239. Ukraine - your questions answered.
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Hello and welcome to this special episode of Battleground Ukraine with me, Saul David, and Patrick Bishop. We've been a little bit remiss in the last couple of weeks having not answered questions, so we're devoting a whole episode to our rather bulging postbag. And the first one comes from David in Cumbria, and he writes, Thanks so much for the podcast. One of the most brilliant and informative. I listen assiduously every week. Well, thank you for that, David. His question regards...

Donald Trump's potential use or lack of use of military force. Much has been made, writes David, of his disdain for forever wars and his repeated comments that the US should not be involved in other countries' affairs. For example, his recent tweets on Syria. However, if you consider his admiration of strong men, don't they require a powerful military force and a willingness to get involved? If 9-11 had happened on Trump's watch, does anyone believe he wouldn't have taken some kind of military retributive act?

So if in future there is a chance to flex America's might or take advantage of weak opponents, isn't there a strong chance he would get involved despite what he's been saying about ending wars? I'm thinking in relation to a chance to put Putin in his place or with regards to a Chinese attack on Ukraine.

Taiwan? Would he want to be remembered as a president who presided over America's military weakening? Well, I think it's all a very good point, isn't it, Patrick? I mean, my reading on Trump is not that he won't take military action if he feels it's necessary. It's just that he doesn't want to get into unnecessary long military wars of the type, of course, that was fought recently in Iraq, which is, to be fair, a point that David himself makes. So would he be prepared to back

Ukraine strongly if, as we've already discussed, Putin doesn't come to the negotiating table. Yes. Does that necessarily mean boots on the ground? No, it doesn't. And I think that's the point here. Probably his overall strategy in the future is going to be backing allies with strong military force, maybe even the use of special forces, drones, long range strikes of the type that America is still undertaking in places like Syria and elsewhere, but actually committing American forces to a long war. No, I think he will avoid that.

Yeah, there's a lot of things in the mix here, aren't there, Saul? I mean, what will be the main driver for Trump? Well, we know what won't be, which is the sort of ideological underpinnings of a lot of American foreign policy post-war. Indeed, their whole foundation, the Cold War, really, is pitting one worldview, one ideology against another, democracy versus communism, essentially, basically.

After that, with the collapse of the Cold War, you get America trying to project its interest in other ways. I'm thinking of the Iraq adventure slash debacle slash tragedy. That's not going to be Trump's alley either. But I think he will be motivated by Trump.

Two things. One is his historical legacy, what he would want to be remembered as a strong president, someone who stood up for America. Standing up for America is going to mean facing down challenges all over the place, isn't it? So I think you're absolutely right there, David. This is

It's going to inevitably mean some kind of military confrontation in some part of the world, China being the obvious one. But I think, getting back specifically to Ukraine, I think as we've said before,

I think his sense of self-worth and his vision of America will both be sorely tried by the Kremlin's strategy or Kremlin's postage, as it stands at the moment. So, yeah, I think however fervently he may wish not to get into military engagements, I think America's unique position in the world means it's an inevitability.

Now, Jeremy in Somerset is asking a question which I think will have occurred to a lot of us. And he says, hi, Saul and Patrick, what's happened to the introduction of the much anticipated F-16s? There's been no mention of their involvement. Have they been superseded now?

by focusing much more on the use of drones. Also, do you ever worry that your show must be very informative to the Russians themselves and must in some way be used to shape their own tactics? Some of your insights you're sharing would make for very interesting listening by senior commanders.

On the Russian side. So we'll come back to that one. But first of all, we saw those F-16s, they kind of got off the radar, haven't they? Literally, metaphorically. They have, but they are still operating. Actually, I saw a report in the last few days that mentioned the fact that the F-16s are very much being used in an anti-air role to knock out, in particular, drones. I mean, one F-16 is known to have hit six drones.

incoming Russian drones, of course, probably Shahids in one action. I think more broadly, they don't want to risk their F-60s. They don't have that many of them. They had an initial 12, I think, possibly a few more since then. But they are very vulnerable, of course, if they get a little bit too close to

Russia's anti-air defences in and around the front line. So they're not really being used in the role in which we anticipated they might be, which is to, of course, combat Russian planes and to also assist any forward movement. I mean, I suppose it's interesting. We haven't had enough detail, as I mentioned in the last pod, about what's going on in the latest Kursk offensive by the Ukrainians. It would be logical that the F-16s were supporting those. But again, I think they probably aren't because they don't want to lose them.

