The End of the West and the Future of China
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Hello and welcome to another edition of the China Global South podcast, a proud member of the Seneca Podcast Network. I'm Eric Olander, and as always, I'm joined by Kobus Van Staden, our managing editor, who is, as always, in beautiful yet smoky Cape Town, South Africa. A very good afternoon to you, Kobus.

Good afternoon. The mountain's on fire, but hopefully everything's okay. You said that. Tabletop Mountain is burning a little bit now, and that's not unusual in Cape Town. Just like I'm from California, you're from Cape Town. Apparently fire is a way of life now. Yes. Yeah. Let's hope everything stays contained.

Yeah, so hopefully it will be okay for you. Today we're going to talk about China and we're going to delve into kind of forecasting and looking at some scenarios for the future, but that's going to be a little bit more difficult than it was a month ago before Donald Trump became president again of the United States. And the changes that are unfolding, Kobus, are I think beyond anything we could have anticipated. Yes,

The Trump administration, the MAGA forces, the Heritage Foundation laid out many of their plans in things like Project 2025. They talked about them. I don't know if any of us really thought they were going to go as fast as they did and as they are in unfolding them and that they would have really no opposition from either the public or

or Congress or the courts as of now. That may be changing, but as of now, they've been unobstructed. One of the things that we're starting to hear in Washington, Cobus, that I'd like to get your take on is there are rumors, and right now it's only rumors, so I want to emphasize this,

that US Africa Command, otherwise known as AFRICOM, is back on the chopping block. Now, that was something that, if you recall from the first Trump administration, five, six years ago, Trump wanted to kill AFRICOM and wanted to get rid of it. The China connection here is that then the former commander of AFRICOM, General Stephen Townsend,

kind of embarked on a narrative campaign talking about Chinese basing in West Africa that he very effectively used to persuade Congress to force the White House's hand to keep AFRICOM. Now we're hearing that again. We haven't had any confirmation yet, but it does sound like it'd be consistent with the kinds of things that the White House has been trying to unfold. What do you think when you heard that rumor again that AFRICOM was back up for elimination?

It's interesting, and I was thinking the same thing as you, that we may well see a recurrence of basing narratives. There is also the wider landscape that has shifted around this discussion, which I think is notable. In the first place, there's talk about the possible conflation of AFRICOM with the Europe Command, which is now in a moment where the Europe-US relationship is in a different place than it used to be. But it's also, on the Chinese side, it's also interesting that as the US forces have been...

pushed out of West Africa together with French forces. We are seeing first early signs of a possible more robust Chinese presence there. So China appointed a defence attaché to its embassy in Niger. And that defence attaché actually had an interesting event, I think last week, where they were talking about, like,

actually explicitly talking about like stronger coordination, like security coordination between China and Niger. And that was all framed in the context of the Global Security Initiative. So for a long time, the Global Security Initiative was basically just vibes. You know, it was just a lot of very vague talk about general, like, you know, shared security concerns and so on. It was very difficult to pass what it actually is. Now there seems to be a lot more, like the possible cooperation with Niger would include both anti-terrorism initiatives

So state-focused stuff and impacts on organized crime. And similarly, the Global Security Initiative is also being cited as part of the crackdown on organized crime that's happening in Southeast Asia. And it's currently, you know, it provides a framework of this intensified policing cooperation that you're seeing between China and Thailand to crack down on scam centers there. So it seems like this kind of shift of the U.S. role in Africa and AFRICOM's role in Africa could potentially

potentially be a step for the global concretization of the global security initiative on the continent.

And just while a lot of people are focusing on China-Africa military affairs, that police cooperation that you've referenced is nothing new, actually. Chinese police engagement in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and elsewhere has been quite robust, talking about a lot of what you mentioned in terms of going after organized crime, scam centers, and Chinese fugitives. So that's something that has been long established. Paul Nantulli at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has done some great work on that.

But something I think, Kobus, you're right to point to. But this question of AFRICOM speaks to the magnitude of the changes that are underway right now. And while a lot of us have been talking about what's going on in the U.S. and trying to keep up with everything what's going on in the U.S., less discussed, even though in the China watching space we talk about it a lot, but in the broader public not so much,

are the profound changes that have been underway in China and how that will play out over the next 10 years. And to that effect, there's a fascinating new report, and it is a deep dive report. This thing is about 100 pages long, but it covers so many details. China 2035, the chances of success. It was produced by Institut Montaigne, which is a leading independent think tank based in Paris, and we are thrilled to have

the two of the authors of that report, François Godemont, who is a special advisor and resident senior fellow focusing on Asia and America at the Institut Montaigne. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. And by the way,

François was last on our show in 2017. So welcome back, François. And we're also joined by Pierre Pinas, who is a project officer in the Asia Program and oversees Institut Montaigne's quarterly publication, China Trends, and also a graduate of Fudan University's Master of International Relations program with Sciences Po. So always wonderful to have both of you on the show. Welcome, Pierre, and welcome back, François. Thank you very much.

François, let's begin with you. You authored this very detailed report. Obviously, you wrote it before Donald Trump became president. I guess before we dive into the four scenarios that you lay out for China in 2035,

Let's talk about this question of how much does the equation change based on what you wrote, given what we've seen come out of the White House. We did not anticipate that the U.S.-Atlantic alliance would be under the strain that it is. You probably did not anticipate that the United States would change.

align itself at the United Nations with Russia, Iran and North Korea on Ukraine. These are monumental changes, generational changes. How does that impact the report and your assessments of the situations looking forward 10 years?

