Lee Jae-myung’s pivot: a reset in China–South Korea ties?
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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi calls on the European Union to establish objective, rational perception of China. South Korean President pledges swift improvement in China-South Korea relations.

Former IMF official urged the upcoming BRICS summit to deliver financial reform and a unified global south stance. Welcome to Road Today, a news program with a different perspective. I'm Ge'enna in Beijing. To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching Road Today.

Our top story, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called on the European Union to establish an objective and rational perception of China and to pursue a more positive and pragmatic approach in its China policy.

He made remarks while co-chairing the latest round of China-EU high-level strategic dialogue with EU foreign policy chief Hayek Kallas in Brussels. Wang Yi emphasized that cooperation should remain the cornerstone of China-EU ties, especially amid global uncertainty. He stressed that the challenges the EU currently faces do not come from China in the past, present or future.

Carlos reaffirmed the EU's commitment to the One China policy and echoed the need for balanced and constructive cooperation. For more on this, let's have Dr. Cui Hongjian, professor with Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Welcome, Professor. Hi.

Professor, to start, the China-EU high-level strategic dialogue has been going on for over a decade, but this year's meeting feels especially significant. It's happening amid growing global uncertainty and marks 50 years of diplomatic ties. So from your perspective, how does this round differ from previous ones?

Also, we know the mechanism of exchange in the name of a high-level strategic dialogue between China and the EU is a very, very stable mechanism to help both sides to understand and also to even get some cooperation on some global and regional issues, including security and also some other.

But this year, yes, we do understand some very different background for this dialogue. Firstly, 50th anniversary for the diplomatic link between China and the EU. And I think both sides have a lot of willing to achieve some goals and especially to take care more about the common ground on some global and regional issues.

Secondly, as we know, this year, we marked a lot of the UN deep change among the relations between major powers, especially as we know, the change of the transatlantic relations. So I think indeed this dialogue will try to help both sides, China and the EU, to understand deeply current change and then UN provide some more dynamic for both sides.

Even as both sides talk about shared interests and support for multilateralism, there are still real issues, right? Like discussions over electric vehicles and medical procurement.

Do you think this latest dialogue brought any fresh approaches to balancing competition with cooperation? Frankly, so far, these relations between China and the EU have become more important. But of course, at the same time, even more complicated than before. As we know now, especially from the European side, always try to raise the issue of competition in the areas of some emerging economy, including the e-waste or digital, some other things.

So I think now it's time for both China and the EU to achieve some new common ground, which means that both sides need to continue some cooperation in traditional areas. But at the same time, both sides should have some more creative mindset and even policy to deal with some challenges.

from new areas. For example, for the EU-based issue, I think now it's time for both China and the EU, they need to find some new solution for this friction and for this friction. And of course, and even to achieve some consensus about the principle of cooperation in those new areas.

especially as I understand there are some very very different requirements from European side on those issues. So how to keep a balance between regulation or security concern and economic development and also economical cooperation. I think it's a new issue but I believe that for both sides they do have a lot of waiting and also wisdom to settle the doubt.

Professor, building on that, let's talk about perception, something that came up in Wang Yi's remarks. Wang Yi called on the EU to establish an objective and rational view of China. How do you interpret this remark? And to what extent do you think the EU's view of China has been shaped by misperceptions or external influences? And how might these biases be addressed?

Indeed, mutual perception in recent years has become a very important issue for both China and the EU, especially to have some more even negative influence on this mutual understanding and even with some policy and behaviors.

So I think a very, very important issue for this mutual perception is, especially from the European side, they are not familiar with this huge change of China, especially now China has become more and more influenced economically. And also even China trying to take some more responsibilities in regional and global relations.

So I think now it's time for the European side to change the traditional understanding about China. And especially, I think more important thing to keep healthy communication with China at all of the levels. Because to get China right, yes, it's a very, very important issue for the European side.

it should be in the environment to keep the exchange and the communication with China. Another key point was China's continued support for European integration and strategic autonomy. From what we've seen in this round of dialogue, do you think the EU is showing a stronger view to pursue greater strategic autonomy?