Yeah, they'll be dangerously close to Russian air defenses there. That was the argument before, wasn't it, about using existing fixed-wing assets in a kind of combat role like that.

Well, what do you make of this last point about, you know, are we giving aid and comfort to the Russians by talking about the situation on the ground? I don't think we are particularly. I mean, they'll be actually experiencing what's going on, so they're going to be better informed than we are. I suppose it's more in the realm of speculation about what the Ukrainians might or might not be doing next. Do you think there's any concern there?

No, I don't think so. I mean, it's very flattering of Jeremy to suggest that we're sort of, you know, the great, great tacticians or even strategists and that the Russians can learn something from us. Of course, we have interviews with people who know what they're talking about, but really pretty much all our other information is coming from open sources, which the Russians have access to themselves.

No, if anything, this pod is designed, I think we both feel this, Patrick, to give some sucker to Ukraine and its supporters in our view of where the war might be heading and our suggestions on what the West might be able to do to get it in that direction. So no, I think it's the opposite.

I think we ought to draw a distinction between our support for Ukraine. How could you not really see this as a conflict in which this is a heavy element of right and wrong here? And we are on the right side. But having said that, I don't think we're uncritical supporters of Ukraine or we're not turning away from Ukraine.

examining hard questions about how Ukraine is running the war. We've said quite a lot about that. So I think we try and maintain a high level of objectivity at the same time as essentially wanting Ukraine to come out of this on top. I've got one here from Rupert. I don't wish to sound defeatist, but it's hard not to form the impression that much of the Ukrainian territory taken and ravaged by Russia is no longer worth fighting for except on principle.

Is it or is it not better used as a bargaining chip? Well, I think that's a good point, Rupert. I mean, what will be left of the Donbass when all this is over? Just looking at the latest World Bank estimates of the reconstruction costs, this is actually quite not that recent. The last one was back in February, and then it was put at $486 billion. So it's obviously gone up.

Since then, so I suppose the question would be, if you're Ukraine, why would you spend a big chunk of that money on rebuilding the east of the country, which is going to, whatever happens, however this plays out, it's going to be a very insecure part of your territory. Of course, historically, the heavy industry there has been important. There are mines, strategic minerals that we spoke about, like lithium, etc.,

But a lot of that infrastructure, which is now in ruins, is it worth actually rebuilding it? It's sort of 20th century technologies, 20th century industries. Ukraine is very much a new nation, isn't it? It's got that new nation vibe. And I think the appeal of going back to those industries would be pretty limited. It's a very tech-savvy state. So I think you're right. This is very much, if value as such is important,

as a bargaining chip. You've got all sorts of questions about what's going to happen to the remaining populations there. It's going to be a very tricky part of the world.

And, you know, the whole question of reconstruction and recovery goes on. There's a big conference taking place in Rome in July, but I'm sure the numbers have gone up even more by then. Okay, one here from Magnus in Sweden. His question, he points out, is of a political nature, which I believe is of relevance looking at the current developments in Austria and Germany. Ukraine does not need more Putin-friendly governments in Europe when U.S. support may decrease. You're right there, Magnus.

He goes on to say, it seems like right-wing parties take ground, i.e. gain popular support using immigration arguments, but at the same time being Putin-friendly, I cannot understand how other politicians allow this to happen. Why is it that I never hear politicians saying things like, if Putin is not stopped, we'll

we will have tens of millions of migrants from Ukraine all over Europe. This should be an argument appealing to voters of these immigration hostile parties. I have a strong belief that voters of such populist parties are very egotistic and need to hear arguments that have an impact on their own lives.

Why do you think politicians supporting Ukraine are not using these arguments? Well, mainly because, at least as far as the liberals are concerned, Patrick, anti-immigration arguments have never gone down that well. Although you can see that, you know, pretty much everyone is now having to accept that the unfavorable

fetid arrival of immigrants is not necessarily a good thing for their nation. So the tide is turning, but I think it's also difficult for them to use the anti-immigration argument too. We may get there, but we're not quite there yet. Yeah. Interesting looking at the trends, the migration trends from

There was that initial enormous outpouring, but of course it's slowed down considerably since then. And I don't think anyone is expecting a change in the military situation that's going to produce another mass exodus. But it is a good point that you make, Magnus, because I think in the event of

of an unsatisfactory peace with Russia temporarily halted but not tamed and not deterred. You know, a lot of people in Ukraine may decide they don't want to live with that insecurity and make plans to move west. But yeah, it's certainly going to be a consideration in the settlement.