Look, I don't want to sound like I anticipated what Donald Trump would do, the sheer brutality of it. He's striking in several directions. You mentioned, of course, the domestic U.S. situation and what looks like literally overturning U.S.

of laws and checks and balances. That concerns us because after all, we were an alliance of democracies. I did not anticipate, of course, the thoroughness of the shift, of the public shift towards Moscow and the

blackmailing of Ukraine against what is now even thorough promise of continued support. But in writing this China report, I had one advantage. I had done the same exercise in 2007-2008. And at the time, 90% of scenarios on China focused on what China would do about itself. Of course, the U.S. was there. Of course, there was the Taiwan issue. Of course, there were international considerations. But

But in the report that was out a few weeks ago, we start by emphasizing that the certainties now are more on what China will do. And the uncertainties we pointed out was about what the U.S. and others want.

We also anticipated that the question of how much support Europe might give to a strong containment policy of China would be in question if simultaneously the U.S. was withdrawing part of its concrete commitments to a security umbrella in Europe in order to focus on China and left Europe to its own actions.

actions. Of course, we did not anticipate the brutality of the shift again. But this was very much in the works, and we have been struck also by the cautiousness that suddenly descended on China's external behavior. Let's say since September 2024, last fall, and obviously the coincidence with the moment when people start to anticipate that Donald Trump is going to be elected again is there. That's the moment that

when Xi Jinping began to understand he might have a more serious issue with the U.S. than ever previously. Now we're today, and even as of today, I simply cannot tell you that what Donald Trump is doing is a rational strategic move towards China that he's going to confront today.

China in several directions, either technological trade, but also military, or whether this is part of the wheeling dealing approach that he's going to take. And we all know that he can reverse himself and that what his advisors, what his entourage says cannot be trusted. We have been treated in the past few weeks to a kind of show of a dog and pony show by his advisors to show how loyal they are

to their master. So it's extremely difficult to predict. But our scenarios had incorporated a much larger dose of uncertainty on the US and European side. And when we divided that, I'm talking a moment, of course, about the four main scenarios which were outlined to 2035, a main feature of each was uncertainty.

How united or disunited the so-called West or democracies or countries concerned with China's behavior more broadly would be able to coordinate their actions or how much China would be able to either play divide and rule as it is accused of. But now I don't think you can even accuse it of playing divide and rule if it faces a divided world. Of course, that makes things easier.

Pierre, I wonder if you could, you know, just before we get to the scenarios outlined in the report, I wonder if you could give us your current impressions of China's priorities and focus in relation to Europe. Like, I've seen, you know, just in reading, I've seen different kind of tones coming from China, you know, sometimes quite different.

quite kind of irritable and crabby in relation to, for example, stuff like the CBAM plans for carbon related tariffs on imports. For example, China has been very adamantly against that. But at the same time, having very expansive plans to connect infrastructural and logistics chains to Europe, you know, in a way that that is quite different from the decoupling conversations happening with the US. So I was wondering if you could like, how does China see Europe at the

Thank you also for the invitation. As always with Europe, it's looking at what the European Union is saying and what the member states are saying on the China policy. But I think starting first with a symbolic nomination is that of Lu Xiaoye, I would say, who was the former ambassador of China to France, who was just nominated as an envoy of China to Europe. So in terms of symbolic, I think it's quite strong. We might not witness a war for your diplomacy.

from China to Europe, but at least we... I think it could be quite an offensive positioning from China towards Europe. In terms of priority, I would say inevitably the pregnant discourse over capacity in Europe now is a challenge for Europe, is how to appease member states on this position, which is quite anchored among member states. The diagnosis is quite established about this overcapacity, so it's how to tackle it from an industrial side, from the financial side.

Of course, there's going to be, now that the US has retreated again from the Paris Agreement, what type of cooperation there can be on climate issues and environmental issues, both from a pragmatic perspective, but also from a tangible perspective. What can China and the EU do? But inevitably, I think compared to 2019, when the CAI was about to be signed, I think there's more defiance from the member states and the EU side looking at China.

what's happening in Ukraine. The fact that 80% of components on the front are coming from China has created, inevitably, a security concern for member states. However, we see that member states might be tempted to create a bilateral relation rather than speaking one united voice.

Without even discussing the case of Hungary at this stage, we see moves from Spain having quite a pro-China policy. So I think it's the reconciliation, which is the challenge, the reconciliation of

member states' positions and the EU quite strong de-risking agenda. François, as Koba said, I do want to get to the scenarios, but I'm just so intrigued by what Pierre has been talking about in terms of this complexity of Europe's relationship with China today. I'm going to take it one step further. I think there's a real sense of schizophrenia within Europe, which is not unusual given the tensions between the EU as a body and the member states with their national agendas. But you

we have the new German chancellor coming out very strong, saying he's going to take on China, you know, in very strong words. But Emmanuel Macron, when he was in China last time, it looked like a romantic love fest. And at the same time, German industry, which is the heart of the European economy, is committed to China,

given the fact that it's their largest market for BMW, for Philips, for Siemens, for any number, Philips not being a German company, but Siemens being a German company, the volume that they get out of China is irreplaceable anywhere else. So it feels like Europe is in a very difficult position when it comes to China, because on the one hand, there's these tensions about democracy and governance, which you talk about in the report,

But on the other hand, there's an economic dependency that is undeniable. How do you square that when you've got Ursula von der Leyen going to China sounding very tough and German industry going to China and sounding very amenable? How do you reconcile that?