In recent years, because of the huge change of the regional situation and also on the global level, the strategic autonomy has become very, very popular in Europe. And also it becomes a very, very big concern from the Chinese side. As we know so far, the Chinese side supports this strategic autonomy of Europe, officially. But of course, I think for both sides, they need to take some time to

have some deeper exchange on what does it mean for the strategic autonomy of Europe, especially its influence on China-EU relations. Because as we know, even now for some European opinion, they also take China as a target to have some more so-called strategic autonomy policy or logic. So how could we make a balance between there are some more requirements from European side

to be more independent in the gaming, especially among major players. And even how about his influence on its policy towards China? I think it's a very, very important issue and it needed to take some more time for both sides to have more exchange.

On sensitive issues, Professor, Carlos reaffirmed the EU's commitment to the One China policy. At a time when some forces are trying to stir up trouble on issues involving China's core interests, the Taiwan question, how can China and the EU work together to deter external interference and uphold mutual respect for sovereignty?

As we know, for most of time in the past 50 anniversary, the Taiwan issue has been not on the table between China and the EU. But the recent years, I think one of the reasons is because of the huge change of relations between major players.

To some degree, the European side tried to follow the way of the United States to take the Taiwan issue as leverage to do its own gaming with China. Another reason is some member states of the European Union, there are political chains happening in this country. And some political parties, they want to take a use of the Taiwan issue to get some more even populist

support. And of course, certainly is also, you know, now the Taiwan issue has been become a playing card for some European Union institution and the member states to be part of this instrument to, you know, take part in the so-called gaming between major players.

So as we understand the background and also the logic behind this so-called Taiwan issue in the relations between China and the EU, I think for both China and the EU, they should have some, I think, reconfirmed principles, especially not only on the level of China, between China and the EU, and also between China and every European countries.

Because as we know, the Taiwan issue is a very, very political and domestic issue for China. So I think unless we got the European side that need to understand the historic context of this Taiwan issue, and especially to learn how to respect China in an equal way.

Finally, Wang's tour is not limited to the EU headquarters. He's also visiting Germany and France, both key players in shaping EU policy. What do you expect from these bilateral meetings? Minister Wang's trip is

this time to Europe. I think it's a showcase that China try to have its balancing relations with not only the European Union institution and also major member states. Because not only between China and EU, they have this high level of dialogue. And for both Germany and France, China has also so many high level of exchange. So this time, I think

It's also a good time in the context of 15th anniversary between China and EU to celebrate diplomatic linkage. And I think for the relations between China and Germany and France,

It's good time and to promote some more dynamic from the member states to support healthy and stable relations between China and the EU. Because as we know, both Germany and France are major member states of the EU. They should take some more recent possibilities to help the situation, especially to help

China to understand more about Europe, of course, to help European side to understand China as well. Thanks, Professor, for those valuable insights. That was Dr. Cui Hongjian, Professor with Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Coming up, South Korean President pledges swift improvement in China-South Korea relations. This is Road Today. Stay with us.

From nickel-rich rainforests to battery plants on the rise, Indonesia is teaming up with China to chase the EV prize. A massive battery project in the Southeast Asian country promises new jobs, growth and green power. But there are also doubts and questions. Is it a clean energy leap or a high-voltage gamble? With big hopes, how could this shape Asia's green future?

Find out on this week's Chat Lounge, wherever you get your podcasts, and on CGTN Radio. ♪

You've been listening to Road today. Let's move to South Korea. Its President, Lin Jie-myung, has pledged to swiftly improve ties with China and Russia. He made the remarks while marking the first 30 days in office. Lee said, "You remained unclear whether South Korea and the United States could conclude their tariff negotiations by the deadline set by President Donald Trump next week," but stressed they are working hard toward an agreement.

Li also said his administration is ready to reopen dialogue channels with Pingyuan, signaling a broader diplomatic reset across the region. So to delve into this, joining us on the line is Dr. Rong Ying, chair professor with the School of International Studies at Sichuan University. Thanks for joining us, Professor. Thank you very much.

Yes, go ahead. Professor, President Lee said he would work to swiftly improve South Korea's relations with China and Russia while maintaining a strong alliance with the United States and deepening trilateral cooperation with Japan. What's your rating of this diplomatic balancing act?

Yeah, that's I think certainly one of the most important messages that President Lee has sent in terms of how to implement or follow through his vision of programmatic diplomacy. It is clear that the

South Korea's relationship with the United States being very much important. But what I think the new administration and president have to do in terms of that diplomatic, I mean, pragmatic diplomacy is to improve, indeed, to improve the relationship with the other two most

equally important major countries, big powers that have its relationship had been deteriorated. And their improvement with China and Russia will indeed help South Korea to restore a kind of a balance which much needed for the implementation of both domestic and international agenda.