So Chris asked a question about NATO, and it's what exactly is NATO afraid of if Ukraine were to join the alliance? Ukraine and its partners have consistently pushed back against Russia's so-called red lines, often exposing them as the hollow threats that they are. Wouldn't Ukraine's accession to NATO be yet another instance where Putin's rhetoric only further proves his inability to act? Are we more concerned about what Putin might do, or perhaps more

apprehensive about the consequences of his potential collapse. Well, two good points, actually, Chris. And, you know, listen, it goes without saying that Patrick and I entirely agree with you on this. We think that Ukraine should be given access to NATO sooner rather than later. And frankly, what is Russia going to do about it?

But clearly, there are elements within NATO, and the US is one of them, that is concerned about this pushing backing Russia into a corner, as it were. I mean, Putin, we heard from Alan in the last podcast, Alan Phelps, our Russian expert, pointing out that it's a complete mystery that the West has been conducting this strict tease with regard to negotiations with Russia.

and conceding more and more ground. And one of them, of course, has been about NATO. Putin was demanding at least 10 years that Ukraine wouldn't be allowed to join. And the US and Trump's advisors said, well, why not make it 20? I mean, absolutely ludicrous. But Alan did say at the end of the interview that he was slightly concerned and no one knows what's going on inside Russia better than him, or at least the mind of Putin better than him, about what might happen if Putin really is backed into a corner, if he gets to a position where

you know, defeat is just around the corner. So there's always that threat. But personally, I don't think it's as big as a lot of other people are concerned about. Yeah, well, I suppose the technical answer is that, you know, currently, the rule is that you don't allow membership to states where there's a territorial dispute with the neighboring state in play. So that's a kind of prerequisite to joining NATO is that you don't have one of these ongoing.

territorial problems. Because, you know, the obvious logic is that the aspirant state would automatically be considered to be under attack by their neighbor. So therefore, that would trigger automatically Article 5, which famously, we all know,

It means that an attack on one is an attack on all. But, you know, that's not a kind of rock solid principle because West Germany joined NATO in 1955 despite having territorial disputes with East Germany. So clearly this is not a sacred principle.

I think, as you say, Saul, that the real reason is that it's basically not wanting to annoy the Russians too much. And given that their mantra has been for many years now, NATO is essentially a hostile organization. You know, we try to make nice with you guys and all you do is just add violence.

new members willy-nilly. I mean, the fact that the states who are joining want to join, they came to NATO saying, please, can we join, rather than NATO going to them saying, hi, guys, would you like to sign up, is ignored. They may well know that to be the case, but in their narrative, it is an anti-Russian organization.

At heart. So once again, you know, as Alan was saying last week, we're buying into the Russian narrative. Okay, we've got one here from Dave in Cambridge. First time sending you an email. I love the podcast. It's been my Friday go-to listening for the last couple of years. I'm wondering what your thoughts are for the future of any territory that remains under Russian control following any protests.

possible ceasefire. It doesn't look like the Russian military has been protecting infrastructure and cities in the occupied territories when they invaded, for example, Mariupol. So there would need to be a lot of money needed to rebuild it to anywhere near pre-invasion civilization. I can't see Russia spending the money on a territory that might not stay with them in a post-Putin world. All I can see is an

underwhelming buffer zone that serves no purpose in a territory too militarized that anyone would want to live there. I don't want to sound like I'm ignoring the misery of people that are displaced, but from a Russian expansionist point of view, do you think they would invest in the so-called new Russia?

Fingers crossed for Ukraine in the year ahead. Well, you know, good questions, really, aren't they? I mean, we've talked before, Patrick, you've already mentioned earlier on about the fact that there may be really valuable minerals in those territories that they want to get their hands on. Mariupol has already been quite a lot of rebuilding, actually. So quite a lot of cash has already been spent there to get it back.

into the sort of condition that might encourage Russians to actually emigrate from Russia into Ukraine and to go and live there. They've certainly been encouraging that. So I suspect that they will try and rebuild a lot of these territories, but it is going to cost them a lot of money. And the conditions of the Russian economy at the end of this war

it's going to be pretty straightened, frankly. So it's going to be tricky. It's going to be a tricky balance. I think their intention would be to rebuild, but whether that's going to be practically possible in the near future, I don't know. I didn't know that about Maripel. That's a fascinating detail, isn't it? That is pretty significant.