Is it so different from the situation under the Biden administration, for example, where Wall Street pundits and a good part of Silicon Valley are totally gung-ho on China, while you have people like Jake Sullivan and the NSC advisor to Biden and the DOD, and in fact, Biden himself at one point calling Xi Jinping a dictator? I think we have these contradictions. If I was to look specifically at Europe, I would say first,

We've been joined at the hip economically with China even more than the U.S., but that's not so much anymore because China is our market. It's because we are the market for cheap Chinese exports. For cheap, I don't mean to say bad. They are actually quite good. That's the...

biggest area of concern is that the quality is improving, something that American consumers perhaps don't perceive, for example, because they don't touch a Chinese car, to use that example. So we are dependent on China indeed, but in a new way. The real trade-off now is between cost to the consumer of shifting away from China in many ways and the

The issue of either de-risking narrowly, which is what the EU claimed it was doing, not decoupling, or more broadly ensuring economic security, which means we should retain an industrial base inside Europe. That's where the shift is. And I think it's not unnatural that people are all over the place in diplomatic terms, don't necessarily take measures.

Mr. Macron's statements always at face value. He's just been smooching with Donald Trump in Washington. And I doubt that this was absolutely real. In fact, on the part of both men, Macron has always maintained this notion that you have to keep talking, that you have to keep a bridge, that you have to address the Chinese in ways that recognizes, even now with respect, at least with respect,

in a manner which recognizes their strength, and they are strong. Today, on the other hand, France has been more consistent than Germany over the past two years over the defensive measures taken by the European Commission, most of them in the economic field, some of them in the

technology field and also on the Anti-Coercion Act. Lastly, on EVs, for example, last fall and a new wave probably of measures are coming. The ground has shifted for another reason. Pierre has mentioned Lu Xiaoyi, one of the leading wolf warriors in Chinese diplomacy who has been appointed special envoy to Europe and that, of course, has sent waves to

to Brussels. He was the former ambassador to France, correct? He was the former ambassador. And quite outspoken, if I remember. More than outspoken, because he maintained a blog that at time he signed at time was anonymous, in which, among other things, said that elderly people in old people's homes were left to die of hunger during COVID and other niceties about France. This was an ambassador that in the end, for example, around the time when President Macron made his visit

to China was literally sidelined in the preparation for the visit. And this is the guy who is nominated envoy to the EU. Well, I put myself in Xi Jinping's shoes and I tried to think about Europe. And I'll tell you two things. First, I don't think Europe by far could be the strongest guy on the block. It's not. We know.

The US might be, or I might be Xi Jinping, especially if I keep a tight connection with Putin. And on the other hand, there is no harm in sweet talking at times, in playing the divide and rule strategy, at least with words. And that's what I've been doing. So there is a mixture. When Xi Jinping finds out how tough Trump can sound, I'm sure he asks his advisor, we got to be tough too. We got to show Europe that we could be very tough. We have to match

Trump in some areas. And that's how Lou Chahier, I think, got sent to or will go regularly to Brussels. He won't be based there. He's the special envoy. On the other hand, sweet talking. And since September, I have to say, minimal reaction to what Europe has been doing defensively. I don't think the reply on the measures concerning Chinese EVs has been as strong as we might have expected. The rhetorics were stronger than the actions. Why?

Because Xi Jinping and China are looking at askance at what Trump and the U.S. might do any day, which would be go much quicker, much farther, much deeper. So I think we have a game. Mrs. von der Leyen, whom you mentioned as having been tough in Beijing, has recently thrown out an olive branch saying, you know, if you have proposals, if you want to make concessions, please come ahead. We're open for business. There's no reply.

Because Europe is not the leading actor. And that, to end my answer with your initial question, that's exactly where Europe is stuck in between a rock and a hard place, in between China and Trump.

Pierre, I wonder, just as an off-ramp to discussing the specific scenarios that the report raises, I wonder if you could just talk in broader terms about non-European global south and emerging powers factored into the thinking around the report. You know, I'm particularly thinking about a country like Turkey, which obviously is very close to Europe, but has a complicated relationship with it. It's very close to China in some ways. Like in today's newsletter, actually, we are covering...

a new special economic zone that's being set up between Turkey and Xinjiang, for example, to increase economic engagement and deepen economic engagement between Turkey and Xinjiang province, for example. And also the powers of the Middle East obviously play an increasingly important role in these calculations. So how did the Global South and the emerging powers of the Global South factor into the thinking around these scenarios?

Definitely. It gave me the opportunity to highlight the methodology of the report. So we had these six variables, but to feed them out of legitimacy, we tried to contact some experts, whether on one of these six variables, which were political, demography, economics, innovation, energy, and security. But we also made the effort of intimidating and sounding experts from the countries, China, Turkey experts, China, Vietnam experts. And the case of Turkey is quite a good one, I would say, because it's actually...

having a we hear a lot about them on the geopolitical front with the EU but also in Syria if you look at what's happening in Syria these days they're gaining ground we also hear they have quite a strong connection with China on the possibilities of the Ukraine peace agreement we remember they were it's in

in Ankara that the agreement on the food, food transits was just all this thanks to Turkish mediation. And we integrated actually one of fellow who's also associated to Transition Mountain, Mr. Ozel, who was underlining us also the competition between Turkey and Asia in Central Asia, for instance, also in the Middle East. So we have these players which have the

the leverage, maybe not this strong leverage against China, but there are many cases where when there's a dependency from China, we have to take into account these countries. We have Brazil in mind for food commodity. We have Indonesia for nickel. So factoring in these emerging economies was a key, especially if we consider a

a joint response. It would be naive to think only an alliance of democracy would be enough to have a pushback on China. So it was important for us to have the grasp, the feeling from the emerging countries' voices. I think first Turkey is an interesting case because it has a straddling position. For example, on Ukraine, it's very much trying to keep

