EP94: Macron Courts ASEAN: France’s ‘Third Way’ with Juliette Loesch
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Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia. This is a podcast that covers current developments in the region, particular countries, domestic politics, as well as regional issues. We look in depth at what is happening, why it might be happening. We speak to analysts, academics from the region, based in the region, and to better understand what's happening and what might be the projections of what's happening ahead. We're now in our second season.

I'm Bridget Welsh. I'm a political analyst and academic who's worked on Southeast Asia for many decades. I was raised here. I'm living here. And very importantly, I care about what's happening in the region. Thanks for joining me. Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia. You're here with Bridget Welsh and my co-host, Zach Abouza. This is episode 26 of season three. Thanks, listeners, for tuning in to the discussion.

Today, my co-host talks about what's happening in temporary Thailand and also about the key questions that are emerging with the U.S.'s tap on Iran as the war with Iran and Israel has escalated and what these implications could be for Southeast Asia. Among the many issues that he talks about are questions about what's happening in Iran, but also economic fallout that may come from this war for the region compiling and impacting Southeast Asia.

The episode, however, focuses squarely on France. As you'll know, for those listeners of the podcast, we do look at how different parts of the world are engaging Southeast Asia. We turn a spotlight on how Macron's policies and speeches and engagement with Southeast Asia are changing what it represents in terms of engagement for Southeast Asia.

joined by a young dynamic scholar in this conversation, Juliet Loesch. And I hope you enjoy and learn from this conversation as much as I did. Welcome to Straight Talk Southeast Asia. I'm your co-host, Zachary Abusa. The fallout from the May 28 border skirmish between Thailand and Cambodia and the leaked transcript of the June 15 call between the Cambodian strongman Hun Sen and Thai Prime Minister Pai Tongtan Shinawatra

continues to reverberate in both capitals. Most recently, the commander of the Royal Thai Army's Second Army has ordered the closure of a key border crossing, disrupting trade and the flow of people. While neither side has an incentive to resume military operations and escalate the conflict, both sides have a clear political incentive to maintain the current level of tensions.

In Cambodia, it is an opportunity to shore up Hun Manet's second-generation government. This is a way to further bind the military leadership to the political leadership. It is a great assertion of nationalism. The Hun dynasty is the defenders of Cambodian sovereignty, a country that has long been victimized by its larger neighbors. While the leaked phone call was definitely an own goal for Prime Minister Paitongtan Chinawat,

The reality is that the ultra-royalists and military have been working to chip away at the grand bargain that saw her father return from self-imposed political exile in August 2023. Every chance they have had to weaken the Phu Thai government, Thailand's royalist establishment, have jumped at. It is very hard to see Pai Thang Tan surviving this conflict after throwing her own military leadership under the bus.

The Thai Prime Minister is in grave political danger. The Bumjai Thai Party, the second largest party in the government coalition, used the Prime Minister's handling of the border dispute as the justification to quit the coalition, even though it was clear they were already on their way out, unhappy with a cabinet reshuffle that was going to strip them of key positions.

In particular, they feared losing the Ministry of Interior held by party leader Anutin. With the Bumjaitai's defection, the loss of 71 seats, Paitongtan's government has a razor-thin majority in parliament.

For now, some of the remaining coalition members have pledged their support to the Prime Minister, who now has eight cabinet positions formerly held by Bumjai Thai to divvy out as incentives to maintain their support. But not all will. The military-backed United Thai Nation Party has called upon the Prime Minister to resign.

If the United Thai Nation Party, with its 36 seats, were to defect to the opposition, the government would collapse. The cabinet reshuffle may not be enough to save the Prime Minister. Other parties may feel the pressure to withdraw their support because things are looking really bad for the Prime Minister. Pai Tong Tan traveled to the border area of Ubon Ratchathani in damage control mode late last week.

There, she thanked the army for, quote, working tirelessly to keep our people safe and protect our sovereignty, end quote. But the military is unlikely to accept the slight from a civilian government and is biding its time.

