48. Smoke Rises From The Kremlin
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Ryan Reynolds here for, I guess, my 100th Mint commercial. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. I mean, honestly, when I started this, I thought I'd only have to do like four of these. I mean, it's unlimited premium wireless for $15 a month. How are there still people paying two or three times that much? I'm sorry, I shouldn't be victim blaming here. Give it a try at mintmobile.com slash save whenever you're ready. For

$45 upfront payment equivalent to $15 per month. New customers on first three-month plan only. Taxes and fees extra. Speeds lower above 40 gigabytes. See details. Hello and welcome to the Battleground Ukraine podcast with me, Patrick Bishop, and Saul David. Well, the big news this week, according to the U.S. National Security Council, is that Russia has suffered more than 100,000 casualties since the turn of the year and that its offensive in the Donbass, chiefly in and around Bakhmut, has failed.

We'll discuss the ramifications of this for the much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive, which might begin any day now. We'll also look at the renewal of Russia's large-scale missile attacks, presumably in an attempt to disrupt the aforementioned counter-offensive, and the various peace initiatives that have been touted by, among others, China and the Vatican.

Okay, well, let's start off with this news about the casualties. It comes from John Kirby, who's the spokesman for the US National Security Council. Now, they're saying that the estimate of 100,000 casualties, that includes 20,000 dead. Remember, this is just for this year. This is not for the conflict dating back to last February, was based on recently declassified intelligence. He added that nearly half the Russian dead were from the Wagner Group,

and that the majority of them, all casualties, had died in the battle for Bakhmut. He added, Russia's attempt, this is quoting, at an offensive in the Donbass, largely through Bakhmut, has failed. Russia has been unable to seize any real strategically significant territory.

and instead it had only made incremental gains. So what, Saul, do you think this tells us about the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive? Well, the Ukrainians are going to be pretty pleased with this, aren't they? And it's obviously good news. Kirby was quite explicit, interestingly enough, about this when he noticed that Russia's failed defensive had come at a, and I quote, terribly, terribly high cost and that it had exhausted its military stockpiles and its armed forces.

So if the figures are accurate, they not only justify the Ukrainian strategy of continuing to fight in Bakhmut when many Western commentators were urging a tactical withdrawal, but they also augur well for the counteroffensive. Kirby said as much when he noted that the US and its allies continue to assist material and military training ahead of the counteroffensive, adding that the Ukrainians will be ready.

Yes, and the Russians are obviously rattled because our old friend Yevgeny Prigozhin, the boss of Wagner, is now threatening to withdraw his forces from Bakhmut if the Russian military fails to provide more ammunition. Now, this has been going on for a long time, hasn't it? This sort of back and forth with a claim and counterclaim. But I mean, the consistent feature has been there.

Pregosian saying that he's being let down by his own side because they're not giving him the supplies he needs to do the job. All this, of course, in the context of the power struggle between the regular army and Pregosian's outfit. According to Pregosian, he's saying his men are only getting 800 of the 4,000 shells per day that they need

And if this doesn't improve, he told one of his allies in the middle blogger community, the Wagner troops will need to, quote, withdraw in an organized manner or stay and die. He also gave a bit of an insight into the Russian strategy at Bakhmut, which he said that the plan was developed by Sergei Surovikin or General Armageddon, as we often refer to him as. And the plan was to grind Bakhmut.

the Russian forces there and deprive Ukraine of its initiative on the battlefield. Now, this is straight, this is what you would expect Surovikin to do. That's what the Russians did both in the Chechnya wars and in Syria. But, you know, this is a very, very different situation and applying this

same strategy to completely different circumstances seems to be an example of military stupidity, doesn't it? I mean, the Ukrainian army is much more sophisticated than the Chechen and the Syrian rebels. And we also know from our interview with Phil O'Brien earlier this week that if they were aiming to take out Ukraine's best troops, then they were mistaken in thinking they were fighting anywhere

in the theater, because as far as we know, the combined arms forces, you know, the brigades that are being trained up for the counteroffensive weren't actually used in the Battle of Bakhmut at all. That's right. And Prigozhin is obviously concerned that the Ukrainians might make real gains with the counteroffensive.