Of course, the other question is, as I mentioned earlier, populations. What's going to happen to these people left behind? There still are, I can't remember the precise figure, but certainly well north of a couple of million people still inside those territories. Some of them have

have elected to stay. Some are just too poor or old to leave. This is something that Askel Krishnlitsky was talking about in a recent pod. So how is that going to work? I mean, are we going to be in a situation of population transfers? Will all that be part of the mix in any negotiation and in any settlement? We'll just have to wait and see. Tracy Dennison makes this point as well. It's obviously on people's minds at the moment about the

you know, the end game, what will happen with possible population transfers and all the rest of it. But she makes another point. I think this is something that when we were talking to Alan last week, we could have gone into a bit more, but I mean,

The whole concept of Russia is at stake here. She says perhaps Putin and his friends and allies are aware that the end of Russia is at stake with any form of non-victory. What do you and fellow listeners think? Well, I think that is a crucial question, isn't it? How this is going to be presented clearly. Any other versions of the plan that's being talked about at the moment don't give Russia anything other than victory.

the territory it's sitting on now to be, and they're not actually being handed that as a gift. It's basically you stay put, and then we'll discuss its future status through non-military channels, i.e. through diplomatic talks, which you'll probably grind on for years. So how do you actually sell that to your people as a great achievement, something that is worth the loss of, by the time this is over a million Russian casualties? I find that even

in an autocratic state like Russia currently is, where information is totally controlled, and where the people have basically been beaten down by years of oppression, there's apathy, there's cynicism. I think even so, that is going to present some kind of massive political difficulty for Putin and his gang. All right, we'll take a break there. Do join us in a moment when we'll be hearing more questions, including one from France about Mirage fighters being sent to Ukraine.

Welcome back. Well, this is a question from Michael Baldwin, who is in Provence. We've heard from Michael before, haven't we? We've heard of his sightings of mirages buzzing around over his neighborhood. Well, he says, Dear Patrick and Saul,

When I last wrote, Macron was proving to be quite hawkish and seemed to be using the Ukraine war as a way to establish some sort of military legacy for himself and his administration. He then seemed to have gone completely off the geopolitical radar. Well, I suppose that's because he had so many problems at home. However, once again, towards the end of November and the start of December, I noticed an unusual increase in

in the low-level training of French fighter jets in my area. More often than not, they were Mirage jets. Last week, I read that France had allowed a, quote, first batch of Mirage fighter jets to be sent to Ukraine. Do you think these two events are related?"

He then asks some further questions about why weren't they sent sooner, for example, when the Dutch sent their F-16s. On a separate issue, and this is interesting, people are so keen to do what they can to help Ukraine. He says, I'm a registered architect in France and the UK and would like to help rebuild Ukraine with my specific skill set, design, construction, engineering.

project management, etc. I know in the past you've indicated various ways of providing financial and medical support, but do you know of any organization or team that's specifically oriented towards the physical reconstruction of these cities and urban landscape? Well, I'll tell you one thing you could do straight away, and that is just look up what's going to happen in Rome in July. I referenced it.

I think earlier, Michael, and that is, it's not just, this is the big reconstruction conference which we're going on for four years now. It's been the fourth one, I think. And it's not just governments, it's NGOs.

And I think if you get on to just Google that, you'll possibly find some way, probably find some way where you can actually offer your services to either some government agency or an NGO. Good luck with that. No, that's fascinating about the Mirage jets being sent over. I hadn't heard that, but I suspect it might well be connected. Certainly the low-level training of French fighter jets in France

the area might be the training of Ukrainian pilots. We simply don't know. But on the more broader point of Macron's support, he's gone off the radar a bit, hasn't he, Patrick? And of course, one of the obvious reasons why he's gone off the radar is he's having difficulties at home. He's losing political support in France and international standing is

far less important than him somehow shoring up his government. And of course, he's had a succession of prime ministers difficulty with politics at home, which has, of course, meant that he's focused on that more than on international affairs.