Professor Li has long expressed a relatively moderate stance toward China. Even before taking office, he described China as both a vital trade partner and a key player in ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula. Given this, how do you expect Seoul's China policy to shift under his leadership, especially compared to previous administrations?

I think by recognizing the importance of the relationship with China, both in terms of economic and also in terms of the role that China has been playing,

I mean, ensuring peace on the peninsula, literally this kind of economic and security sort of role China's played. That is, I think, the right way. And of course, China has been very much attached importance to that. As we have learned, I've seen that during the phone conversation between President Xi and President

Lee, China emphasized very much on the sort of importance of

First and foremost, of course, it's kind of a reality. China and South Korea are close neighbors and got to develop and maintain a relation. But most importantly, I think if one looks at the relationship ever since the establishment of the diplomatic relations, there's many important agreement and consensus with how to build up that relationship.

is exactly where I think President Li could do more compared to the damages that have been made by the previous administration.

which very much I think focus on ideology and lost that kind of sense of balance that I think President Li would like to restore. And last but not least, I think of course China, which I think South Korea would show more sensitivities

on the issues of core concerns, specifically on the question of Taiwan and others. So all in all, I think that's a very important diplomatic gesture and we'll see what will be followed. Interestingly, if I can say more, is that there are, I mean, speculations or reports that the Chinese side have expanded the invitation

to attend the September 3rd commemoration for Chinese war against Japanese aggressions and also the anti-fascist war, which I think 10 years ago, President Park Geun-hye attended. So if President Lee accepted that invitation, I think that would very much reinforce

and send out a very strong signal that, I mean, the new administration is very much sincere on this regard. But of course, following the reports in South Korea, one would find that it's still a very debatable issue

So more efforts need to be done and more sort of let us wait and see what would happen in this regard. Indeed. Professor, building on that, earlier you mentioned the damage was done under former president Yin Suk-yeo's term. What do you think are the biggest obstacles standing in the way of mending China-South Korea relations? And where might the two sides find common ground now?

I think the damages to the relationship largely was because of the erroneous sort of policies and moves made by the previous administration on specific issues. But these issues

reflects, I think, the direction or the shift that South Korea has been sort of making in terms of the kind of balance or diplomacy. First and foremost, I think the question of the Assad issues

And secondly, I think, as I said, there are the issues related to the question of Taiwan. And there are thirdly, the issues like the chip issues and so on and so forth. And all these sort of developments as put together in a way that damages not only relationship, but I think mostly the strategic trust very much needed

for maintaining a stable and healthy relationship. And that loss of trust, damage to political and strategic trust, had also resulted in the public opinion, which I think so far

the two relationships, the two sides have played a very negative role in creating obstacles, difficulties for the administration to restore that relationship. So damages are done and work has to be taken, made to rectify these mistakes. Professor, let's shift the gear to South Korea and U.S. relations.

Lee has acknowledged that tariff negotiations with Washington have been clearly not easy and time is running out before Trump's July 9th deadline. How do you assess the current state of these U.S.-South Korea trade talks and what's really at stake for Seoul, especially if no deal is reached in time? Yeah, the most I can say is that the talks, the tariff talks are between...

South Korea and the United States being difficult. I think that is exactly what President Lee has, I think, said in his press conference. And that raised a question that whether South Korea will be able to hit the deadline that is July, I mean, just in a few times. And the old

Overall, I think the question is also very much related to the fact that South Korea and the United States do have a kind of free trade agreement. But unfortunately, despite that, they still suffered, I mean, were hit by the so-called reciprocal tariffs.

I think it makes the matter worse. South Korea has also been subjected to a kind of 25% of the

I mean automobile and auto parts. And this is also taking place in the context of where first, I think because there are political problems and domestic issues, they were not able to talk, communicate to the Trump administration in an effective way because of the chaos, political chaos. And secondly, I think South Korea is very much vulnerable

to the pressure of the Trump administration on the question of tariff talks because they easily, and the Trump administration, hit

and pressurized South Korea with security issues. So I think the South Korean, I mean, President Lee has very sort of weak positions and not an advantage position, and it's running against the time. Indeed. Thanks, Professor. That was Dr. Rong Ying. You're listening to Road Today with me, Guiana. We'll be back after a short break. ♪

You've been listening to Road Today with Mika Anna in Beijing. A renowned Brazilian economist says the BRICS is uniquely positioned to offer alternatives to the Western-led financial system. Paulo Noguila Batista is a former executive director at the International Monetary Fund representing Brazil.