And we know this because in the same interview, he suggested that the counteroffensive might take place before the 15th of May. He was actually specific about the date, but that the Russian military is failing to prepare for this. Now, according to the Washington DC think tank, the Institute for the Study of War, Prigozhin's threat to withdraw from Bakhmut may be an indication of his concern that Russian positions in Bakhmut's rear are vulnerable to counterattacks. And there are also some hints from the Ukrainian military that the tide is beginning to turn in Bakhmut.

Colonel General Oleksandr Sersky, who we mentioned last week, he's the commander of Ukrainian ground forces, said earlier this week that local Ukrainian counterattacks had ousted Russian forces from some positions in the city and that the main supply route into the city was still under Ukrainian control. The enemy, he added, is unable to take control of the city. Yeah, the precaution complaint was quite specific, wasn't it, Saul? He talks about

needing 300 tons of ammunition a day, which he claims was not a lot at all. But he's obviously forgetting his history. He said he was only actually getting a third of that, i.e. 100 tons a day. But just thinking back, you'll know more about this than me. But the whole of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, the besieged force at Stalingrad, in December 1942, was asking for 700 tons a day and was only getting...

200. Well, that tells us two things, doesn't it? One, it reminds you of how important military supply chains are. But the other is that the field commander is not the prigogine that seems to be actually anywhere near the front line himself. But they're always asking for more than the people back at HQ are either able or willing to give them. Now, moving on to other news, we've had another wave of news.

Russian missile attacks. We can speculate a bit about what's behind them. It is a bit baffling. But this is 18 cruise missiles were launched from aircraft in one strike. And most of them were shot down, which is encouraging. 15 of the 18 were shot down. But others did hit a Ukrainian ammunition store in the eastern city of Pavlovrad in a blast that injured at least 34 people, including three children, and damaged dozens of

buildings. But a separate salvo of missiles killed at least 25 civilians. This time, 23 cruise missiles were fired and 21 were shot down. And this is mostly down to the IRIS-T air defense system. This is the German system, which was only delivered a few weeks ago and has been described as a game changer. That seems to be the case. And it doesn't knock them all down, but it knocks down a big chunk of them.

Now, I've been talking with Ukrainians here in the US where I am at the moment about what is the thinking behind this. And our old friend, Krushkolnitsky, who's with me at the moment, was saying, well, he thinks it's probably actually designed not. It's not really specifically about trying to disrupt the counteroffensive. It's more for home consumption. The people back in Russia and even Putin's own people are hearing they're running out of advanced weaponry. And this is a sort of message, no, no, we've still got this kit.

That seems to me to be a plausible explanation. I mean, the original idea, of course, was way back at the beginning of the winter was to starve and rather freeze the Ukrainians into submission. That's obviously failed. So that seems to me to be a likely explanation. Now, the Ukrainians, as we know, don't have long range missiles of their own. The Americans are still refusing to give them that capability unilaterally.

point that we've questioned and indeed many people are questioning phil o'brien does the same thing so the ukrainians have got to kind of improvise and they've been doing that very effectively it sounds like certainly over the last week a russian fuel depot was blown up in sevastopol in crimea

last Saturday, almost certainly by drone attack. And the fire, and this is according to the Russian-installed governor of Crimea, reached a size of 1,000 square metres. So that's a massive blast. And in a separate attack, either by partisans or Ukrainian special forces, a train carrying fuel and construction material was derailed after a section of the track was

was blown up in the Bryansk region of Russia, and that's just 70 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. These are all, I suspect, attempts to disrupt Russian supplies and make it harder to combat the coming offensive. Okay, well, while we're recording, we've just seen the news alerts saying that

there's been a drone attack on the Kremlin. Now, initial thoughts, there's two possibilities. There are several possibilities, but the obvious one is, you know, it's the Ukraine is behind it. Another possibility, I suppose, is it could be actually a homegrown anti-Putin group that have done this. There have been various incidents since the beginning of the conflict of kind of sabotage operations. This may be one of those. My feeling is that it's probably a Ukrainian inspired operation, at least.

and that first thought is that it may be designed to disrupt the Victory Day parade, which is a big, big event in Russia's national calendar, which is only a few days away. It's on the six days away. It's May the 9th. What do you think, Saul? Well, it's extraordinary, isn't it? If it is a Ukrainian operation, and I agree with you, Patrick, it almost certainly is. Certainly that's what the Russians are saying. And I'll come on to a quote from the press office, the Kremlin press office in a minute. But the pictures are...

