Sir Lawrence Freedman on the delusions that plague war planners
37:22 Share

And I think the problem for Putin is if he doesn't make Trump's process work, then it's not clear what else he does. I mean, this is his best chance. He's not going to get a more sympathetic American administration. And he may be blowing it.

Welcome to Stop the World, the ASPE podcast. I'm David Rowe. And I'm Olivia Nelson. Today we have the doyen of strategic and military studies, Sir Lawrence Friedman. He's the Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College London, the author of many books, and I've got to say, Liv, a thoroughly nice bloke. And the perfect person to talk about the various conflicts and crises around the world right now, Dave.

Lawrence recently wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs titled The Age of Forever Wars, which argued that military strategists continue to believe in surprise offensives delivering quick victories. That's despite all the recent evidence that this is a fallacy. And this in turn produces political objectives that are poorly matched to military capabilities and war planning. That's right. Keen listeners might notice that this is the second week running that we've had an episode launching off a Foreign Affairs article, but I assure everyone that our reading here at ASPE is wide and varied.

As is Lawrence's vast wealth of knowledge and expertise. He talks about the so-called short war fallacy and how Putin's misjudged invasion of Ukraine serves as a clear example. He talks about the way forward for Russia's war on Ukraine, the significant obstacles to peace, other conflicts around the globe including those in Africa, which we covered last week in our Sudan episode, and

and why Xi Jinping might not be in such a hurry to take Taiwan by force. Lawrence also explains how mass remains a key factor in warfare and the ways in which modern conflict is layered with advanced technology at one end and more antiquated forms of warfare at the other. And finally, we cap off with nuclear and the recent flare-up between India and Pakistan. Lawrence is as indefatigable as he is prolific. Check out his sub-stack where he posts regularly. But for now, enjoy the podcast.

This is David Rowe, and I'm here with Sir Lawrence Friedman. Lawrence, thanks for coming on the podcast.

My pleasure. So you wrote a recent piece in Foreign Affairs magazine titled The Age of Forever Wars. It isn't so much arguing that wars are getting longer, but rather that the idea of surprise offensives delivering quick victories persists in military strategists thinking, despite ample evidence that this is unrealistic and this produces a mismatch between political objectives and war planning.

Can you just start by taking us through how you've arrived at that analysis, why it's important to understand if we're to make good assessments of current conflicts and potential conflicts around the world at the moment? Well, first it's simple observation that wars start and then despite hopes that they'll be over quickly, they're not over quickly and they keep on going. And we've got examples at the moment in Ukraine and Gaza,

And even when you do have wars that are over, apparently quickly, they linger. So take India and Kashmir, which I didn't particularly mention in the article. It goes back to 47 and it keeps on erupting in some way. So though...

It's not like a prolonged, intense conflict. It never quite goes away. And you can even argue that with past quick wars, like Israel's victory in June 67, which was stunning in its speed, but we're still living with the aftermath of that, with the problems.

So, and I think you put it quite well in terms of what I'm trying to argue. It's not that just wars go on. There are reasons for this. Partly it's military strategy. It's actually quite difficult to defeat a serious opponent that's trying hard and has not been caught wholly by surprise, especially if the initial moves don't work. And partly and eventually largely it's political strategy.

How do you reframe your objectives so that you can get out of something that otherwise you can't leave because you can't accept that your objectives have not been achieved? And I think, again, if you look at both Ukraine and Gaza, you can see this at the moment.

There's enough, you could argue, for Israel to say it's done enough, but it set objectives at a level that could actually never be properly attained. Similarly, Putin could get a deal based solely on territory, but that wouldn't achieve the objectives he'd set himself of finding a way to subjugate Israel.

So they're the two sort of basic factors. And then once you're in a longer war, then countries have to adjust to the demands of a long war, which are different from those of a short war. Yeah. I mean, there are all sorts of resonances for Ukraine when I think it through. And I mean, I think the good thing about the article for me, the useful thing was that it sort of did put forward a sort of theoretical template that is actually quite useful when you start to sort of think through

circumstances that we're seeing currently in some of the conflicts. I mean, the point you make that even when they appear to be over, the core issues can continue to linger. That's one of the reasons, obviously, Ukraine needs security guarantees, because even if there is a ceasefire, the assumption is that Putin will try again in a year or two. So, I mean, you just touched on the fact that

Putin is not in a great position to moderate his political objectives, the ones that he set for himself back in the start of 2022. I mean, according to your model, he should temper his political objectives, but that doesn't seem to be an option for him politically. So where does that, I mean, talk through that and explain where it leaves him now.