A group of senators has submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court and the National Anti-Corruption Commission to have her removed from her post over the revelations in the leaked call. The Constitutional Court brought down her predecessor and has been used to systematically weaken the political opposition and other reformist parties.

Neither Bali, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, nor the Constitutional Court has ruled against the interests of the military and royalist establishment. Moreover, massive street protests are planned for later this week.

At the forefront of this is the longtime ultra-royalist activist Sundi Limtungkul, whose mass yellow-shirt protests helped topple Thaksin Srinivasa in 2006 and his sister Yingluck Srinivasa in 2014.

Thaksin Shinawatra returned from self-exile in 2023 as part of a grand bargain that appeared to have been struck with the palace to prevent the progressive Move Forward Party, which won a plurality of the votes in the May 2023 general election, from establishing a government. But ever since then, the ultra-royalist and military have been trying to check Thaksin's power and undermine that grand bargain.

Taxon was supposed to have returned so that he could care for his grandchildren and avoid politics altogether. But ever since his release from a police hospital, he has been deeply involved in the internal politics of the governing coalition. That was the cash-a-spelly for the royalists to move on him. He was charged with laissez-majester to signal where the political power in the country really resides.

In 2023, the Constitutional Court removed Thaksin's longtime friend, Prime Minister Sreda Thaksin, which elevated Thaksin's political neophyte daughter, aged 36, to the premiership. The military now smells blood in the water, and Paitong Tan's missteps have given them the opportunity to move quickly.

While the prime minister could step down, which would allow the Futai party to nominate Chaikasem Nitsiri, the other prime ministerial candidate, that might not be enough to save the government. Right now, the military and ultra-royalists may be trying to machinate a conservative, Bung Jai Thai-led government under Anutin that includes the two military-backed parties, Palang Pratarat and the United Thai Nation.

But for now, there is simply a lot of political uncertainty and a government that is very much on its back feet. As we record this week's episode, news is broken that the United States has entered Israel's war against Iran, using stealth bombers to attack three Iranian nuclear sites. The scope of America's involvement, its extent, and the continued operations are all unclear at the moment.

There are three broad questions that arise from this attack that could impact Southeast Asia. First, is Iran able to retaliate? Second, will the war lead to regime change? And third, what will be the diplomatic impact on the United States? Regarding the first, Iran's ability to retaliate has been greatly diminished.

Israel has systematically degraded two of its most historically lethal proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has already signaled to both groups that they are largely on their own. Iran lost its proxy in Syria. Iran still has proxies in Iraq and perhaps more impactfully in Yemen. The Houthis are likely to disrupt international trade by targeting offshore shipping with their ballistic missile program.

The wild card is whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the elite paramilitary force that is tied to the ruling clerical establishment itself, tries to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran produces approximately 3.3 to 3.6 million barrels of oil a day, which accounts for roughly 3 to 4% of global oil production. So any loss of Iranian oil will impact global markets. China is the largest purchaser of Iranian oil, which transits Southeast Asia, and has often been offloaded in ship-to-ship transfers to evade sanctions.

But any attacks that impact global shipping, whether off of Yemen or in the Strait of Hormuz, will have an immediate impact on global commerce and therefore Southeast Asia. It is unclear whether these attacks will lead to regime change in Iran. While the clerical regime is loathed by wide swaths of the population, in particular the urban middle class, the Ayatollahs are still a legitimate force in rural Iran.

The aging Ayatollah Khamenei has been in power since 1989 and is in ill health. Iranians are proud people and any attempt to conduct a regime change from the outside is likely going to have the effect of creating a nationalist backlash and support for the regime. A country of 100 million with a rich and complex ethnic tapestry, this has never been an easy place to govern.

and the Islamic government has only been able to do so through force. While the Iranian people deserve a government that will lead to the development of a chronically underperforming economy and ending the five-decade reign as a diplomatic pariah, that is an issue for the Iranians themselves. Regime change will be bloody and complex.

