Kenya Prez Ruto Shows Persistence Pays When Negotiating With China
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Hello and welcome to another edition of the China in Africa podcast, a proud member of the Seneca Podcast Network. I'm Eric Olander, and as always, I'm joined not from beautiful Mauritius this time, but Gero Nima is joining me here in Salzburg, Vienna. A very chilly good morning to you, Gero. Morning, Eric. But it's still beautiful here in Salzburg as well.

It is still beautiful here, but you can tell we are not in our normal environments because, first of all, I'm not sweating like I normally am in Southeast Asia all the time. You and I are both wearing sweaters today. Yes, it's cold. And it's a little bit on the chilly side. We're going to tell you all about why Giro and I are in Austria. We've been here all week, thanks to the generosity of the Salzburg Global Forum, fantastic organizations that put on a wonderful conference this week that we're going to talk about towards the end of our show today.

about some of the themes about envisioning new paradigms for Africa. And so we'll get Giro's take on that. And again, just some fantastic conversations that we're having in Austria this week. And so very thankful to the Salzburg Global Forum for making this possible.

But today we're going to focus on William Ruto's visit. The Kenyan president went to Beijing and had what can only be described as a very successful visit to Beijing. He came back for the first time in a long time. He's done many visits to Beijing. His suitcases have been rather empty in previous visits, but he's going to be finishing up his trip to China this week, coming back with a lot of deals and a lot of promises. And then we're going to get Chih-ho's take very quickly on the demise of

of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which is yet another U.S. agency that has been put into the woodchipper, as Elon Musk would say. Let's start right away into Kenyan President William Ruto's visit to Beijing. He is in Fujian as we are recording this on Friday, wrapping up a week-long visit that started yesterday.

On the 21st, again, by any measure, Giraud, this was a good one. Let me just run down some of the highlights and then I want to get your take. 20 MOU signed. He finally got this phase three deal signed on the Standard Gauge Railway. And they're going to do a public-private partnership bringing the Standard Gauge Railway from the Rift Valley.

in Naivasha out to the Ugandan border of Malaba. We're gonna hear from you on that. There's also a new highway plan from Nairobi to Malaba out to the Ugandan border. The statement made reference to the fact that these would probably be done under the auspices of a public-private partnership. There are also numerous announcements made for initiatives in vocational training, new digital traffic management systems, and the rollout of a new fiber optic network. Most importantly, at least diplomatically,

ties were upgraded between China and Kenya to comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era. That is moving up in the hierarchy of China's diplomatic ties, and so it just again is more symbolic in terms of the importance that China is attaching to its ties with Kenya. So of course the big

thing, Géraud, that everybody's thinking about is that as the United States is announcing its wind down of its diplomatic presence in Africa, here we have William Ruto in Beijing ramping it up. Give us your big take picture of this visit this week. My big picture is, it's really quite interesting because when I see how and what William Ruto managed to get from this trip, it's really interesting in a way that you see someone who's been very insisting for

fighting hard to get things out of Beijing and where despite all the warning, the signals that, you know, things will not go the way you expect, you don't get what you want. But he kept consistently into working to get something out of China. And when you see, especially when we mentioned the railway deal, we see that coming out of that, it's really something impressive in a way that he managed to find the way to get China to be involved in that project again. That's something I think it's commendable.

for someone who say, you know, I see now how China is moving. I see how things are changing. How do I need to change? How do I create incentive for China to be on my side, to be with me in that regard? And that's something quite interesting because you see someone who learned how to adapt to

learn how to readjust. And maybe he's been really studying China. Maybe he started with like, we want that $1 billion. Do you remember? It was, we want $1 billion for railway and everything. And then he started to learn that that's not going to work. We need to readjust, to reimagine our way to engage with China. And I do believe that's really quite interesting. And as you mentioned yourself, 20 MOUs, agreements signed here and there, promises made and everything. I think it's something quite significant. And I believe that he's happy. He

He's heavy right to be happy about this trip, how he went to China. But now we're going to have to look into how those deals are going to be implemented, especially the MOUs, because the MOUs are still MOUs, but we're going to have to see how they're going to follow through on that. But on the overall picture, I do believe that he really did an overall good job.

during this trip. Some excellent points there. And I think, again, I think you're right. You've made me think about this in a different way. Listen, the Kenyans were persistent on this. For 10 years, they've been trying to get this phase three deal signed. And for 10 years up until now, the Chinese said, no, we're not there. The Kenyans then went looking for financing elsewhere to get the SGR extended from Naivasha. They couldn't do it. So they went back

And they came up with a more innovative financial solution through a public-private partnership, de-risking it a little bit so it's not all coming from the policy banks. So I think the lesson here is, to your point, excellent points here. One, persistence matters. You got to keep at it. If you don't get it the first time, you don't get it the second time, you don't get it the ninth time, you keep going at it.

Number two. And learn. And learn. That's it. And that's the key one. That's the key lesson. They adapted to the Chinese reality. Exactly. So simply going to China and saying, I want a China Ex-Im Bank loan for $3 billion, not going to work in this day and age anymore. Exactly. They came up with a new plan. So I think this trip is very instructive for other African policymakers on how to engage the Chinese at this moment right now. Let's look at quickly another highlight of the deal, $1.6 billion in deals.