Speaking ahead of the upcoming BRICS summit in Brazil, Batista says the bloc's growing global shares gives it the weight to promote a more balanced world order. In an interview with Xu Yawen, he highlighted the role of the new development bank and plans for a joint reserve currency. He also sees strong potential in deeper China-Brazil cooperation, especially in local currency-bound markets.

Brazil is set to host the upcoming BRICS summit with the focus on strengthening cooperation among global South nations. So what specific outcomes do you anticipate from the summit, especially amid its ongoing trade barriers and geopolitical uncertainty? Well, the BRICS have become much more important as a cooperation mechanism.

We now have new members in the group since 2024. The BRICS are larger and they share a proportion of GDP, world population, territory, which are very high. So when they get together, they need to take stances on certain crucial issues.

For example, in the political terrain, what stance will the BRICS as a group take with respect to the genocide going on in Gaza? It's one important question that I would like to see when leaders make their declaration. The other thing is how far will the BRICS go? For example, in

producing as a group alternatives to the Western dominated system that is increasingly dysfunctional. Will we move forward on that or will we still remain at the level of preparation and reflection? These are two examples of important points that I'm looking forward to see how the BRICS leaders will respond.

We know you used to work as the former IMF executive director and also the vice president of the New Development Bank. What are your observations on the two institutions in their engagement with the developing countries, especially

when we zoom into the ndb the new development bank how are the bank and also a cra the brics contingent reserve arrangement unlocking development potential and providing alternative to traditional western dominated financial systems in my time in the imf as executive director for brazil and other countries

I learned that the IMF is very difficult to reform. We did make some progress in reforming the IMF, but fundamentally the institution remains a Western controlled institution that not always serves the needs of developing countries. Often they mistreat countries, especially those that are seen as being

rivals or hostile to the West. So it is an uneven institution. Now, one of the reasons why the BRICS, 10 years ago, established the NDB, the New Development Bank, and the Continued Reserve Arrangement, is precisely the fact that we were as a group

At the time we were only five countries. As a group we were dissatisfied with the way the existing Western controlled institutions were working. The IMF and also the World Bank for example. Now we did an effort. I participated in both institutions in the creation of the CRA and I was one of the founding members of the NDB. Our intention was exactly that, to create alternatives to the existing Western dominated system.

We have made progress in the NDB, but we are still far from achieving our initial goal of having a global bank that can play a global role for the developing countries. As for the CRA, their progress has been very little because our central banks have basically frozen the CRA, the Continued Reserve Arrangement, and we need to unblock it to make it effective if we are serious about

building an alternative to the IMF. What are the prospects and challenges so far of establishing this BRICS currency and how would it impact the global financial system? Look, the BRICS currency issue is one of the fundamental issues before the group.

If we do manage to create a common reserve currency, this will have a major impact on the international scene. Now, the international monetary system is dominated by the dollar.

and the dollar has created many problems for many countries so countries want to seek alternatives so but let me just clarify briefly there's a lot of confusion about this issue many people think that the brics would try to create a unified currency with a common central bank like the euro

in Europe. No, it's not that. If we do reach this point, we will create a common reserve currency for international payments, only for international payments that would circulate alongside our national currencies.

and our central bank to continue to function as they do. And it welcomes not only countries from the global south, but also countries from the global north, right? The BRICS currency, or is only designed for countries who join the BRICS mechanism. Joint reserve currency would be constructed by the BRICS or a subset of the BRICS. Initially, it would be defined by us or by a subset of the group.

But as it goes forward and it gains credibility, developed countries can use this currency well as well if they wish to do so. With the increasing influence of developing countries nowadays, reflecting on your tenure at the International Monetary Fund and also the NDB,

How can BRICS nations amplify their voices of the Global South in international institutions like the WTO and also the United Nations? And what strategies should they adopt to strengthen their own economic governance and policy frameworks?

The WTO is a sort of hopeless case. It's paralyzed and will not recover, I believe. Also, the UN has many problems. But for example, we could increase, try to increase the number of permanent members of the Security Council of the UN. Now in the financial field, in monetary and financial field, the important thing is for BRICS to realize that we are the only group that can offer alternatives to the Global South countries.