Now Alistair from Lincoln in England says, did we learn some of the wrong lessons from the Second World War in terms of today's Western ground equipment? This combines Battleground 45 with Ukraine 2035, doesn't it? So he says the Germans chose small numbers of complex high-end machines, while the Russians selected large numbers of capable but low-tech items, as did the Americans.

Since the 1990s, we've contracted our equipment numbers but justified this by that it means we've reduced our numbers of actual units, I suppose, of military kit, but justified this to some extent by an increase in capability resulting in increased complexity and cost of each item.

Is the Ukraine war indicating an error in our approach? So I think the basic question is, you know, have we sort of spent money on the wrong things? Are we going too high tech? I mean, we just got to look at the success of cheap, low cost drones in particular. So are we spending too much on the high end stuff and not enough money?

on the mass-produced low-end stuff. What do you think about that? So is there a lesson to be drawn from what we're seeing on the battlefield in Ukraine here? Well, not necessarily in relation to the Second World War. I mean, I think you need a mix is the truth of the matter. You need really good high-tech stuff

like Patriots and the latest kind of long range missiles, hypersonic weapons, that sort of thing, all of which are now being developed, particularly by the Americans. But you also need to take account of changes in battlefield technology indicated by the Ukrainian war.

in particular with the use of drones, not just aerial drones, ground drones. We heard last week about the actual fighting conducted from Askold, fighting conducted by a brigade northeast of Kharkiv, a Ukrainian brigade, which basically fought a battle with just machines alone. And none of those machines, particularly...

particularly expensive to produce. So you need a mixture. I certainly wouldn't recommend the Russian way of war, which is just like cannibalizing whatever they can get together. Most of their high-tech stuff isn't actually that good, but they're effectively...

carrying out this war with bodies alone. That's not a way to go in the future. I think you need a mixture of very good technical staff, but also developing these cheaper weapons, which can really make a difference on the battlefield. Okay, we've got a fascinating one from David in Preston, again in the UK. And he asks a query that...

I think it puzzles a lot of people. He says why, when he heard the news regarding the switching off of the gas pipelines into Europe from Russia via Ukraine, he said he was astonished that Ukrainians had allowed these pipelines to run through Ukraine for so long. Why had they not just switched them off at the outset?

What's the answer to that, Saul? Well, they didn't want to irritate certain people in the EU. We mentioned them before, of course. Places like Slovakia, Hungary and Austria that were still getting their gas from Russia through the pipelines. Now, Ukraine was contractually obliged to continue the pipeline

lines running until the beginning of this year. So this is the first opportunity for them to say, we've given you due warning, we're not going to renew the contracts, we're not going to renege on the original contracts, but we are shutting them off now. So it was frankly a compromise that was demanded by diplomatic niceties and a determination not to irritate certain states within the EU that have been, you know, friendly in terms of their attitude towards Russia.

Yeah, I want to read something here from Carl Bilbo in Denmark, which he makes a very good point and I think corrects us rightly on the emphasis we gave to the European contribution to the Ukrainian war effort in a previous pod. I think it was the one where we were doing our review of the coming year.

He does give us some praise about saying it's an excellent review, and it's rare to get the many small movements summarized so eloquently. However, and it follows the old rule, doesn't it, Saul, that we've often pointed out, that when you get a bit of praise, it's frequently followed up by a little bit of a rap on the knuckles.

He says you praise the contributions from large European countries, UK, France, Italy and Germany and did not mention many others. He says the UK certainly deserves that praise. But there are other big countries which don't. For example, he contrasts the contribution made by Germany.

small countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, which each give more in absolute terms value than France, Italy or Spain. So what he's saying here is that small countries are actually pulling their weight much more effectively than countries like France and Spain and indeed Italy. Italy gives a lot of diplomatic support, but in terms of actual hardware, not so much.

And he says, even if you look at donations relative to GDP, the Baltic states, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, the Nordic states, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway.

And the Netherlands all dwarf the relative, that relative to economic capability, that is donations of Germany, France, Italy and Spain. So, well, thanks for pointing that out. It's a good point. And I think it is broadly the case that we could be doing a lot more.