I mean, smoke rising from the Kremlin. So this really is bringing the war right into the heart of Moscow. The Kremlin press office feels it was an assassination attempt on Putin. He wasn't at home at the time, so there was a little chance of him really being killed. But of course, it's the image really, isn't it, of the Kremlin under attack that's happening.

means this is such a coup for the Ukrainians. So what does the Kremlin press office say? Well, they describe it as a planned terrorist attack and an assassination attempt, and they pledge to retaliate. Exactly how they're going to do that when they're trying to bomb the hell out of Ukraine already is another matter. The comment goes on to say Russia reserves the right to retaliate where and when it deems necessary.

Now, this really does bring the war home to the Russian people, doesn't it? I mean, they've been pretty much insulated from it directly. Of course, they hear stuff coming back from the battlefield. But, you know, this is an extraordinary symbolic event. I'm trying to think of it in the Second World War. To what extent was Moscow actually damaged by the German offense? Yeah, well, good question, Patrick. I certainly think it was shelled. But

In terms of symbolism, this is akin to the Buckingham Palace being bombed, which, if I recall rightly, was done deliberately, wasn't it? There was even a suggestion that the dreaded Edward VII, of course, who was Duke of Windsor by this point, had given certain intelligence to the Germans to allow them to make an assassination attempt on George VI. But that strikes me as a similarity.

Yeah, but I think in terms of Putin's mindset and the psychology of the people around him, this is an appalling affront, isn't it? I mean, this will drive him mad with rage, I would have thought. So in all respects, this is an extraordinary event. The other thing it tells you is that you'd imagine that the air defenses around the Kremlin would be the

the best kit that the Russians can have got. And here we are in a situation where a drone, we don't know the exact details of the specifications of the drone, but it's managed to get through it. Whatever way you look at it, this is an incredible story. Okay, well, just as the war is taking this new turn, there's another peace initiative. And the latest global figure to try and broker a deal is none other than Pope Francis. He revealed that he discussed a peace mission when he met the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

and the Orthodox Bishop of Budapest during his recent visit to Hungary. There is a mission in course now, he told reporters, but it's not yet public. When it is public, I will reveal it. He added, I think that peace is always made by opening channels. You can never achieve peace through closure. This is not easy. Well, you can say that again, Pope Francis.

I kind of think, you know, if he's actually doing it with the assistance of Viktor Orban, who is no friend of Ukraine, and an Orthodox cleric from the Moscow Patriarchate, who's very much on the side of Putin...

This doesn't sound to me like it's going to fly. But what do you think, Saul? Yeah. By the way, I loved his comment. It's not yet public. But when it is public, I will reveal it. I think by that point, it's too late. But yeah, no, I'd rather agree with you, Patrick. But normally, I would have said this is not going anywhere. But there is some interesting context to this.

Pope Francis has been talking about the need for peace since the start of the full-scale invasion, as we know. But the context is interesting. Prior to his Hungarian visit, the Pope actually met Denis Shmuel, the Ukrainian prime minister at the Vatican, where, according to the latter, that is Shmuel, they discussed a peace formula put forward by Zelensky. So you could say that the whole papal mission has actually been prompted by this initial contact

with Schmeil, with Zelensky's proposal. What the terms of that formula are, we don't know. But Schmeil also said that he had asked for help in repatriating Ukrainian children who'd been taken to Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine,

mainly Crimea, of course. And the Pope has confirmed that he'll do everything he can to help. Now, again, is this initiative likely to have any success? Well, possibly, because the forced deportation, as our listeners will know, is the charge that has caused the International Criminal Court to issue a warrant for Putin's arrest.