Well, so Putin can keep this war going. I think with increasing difficulty. He seems to have supplies of men who can be sent

to the front, even if they don't come back again, most of them. He's geared his economy to a war footing. He's in control of the population and they're being encouraged to believe this is all about a big fight with NATO as much as Ukraine. But he's got difficulties. The first and most obvious one is despite what's regularly reported, they're actually not making a lot of progress.

It's a very slow grind. The costs, human costs are still enormous. And his economy, for a variety of reasons, including he just got overheated because of the defence expenditure, is now in trouble. It boomed for the first couple of years of the war, but not so now. But the basic problem is that as soon as this war is over, there's a reckoning. And the question, well, what was that all about, becomes...

pretty pertinent because whatever I think Trump and Steve Witkoff believed that it was really all about territory and that Trump should be very satisfied that he's left with 20% of Ukrainian territory. But it's useless territory now, a lot of it, because it's been bombed to pieces and full of unexploded ordnance and depopulated, economically inactive and so on. But that's not what it was about. It was about getting Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence.

And if he fails to do that, then he not only is Ukraine concerned about Russia coming back for more later, he's worried about Ukraine coming back.

So that's the mess he's left himself in. And at some point, he's going to have to address that. Now, I could make a perfectly good case that he'd be better off agreeing a ceasefire and then entering into prolonged negotiations about a peace settlement. Because you can say the war isn't over so long as endless negotiations are underway, which is better than endless fighting. But that's so far not the case.

Not the line he's taking. Okay. I mean, it has consequences for Zelensky as well, and for that matter, the United States, which are...

I mean, they are very well aware that they are negotiating or facing the prospect of negotiating with somebody who can't really back down for those reasons that he would clearly be doing so under a ceasefire. I mean, unless he takes the approach that you're suggesting there, having manifestly failed to achieve the objective that he set for himself and that therefore he could lose stature and authority and that could have all sorts of consequences for him at home.

Is it the case then that they need to try and give him some other way out? No, I don't think it's up to them. I think they've got to look after themselves. I mean, there isn't a way out, I don't think, other than the Kremlin and whoever's in charge accepting that this is pretty futile and that it's not going anywhere. And I think from that point of view, Zelensky needs the sanctions to be maintained and improved by the West, including, if possible, by the United States.

and weapons and support coming in to keep his forces going. I mean, Ukraine has adjusted to the demands of a longer war in many respects. It's slow to sort out mobilization, that population, that's still something of a problem, but its defense industry is pretty impressive now, and its production is pretty impressive. It's quite ingenious in how it manages the front.

I mean, Zelensky has acknowledged that it's a strain for Ukraine. They really would like a ceasefire, I think, just to recuperate and recover. But they don't have a lot of choice, so they'll keep on going. And I think one of Putin's problems is Trump has tried to provide him with an offer of

Not so much in terms of agreeing to what he wants in Ukraine, but offering him improved relations, normalization with the United States, even economic deals, limits economically to what US can do for Russia. But Trump's offered that, big handshakes, summits, that's sort of been on offer. And I think the problem for Putin is if he doesn't make Trump's process work,

Then it's not clear what else he does. I mean, this is his best chance. He's not going to get a more sympathetic American administration and he may be blowing it. That's why I think he's been scrambling around to find gestures and ways to show that he does really care about peace, even if he doesn't moderate any of his requirements.

We were talking just before we started recording that you were expressing no surprise whatsoever that Putin failed to turn up to Istanbul to speak with Zelensky as part of a negotiation. There is some reporting and analysis now that Trump is finally starting to get fed up with Putin's stalling and his very obvious stalling, which has been patently clear to anyone with the faintest degree of common sense that that's exactly what Putin is doing. Do you

buy into that view that Trump might be starting to get fed up with it? Well, he says so, so that's not a bad start. I mean, I think the thing about Trump is what he says is what he's thinking at the time. I mean, his views change, but that's what he's thinking. I mean, the meeting of the Pope's, Pope Francis' funeral between Zelensky and Trump went fine. The mineral deal, which...