And finally, it is important to know that for Israel, this was never a war of preemption, but a war of prevention. That is more than a linguistic distinction. A preventative war is a war of choice, and there are clear distinctions in international law. The United States has joined Israel, and that will have a bearing in Southeast Asia, which is already dealing with the foreign policy challenges of an American-first foreign policy.

While Iran does not have natural allies in Southeast Asia, both Indonesia and Malaysia engage the country and see Iran as an important partner in countering Saudi domination of the Islamic faith, as well as standing up to the American-led world order. The countries of mainland Southeast Asia, as well as the Philippines, tend to be closer to Israel, an important source of high-tech trade, investment, and increasingly military sales.

The Israeli-Iranian war is another fault line within ASEAN that outside actors such as China will exploit. But if the war escalates with all the expected negative economic implications, then the United States should expect more fallout in Southeast Asia, where economic growth has already slowed this year due to trade and tariff uncertainties from Washington.

Hope you're enjoying listening to this episode. If you want to find out more about previous episodes, you can reach this on the website, straighttalksoutheastasia.com. The link should also be available in the show notes. If you want to contribute to the production costs of the podcast, you can hit the link, buy me a coffee. Every little penny counts. All that money will not go to me, but go to the producers who are helping me to put the show together. Thanks for listening.

I'm really delighted to have Juliette Loech, who is from the Institute of French International Relations in Paris. She is speaking to me today about France's engagement with Southeast Asia or Macron's third wave. Bonjour, Juliette. Bonjour, Brigitte.

Let's talk about Emmanuel Macron's visit to Singapore. He spoke at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the first European to do so. He visited Singapore and Vietnam and Indonesia. His speech garnered a lot of attention, and it's seen as a pattern of engagement, a positive alliance, a third way. Can you unpack the key points that Macron was making and how this relates to the evolution of France's Indo-Pacific strategy?

You are correct to say that Emmanuel Macron was the first European president to speak at the Shangri-La Dialogue, but he was not actually the first European and not the first French authority or personality to speak at the dialogue. And in fact, France has been represented at the Shangri-La Dialogue for a few years now by its defense ministers. And I'm saying this not only to brag about how France is

present and invested in Southeast Asia, even though it relates to what we're talking today. But to say that the president's speech during the Shangri-La Dialogue is anchored in previous speeches that were made by his ministers that related and developed about France's strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

Macron's speech this year actually was not a big shift from what was said previously. And the strategy is still unchanged, at least for now, since during the speech he announced a new strategy should be unveiled in the coming month. Let's see if that happens and when. But the main pillars that were underlined during the speech remained the same. And the

key pillars of the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific that were recalled by Emmanuel Macron are to promote and defend international law and to do so through cooperation. And I think that is quite clear in the first and second part of his speech.

So the first part to set a background to the discussion, the first part was a law about not having double standards. And it was referring to the different conflicts in the world, especially the conflict in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza. But he also talked about the situation in the South China Sea and the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

saying that this is intertwined and can be paralleled with other situations in the world, including in Europe and Ukraine.

The idea of the double standard that he discussed during the first part of his speech was an effort from his part to set the frame of how France and Hassan share common interests and have a shared responsibility in the affairs of the world.

The second part is about building new cooperation, cooperation of actions, coalitions of actions. So this one is really a call for ASEAN and France to build new cooperation, build new coalitions and activities together to promote international law, but also to seek new opportunities for both parts.

These things are very broad and not very concrete. And one of the criticisms of President Macron was that he was too vague. Do you think there's anything really concrete that's coming out of this? Or is this just a symbolic speech?

I think to see the concrete actions, you have to delve into what happened before the Shangri-La Dialogue, actually, when he visited Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore. Because when he visited the three countries, there were a host of deals that were signed, a host of intentions that were expressed by parts from all the countries. For example, France and Vietnam are going to cooperate on energy transition through the Just Energy Transition Partnership.