And I think the global south countries, the other global south countries, are looking to us to provide alternatives to the dysfunctional Western-dominated system. Let's talk about China-Brazil bilateral ties. How do you assess the current state of China-Brazil cooperation within the BRICS framework? And what areas hold the most promise for future collaboration? China is the major trading partner of Brazil by far.

And Brazil is the most important country in Latin America for China, because of the size of Brazil in Latin America. So it's extremely important for the BRICS as a group that bilateral relations between China and Brazil develop more. For example, how? If we could have more manufacturing exports from Brazil to China, provided that's possible in a competitive way,

China could invest in Brazil, not only buying existing productive capacity, but creating productive capacity and allowing for technology transfers to occur. So China is doing some of these things, but we need to intensify that. And also in the financial field to conclude, I would say that China can play a role

in gradually buying more bonds issued by the Brazilian treasury. This would make the Brazilian government more independent - of Western and domestic capital private markets, - private capital markets, that often function as a factor - of destabilization of countries in the global south. So, China can have a stabilizing role there as well.

That was Paolo Noguila-Badista, former IMF executive director, speaking with our Xu Yawen. This is World Today. We'll be back. Hello, my name is Alessandro Golombievski-Deixeira. I'm a professor of public policy management at Tsinghua University in Beijing. I am a great listener of The World Today. In my opinion, The World Today is one of the best China radio programs.

In the world today, we can get the best news and analysis in what is happening now in the world. So please, come to join us!

Welcome back. Reports show the United States has lifted export restrictions on cheap design software to China. Major tech firms including Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens have stated they were notified by the U.S. government that the export restriction introduced in May had been lifted. So for more on this,

My colleague Zhao Ying spoke with Dr. Zhou Mi, senior research fellow with the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation. First of all, remind us a little bit, what were the original restrictions on chip design software and why were they imposed in the first place?

Well, it's about 60 days ago when the United States notified the three main providers of these electronic design automation companies as Synopsys, Cadence and Simons.

they said the government of United States forbid them to export the software to Chinese customers. So after 60 days, I think that a lot of situations have changed. Maybe we cannot just defend the declaration in the government website of the BIS of the commerce of United States, but there are some messages coming from the customers and also from the internet that the companies are not able

to provide the further certifications or permits for Chinese customers after this kind of notification. So it was about 60 days ago there were some kind of messages coming, not officially from the government's website. But how critical is electronic design automation or EDA software to the semiconductor supply chain?

Well, it started to emerge in the 1950s, about 75 years ago, but when it came into our industry, I think it's around the 1980s. So after that, I think that design mechanisms are compelling with the development of this chip

We know that chips are becoming more complicated. We are putting more elements in the smaller chips. So it makes the functions of the chips even more critical because any kind of mistake will lead to a bad function of these chips.

So as for the EDA, they have several different kind of functions. The first one that is supporting the design of the chips when it's becoming more complicated and coming from the 2D, the two dimensions design to the 3D, three dimensions, you know, it's a vertical kind of distribution of this kind of elements.

So the design becoming more difficult and the simulation is the second function. It's helped this, you know, the chips manufacturing to know what will be the result of these chips. And third one is analysis and the verification to make sure that the chips can be, you know, function well in the different direction. And first one is a manufacturing preparation. And they also offer a lot of support for the manufacturing

And the last one is trying to make the functional safety. So there are so many functions of the EDA software. It's not just a kind of design process in the whole process of the chips manufacturing.

Okay, so why do you think the U.S. decided to lift the curbs now? Well, I think that you might understand the first and most important reason is that we can find from this negotiation between these two governments of China and the United States. We started the negotiation after the so-called reciprocal tariff of April 2nd. So we started to negotiate that.

in Switzerland and then moved to London to reach our framework about this to governments on the trade issues. So in that kind of a consensus, I think that both governments are trying to make it clear that we want to do something to make it more easier for the government, for the markets to believe that

the trade between our two countries can still continue. So during that time, I think the Chinese government has made our promises while the US government is also making their commitments on trying to do more on the lift of these restrictions on some of this measurement, including this EDA related restrictions.