Ukrainian Europeans on board any talk with Moscow because it fears an over-dominant Moscow in its own neighborhood. Let's not treat Turkey purely as a member of the global south. It has a customs union and has had for years with the European Union, which means products made in Turkey come into the Union free of charge. In fact, one of the main issues is that there was no close obligation of origins, which means currently Turkey could become a backdoor just as important as Hungary to get Chinese

cars, for example, into the EU. This is something that's going to be a problem, but it's closely related to the EU. You might cite the same issue about Morocco, for example. Europe hasn't been able, well, it thinks straight, but it doesn't act straight on these issues. Let's take, for example, French opposition to Mercosur, which at this point is totalitarian.

totally irrational, since the best defense against Donald Trump's bilateral blackmail and stone-arming on trade terms of nations is to expand our free trade zone and to constitute a moat of countries which don't necessarily subscribe to the same values, but at least have some of the same trading interests.

If you look at Eastern European countries, for example, I'm just back from Warsaw, they would like to have an increased part of auto production in Europe. It would be logical, you know, if you have to make costs go down. It's like moving from Michigan to Alabama or Tennessee, shall we say, when the Japanese came in. But these guys don't look with a very kind eye to production moving to the

countries on the periphery of Europe, Northern Africa, for example, or Egypt or Turkey, or even to imports from Thailand. It would be our interest in trading terms facing the Trump administration to have real avenues of trade to developing and emerging countries with clauses of origin that would guarantee that it's not actually Chinese products repackaged that come through this door. It's a difficult avenue, and I don't think that Europe has been very

very coherent yet about that, but its speech about the importance of the Global South, of the importance of maintaining free trade relation might lead to that. Well, let's dive into the four scenarios. So, Kobus, I'm going to ask Pierre about one and three, and if you can ask

François, about two and four, and then we're going to plow our way through these four scenarios. Again, this is a forecast looking ahead to 2035. It did not take into account what we've seen now, but a lot of what the report kind of lays out really doesn't always have that much to do with the U.S., and it's very important not to center the U.S. in everything that's about China. So I think we can still have a rather robust conversation about China independent of the U.S. Pierre, the first scenario is an unstoppable China-

on top of the world. In this scenario, you write, China solidifies its position as an indispensable global power, dominating key industries and supply chains while keeping its economy stable and technologically advanced. Expand on scenario number one for us.

Maybe it's an acceleration of what we're missing about this union of democracies, leaving the field open to China to have its own policies, its trade surplus booming. It's really playing on the weaknesses of countries, especially on the trade front, but also on the climate front. If China is able to provide clean tech solutions to most countries, it will gain the support among these countries, probably. It's also playing on the... I'm sorry, I have to again put the United States...

con in it about on the United States moving away from the geopolitical scene, maybe China having a bit more of a security engagement, whether tangible or not. It's just, it's China with less barriers to its expansion. So it would be on the economic front, especially being able to export with an

unsuccessful de-risking policy I would say and on the domestic front there would be an acceleration of the autocratic system in place thanks to technologies thanks to tamed opposition even more tamed opposition so I would say that

That's my key take on this first scenario. Maybe, François, you would add a few words on this one? No, not really. I think this is the optimal scenario for Xi Jinping, of course. And it's really based on relative strengths and weaknesses and on the division of others. So it does factor in pretty much what's happening in the West.

It's also something, by the way, that has happened before. Remember the ascendance of Japan, the book Japan as number one in these days, the optimism of Southeast Asian nations in the 80s and early 90s, people like Singapore, for example, who thought about really replacing the values of the West. So,

Even before we talk about the new factors, it's clearly something that China has in its sights. I just want to stress being on top of the world doesn't mean running the world. Doesn't mean taking up what you might call the West's burden. China's ideas about global governance are far less ambitious in terms of breadth and depth of this governance. Would leave aside a lot of issues.

The difficulty about that scenario, and we'll come back to that for other scenarios, is that how do you preserve trade rules are necessary for China because it's a huge surplus export nation. So it needs to be protected from a lot of countercurrents or starting with protectionism or with conflict. How do you do that if you don't take charge of other countries?

of other areas of international life. The US approach, the Bretton Woods approach was an integrated approach. And that's not what China is really about if you go beyond ideology and the speeches. - Just a little footnote here on that one scenario, Kobus, just before I get to you, you wrote there the trope when quote, "China rules the world remains a fantasy of self-deprecating foreigners."