Total signed at the China-Kenya business roundtable. Now, what was interesting, a couple of key takeaways from this. One is lots focused on manufacturing. This is a key Kenyan priority. In each of the announcements, they listed the number of jobs that are attached to each of the projects.

Let me read you a few of them, and this gives you just a flavor. Again, I'm not going to go through all of them because there are too many. $150 million for a new special economic zone specifically focused on manufacturing. Again, African countries, specifically Kenya, want to move up the value chain. Light industry, manufacturing is part of it. This new $150 million SEZ is part of that. 5,000 jobs.

A company by the name of Chongqing Shangcheng Apparel Group signed a $20 million deal to set up a manufacturing facility that will create 7,000 new jobs. Shandong Jialijia Agricultural and Husbandry Company. These are great Chinese company names. No branding or flair in any of these names.

They're going to build a $30 million hen laying farm that will accommodate 500,000 chickens and create 500 jobs. And then the Hunan Conference and Exhibition Group will invest $23 million to build hotels and conference centers in Kenya. So, Giro, two things that I take away from this. Number one, we're starting to see the pullback a lot more. This is a key trend of the central government and Beijing, two provinces. Notice that there was...

Hunan, Shandong, Chongqing, these are all cities and provinces that are increasingly becoming more active in the China-Africa relationship. The focus on manufacturing, this is a key Kenyan priority, and that focus on jobs.

And this is quite interesting as well. We've been talking about it for quite some time now, seeing now provinces being engaged more into Africa relationship, the subnational engagement, where really Beijing is trying to take a step back and letting the provinces where they can have their own quote-unquote foreign policy and foreign trade engagement with African countries. And this is the part as well where you see certain countries are learning better than

others to say you know what instead of going to Beijing let me go to Chongqing let me go find Hunan let me go find Fujian governors because they also have state-owned companies let's go to the industry because they also have their goals in terms of development goals in terms of internal stability so those provinces are

They also have a lot of incentive to go overseas to find new markets, to find new opportunities. So when the government in Africa start to understand it, find them as an opportunity to engage, they can really get a lot more from those provinces than what they can get from Beijing. Because...

When you understand how China works in terms of development policy, that each province has a certain goal to attend, they have the autonomy to decide, you kind of know, why would I go to Beijing? I can engage with Chongqing. I can engage with Hunan. And we've seen what Hunan has been doing for the last five years in terms of engagement with Africa, actively walking into becoming that hub between mainland China and Africa to really become that trade hub for African countries. And having those kind of engagements, it's a sign that, you know, the China-Africa relationship is changing exponentially.

It's shifting. We are seeing the emergence of new actors, of new stakeholders. And I do believe that many in Africa should also start paying attention to that and also be ready for those kind of changes. Those kind of changes have been happening already, but I feel that many are not picking up on those changes. They're still kind of distracted in the way they approach China in those kind of engagement. So this is when we talk about the need for better infrastructure.

China literacy. It's exactly this, Jiho, about understanding the different pieces that make up China. And I think a lot of people don't always appreciate when we're talking about Chinese cities, Chongqing, for example. And just a few weeks ago, Chongqing, the mayor, came to

Nairobi spent a week there and had a whole big thing. And I, you know, a lot of people in Kenya were kind of confused about Chongqing. I mean, it's, it's a funny sounding name. What is it? But it's a massive industrial hub. This is one of the major auto manufacturing centers of the world. Chongqing alone, just a

city has almost a half a trillion dollar GDP. When we're talking about Zhejiang province, which is where Alibaba is headquartered, we're talking about a province that has a one trillion dollar GDP. This is almost a G20 size country, just one province. And so this is why it's so important for African policymakers. And clearly the Kenyan team deserves praise for being able to engage these different stakeholders. And again, he's in Fujian right now. So you

He's out of Beijing. That's a very encouraging sign. Also, Angola's president last year went to the northeastern province of Shandong. So we're starting to see, you know, this more diverse actors in the China-Africa relationship. And if you're following this story, this is a key takeaway from this visit, I think. And so, you know, I just want to echo what you've been saying there on this.

And I believe that we really need to change in our way of engaging those big countries, being China, being the United States. We have a lot of subnational actors from which we can get much more into our engagement with them. They have a lot of economic power. They have a lot of economic leverage and agencies that we don't always look into. And not looking into those provinces and those subnational actors, we're missing out in terms of opportunities, in terms of what we can really get from those countries. And that, I think, in the case of Kenya,

They've really learned a lot. And I'm expecting to see much more of those engagements. And the interesting part that you mentioned, that we see a lot of those provincial authorities traveling around the global south, in Latin America, in Southeast Asia, in Africa as well, to find new markets, new opportunities. And most of the time, they fly under the radar because, as you say, you arrive in Kenya. Chongqing, what is Chongqing? What is it and what...