So I think that practice is a kind of a reflection about their promises during that days. And I think that is also very important for the market. So the second important reason is that the EDA companies of the three main companies, Synopsis and Cadence and Simons, they are really important suppliers in such a way.

world market. While they have a lot of existence in China because China is developing very quickly. So many of the Chinese companies are really want to have the software from them and they depend a lot on the development of the Chinese market. So they want the government of the United States to try to lift the restriction. I think that both of these two factors are

the reasons why we see there's some change about the policies. So is this like a one-off deal or does it suggest perhaps a broader shift in U.S. strategy from restriction to engagement? Well, it is very good news. We're coming after so many years of more and more restrictions from U.S. government. So I hope

it would be a very good signal that the US government is really want to sit down with Chinese government and trying to give more certainty to the market. But I'm not quite sure about whether they will stick to that kind of principle. As for the government, I think that we should try to provide better certainty to the world while the US government is not doing so well in the

previous months and years. So I hope that we can try to listen to the markets and try to give them more confidence about what we can do. Well, given China's push for indigenous chip technology, how significant is the restored access to U.S.-dominated EDA tools? Like, does this suggest China's domestic EDA capabilities are still insufficient?

As the industry has developed for almost 75 years, I think that it's not that easy for another country to just do from scratch in the short term. Well, as you know, the Chinese chips industry has developed not so early, so we benefited by a lot of the support of the EDA from the foreign countries, including those three ones from the United States and also some from other countries.

So there are a very good ecosystem before this kind of restrictions. So I think that is the reason why if you are looking at the stock price of those three companies, they dropped about more than 5% when the message has been sent by, you know, they are not able to provide the software to Chinese company.

So during that time, many of the Chinese software providers, they have much more good performance in the stock market. I think that reflects some of the expectations that Chinese companies are able to do this replacement of the software from the US.

But I have to say that although China's independent supply of these EDAs are increasing their market share in China, but it's still less than 20% of the whole market share. So I hope that the EDA companies in China are having better abilities to do more jobs in such a kind of changeable world. But I think that they still need some more time

But the chips are, factors are so widely spreaded. So we have a very different kinds of chips, like for the automobiles, for electronics, for the toys. And also there are so many kinds of chips. So many companies are able to start from certain vertical areas in certain sectors. That is also the benefit of Chinese companies.

market because we can provide such a wide and diversified market to the companies. And what we are able to do is not only limited in China. So the trade between us and other countries can provide even bigger market. We have so many potentials to develop for supporting the development of EDA sectors in China. And I think that's the

the two lakhs movement would be important. We still have to use some kind of very high-end software from the foreign companies, but at the same time, we can do more to improve the independent supply of our own providers. That was Dr. Zhou Mi, Senior Research Fellow with the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.

China's leading tech company Xiaomi, known for its consumer electronics and smart manufacturing, has signaled that 2027 would be the earliest it might begin exporting its electric vehicles overseas. CEO Lei Jun says the company is taking a domestic-first approach, focusing on building a strong foothold in China before looking abroad.

The decision comes amid robust demand for Chinese EVs overseas. Official data shows EV exports rose nearly 20% in the first five months of the year. In May alone, nearly 300,000 new energy vehicles were shipped abroad, accounting for over 40% of all vehicle exports. So for more on this, let's have Professor Qu Qiang from Minsu University of China. Thanks for joining us, Professor. Thank you.

Professor, Xiaomi's CEO has made it clear that the company will prioritize domestic deliveries before even considering international expansion, at least until 2027. How do you interpret this delayed going global strategy? Is it driven by practical constraints or is it part of a deeper long-term game plan? Oh, I think they have their decision making like that because

they have their own consideration based on the facts uh they're facing right now and also the lesson they've learned in history i think for the current effect that been limiting their internationalization strategy i think number one is because there is a very different market out there uh different nations and regions they have very different consumption

and a habit and different law system, different cultural background, different habit of the consumers. So I think it will take time for the Xiaomi to understand and adapt to those kinds of differences and to make more targeted market strategy. For example, in different nation, they will have different safety standard, emission standard, the requirement for the batteries and also for the size of the cars.

And all that, you know, need to be very, very detailed. I used to be part of the Chinese, you know, opera bill standard making myself. Then I understand, even though we try to take reference from American standard and European Union standard, but still you need to make very, very detailed and customized, you know, standards.

accommodation and also revision so that you can build the same car in a different nations in different regions. So I think I still remember at that time the Fox, Vogue, BMW and Toyota when they try to move their car into China, they have to do a lot of the revision of the same car that they sell that they sold in European standard, a European market with a standard and also in the North American standard.