So I guess you're not a huge fan of Martin Jacques and his 2009 book. Is that what I'm taking away from that statement? Yes, it is. A little bit of shade thrown his way on that one. Back in 2009, that was a pretty kind of like shocking book for people to read when it was like China's going to rule the world and be the best at everything. So here we are, I guess, 16 years later, not quite as relevant today. Go ahead, Kobus. Your second scenario is, you know, also highlights

you know, like this kind of interesting kind of mix of where China does get some pushback, but not coordinated enough to really hold back its rise. But at the same time, there's still some semblance of a global geopolitical balance. I wonder if you could unpack that a little bit, and particularly around which particular issues do you think China might get more or less resistance from some of these countries? Yeah, that second scenario is pretty much what I would call a muddle through

scenario for China's rise, not complete, facing obstacles and having to deal with some opposition and having to make compromises and willing also to make compromises, which, by the way, is an important question today that we must ask ourselves. But on the whole, it will also be a continuation of the recent trends before.

pre-2025. And I think it would be the best that all former advocates of engagement and dealing with China, attracting them slowly to our own ways of behavior, not to mention our values when that was the stated policy. The notion that it's a rational world and that we know what China's interests are and can therefore induce them to undertake actions that fit these interests and our own. There are

strong points which might make this scenario more or less likely. A very strong point is that in this report, we're generally very gung-ho on China's capacities for innovation and technology.

I wouldn't have written the same thing five years ago, but it's very clear that on a number of grounds, China is replicating the old Japanese Mitty story, but on a scale that the Japanese could never envision, which of course... And the speed too, I think, a pace that they're going much faster than the Japanese. As we say...

even now accelerating on a number of key developments. And it's a function of support. It's a function of market size. It's a function of the agility and ability of Chinese researchers. It's a function of everything that's been sucked in from outside into China. That was a stated policy ever since Deng Xiaoping got back into power. It predates Xi Jinping by far. And that's, of course, a huge opportunity.

Hey, do you remember what Mr. Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, said during the Asian financial crisis?

He said the Asian financial crisis, low prices, especially on chips and other things, would enable us to increase our level of living and productivity at almost no cost. And this is what part of the customer's market in other countries believes. The Chinese have been a factor of low cost and increased living standards. If you live outside the employment question, if you live outside

outside the longer-term security issues, security sometimes from a very concrete dual-use or cyber point of view, sometimes from the point of view of economic security, that is, if you have monopolies

in certain sectors, at some point the monopolies are going to extract their price. The Chinese price would no longer be a low price, it would become a high price. So there is this hesitation which for the time being favors China. I look at the US, you know, I don't know whether Donald Trump is going to go beyond the 10% surtax. If he doesn't go beyond, since China has been in deflation for 29 to 30 continuous months,

and has had a degree of currency devaluation, can easily match those countervailing duties as it is matching now European countervailing duties on EVs. It's very tough.

to go beyond that. And going beyond is going to have a cost for consumers. How much voters will arbitral between jobs and the price at the stores? That's something that's not decided yet. So I think these are huge societal factors. I insist that some of them are beyond China's hold. They belong to us. They belong to the receiving markets.

But it's an important issue. The other one, of course, I don't want to be too long, would be how much you can have this imbalance between, let's say, relatively low level of consumption of China. I think we exaggerate the degree of stagnation in China, but still it's much lower structural growth overall. And this export boom and boom of certain sectors, how long that impacts.

imbalance can prevail. Okay, let's move on. Progressively, your scenarios get more and more depressing for China and get more and more bearish.

So the third scenario is the end of China's economic and technology miracle. So moving on from the troubles that you talked about, Francois, to real, you know, a collapse of its current, well, not quite a collapse, but just a real downgrade of its current status. You write, global partners impose coordinated restraints on Chinese technology acquisitions, trade surpluses, and market access.

China remains a large, important economy, but experiences a relative decline in competitiveness and innovation. And certainly tied to this has to be factored in the demographic changes that are underway in China, which are going to put strains on the economy as well as the population continues to shrink. Pierre, talk to us about scenario number three, which is getting progressively more depressing for the Chinese. So first, I think it's again important to factor in why 2045, because it's the deadline for the...

the party has set for social modernization. So I think this in any scenarios will be achieved. There's a subset of all criterias. So we're not...

it's definitely pessimistic for China but it's not critical for China it would have modernized it would have achieved a certain level of development indeniably so it's not a recession or it's not a complete explosion of the Chinese model it's more an alignment of hurdles and barriers which would have made Chinese path more strained on the domestic front as you mentioned definitely the demographic issue would have started to be an issue and on top of this maybe this time the low consumption would have pushed the regime to rethink its economic model of growth because at

At the international level, as we were mentioning, you would expect a bigger push from developing countries, but also emerging economies trying to protect their own industries. So it's both the addition of domestic hurdles along with a pushback from the international partners. And what does the addition of these two components make is that possibly also at the regional level in terms of security or military...

It would refrain Xi Jinping from maybe attempting military intervention or initiative. So of course we have Taiwan in mind, but maybe because the domestic weaknesses of the economy would tame Xi Jinping's temptation to launch a military adventurism that could only actually worsen China's situation. So that's maybe the biggest impact of this. It's not only

Chinese economic and technology impact, but also maybe a security restraint. Francois, the fourth scenario is basically kind of a doomsday scenario in which there's a major conflict, you know, possibly around Taiwan, as the report specifies, which then, you know, has a

kind of global economic fallout. Has the recent developments around Ukraine shifted, like how you think about what that kind of conflict might look like? You know, like I think in my own background, my thinking around the different kind of sides of a possible conflict like this was very,

set kind of by Biden era kind of logics in some ways, you know, like assumptions about a certain kind of Euro-American alliance, for example. A lot of that is now kind of up in the air. So I was wondering how you think about this scenario at the moment. There are two ways that we could get to this, what you call the doomsday scenario number four of outright and increasingly global conflict. One is because of overconfidence. That would be an outgrowth of scenario number one. Xi Jinping feels he's really succeeded in overturning China

obstacles in dividing people. He feels he has allies, and let's say, for example, a Russian success on the Ukraine front. And he feels, therefore, he can now challenge the U.S. since the U.S. has backed away from outright conflict on other terrains. The U.S. might back

out of a Taiwan conflict that's been talked about in the U.S. That means a lot of risk-taking, of course, because historically the U.S. has been known to be unpredictable in terms of engaging Oumar in a conflict that he had not started. The other option would be, on the contrary, total insecurity on the part of Xi Jinping about himself and his regime, brought about by a sharp economic downturn. It's interesting that in the red lines that he has recently outlined to his outside partners, including the U.S.,