We want China. That is China. That's the China that makes money. That's the China that makes business. And this is where you can really get things being done as well in your relationship with China in terms of economic engagement. And that is definitely the new China. What we'll call the new China right now because, again, not the central China. These are called subnational actors. And these are the ones to keep an eye on. Also the city of Shanghai, Guangdong province. There's a lot of, and Hunan, of course. We've talked a lot about Hunan in Africa over the years.

And it's also a way for Beijing to de-risk its own engagement with African countries. Having sub-national actors being there, having a lot of private actors from sub-national levels to be there, it's also a way for Beijing to de-risk its engagement, having much more actors being present. It allows to have a diversity of engagement, not to have one country, the country being stranded in a difficult economic situation with the central government. And I think it's a strategy that so far it's starting to work, it's starting to take shape. We should be a

expecting to see much more of those happening in other countries as well. Well, that de-risking is most evident in the details of the standard gauge railway deal between Navajo and Malaba, where, again, it's going to be a public-private partnership. You still are quite skeptical about this. Again, we have not seen contract signings yet. So we've seen agreements, we've seen a lot of head nodding, we've seen a lot of talk about it. But

You want to see a contract signing because when you have more actors in it, that makes it more complicated. When it was just the China Ex-Im Bank, it was one guy who could sign the deal and then you're done. But now because the China Ex-Im Bank will be involved in this, but also other players, corporate actors and other stakeholders will be involved, you got to line up a lot of different signatures in order to get the

these things ready. However, it still raises the question on the viability of this railway. One of the problems of bringing it out to Malaba is these are not densely populated areas. These are also, there's not going to be a lot of passenger traffic and there's not a lot of heavy industry or mining in these areas as well. Now they're building for the future. People will say bringing it out to Uganda can tap into a lot of potential transport that will come into Uganda and potentially then from Uganda can tap into other rail networks that can then kind of connect with the SGR.

But this is going to be difficult for the Kenyans to make this profitable. They're going to have to work very hard. It worries me as well, and I don't know if that caught your attention, that if they're going to build a new highway from Naivasha to Malaba, does that not present competition for the SGR? That, of course, has been the problem in the Nairobi to Mombasa, where the truckers are still very much a competitive force against putting cargo on the SGR. So I'm just wondering about the logic of putting a

highway next to the new railway, creating more competition for the railway. I think maybe they want to incentivize the development of the region to say, we are building infrastructure first, because it's almost a bit what Japan and China have done in their own country, where we build infrastructure first, and we hope that people are going now to follow. Because you have infrastructure, people would want to build there, because you know, now I can build there because I can go there. And it was a chicken-egg situation, where as an operator, as an investor, you want to see people...

economic activities being there to build the railway. But as people, you see, why would we be going there? Because there's no connecting point. There's no infrastructure. Now, Kenya has been really trying to get that. And so far, they come up with a very, very complex approach into getting done. It's a

private-public partnership, but the way it's going to be funded, like 30% from China Exim Bank, 40% from a consortium of Chinese companies, 30% from the government of Kenya, but through the levy that's going to be paid through the railway because they're going to be a kind of toll payment, but they're going to have to change the land ownership rights and legal... So,

So just all of that to get to a point where we need to de-risk as much as possible the financing of this project in a way that, yes, as China, we want to invest in, we want to build in, but we want to guarantee the return on investment. But second of all, we don't want to find ourselves stranded with you Kenyans in a position where you cannot pay us back.

And this is where you say the debt trap narrative reverse where China say, I don't want to be trapped in you not being able to pay me back. And this is what really, when I read the details on what may happen, it was really interesting because I realized that just because of that, we are seeing how China is changing norms. It's kind of influencing how certain regulation and norms may start to work for countries if they want to keep on.

attracting a certain amount of Chinese investment, what kind of change they need to put in place just to be able to de-risk the loan and the lending they're going to get from China. Yeah, that's very interesting that you said that. Also, there was a discussion between Ruto and various stakeholders in Beijing about some flexibility is the word that they use on some of the debt repayments for the SGR. They have to be very, very careful on this because a couple of weeks ago, they hinted that they were going to ask for restructuring

of the SGR debt, that sent the markets into a little bit of a tizzy because it was hinting that maybe the Kenyans are running into debt distress. The Kenyan treasury came out. And they say it was not the case. They said, no, it's not the case. No, no, they denied it. We did not talk about it. That was not the point of our discussion. It was a misinterpretation of what we said and everything else.

That's right. But it was it shows you the sensitivity of these conversations. But it also I think it's a little bit unfair in one respect that the markets are that hard. You know, Kenya has actually been quite good in its debt servicing. Yes, the debt levels have gone up, but they have not fallen behind. They have maintained their payments.

They've kept up and they're, by the way, they're now coming to the end very soon and within a year or two of their SGR payments. This thing is going to be paid off. One of the things that the Kenyan finance ministry said that because this is getting to the end of the initial payments for the SGR, that they can take on new debt for the new phase. Now, the markets didn't like that either, by the way. That's why they came back to the public-private partnership. But one of the key things about this trip, unlike previous trips,

We did not see big China Ex-Im Bank loans. There's no more of that bilateral sovereign lending talk that used to frame so many of these African state visits to Beijing. That was missing from that discussion. Exactly. That was really missing from that discussion. And just to go back a bit on the lending and how the market has been hushed.