I mean, analysts say it doesn't mean very much in practice, but I think symbolically for Trump, that's the sort of thing that matters. He likes deals. So I think, though he expresses frustration and so on, he's, and he doesn't particularly like Zelensky, he's nonetheless as inclined to push Ukraine as he was before. And I think there's a couple of positive things in terms of

new contracts on air defences and so on. These are more commercial than donation, if you like. But the fact that they're starting to happen, I find encouraging. So I don't think we're going to get a big supplemental like Biden got through Congress. I don't think that's

very unlike, especially given the state of the American budget, which is going to be pretty dire. So I don't expect that. But I do, there's still access to American systems. Even if somebody's paying for them, Elsa's paying for them, that's good. And we'll see, as it happens, the biggest sanction that Trump has put on Putin is...

crashing the economy a bit, so you get the oil price down. That's a real problem for Russia. Running at around $70 a barrel to going under $60, probably stabilize around $60. That's a problem. They don't have the cash. And the thing about Putin is he has shown in the past respect for his central banker.

And she's having trouble now keeping the show on the road because with interest rates at 21%, inflation is still taking off and not enough money is coming in. And these are things that he's well aware of, Putin talks about. So I don't think it's easy for him. I think he would like a way out, but I just don't think he knows how to get it. And, you know, we have to keep in mind that the political pressure on him comes from his right.

not when all the nice moderate people are in exile it's the right that are cross with it for having the best opportunity to bring Ukraine to heal and wasting it yes the people to the right of Vladimir Putin are a terrifying prospect so I mean Ukraine is a as I said really is the it's a great recent example of the the sort of short war fallacy that you describe in your piece and

I mean, obviously, Putin, well, along with probably many observers, thought that it would be over in a couple of weeks and he'd have Kharkiv and he could install a puppet government and Zelensky would flee. But it has worked out dramatically differently. The other potential situation for which your piece is a useful basis for analysis is, of course, Taiwan. And I realize that Taiwan's strategy, the porcupine strategy and so forth, I mean, its best chance really is to keep

mainland China away from a successful amphibious landing and expect the US to intervene and US allies hopefully to intervene in order to make it a long and drawn out and very, very costly exercise for Beijing rather than a quick and manageable one.

Can you just sort of talk us through your, you know, sort of general observations of Taiwan's options at the moment? I suppose, you know, what do you imagine Beijing's thinking is at the moment and what do you imagine Taipei's thinking to be? It's an interesting one because, I think it's well described in Taipei's

strategy, you've got the same issue that we have in Europe, which is, does Trump really care? And I think if you're watching him in the Middle East over the last few days, you would take the view that he just wants to get all these issues over and done with. And I don't think he's got any particular affection for Taiwan. And I don't doubt if he particularly wants to go to war for Taiwan. Some people in his administration would.

and think that's what you absolutely have to plan for but i doubt if he does and if i was in taiwan i'd be worried about that and if i was in beijing i would take a note of that i think the chinese are different from from the russians on this it's a long time i mean china has used military force against its neighbors against vietnam against india but quite a bit in the past

I don't think the Chinese themselves are that sure about how good they are at this sort of thing. They're certainly building up lots of kit and lots of ships and practicing lots of things. So they're certainly...

It'd be very foolish to say they've ruled it out. My assumption has always been that this would start with a blockade. And in a sense, that challenges the Americans and others to break the blockade or else just rely on constant pressure with others as China's sort of influence in the region grows. And again, that's another problem of Trump's general approach.

to leave Taiwan feeling it's isolated, and it might as well try to work out the best accommodation it can. So I think the Chinese famously are more patient. I think they're looking at what's happened in Ukraine pretty carefully. They analyze it pretty carefully. I don't think they're very impressed. The basic point of my analysis, which is in a sense, screamingly obvious, is that

Surprise attacks can take you so far, but if they're not decisive, then you're stuck. And if you try to occupy places where you're not welcome, you tend to get stuck even more. Even in February 22, my assumption was that even if the Russians had attacked,

done a lot better than they did. They would still be facing partisan warfare and so on, that it would just be a mess. They tried to occupy Taiwan. It's difficult to know whether it would be the same, but it is actually quite hard to establish control. And though Taiwan is nowhere near the size of China, it's still not tiny. I mean, it's still

Lots of people there. And if they're hostile or if the Chinese mismanage it, then it would be difficult. And here, you know, you go back to the politics. If China had not undermined Hong Kong in the way it did, then you might still believe in the two types of government in the same country. But they rather undermined that. So promises to Taiwan don't mean the same.

So my inclination is that the Chinese will be careful, but the pressure will just continue. And at some point, for the reasons that we're all familiar with, in terms of a Taiwanese declaration of independence.