And we're going to have to, aren't we? I mean, one of the things that's becoming very clear in Britain is that the current government, the Labour government's very mealy-mouthed statements about what it's going to do to increase the defence budget are not going to be tenable for very much longer. From a combination of the growing obvious threat, there's a kind of local alarm about the fact that we've got no defence.

anti-ballistic missile defenses to speak of. That's going to have to be addressed. And of course, we're going to be under increasing pressure from Washington, from the Trump administration, to actually do something to put our hands in our pockets and come up with something closer to a 3% of GDP spend on defense. Okay, we've got one here from Tom. He's in Owen Sound in Ontario, Canada. Was sad to learn recently that WGN Radio in Chicago has dropped Joe Lindsley. His pod and Battleground are my two favorites.

I've listened to a few of his post-WGN pods and they're okay and getting better, but not nearly as professional as the WGN broadcast. So I'm worried about him. Just thought there might be an opportunity for Battleground to talk to Joe a bit more frequently now. I don't want to lose his man on the street in Ukraine, POV.

Point of view, the episodes of Battleground with Joe were all great. Wishing you a happy winter holiday and a happy new year. Well, very timely question from Tom, because as all listeners know, we're about to head out to Ukraine. We were hoping to catch up with Joe. I sent him a message about a week ago, radio silence, but actually he's been in the Carpathians resetting, which he tends to do at the end of every year. He did actually contact me just before we started recording this podcast and

and we are agreeing to meet up. And it's absolutely true that the news about Joe being dropped from WGN Radio in Chicago was a bit of a bombshell because he was the only journalist, Patrick, believe it or not, who's reported from the war since the full-scale invasion, since the start of the full-scale invasion, every single day. And every one of those interviews were on WGN until suddenly in mid-December, I think it was, or late December, he was told that

the owners of the radio station were cutting it, which I can't help feeling is something to do with, you know, the politics of all of this. I mean, Joe's been pretty robust recently.

frankly in his opinion on the far right a movement that he was actually very close to when he started out his journalistic career and then then managed to extricate himself from fox news and that and that sort of thing and joe may be being punished for that kind of attitude although it's interesting if anyone actually listens to any of these broadcasts and he is now if anyone wants to continue to follow him you can't hear him on wgn anymore but he is on ukrainian freedom news which is a

feed that goes out on YouTube, he has actually become much more positive in what Trump might do in Ukraine, as have we. So we certainly intend to meet up with Joe. We would welcome more contributions to him on the podcast. And we're very much looking forward to seeing him again in the flesh very soon. And on that subject of our trip, we've got a message from Simon Blinko,

who says, love the podcast. Listening to your last couple of episodes, you mentioned you're traveling to Kiev for 20th of January. Well, we don't quite know where we're going to be on the 20th of January.

But Simon says, I live in Nottingham and was a police officer for 30 years before retiring. When the war started, I realized I had spare time and no excuse not to help. So I volunteered on the border in Lviv to work with refugees and have continued since then traveling extensively through Ukraine with aid. And for the last two years, I've

He's been volunteering with Ukrainian Action, and he's going to be delivering vehicles to the country on the 20th. That'll be his 12th trip out there. He says, I've come to love the country and the people. He says, if you're free around that time, I'd love to buy you both a beer as a thank you for the hard work you do keeping Ukrainian people's minds. Well, it sounds like you're doing a hell of a lot of hard work

as well, Simon, more practical than us. But that's such a great idea. We will try and make that happen. So we'll try and contact you and take it from there. On the volunteering front, we were talking in last week's pod about the sad death of a Scottish medical volunteer, Jordan McClacton from Ardhamirkan in the Highlands. And it turns out that there are quite

quite a few overseas volunteers. We got a message from someone called Luke, just gives his name as Luke from the Netherlands. And he says, I'd like to draw attention to two incredible individuals, Regan and Crow, volunteers for the

Augusta Ania Foundation in Ukraine, and they're operating in the Donetsk area. And they spent the last two and a half years on projects from running a mobile medical center and performing civilian evacuations to delivering supplies to combat medics and training soldiers in tactical medical skills, etc. 500 soldiers have been

trained in the last year alone so you know there's a lot of good people doing good stuff out there and we're going to try and put some of these links that he gave us to the august diania organization onto the podcast site okay that's all we have time for do join us on wednesday for another episode of battleground 45 and also on friday when we'll be bringing you the latest from ukraine goodbye