It reminds me of a study that was released a few months ago talking about how when we look into beyond Kenya, look into Africa, the rate of default on loans that comes on infrastructure in Africa is the lowest in the world.

Yeah. So basically, African country, the loans when it comes to infrastructure, the rate of like we're defaulting or not, it's really the lowest in the world. So the way the market is reacting toward Africa when it comes to infrastructure, it's always hard. That's why I guess the point where people say we need to start having our own

own rating agency to kind of evaluate our own risk because somehow people have the feeling that when they hear that Kenya wants to talk about restructuring its loans, it's like, no, no, it's dangerous. No, Africa has been doing relatively good, especially when it comes to loan for infrastructure. So I think that the market is really, really too harsh on Kenya and on Africa on that in general. But to your point, yes, a lot has been done and you really see that there is that demand

of really controlling and maintaining a certain control of how China financing is now working in Africa. And the lack of China Exim Bank just reminds me that, let's not forget, Las Focac already gave us the cap in terms of the amount of money that's going to come out of China for the next three years on the continent. So we're in the first year of that year. I don't see a lot of billions of dollars coming right now because there are still many moving pieces here and there. But let's not forget,

Those deals that have been signed and everything, they'll be counted in at the end when you're going to have the 4K in 2027. They're going to be counted in as a part of the whole package that China mentioned in its agreement with Africa.

Now, last summer, you and I were in Washington. We talked to one of the top China-Africa experts, and we asked this scholar about why hasn't China restructured some of Kenya's debts. And her reply was very simple, and I thought that was very interesting. She said, China doesn't need to restructure Kenya's debts because they're paying off their debts. They're not in distress. Exactly. They're doing fine. I mean, it's difficult to be sure. There's no doubt. The debt servicing is taking up quite a bit of the budget. It's a heavy...

But they are actually doing it. And we cannot forget that in the discussion, that Kenya is actually holding its own. And by the way, you were talking about creating a new African ratings agency to evaluate credit scores and whatnot. That's something that the team at Development reimagined and led by Hannah Ryder. They're pioneering that. So if that's a topic that you're interested in, be sure to look up what Hannah and her team are doing on that front as well. So I did mention that the upgraded diplomatic ties, comprehensive strategic

partnership in the new era. Now, that kind of phrasing doesn't mean a lot to a lot of people. And it's very confusing. There are these charts that are out there that show the hierarchy and the rankings. And last year, we went through this when I think the DRC was moved up. It's a rabbit hole. It is a rabbit hole. It's very complicated. But basically, you have Russia at the top. They're at a separate category. Very, very high. That's right. And then you've got another group, and Vietnam is up there. And these are the priority countries.

Pakistan as well. Pakistan as well. These are the neighboring countries around China's periphery that are very strategically important. And then right below it, you've got this cluster of global South countries. And I think that's where the DRC is now. That's where Kenya was put in there. I don't entirely know what benefits it brings, but I think it's a more of a symbolic gesture that says, listen, you are now very important. The timing of this visit

was crucial because it comes just as the United States. We learned over the past several days now that the United States has closed the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which I want to get your take on it. It's restructuring the State Department to de-emphasize Africa. It's going to close a number of missions there. It's going to have a special envoy. But the special envoy, the use of special envoys in many ways is a reflection of a way that Trump wants to do diplomacy, which is one-to-one as opposed to having a

big, giant bureaucracy. But the message coming out of the United States is that Africa now is not anywhere near as important as it used to be. And I think the Chinese were taking advantage of this to say Africa remains very important to us and highlighted by this trip with William Ruto. I remember in our discussion, you were saying when from Beijing, people in foreign affairs are really laughing, they're really smiling because they say, yeah,

You're leaving space to us. They just laughing their butts off on this one. And when I was writing about that story at the beginning of what to expect about the Trump 2.0 in Africa, I was kind of predicting that not every African country will matter to the Trump administration. It's going to be a handful

picked country that's going to matter. That's why we see now in terms of the reduction of the African Bureau, the closing of many embassies and offices in Africa, the reduction of certain diplomats and all. It's really to show you that we are not really seeing the continent as a whole, as strategic places. We are considering few countries as being important where we want to be

knowing what's happening there. And in that regard, do we need a full department for that? We're going to need an individual person who can tell us what's happening there, how we should be engaging that country. And that's it. From China perspective, it's really playing into China perspective to say, you know, in China's narrative to go back to African country and say, we remain consistently engaged with the continent as a whole. We maintain that we are there really consistently. You being big

small, resource poor or not, we are going to remain present in the continent and we're going to do as much as we can because we are friends. This is going to really play into Beijing narrative to say, we are there. We are there to stay. We are really engaged in whatever situation you are having here. And this is the part I believe that in the United States they don't get. And it's really counterproductive into the idea that they wanted to

counter China, but they're really doing the contrary of what they say they wanted to do. Interesting that the counter China narrative is not coming through in a lot of these downgrades of the African presence. It's not, and you would have thought that it would be. A lot of the response from stakeholders in Washington is,

Don't cut these things because you're going to hand it over to China. That's been the narrative coming out of D.C. But you mentioned that a few countries will be important to the United States. Let's maybe quickly just look at some of those. So let me just see if I'm guessing what you're going to say is right. You're going to say South Africa is going to stay important, right? Yeah. Okay. Your country, the Democratic Republic of Congo, because of the critical minerals, right? Yeah, just to an extent, yes. Okay.