That might trigger a move. But I think the Taiwanese understand the game well enough to avoid that. And of course, eventually, Kwame Tung may win an election and look for some more accommodations. I mean, a blockade presumably would... I mean, an extended blockade, even if the US decided, no, we are not going to go in and sort of militarily break it. I mean, I would have to think that it would...

produce an international response that China would be uncomfortable with, and that if China decided that it was testing and it could incrementally increase the pressure from a blockade and start to move towards an invasion, that Xi's calculation would have to be that an amphibious invasion would be extremely... I mean, it's not going to be short and easy, even if the Taiwanese don't get help.

These things are very difficult. I mean, and

If you're watching the drone war, the naval drone warfare now, which is one of the things that really has developed in Ukraine, you would have to think what's going to happen to landing ships. And so it really is very... I mean, amphibious landings are as hard a military operation as you could imagine, which is why we keep on looking back to Normandy. But we've seen the Chinese have their exercises. So it's not as... They do it now and again. And...

you assume this is just to make the point that we can do it, and then it eases off for a bit. And then one day, maybe it just won't ease off. So I think the Chinese can probe and see. Also, of course, a lot depends on what's going on elsewhere in the region, Philippine, Vietnam, and so on. If Xi decides that...

Maybe he should manage a charm offensive a bit with some of these other countries because they're a bit annoyed with the Americans at the moment because of tariffs. Then he could leave Taiwan more isolated. But as long as other countries are pretty nervous about China's intentions to them as well as to Taiwan, then...

In the end, there's still quite a formidable group of countries that would help Taiwan resist. So I think a lot of it's about probing. And it's also just about how big a priority this is in the end for Xi when he's got his own economy is not in great shape. And there are real social, demographic, whatever issues there.

inside China. I've never been taken by the idea that war is a great way to distract attention from domestic problems. Normally it makes them a lot worse. And, you know, he's been in power a very long time now and it's all on him.

So I wonder, and I have no way of knowing, whether this is – you really just have to get this sorted out by 2027 or whatever people say. You can always wait. Yeah, no, that all sounds eminently sensible. Let's zoom out again for a moment. I mean, I'm interested in your views on the changes –

that are making differences in war fighting. I mean, the title of the piece you wrote was The Age of Forever Wars, but you're not really arguing that the wars are getting longer. No, no, no, sure, sure. It was a great title, but it's... But I am interested in your views on... There are clearly changes. I mean, technology is the most obvious one that is, that one would assume has a tendency to make wars move at a faster rate.

tempo, there might be some other things that would slow it down, like the need for caution for political reasons, for international political reasons, for national reputation reasons. I mean, certainly Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not a great example of this, but generally speaking, there are quite a lot of countries that do want to avoid unacceptable

civilian casualties for fear of being condemning themselves in the eyes of the rest of the globe. So that might impose some constraints, which didn't exist, you know, 100, 200,000 years ago. Can you just give us some sort of top of your head overarching thoughts on what the sort of key changes are that you think are sort of changing the tempo at which wars are fought now? Yeah, I mean, first, just a caution that the

Tempo is a good word because they often go in fits and starts. They're not linear in their development or follow a simple escalation ladder as some people might assume. We kind of think of forever wars in terms of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which were not fought at a particularly intensive pace after the initial moves. We couldn't stop internal fighting and insurgencies and so on. Most of the

wars that never seem to end are in Africa. I always get struck by a statistic from Sudan, which I think I mentioned in the article, about since independence from the UK, there's been about 46 peace treaties, which indicates how successful they are. And I think that's

So if you look at the Democratic Republic of the Congo, if you look at Ethiopia, Sudan, Central African Republic, and so on, I mean, these are wars that just go on. And, you know, in Sudan or in the Sahel at the moment, they're fought with sometimes quite modern weapons. They're fought with drones.

But they're more skirmishing, if you like, than great battles. And it's often about moving populations, starving people and so on. It's pretty crude stuff. When you get to the sort of big wars like Russia-Ukraine, I think one of the things we've learned is

is the importance of mass. If you want to keep these things going, you need a lot of it. And the West has concentrated on getting super precise, high quality systems, and they do make a difference. And you can see that too, if you're absolutely sure that you're going to hit a particular target, once you've got decent intelligence, then that makes sense.

a difference. But the revelation of Ukraine is first, which isn't a revelation at all, that once you get into one of these fights, you need a heck of a lot of ammunition. And if your factories can't produce it or you can't source it from somewhere else, your effort is just going to peter out, even if you've got...