So everything needs to be changed according to Chinese standards. So I assume that when Xiaomi want to move their car to be sold in Europe, in America, in Australia, they need to have a very, very huge amount of work, try to understand all those differences. And I think secondly, the difference and challenge will come from the supply chain. Look, I think Xiaomi will really have very challenging, very competitive cost and efficient

In the regard of the card making in China, their factory in Beijing is marvelous. But that they can do that is because the supply chain in China is very thorough and comprehensive. If you want to move this kind of supply chain out of China, you probably wouldn't say the same thing because.

This kind of a highly efficient and cost-effective supply chain only exists in China. If you want to make your car in Japan, Australia and North America, you will face a whole different challenge and a very, very different scenario in a supply like in the turmoils and the geopolitics.

And also very different human resources cost and also very different raw materials. And also thirdly is about brand and recognition. Even though Xiaomi is a household name in China and many other markets, it's not quite like that.

And also, I think Xiaomi, it's been famous, even though very famous already, but they've been famous for a house appliances and electronic product maker, not a automobile maker. They've been famous for their cars only by the recent...

you know popular product that like the su7 and yu7 these two products are very very popular no question about it but they've been in this game only for like three years so can they be as popular as now like in another 10 years or even 50 years we're not sure about that so i think for xiaomi a reasonable consideration is that to solidify their advantage in china when they become the real king in china and

Then they try to move outside of China and to conquer the international market. I think that will be a more reliable strategy. And of course, they always want to build a people plus car plus home, this kind of ecology system. So before they can try out all this ecosystem inside of China,

They don't want to test international market, you know, when they're not very matured with the whole system. I think that's also another reason for that. So I think still the internationalization required very solid steps and very thorough consideration for sure.

Professor, speaking of that, while Xiaomi is taking its time, other Chinese EV leaders are already making strides beyond China's borders, right? Like BYD and Niel are expanding into Europe and Southeast Asia. How do you compare these different strategies and what risks and opportunities do they each reflect?

Well, I think BYD and all these players, they have long-time players in this market. For example, BYD, I still remember when I was a kid, my parents used to drive a BYD, even though at that time BYD is just a name standing for a low-end, very cost-effective car. But they've been there already for a very, very long time, and their internationalization

it's also been there for a very very long time because of that i think byd have established their production base all over the world they have multiple channels in the dealers in many nations they have production base in many countries and regions and also they have very independent battery technology so byd is not just one automobile company you can consider them as a conglomerate

of the auto making, of the battery making, of the technology, of the car design, and all the things. And also there are car dealing companies as well. So I think instead of only have one or two popular products, BYD have more of the thorough, more comprehensive line of product and services.

That guarantee that they can conquer many markets outside China. And NIO, I think they adopted another strategy because they focus on the product. So they sell the product. They have many partner dealers in European Union, in North America. So they rely on their overseas partners to sell those products.

So Xiaomi, they have a very different strategy because if Xiaomi is following their old path of internationalization, that is to set up a branch company overseas of themselves, for example, Xiaomi North America, Xiaomi Europe, and then they probably is going to sell the product by themselves or produce a certain part of their vehicles.

by themselves in North America or in Europe. So they're not fully relying on themselves, nor fully relying on their local partners. So this kind of a mixed up models can face some challenges.

Well, they have already encountered a major challenge in setbacks already. I still remember in 2014 when they moved to India market, a lot of people said this is really a good thing. But I say don't go to India. You're going to suffer from lots of the local setbacks. But Xiaomi didn't listen. They go there and Xiaomi's nightmare has been happening in India. Lots of the lawsuit and lots of the...

uh troubles made by the Indian market and they've been suffering all those nightmare even till now I think that's another reason they'd be haunted about this internationalization so I think Xiaomi if they want to move outside China they still need to you know do some revolutionize uh you know a move about their own operation system if they consider if they still stick to their old passive internationalization I think they're still going to have some other problems

Thanks, Professor, for your time and insights. That was Professor Qu Qiang, fellow of Belt and Road Research Center at Minzu University of China. That's all the time for this edition of World Today. A quick recap of today's headlines. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi calls on EU to establish objective and rational perception of China. South Korean President pledges swift improvement in China-South Korea relations.

Former IMF Executive Director urges BRICS summit to deliver financial reform and a unified global self stance. To listen to this episode again or to catch up on previous episodes, you can download our podcast by searching World Today. I'm Guiana in Beijing. Thank you so much for listening. Bye for now.