And we have this deal that supposedly is making its way through about weapons. I'm very skeptical of that, but okay. Djibouti is going to still be important because it's got Camp Le Mognier and the U.S. military presence there, right? Yes. Okay. They don't like being there because they hate the fact that the Chinese are there as well. Then there's Somaliland.

Somaliland is not a country, at least not yet, but there is growing momentum in Washington to formally recognize Somaliland, which would be a potential setback for China because Somaliland has a relationship with Taiwan. I have a feeling that the Trump administration is going to recognize Somaliland.

Quote-unquote, but China can find into the AU and the AU Commission allies on the continent to be against Somaliland because the AU is against that Somaliland thing of becoming an independent country because we've seen the experience of South Sudan and everything. There's no really traction on the continent to see Somaliland becoming an independent country.

And China can really play into that narrative again to the South African Union to say, that's not the way to go. That's not the solution and everything. And all of that, I think that's going just to create more space for China narrative to grow more and to be much more accepted on the continent.

There was a wonderful article written by New York Times Kenya correspondent Abdi Latif Dahar in the Times about the Somaliland issue, and he was kind enough to quote me in it. I'll put a link to that in the show notes, but it is an absolutely fascinating issue. Let's quickly wrap up this Kenya discussion because one of the other, you know, highlights of the trip that didn't get a lot of notice, but it was not in the official statement, but it was released before.

by the government that China is going to pay for the new headquarters complex of the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Now, this should not come as a surprise to anybody. China has been building government buildings across Africa. Ghana's new foreign ministry annex was built by the Chinese, the Tunisian diplomatic academy at Sierra Leone, the new Zimbabwe parliament was built by the Chinese, the African Union headquarters, the Africa CDC. All in all, there are about 170, 180 new buildings.

But we know for a fact that China was spying on the Kenyan government, I think about two or three years ago, to check on their debt issues, the Ministry of Finance and others. And at the same time, there's a question of, you know, I go back to Paul Kagame's statement after the spying incident at the African Union, when he said, if we did not want them to spy on us, we should have built our own building. Right.

And he was a little bit more animated than that. And I mean, what does it say about a country as large as Kenya that they can't pay for their own foreign ministry building? Okay. I mean, I just, I mean, Kenya is a big country in Africa and it should be able to pay for its own foreign ministry building. And I just, I don't know, the optics of having a foreign country pay for your foreign ministry building to me just feels, I don't know, it just feels weird. I mean...

It's just lazy. I mean, I don't know. It's lazy. The reality is it's just lazy because China will not put a billion dollars on that building. It will be something within the range of like 100 million US dollars. It's not about being nice because you can hire a Chinese architecture company to make the design to be the building. But do you really need Chinese money to build that building? Come on.

I mean, they can have Chinese company doing the work. They can have Chinese company doing the architecture, do the design and everything. But do they really need Chinese money to build that? And this is the part for me is like, it's lazy. It's just lazy because it's an easy way out. It is, but you also want a foreign policy that is objective.

And that when you are, your building is literally built by one of your major partners, then it makes it more difficult to push back when you need to push back. I mean, it's like any relationship. I mean, Giro, if I give you a whole bunch of money, you're probably going to take it, right? But you're going to be like, well, maybe you take it and not feel weird. But a lot of people would feel weird.

weird if I then if I then now come and ask you for favors I say you know listen I gave you that money now some people will say F off you gave me the money you know go do your own thing but a lot of people will feel obligated and we're not suggesting that there will necessarily be a quid pro quo but the

optics are just not great and and that's that's the frustrating part of all this you know that's why i'm talking about laziness why i'm talking about laziness let's talk about ecowas for instance ecowas building by the way was built by the chinese too do you know how much it costs 31.6 million dollars ecowas headquarters in abuja nigeria which is probably about one day of oil sales from nigeria

31.6 million dollars. Do you want to tell me the ECOWAS country altogether do not have 31.6 million to put on the table? Or Nigeria alone do not have 31.6 million to put on the table? Come on. This just become lazy cop-outs. We want easy gifts. We want someone. You want to give us? Okay, thank you.

It's not because it's easy, they can do it, that you have to accept it. Because at some point, it's about your own sovereignty. It's about your own ability to say, you know what? There are certain spaces where gift will not be allowed. On sovereign matters like, for example, you building a governmental building, we say, no, no, it's not a billion dollars. It's not a 500 million. It's within our range. We can do it. We can build it ourselves. You can help us with the companies. You can help us with the design. But we're going to build it ourselves. We're going to give you the money. We're going to do it.

But receiving sovereign building as a grant, as a gift, for me, just lazy and very undignified. You're not dignifying your own country. And it's really, as I say, it's really lazy. There's nothing else. There's no financial issue. It's just pure laziness.