Just to take this example, there was a deal that was signed between the French Development Agency and Vietnam. So this is very concrete. There were also other deals that were signed with Indonesia about future cooperation in the domains of defense equipment. These are the concrete actions that are behind Macron's call for cooperation.

It's not new. It's in chord in historic relation with all of the countries. But another level is how France is going to build new corporations with the region as a whole. And this one, I have to confess, is still very vague. And maybe the answer lies in how the European Union and how France is going to

push the European Union to engage further with the ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region as a whole, especially in the economic domain.

But when we look carefully at the visits to Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore, it seems very self-interested. France is just interested in investment. Business deals had a big business delegation with them. And there were a lot of defense purchases solidified. It's not clear to me how this relates to strengthening the rule of law. And it really is more of bilateral strategic interests. That's not new. Most countries do that. And you're correct to say that these are an extension of what has happened from the past.

I'm curious if there's something different or is this just hype? I'm also curious about how different countries in the region are treated by France. The fact that he visited Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore is a signal that they have very good relations with these countries. Are there other countries in the region that they have less dynamic relationships with?

To answer your first question about how it is different than just a self-interested relation, they say that it's self-interested but on both sides. It's true that France is promoting its own interests through investments and exports, especially on the defense side, but it's also to ensure a demand, especially from Indonesia, for example. The benefit for Indonesia is not only to acquire new defense equipment,

But the fact that it's been, the government of Indonesia has been prioritizing buying defense equipment from France, it's also because it comes ITA-free, which means it's free from the U.S. export rules. And then says the strategic autonomy, also, this is a key concept that is promoted by Macron, but also has an echo in Southeast Asia and especially Indonesia. So strategic autonomy is preserved and enhanced through

buying equipment that have no string attached, so to speak. But it also comes with transfer of technology, which is something that Indonesia has been seeking with its partnerships.

Speaking of Singapore, for example, the cooperation between the two countries have had many positive consequences or positive achievements in the scientific domain. Yes, it's self-interested from the French part, but also from the Asian parts.

It's the basis of better relations, and I'm saying better relations because France and Asia have long-standing relations, but these still need to be deepened and developed and extended. But just to set this against the more international background of international law and how it contributes to preserving the rules-based order, well,

France anchors its different investments and cooperation in a broader strategic narrative, which is not only words, but also actions. For example, it's been committed to deploying assets in the South China Sea to show its attachment to international law and the respect of freedom of navigation in international waters. So it's something that is also important.

Finding a NICO in Southeast Asia. You didn't answer the question I had about the relationship with different countries in the region. We know the countries have been given French favor. What about the countries that are less favored, say Myanmar or even Cambodia? Is there a different relationship with certain countries in Southeast Asia?

This is a really interesting question because there are different levels of engagement with different countries in Southeast Asia, but this has been evolving over time. And I think Malaysia is one good example of that. I remember in 2018, Malaysia was seen as the key partner of France in Southeast Asia together with Singapore.

This can be traced back to France helping Malaysia to building its submarine fleet. But the relations have been very good until then. Things changed when the government changed in Malaysia. So when the PH coalition took over in 2018, the relation between the two countries started to deteriorate.

Let's say that France had to find new partners in Southeast Asia and Indonesia became that new partner. Malaysia still is a partner of France, but let's say that it's not the priority and mainly because authorities in Malaysia do not have the same interest in developing their relation to France due to not aligned views of international relations, but also how they can benefit from the situation or from the relation.

Let me interrupt you for a moment on the Malaysia thing. Let's be clear. There was a huge multi-billion dollar scandal involving the submarines, which was investigated in France. This involved massive corruption. This is something that has blemished the relationship. But you were saying about Myanmar.

