not come in with the necessary economic and political support to ensure the transition was going to succeed.

Right. So it was an excess of caution and lethargy really then on their part. I mean, that seems to carry over today. Clearly, the international response to the conflict in Sudan at the moment has been inadequate. Can you give us some sense of what effort there has been internationally to improve the situation? And in particular, what impact do you think the Trump cuts to USAID are going to have? The international community has tried to

organized ceasefire talks, both public and secret. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia had organized a series of different negotiations in Jeddah to bring about an end to the hostilities. However, those have largely failed.

At the same time, Egypt and the UAE also organized secret talks in Bahrain to bring both sides together. Those talks have failed. And the United Nations and the African Union have all but been sidelined in bringing about an end to the conflict. There's a lack of coordination and really lack of political will. Unfortunately, what we're seeing is that the war economy is winning right now.

Long time foreign patrons are benefiting from the extraction of lucrative resources and as well as trade. And unfortunately, I don't think there's any momentum right now to bring about it into the hostilities. And unfortunately, as the conflict continues, the more fragmentation we're going to see in the hostilities.

the harder it will be to come to a shared platform for a comprehensive ceasefire that would lead to some sort of peace agreement.

At the same time, we're also seeing the potential partition of the country now with the areas controlled by the RSF and the areas controlled by SAF under entirely different administrations. And at the same time, there is likely going to be, as I mentioned, further internal fragmentation between these two coalitions because they are so fractious and fragmented.

Now, the USAID cuts have had a devastating effect on Sudan. We are seeing that the humanitarian response has been inadequately funded. We are seeing that there is less than, I would say, 30% of the humanitarian needs have been met at this stage. We are seeing famine that is now being reported in certain hotspots of the country. So those have really made

Yeah, and it's incredibly sad to hear about. And I have to say, I mean, the depressing but unavoidable conclusion from what you're telling me really is that nobody seems to have much of an incentive to end the fighting, whether it's the leaders of the various groups. Of course, other than

the poor civilians who are bearing most of the brunt of it who don't really have much of a say, but really none of the leaders of the various groups. The international community doesn't seem to have much incentive. You've got the ones who are actively trying to fuel the conflict further. I mean, are there any prospects for a transition towards peace and stability? Is partition potentially part of the solution? I mean, what do you see as some hope for a path going forward? Unfortunately, as you've just mentioned,

No major player, whether domestic or international, really has an incentive to end the war right now. Everyone, whether it's the foreign backers or the

leaders of all the different armed factions or even the local warlords are interested in peace because a lot of them are maintaining their influence and lucrative resources and any peace agreement will put that under threat. At the same time, the country is very much likely heading towards a partition, which is already happening,

Unfortunately, that partition will not bring peace. A lot of people may think if there are two sides, there are two geographies, why don't we split the country as was done in 2011 when the South Sudanese decided to secede from Sudan?

What we saw in that conflict is actually a much more brutal civil war that broke out in South Sudan between the different factions of the rebel group that fought for South Sudan's independence, leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and displacement of millions. At the same time, what we are likely going to see in the future is that

The different elements are going to seek to exploit the conflict for their own, whether it's parochial local interests, regional interests, national interests or international interests. Unfortunately, the likely future is going to be more war before we see any lasting peace in Sudan.

Alright, well look it's a sad situation and as I say a sort of depressing conclusion. We'll have to wrap it up there with unfortunately not much of a message of hope at the end other than one can only hope that more people listen to this issue, pay attention to this issue, read about this issue and perhaps with a little bit more attention and some international pressure there might be a shift in the future.

Ahmed Khaduda, thank you so much for joining us all the way from Kabul. We appreciate you taking the time. You're an extraordinary individual. Thank you very much. Thank you so much, David, for shedding light on the conflict in Sudan. I really appreciate you hosting me today. Thanks for listening, folks. That's it for Stop the World this week. We'll be back next week with another episode.