So this comes at a time when you and I are thinking about these issues and with a great group of people, many young people here in Salzburg, Austria, who were brought at the invitation of the Salzburg Global Forum to talk about, again, a new kind of vision for Africa. And it contrasts sharply with what you're talking about in terms of this laziness. What we're hearing from this discussion of

environmental stakeholders, education stakeholders, people from public policy, ex-diplomats who are all here talking about what a future for Africa would look like. I'm here more as an observer than a participant. It's important because this is an Africa-centered conversation. And what Salzburg wanted to do, the Salzburg Global Forum, is to center Africans in the discussion about

what a future Africa would look like. And what you hear is very much in contrast to what you're talking about. What you hear is young people saying they want a future where Africa is seen as an equal on the world stage. They don't want to be dependent on handouts. They don't want the aid. They don't want the dependency. There's been a very robust discussion here this week about whether it's good or bad that USAID left. In fact, there's some folks who are very supportive of USAID who've been at this conference. And

you've heard some pushback against them saying, yes, we know what USAID's contributions were to Africa, but at the end of the day, we weren't always comfortable with it. And so it's been a very dynamic conversation here. It's one of these really rare opportunities when you get opportunities

a lot of people away from their normal environments, put them in a beautiful kind of space, and then you get to have these kind of very dynamic conversations. Give us a little bit of the overview of some of the conversations that have been going on, because you've been in the middle of so many of them, and tell us a little bit about what your impressions are.

It's really those impressions where you have young people, the strength and the energy of seeing things changing, especially in this environment where we see the withdrawal of the U.S., diplomacy around the world, and what does it mean for the rest of the world, what does it mean for the country in the global south, and why and how Africa can navigate those environments. It's really interesting because we talked about so different issues, diplomacy, education,

technology, AI, and all of that. Nature, how we should be moving forward and how can we be centering Africa in those conversations. I even had, it's under Chetamara's rules, but I can tell what I said. I even throw out the idea, since we are talking about resetting the international law,

or the, why don't we dismantle the UN altogether? Because let's face it, it didn't really help Africa as much. And it really sparked a whole debate on like, you were not popular with that one, I'll admit. That was not a popular take. But at least it's opened the door for a debate of thinking like, how can we change things?

How can we move forward? Do we really need to keep things the way they are? Because we are talking about the UN as being a staple of the international order today, as if nothing can change. Forgetting that 76 years ago it did not exist. It came after the French, before that there was something else, before that there was nothing. So actually they can really have changes, structural changes that can take places. But one of the things that I will get out of this conversation is like, Africa needs to be bold.

African countries and Africa as a whole are going to need to be bold enough to make the courageous move, the structural changes that are required for it to exist as a global player. And I'm really urging African stakeholders, African leaders who are listening to us, who are present, to really, really take really hard

look into what can we do to really get things moving. And when I was saying African stakeholders who are listening to us here in Salzburg, here I'm going to give a really shout out to, it was really interesting. We are having a dinner and I introduced myself to a diplomat. Hey, my name is Christian Géraud. Oh, Christian Géraud. I know.

I was like, you know me. I listen to your podcast, the China Africa podcast. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Eric, come. This one person who really, and here I'm going to call out Ambassador El Gassim Wane. He's been the head of Minusma in Mali. He's really a big fan. I know he's going to hear this.

And he's going to hear this episode. Really thank you for the support and really thank you for listening to us. He's a super fan. Having a person like him telling us that we are doing a good job, it's a really vote of confidence. And it's really warmed up our heart to say we need to keep on doing what we do. So that's really the kind of people we've met here. That really was the verse.

Exactly.

you know, didn't end very well given that Mr. Adolf Hitler came from Austria. And the purpose of the forum is to make sure that Austria doesn't go down that path again. So by bringing all these discussions together, by creating knowledge and by kind of thinking about big world problems, uh,

I participated in one of their events in California as well, focused on China. This year, they're focusing on Africa. But the timing of this conversation about Africa by a group like the Salzburg Global Forum that is dedicated to trying to prevent the world from going back into a world war that happened in the 1930s and 1940s, now as we are on the doorstep

of a new era where I describe it as the wolves are at the door. Russia is becoming much more assertive. The United States is obviously changing. China is a major power. And Europe is increasingly sidelined in this new era that we're in right now. Europe doesn't have a voice on a lot of these issues. And so one of the things that we've talked about all week is that this produces both opportunities and risks for

for some African countries. So again, it's difficult to talk about Africa as a continent because I don't particularly like doing that because I think it flattens this huge region that is extraordinarily diverse. I think you've talked about how there are going to be winners and losers in Africa from all of this. Some places are going to come out of this much stronger.