There is now what he calls the right of China for development, meaning don't put obstacles in the way of Chinese growth. And this is an important factor that might cause scheme, you know, in the usual scheme for authoritarian dictatorships that move forward externally when they're challenged internally to create the conflict around Taiwan.

Taiwan. This is entirely possible. It's very hard, however, to predict. In particular, we've seen a bunch of experts who say it's going to happen sooner rather than later because there is a window of uncertainty in U.S. behavior. And the window of uncertainty, by the way, hasn't fully closed, as you noted about the Trump administration. We'll see when we believe it.

but we are not seeing it yet. Or on the contrary, in a more traditional way, China needs more time. It's still building up its army. It hasn't really tested its army in many grounds, especially on the maritime front. And therefore, it's going to delay and hope for the best in between 2027, shall we say, and 2020.

2035 is really a milestone for two reasons. One, that we're really coming at the end of the sitting Ping's life.

potential longevity in power, either the succession would have taken place or it would become very much the number one topic of political strife in China among people at the top. And two, that's the moment when demography really hits. I'm always skeptical of quick demographic explanations because very often they jump to conclusions. Right now, the sudden and sharp drop in birth is

is something that might even be lessening Chinese costs rather than increasing them. But by 2035, of course, the situation will become drastically different. Xi Jinping has bet on automation and innovation to go over that issue. We can't be sure that he will have succeeded. So this number four scenario, it's not a purely Chinese factor that will lead to it.

But it's something that if we want to be on the safe side, we really have to include. And it's not because we might feel overconfident that the Chinese PLA hasn't been tested in battle and might lose that, that it won't happen. There have been regimes that start wars that they lose.

Yeah, and just to your point about Xi Jinping's age, he will be 81 years old in 2035. And if you read his speeches, he has insinuated, although I don't know if he has directly stated that he would like to see the reunification with Taiwan or the unification, as he calls it, in his lifetime. So that is another indication that something may happen. But again, I just want to put in a corollary to your

scenario because there is no consensus in the United States today on whether to defend Taiwan. The United States is a highly fractured, broken society on public opinion. And remember, Taiwan is not a treaty partner like the Philippines or Thailand, Japan or South Korea or Australia.

So there's no legal obligation on the part of the United States to defend Taiwan in the event that it is attacked. There's a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide military supplies for its defense, but not for the United States necessarily to defend it and to intervene.

So there is a scenario where China does move on Taiwan and there isn't the war that breaks out with the United States. The United States does what they're doing with Ukraine today, just to Kobus's point, and kind of says, well, that's the way it goes. That's just what happens. It's not our fight. And in that event...

There may not be the cataclysmic response that you outlined in scenario four. What do you think of that? We're very much overwhelmed by events happening now. Yeah. And that's, of course, what creates this uncertainty. Facing Taiwan, for example, Trump has started a TSMC game saying TSMC has got to team up with Intel, the ailing company.

chief maker in the U.S. and built in the U.S. And you saw the Intel shares rising immediately. Yeah, but TSMC people did not respond well to that, by the way. I mean, they did not like that idea. If I was Taiwanese, I'd be looking at Ukraine and say, if I give up my crown jewels now, what would be the rationale for the U.S. to defend us? And so as far as I can tell, TSMC is not moving as the Trump administration would like it to do immediately. But yes, in the longer term, this is an important step.

And also you have to realize now that China is using all sorts of harassment and coercion tactics, which are aimed at winning without the actual war by wearing down the opposition in democracies. And they can be quite confident, you know, with what's been happening.

that democracies can change their course if they are faced with conflict. After all, it's our number one issue in Europe about Ukraine. We don't really want soldiers there. If you ask people in terms of public opinion, nobody wants to die for Ukraine right now. It's the limit of our engagement and any authoritarian regime will calculate that on that front it has an advantage over democracies because it can engage in a conflict and lose stability.

soldiers when it's tougher for democracy. So you're right. This is a new window that is opening. But to be frank, if I

answer in a broader term, what's been happening about Ukraine must be raising more than eyebrows in Japan and Korea as well. Well, I was going to say what's happening in Europe is raising eyebrows because like Germany and Europe, Japan and Korea have tens of thousands of U.S. forces stationed there. And the prospect of U.S. forces being pulled out, which Trump has said is one of his ambitions, would provoke, I think, a lot of concern in South Korea and Japan to maybe start developing their nuclear weapons programs.