great artillery systems, you need the ammunition. And secondly, the way that this is new, the way that drones have developed is the large scale production of very expendable drones. The cost adds up, but they're nothing like 70 billion, sorry, $70 million you would spend on a US Reaper. These are thousands of dollars each. And

You can get them to take pictures. You can get them to drop weapons. You can get them for communications. You can just use drones a lot. Now, that doesn't mean to say all the other stuff that's important, like artillery, isn't still important and still present. But drones have made a difference. Well, you need the production. I think mass is the real lesson. And I think for Western governments, this is a big one.

because we just haven't maintained the productive capacity to do that. And you can see in Europe that's switching very slowly. I mean, it's switched, but the productive capacity takes a long time to build up. And of course, if you're doing it with private companies, they've got to be persuaded that the orders are going to keep on coming because it's expensive to tool up for these sort of things.

So, I think the new technologies are important and how much can be cramped into small spaces is always impressive. And the role of AI in all of that, which makes a difference with air defenses and targeting and so on. But you just need the numbers as well. Well, yeah, and the production capacity. So, I'm sort of thinking on my feet a bit here and there's a risk that I might just come out with something silly. But help me think this through for a moment. I mean, if...

Ukraine, on the mass side, has demonstrated that clearly output of drones that they can use effectively has been extremely important. The ability to continue producing them, they would have run out presumably some time ago if they weren't continually producing them. They're being presumably somewhat supplied by other countries as well. Does that mean that

wars can, I suppose, continue for longer in this attritional style compared with, say, if countries had, I don't know, 100 or 20 exquisite platforms that when each one goes down, then that's a big chunk of their fighting capability gone. I mean, is that a sort of fundamental change?

Well, I mean, it used to be easier to generate the mass in terms of armies and their equipment, because over time we've moved to more exquisite platforms with incredibly capable weapons. And then you stop to think, well, you know, if one of the UK aircraft carriers

gets caught. That's an awful lot of the last 20 years' defence budget down the drain, as it were. So I think that gives you pause and why thinking about mass is important. I don't think this is anything new, other than we've concentrated so much on the smart weapons. One of the more effective Russian

weapons in Ukraine as being the dumbest bomb of all, the glide bomb. It pointed in the right direction and it causes an enormous mess when it arrives on its target. In a target-rich environment, it doesn't have to be that accurate. The way I think to think about new technologies is in terms of layers.

The old stuff is there. You don't have to spend a lot of time looking at the imagery from Ukraine and you're seeing trench warfare. It really could be at times from the First World War. Guys throwing grenades at each other and so on. And then you've got the armour, armoured warfare, which is still present, although less so than one might have assumed because a lot of the armour has been lost now.

Then you've got aircraft and drones, and then on top of that, you've got AI and so on. So it's the interaction between these different layers of technology that produces the results. All armed forces are full of "legacy systems" because you fight with what you've got. Now, once you get into a longer war, as we've seen with Ukraine, then the technology develops and there's more innovation. I think what's been interesting about

Ukraine is a lot of the innovation was almost in cottage industries initially. I mean, just people making drones and adapting drones to the point where there was actually not a lot of coordination between different systems. So one unit could use one set of drones but wouldn't be very good with another. I mean, organize that and it's all getting more effective. But it's where the innovation comes from. And the problem, I mean, the Russians can innovate

but on pretty narrow tram lines. I mean, they improve things they're already doing. For example, electronic warfare. They're not bad at that at all. And in the end, I mean, just sort of following that thought through, the problem for the Russians is that they still have a general staff that thinks in old Soviet ways. And they really, in the end, don't innovate an awful lot in Russia.

equipment unless you think sort of using buggies and motorbikes to mount your offensive but they can't think other than just throwing people at a front line in order to budge it so it there's also questions of tactical innovation as well and i think one of the reasons the ukrainian position

stabilized at a time when people were worried that they were under a lot of pressure was they developed new tactics so that they weren't taken out so easily by glide bombs, that they were able to maximize the use of drones. So it's not just the technology itself, it's your grasp of how you can use it most effectively. Yeah, yeah, okay.

I mean, you're obviously known for many years as a great nuclear strategist, among other things. And we have to cover the nuclear question. I can't let you go without it.

Just staying, I suppose, relevant to the topic we've been talking about, are the options for nuclear armed belligerents to fight below the nuclear threshold? I mean, look, this could be an impossible question to answer, but are the options for those two sides who are both nuclear armed expanding or contracting to fight below the nuclear threshold with the changes that are going on, do you think?