And as we're seeing, William Ruto negotiated a good deal in Beijing. That bodes well. South Africa is struggling right now, given its pressure that it's facing from the United States. But talk about the conversations again this week at the moment where we are in history. And I think that was a major theme of the show.

of the discussions. Yes, those conversations really come to a moment where it's about where do we stand now? Where do we go from here? Where do we, do we align or not? How do we move into that changing world? Do we align to the new environment, the G20, the BRICS,

What substance are we giving? What tool do we have as Africa to be able to become a global player? Do we go as a grouping of country? Do we go as single countries? Or do we go as sub-regional groups into that new battlefield that are taking place? How do we assert our advantage? How do we put on the table our leverage to say...

because of X, Y, Z, we want this and that. How do we move in within the G20? We're going to have the G20 coming in South Africa. What's going to be Africa's stance? Do we have the AU Commission being able to do something? So let's stop there because this was a very lively discussion we had yesterday.

where there was a lot of excitement about the African Union joining the G20, which is effectively now the G21. Notice, by the way, we don't call it the G21. Yeah. That is weird to me, but okay. But a lot of people kind of came out and said, what has the G20 done? It's a useless organization now that is just mired down politically

by great power politics. In fact, there's, I think, a strong indication that the United States is not going to participate, not even going to attend. And so does this even matter? The last time the G20 convened, the African Union was quiet, did not assert itself.

So a lot of people kind of said, maybe this is the time for the African Union and Africans to lean into new institutions like the BRICS. In fact, there was an indication that Kenya wants to join the BRICS, which would be a great thing if for no other reason. There are many countries. But here's the one thing, the reason why, let me just tell you the reason why the best thing that Kenya joined the BRICS is because you'd add a K into BRICS to finally spell it correctly. Yeah.

We got to go from bricks to bricks. We got bricks. We really got bricks. But anyway, some enthusiasm now for some of the Chinese initiated multilateral fora that are coming out and less enthusiasm for the G20, the UN and all these others. So, you know, pick up that conversation and tell us why.

how an Africa-centered conversation on these issues differs than having a lot of white people talking. An African-centered conversation really gets us to the place where we talk about the way we see the world, the way we think of like what those organizations are delivering for us. Because there was a moment, a question of like people in the global north seems to be a bit of distracted and not always grasping the idea and the

on the why on the global South we are calling for reform. People are not really paying attention closely. Why people keep on calling, questioning the validity of the current international system? And this is one of the issues. We are not paying attention in the global North. What's happening? Why are those things happening? Unless they start doing that, they will never understand why in the global South, in African countries, saying we want to be now, we want to have those

International organization change and those international framework change. And for me, having those China-led organization, it's a good thing. It's not a bad thing. But for me, the question always remain, what do we get from that? It's easy to say China is not the US. China is not centering itself in all of those organization. But yet, what do we get from that?

Do we have a clear agenda? Do we have a clear goal? I'm going to give an example. China is saying, last four months, you know what, we are going to support Africa's sitting on the United Security Council. But what does it mean exactly? I mean, what do we get? When China says we want to reform international system, does it mean that China, are you going to see you, China, and South Africa as equal?

Are you going to see huge China with the Sudanese equal? Or what do you mean? And those broadened discussions, those broad declarations, you know, we are the new international system, it's not bad. But at some point, as an African, we have to step back and say, what does it exactly mean?

mean for us if there's no clear outcome a good outcome for us guys we're not just going blindsided you know because it's not Europe centered because it's not West centered because it's not US centered that it's anything else centered it's good for us no we need to think about okay a world that's centered around African interests

How is it going to look like? And I'm really speaking today hoping that leaders on the continent are going now to start to think a reform international system centered around Africa. How does it look like? Where do we want to go from here? Do we want to keep the status quo or do we want to really make the changes? And I've been saying that over dinner and over...

Breakfast. The world that's changing because of what Donald Trump is doing, for me, I see much more opportunities than anything else. It comes with risk. It comes with challenges. But we have to see the opportunities that's offering us to make the bold move to make the reform that's going to benefit us. And we have to be smart about that.

Yeah, it's a lot. I mean, I was just going to ask you very quickly before we go. I mean, you've been traveling a lot lately. You were in Washington, then you were in Nairobi, now you're in Salzburg, Austria. You're heading back to Washington very soon, next month. When you go back to Washington and you're going to circle back to a lot of the people that you met a month ago.

And you're going to tell everybody that says, I was just in Nairobi. I was meeting with some fantastic fellow African stakeholders at the Salzburg Global Forum in Salzburg. What are you going to tell the folks in Washington? Because, you know, they live in this hermetically sealed bubble.

where outside information is very, very difficult to penetrate in. After this month and a half that you've had of traveling and these discussions of an African-centered discussion looking at the future, what are you going to tell the people in Washington? I'm going to tell them the world is changing. I'm going to tell them really the world is changing. And I'm going to tell them Africa is once a new world, is once a new environment. And

And I'm going to tell them, I understand that you guys are dealing with your own issues. You're trying to figure out what's going to become of America next year or the next four years. But as an African, we're not going to wait for that to happen. We're going to take every bit and pieces that are presented to us with the opportunities that you are of disruption that you're doing. We're going to try to take advantage of those disruption to make it a world where our interests are starting to be heard.

Because I don't believe that given the current circumstances, I'm not believing that in D.C. people will be more paying attention, being different to what I've seen last year. I don't see that happening. I'm even expecting to see things being even worse in terms of being deaf about really what needs to happen. But I'm going to tell them, us...