I don't know how much he said that he would withdraw troops from the farm. In the first term he did. In the first term. And he wanted them to pay up or else he'll take them out. That's right. No, that's a constant theme which they are accustomed and they know how to deal with it. But the issue of a

leaving Europe to its own travails is indeed something in the Japanese and the South Korean mind. Right now, especially the Japanese, they think they can repeat what I call Shinzo Abe-1. The maneuver of, you know, sweet-talking Trump, making very limited concessions, in fact, but in appearance, they're huge and hoping for the best. I'm not sure this was walk them through the second term. Pierre,

Pierre, I was wondering if you could reflect a little on, in these scenarios, how Europe's own position in the world may shift. You know, like when we were doing early analysis of the impacts of Trump on, like the shifts under Trump, one of the things that we were pointing out was that the kind of breakdown of the Atlantic Alliance also shifts Europe's position in relation to Africa, for example, right? Kind of because it, you

you know, like a more self-dependent Europe, making these large kind of like shifts in defence and so on, also shifts Europe's position as a norm setter, as an aid provider, as all of these kind of traditional role that Europe has played. And it also raises some kind of important demographic issues as well. So how do you see Europe's relationship changing in relation to

the global south you know and how could that affect also like possible trilateral cooperation with China I mean it could be is does Europe still have a place at the table and is it for us to heard tangibly I think Europe is still associated I mean there's a colonial past factor which still factors in at this point

So it's how much Europe is associated to this past or does it manage to have a more, how would I say this, transactional balance, transactional relation with certain countries. It's rethinking its position, but I think it's both an identity crisis for Europe about what would it be in this position in five, ten years from now on. Would it be sidelined compared to the US or China? And especially in relation with other countries, I think that's still...

underestimated presence of both European development aid to many countries, but also trade relations. Whether you look at ASEAN or African countries, trade relations from Europe compared to Russia or China is still much stronger coming in from Europe. So there are footprints that won't evaporate immediately, even in the context of more tense security or military relations.

So first, it's what will be Europe's position with its voice to be heard. How much will it have to adapt its trade discourse and trade relations? And secondly, how much its offer will be interested compared to that of China, I would say. China will have more as-good products and cheaper ones. So it's how to find which criteria to insert without alienating emerging economies and developing countries, I would say.

Okay, the report is China 2035, the chances of success produced by the Institut Montaigne. Absolutely essential reading, no doubt about it. This is fascinating scenarios to kind of explore and think about the various, and they go into such detail on it that it really is such worthwhile reading. It was written by François Godemont, special advisor and resident senior fellow focusing on Asia and America at the Institut Montaigne.

and also a non-resident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and also Pierre Pinas, a project officer in the Asia program at Institut Montaigne. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time and for this fantastic report and for helping us better understand what some of the scenarios are looking out 10 years from now, which is a fool's game right now given everything that's going on, but nonetheless really important for us to do. We appreciate your time today. Thanks, Corbus and Eric. Thanks very much.

This exercise of scenario planning

of going into excruciating detail, in this case, Europe's relationship with China. But, you know, I could imagine this being, you know, Botswana should have this, Kenya should have this. Every country should have these kinds of scenarios to try and think about how

their country is going to be impacted by the geopolitical changes more broadly, but specifically within China as well. We don't have that. Paul Nantouli, again, I referenced him in the beginning of the show. He always wants to make this point that China issues white papers on Africa on a regular basis, yet not a single African country has issued a white paper on China.

And that is what these types of scenarios and these types of reports do so well. And I do hope that our conversation today and reports like this inspire other governments. This is not a government. This was a think tank. But even think tanks in Africa and here in Southeast Asia to do this kind of exercise.

Yes, I mean, obviously, people like Yaki Selyea to the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, they do a lot of scenario planning and scenario planning has become a big part of South African think tank world. But specifically on China, though, I'm talking about that's what's missing here.

But not specifically on China. And I do think there's a lot of work being done in relation to Africa's position in the world, but not specifically in relation to China. I also think that more work in relation to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other global south emerging powers and putting those in context of China's rise, I think would also be really important.

You know, I spoke with an African journalist today and they were asking me about whether or not the changes in the Trump administration policy towards Africa is going to force China to change its approach to Africa. Fantastic question. But those are the kinds of scenarios and questions that think tanks and scholars should be airing out in the media. There should be a big public discussion in African media. And we're talking about Africa right now because that's

what you and I started on. That's your focus. This, of course, applies to South America. It applies to every region in the world. Everybody needs a coherent, detailed, robust China policy and China evaluation like this, these scenario plannings. We don't see it very much.

even here in Southeast Asia with such proximity to China and the deepest level of regional engagement that China has with any part of the world, we still don't see it. And so this is not an issue specific to Africa. We're just focusing on that, but it is a good kind of talking point. To me, it risks if you don't do this, you are going to be in potentially very big trouble because we've talked about your president, Cyril Ramaphosa, who may be confronted with

with the unimaginable choice if Joel Pollack becomes ambassador and if Trump follows through on his threats and what MAGA is talking about with South Africa to say you either remove yourself from the BRICS, remove yourself from the Belt and Road Initiative, or else you remove yourself from a relationship with us. That is a conceivable choice that he certainly is on the specter of, on the range of choices that he may be confronted with. My whole point is that

I'm hoping Durko right now is doing these kinds of scenario planning, saying, here's the best case scenario, here's the worst case scenario, here are the various options, so that the president has the full range of choices, be able to negotiate quickly, rapidly, and effectively with the Americans if he's confronted with that choice. I think so. But I think at the same time, that planning would also have to

have to kind of take into account some of the, like, broader dynamics that go beyond the bilateral relationship with the US, particularly the fate of Ogoa itself, right? Like the preferential trade, you know, trade pact with Africa as a whole. I mean, I've seen...

strong rumors coming out of Washington that AGOA itself is cooked and that it probably won't survive. There is no scenario that AGOA survives. No scenario that AGOA survives. Yeah. In which case, a very significant kind of like form of U.S. leverage disappears. And, you know, kind of American foreign assistance has also disappeared. So that's another form of very strong leverage. And Africa may disappear as well, in which case... I think you should get the point. They don't care.