Well, I think India and Pakistan is sort of the best example of that because these are two countries who've got nuclear weapons, who seem to have regular fights. And, you know, if you look at the wars fought over Kashmir in 478 and in 65, they were pretty big wars. Whereas you have this sort of skirmishing that leads to a bit of excitement and then somebody finds a way to dampen it down.

So you have this thing that people call the stability-instability paradox. It's sort of stable at the highest level. Below that level, because people are scared of escalating too far, a lot can be done. But that also means that nothing gets resolved either, which is the case within Europe, Pakistan. And I think that's the difficulty. I think Ukraine demonstrates that despite everybody's assumption that Putin was incentivized in some way,

to make a point and scare everybody by using low-yield nuclear weapons. It's a very unattractive idea to be the first to break the, quote-unquote, nuclear taboo since 1945. And for what? I mean, you couldn't even be sure that this would bring the war to it. And either it's a small enough...

operation. So it doesn't seem too ghastly, in which case it doesn't necessarily make a lot of difference or it's large, in which case it's not low yield tactical, it's big and strategic. And I think Putin has tried to sort of exude nuclear menace

quite often and the problem that's created for him is that the Ukrainians keep on pushing and targets in Russia get attacked and so on and it never seems a good idea to respond with nuclear weapons and many

have argued in Russia, again, on the more belligerent side of the Russian debate, that he needs to find some way to lower the threshold to demonstrate the risks that Europe and the US are running by supporting Ukraine. And Putin's resisted that. So my view is that the nuclear dimension in Ukraine is more or less as one would expect, that Russia hasn't attacked NATO countries supporting Ukraine.

Ukraine. The West has not put its forces to fight side by side with Ukrainians. They might at some point, but they haven't yet. And so it's encouraged caution and contained the conflict. But in the end, it's been fought at a pretty high level.

much higher than say India and Pakistan, without really producing situations in which nuclear use makes a lot of sense. You've always got to remember all this war is being fought on territory that Russia is claiming for itself. So it would be quite odd to use your first nuclear weapons on territory you've written into the Russian constitution.

I mean, the unstable stability, I mean, I'm sort of in two minds about Kashmir, but my inclination is to think that it's more stable than unstable. I mean, yes, it does allow for all sorts of things to go on below the nuclear level. But ultimately, I mean, there have been quite a few skirmishes, haven't there, since 1998, or if that's the year that both announced nuclear capability, I think it was. I mean, each time, I mean, of course, it's...

You only want to roll that dice so many times, I suppose. But each time they do seem to manage to keep it at the skirmish level. And like you say, they don't resolve the Kashmir issue by one side decisively defeating the other. And I mean, of course, lives are lost every time and that's terrible and we don't want that to happen. But I mean, do you see a sort of more stability there than not? I think it's very difficult to resolve this issue by on falls. But the issue doesn't stay static. The line of contact

which is the ceasefire line from January 1949, hasn't actually changed. But within India-controlled Kashmir, India has tightened its grip. It's more repressive than it was. Elements in Pakistan, including the agencies, are still going to be pushing. I think if it continues along those lines, maybe one day it will go a bit further.

Bigger danger, possibly, is if you had another Mumbai where you have terrorists or what happened in 2001 with the attack on the Indian parliament. Parliament, yeah. Yeah, I mean, if the terrorists had moved, gone to the left rather than the right, you'd have a very different outcome because they missed the parliamentary chamber. So the Indians are much stronger than the Pakistanis.

And if it came to it, I don't think one can assume indefinitely that India won't just get fed up.

and decide to deal with Pakistan. I mean, that's the sort of impulse that leads you into trying a short war and ending up with a long one or a more dangerous one. So I don't think the politics is static. I think that's the point I'm making. There are changes that are going on. My India-Pakistan relations are a very poor state at the moment. So you've had these periods where they haven't been bad and good,

leaders meet each other and have positive conversations and so on. I haven't done that for a while. So I'm not sanguine.

about it, though there aren't particularly good military options really for either side. Okay. Look, Lawrence, I will leave it there. We're out of time. I mean, I had more questions, but I'm going to have to return to them another time and hopefully we can have you back sometime. But look, I think we've covered Taiwan, we've covered Kashmir, we've covered Ukraine. I think we've done pretty well. So really appreciate your time. It's been a pleasure and an honor for me. Thanks for coming on. Good to talk to you. Thanks for listening, folks. That's it for today. We'll be back next week. Bye for now.