About Myanmar, of course, the relation cannot be the same, but it doesn't mean that France is not committed anymore in the resolution of the conflict. And it has a special envoy from Myanmar that is active, continuing French diplomacy with regards to this resolution of conflict. Indeed. And it's a very difficult, challenging issue in terms of Myanmar.

That brings me to the question, with a focus on defense and economic and even strategic areas like waters, where has human rights and values gone in the relationship between France and Asia?

You talked earlier about the issues of double standards vis-a-vis Gaza and Ukraine. But what about a discussion of human rights conditions within the region? Many people in Southeast Asia see the democratic backsliding and they see Europe as basically abandoning any moral engagement with the region on these issues. Where do you see that in Macron's strategy?

Well, you're absolutely right to raise that question. There is a focus on values in France's speech and France's actions towards Southeast Asia, but the values that are highlighted are more international relations values, so to speak, which are international law and multilateralism. So it's really the core of France's speech and strategy towards the region. But this does not mean that human rights are completely bifided. It's just that it's less publicized

publicized. But I know for a fact that human rights here are at the agenda of bilateral dialogues with countries like Vietnam, like Indonesia. And it's also an issue that is being talked during dialogues with the European Union, which has a human rights diplomacy that is not only active, but also more publicized compared to what France is doing.

Well, in fairness to France, I think that France is not alone in leaving and abandoning human rights issues and moral backgrounds. Even if these things are happening very quietly behind closed doors, at least it's beneficial that there's some conversation. In other places, we see violations that are taking place by Western powers.

Let's look ahead to what are the key developments to look out for. You've just highlighted earlier that they are talking about a new strategy and whether or not it's new or a deepening of the current strategy. What are the things that we should look out with France's relationship with the region? You've described a very important dynamic of strong security relationships, strong economic ties, long-time engagement. As you rightly point out, the Macron speech is a product of many years of investment.

working with Southeast Asia, and France has been present for quite some time. But are things new? Is there going to be more of a French security presence, for example? What should we be looking out for ahead?

For sure, there won't be less security, at least I don't think so. Of course, it's hard to say since the new strategy has not been published yet, but they are non-negotiable in this strategy, especially France's self-claimed status as a resident nation in the Indo-Pacific. So the overseas territories and how we defend them, but also promote them in this era will remain the main pillar of the strategy.

How will that play within the hoped-for cooperation with Southeast Asia? I don't know for now. But another thing is that I don't see less security because it's maybe the most developed part of the cooperation with the countries that were visited, but also with other countries in the region that we did not talk about.

Defense is certainly something that will continue to be the spearhead of the relation, especially with Indonesia, and that is clearly visible in all the deals that were made or the letters of intent that were signed. But something that could receive more support or more attention from France, French authorities administration in the coming months and years, could be how to engage

Southeast Asia economically, because it's something that clearly does not have the priority for now in the relation and French companies, but also Asian companies also clearly they have the role to play.

Certainly there will be more efforts to make these spots know each other better and invest in each other as well. And the EU here has a role to play within that framework. Maybe France could be the intermediary to conclude agreements that have been years in the making. I'm thinking, for example,

of the EU-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement that was concluded only a few days after Macron's visit. So there could be other agreements like this one. Trade agreements, more economic ties, potentially more defense deals, and even a greater security presence looking ahead for France's engagement with Southeast Asia. It's maybe not a third way, but it is definitely the French way.

This has been Juliette Loesch, associate researcher at IFRI in Paris. Juliette, merci beaucoup. Thank you so much for your insights. It's always good to have someone like yourself sharing about what's happening in the interactions with Southeast Asia. Thank you, Bridget. Thank you for hosting me. Thank you for listening to the episode. Subscribe to the show on your favorite podcast listening app.

If you'd like to keep up to date on current Southeast Asian political affairs, just keep following. This is Bridget Welsh, and I look forward to connecting to you in the next episode. Straight Talk Southeast Asia is produced by Norman Chella, a.k.a. Norm, and you can find him at thatsthenorm.com. Thanks so much for listening. ♪