They don't want leverage. They genuinely don't care. - In which case, then Africa will stop caring too, right? - Fine, but I don't think that matters to these guys. Do you know what I mean? Like that's not a threat of like, "Ooh, scare me Africa." Do you know what I mean? - Yeah, but that, you know, so then any kind of leverage of making South Africa do anything disappears, right? So like it's-- - I don't think they care.

In which case, then maybe we don't need a scenario, right? If no one cares, then it's fine. I mean, listen, I mean, if AFRICOM goes away, USAID goes away, AGOA goes away, there is not much left. Right.

Right. Yeah. I mean, we talk about critical minerals and Senator Ted Cruz brought all of the African ambassadors together, a group of them in Washington to reassure them that the United States still wants to remain engaged in Africa. And he, of course, used the opportunity to kind of crap talk the Chinese and raise the debt trap issue. But let's remember.

He is a senator. He does not carry any sway with the White House in terms of how they conduct foreign policy because that is being done by a very small group of people. So I wouldn't take Senator Cruz at his word for any of this stuff. I mean, basically, we have to look at the actions and the actions coming out of the White House right now are USAID is done. AFRICOM may be done. AGOA looks like it probably would be done. AGOA, by the way, comes out of the Congress, not the White House. But there's just not a lot of

you know, warm, fuzzy feelings right now for Africa. And there's not a lot of warm, fuzzy feelings for free trade agreements. So it would be weird if they kept it given the current direction that things are going in right now. Very quickly before we go, I want to talk about the G20 summit that took place last month, a couple of weeks ago.

It was in South Africa. We didn't cover it. It caught in the middle of... It's not the summit, though. It was a foreign ministerial meeting. I'm sorry. It was a foreign minister's gathering. Yeah, I think the summit is in November also, I think. That's right. So this is the preparatory for the summit. So this was a foreign minister's gathering. Senator Marco... Senator, listen to me. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio... Listen, he was a senator for a long time, so it's hard to kind of change that thinking. Secretary of State Marco Rubio did not attend...

He's pissed off with South Africa, as is Donald Trump. And so basically, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had the field to himself. I'd like to get your take on what you saw and what you read. Again, this is a couple weeks ago, but it's interesting to see Chinese diplomacy, how it's playing out in this new era. What were your takeaways from what you saw at the foreign ministers gathering that took place in Johannesburg?

It was mostly a space that, as far as I could see, it was mostly a space that was focusing on China's, on some of China's wider global foreign policy issues, right? So there was a lot of meetings with foreign ministers and ambassadors from Middle Eastern countries and North African countries, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, several of them. And it seemed to be

also functioning as a form of coordination on messaging around Gaza. You know, so China has criticized the Trump administration's plans to depopulate Gaza. You know, it's basically aligning with lines from, I think, the Arab world that this constitutes a form of ethnic cleansing.

And it was also for the ongoing normalization of India. So there was a large, prominent meeting with S. Jaishankar, the external affairs secretary from India. And so that sense that it was essentially kind of keeping tabs on and advancing larger kind of foreign policy issues that's outside of the Africa-China relationship.

Yeah, and there was some signaling going on to the United States in the meeting between Wang Yi and Cyril Ramaphosa, the president of South Africa, and conveying the message that China is going to be a stable, reliable partner. And that was, I think, some shade thrown towards the United States with the implication that it's a more erratic partner. Also, in the two meetings between the U.N.,

appearance that Wang Yi made as the rotating president of the Security Council, and then a week later going to the G20. Very warm response from other countries to China. It felt like Wang Yi was very relaxed. And by not having Marco Rubio there, he could devote his attention to the other players. Had Rubio been there, no doubt the two would have been fighting each other and boxing with each other and sparring with one another. So I think it gave...

the Chinese a lot of room to move without having the U.S. presence there. And that is the risk for the Americans, that if they step away from these fora and they're not there, the world is going to move on without them. And I think that's what we saw at this G20 foreign ministers meeting as well. There was a presence of the U.S. delegation, but of

not at the ministerial rank. So they were really not present in many of the conversations. So fascinating discussion. That's the kind of thing that we've been covering in detail over on the site. Kobus has been writing about a lot of these things for the daily newsletter. By the way, we've changed our format recently on our newsletter.

Folks were complaining that it was too much detail, a little bit too much to read. So one of the things we've been doing is shortening up big parts of it to make it easier to consume on a daily basis because we're all dealing with information overload. You know, a lot of people say they don't have the capacity to subscribe to something else. The one answer I give to you on that is there's literally nothing else like this newsletter.

that Kobus and I produce every week. So I do the Mondays and Kobus does Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday. And then we've got our China Global South Ideas newsletter on Friday. Folks in about 25 different governments around the world are subscribing to this. Scholars, academics, universities, activists, corporates are all part of our reader community. And we would like you to join our reader community. Go to chinaglobalsouth.com slash subscribe, and you'll be able to follow the great work that Kobus Jiroh

Lucy, Edwin, Johnny and the rest of the team are doing around the world. So that'll do it for this edition of the China Global South podcast for Cobus Van Staden in Cape Town. I'm Eric Olander. We'll be back again next week with another episode. Until then, thank you so much for watching and listening.

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