As African stakeholders, we are really working into moving the pieces. And we're not going to wait for you. Four years from now, if things change on your side, you may find yourself in a place where Africa is becoming more assertive, more courageous. But it's not really dependent on me. It depends on the leaders that we do have. That's why I'm calling for bold move, courageous, being smart. We need to be smart. We really need to be smart. Africa really needs to be smart about how the world is changing.

And very quickly, you've also let me know that you're thinking about going on vacation to Beijing. And while you're in Beijing later this year, you are probably going to be asked the same question. They're going to say, Giro?

You know, what do we need to know? So what would you tell the folks in China that's different than what you're telling folks in Washington? The folks in China, I'm going to tell them to start to pay more attention to Africa in a sense where for so long, as much as they've been engaged in Africa, I have the feeling they've never really paid attention to what Africa wants or needs. I understand that if someone would tell me, it's not our fault we've been there, they haven't told us what they wanted. But I say, no, it's really time for you to stop certain window dressing movements

decision like, you know, removing the non-tax barrier on less developed countries as if it was a very drastic move to have access to African market. I'm going to tell them you need to be engaged more into changing Africa infrastructure landscape. You really need to walk into helping African country. If you say you're really helping us to move from not extractive, leave the extractive a lot, to build solid manufacturer industry. That's why I like that.

Gérard, they're going to tell you, look at what they signed with William Ruto. That's why I like... A lot of manufacturing. Yes, that's what I like, what Kenya signed with the special economic zone and with the manufacturer. And I think this is the path that many African countries should start thinking of. Like, what do we get? Earlier this week, I published a column for the newsletter in French asking, does sub-Saharan Africa really lost the opportunity with China? Because...

You have two kinds of Africa when you look into China engagement on the continent. You look at the Maghreb region, you see the quality and the quantity of Chinese economic engagement in those regions. You have a different picture of what you see on the sub-Saharan Africa.

In the Maghreb region, you have a diversity of investment. It's across different sectors, different industries, and it's very rich and diverse. You go sub-Saharan Africa, we are still on the very low-hanging fruit of like, we want infrastructure, which is not bad, but we still want extractive here, we want extractive there. You don't see much of like...

across different sectors, the kind of qualitative investment that changes the economy. And this is the message I'm going to bring to Beijing. Say, you know what? You need to change that approach to Africa and to really to help and

make the changes that kind of correct the structural imbalances in our trade as well. One of the things that it didn't surprise me, but it disappoints me a little bit is, you know, when you get a group of this caliber of African stakeholders together, I guess I'm surprised and disappointed that there isn't more interest and more knowledge about China, given that we are decades into Chinese engagement in Africa. But the interest level, it's as if like, what?

China? Really? And you're just like, and that again, just, you know, and it reaffirms why the work that we are doing is so important. It is so important because just the interest is not there to learn more about this topic. I mean, they literally, we could have told them that we are from a planet of green cheese and we're, you know, we're talking about Martians and they'd be like, what?

Oh, that's fascinating. And yet China has been such a transformative force in Africa. And we are two and a half decades into this modern engagement period. And yet senior level stakeholders are like, what? Yeah. I mean, it was just that was a little bit. And again, it is a motivation for us to continue what we are doing because the need is so pronounced. Right.

But so when you say they've got to be smart, they've got to then start reading things like what you're writing and what Obert Borre, our transition minerals editor is writing and what Njinga Hakina is writing and what Kobus Van Staden is writing. And we've got that whole team that's there. So yeah.

I hope that some of the folks when we leave here in Salzburg are going to sign up for our service. And I hope that you as well, you know, at home will be able to follow the great work that Jiho is doing and the whole team here at the China Global South Project. We depend on your support. We were talking today, you know, the viability of what we're doing is not guaranteed. This is a tough space to be in. And right now we've got probably another one or two years of solid funding that we can rely on. But after that, we're not sure. So it depends on the support of

of people like you who are followers on YouTube and also on Spotify and our podcast. If you'd like to sign up for the China Global South project, go to chinaglobalsouth.com slash subscribe. We'll let you try it out free for 30 days. See if you like it. And if you like it, then it's only $19 a month. And if you are a student or a teacher, send me an email, eric at chinaglobalsouth.com.

and I will give you a half-off discount. Just 10 bucks. Very, very fair. So, Giro, let's leave our conversation there. Next week, we'll be back in Mauritius, and I'll be back in Southeast Asia. So thank you for a great week, and thank you for joining us today. Thank you. See you next week. Okay, we'll be back again next week with another edition of the China in Africa podcast, and Kobus will be back with us. He hasn't been on the show for a while. A couple people have emailed us and saying, where's Kobus? So we'll be back with Kobus next week. Thanks. Bye for now. ♪

The discussion continues online. Follow the China Global South project on Blue Sky NX, a China GS project, or on YouTube at China Global South and share your thoughts on today's show or head over to our website at ChinaGlobalSouth.com where you can subscribe to receive full access to more than 5,000 articles and podcasts. Once again, that's ChinaGlobalSouth.com.

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