And it may be that Putin is keen to lessen the fallout from this by repatriating some more Ukrainian children with the Pope as an intermediary. Whether we're going to get any further down the track with the peace proposal is another matter, but there may be some movement on that. Yeah, it sounds like some good may come out of it, even though we're both a bit sceptical about the chances of the peace deal emerging. OK, well, that's all we've got time for in part one. Join us after the break when we'll be answering listeners' questions.

Welcome back to the Friday episode of Battleground Ukraine. And I'd like to start this section, we normally go on to listeners' questions, but we've had a fascinating email from the podcast's resident cybersecurity expert, David Alexander. Referring to the recent Pentagon leaks by intelligence analyst Jack Texera, David makes a number of interesting points. I don't have time to read out the whole thing, but I'll just give you a kind of flavor of some of the things he says.

He recognises that Texera is probably identified, that is, identified as the leaker by a process known as protective monitoring or PROTMON, as it's known for short in the cybersecurity world. David writes, a good PROTMON system allows incident investigators to identify every single document, spreadsheet, file, email, etc. that the accused has ever read, written, edited, deleted, printed, received or sent by email or other means.

every website they've ever accessed, which PC and which office they have used, and the times and dates they did so, and much, much more than that. As for the wide range of material that Mr. Texera is said to have compromised, he does actually give the first credible explanation as to why someone as junior as Texera was able to get hold of all this material. He writes, Mr. Texera was an analyst. His role would have included doing research, finding patterns and correlations, then writing reports.

This requires more of a need to share rather than a need to know principle with access to a very wide range of classified materials so that he can do his job. Striking a balance between the two principles of need to know and need to share is never easy. It brings challenges and

and risks that need to be managed. This is especially true of the younger generation like Texaria, just 21, who have grown up in a connected world with social media. They are by nature people who share because of it. And that is exactly what Mr. Texera appears to have done. So fascinating stuff. You can say that again. He shared it with the entire world.

Okay, on to the questions. So we've got one first off from Agnieszka from Poland. I've noticed all that this week we've got lots of questions from women, which is nice to feel that we're actually kind of, you know, not just confined to an audience of males. So, yeah, that's rather encouraging. Well, Agnieszka asks, as we know, Russians were and still are preparing defensive lines for many months. I've been thinking about the length of fortifications required

And in my amateur opinion, it's a major weakness of these defenses. Correct me if I'm wrong, but in its current state, Russia hasn't got enough military personnel to man them properly at full length. She's saying that Ukraine also will be able to find the weak spots with their access to US spy satellite information. And she's asking, should the Ukrainian military

exploit that? Well, the answer is obviously yes. But what do you think about that, Saul? Do you think that because of the extraordinary length of the battle line that the Russians will have a hard job even with their

man power superiority to actually man it effectively for its entire length. Yes, I do think that's the case. And she's absolutely right about the intelligence, although we're discovering, of course, that we've already spoken about drones being used in an offensive capability. But the Ukrainians are brilliant at using drones just to find out what's going on over the hill, as it were, and they'll be using them before the attack. I mean, you know, this is being discussed literally as we speak.

Do they have enough men to man these defences effectively? Almost certainly not. They've just lost 100,000 since the turn of the year, as we've already pointed out. So, you know, I've got a lot of optimism for the counter-offensive. I think if they launch it in the right place at the right time and keep the Russians guessing, they've got a real chance of making some headway. But we're going to see in the next week or two. OK, we've got a question here from the Netherlands. This is Peter Snarterza. I hope I pronounced that right, and I almost certainly haven't.

Enjoying your podcast. Love the interview with Phil Littner last week. And I hope his optimism will prove to be justified. So do we, of course, Peter. Phil mentioned seeing 113s all over the place. And as an ex-Dutch military man, I actually know it must have been our former Dutch Army YPRs. We have donated about 200 so far and are still sending them from our stockpiles.

In the clip, you'll see he sent a clip to us. And in the clip, you'll see we are preparing the old YPRs that have sometimes been in stockpiles for more than 20 years. So they're not exactly getting brand new stuff. Removal of bird's nests is among the tasks our engineers face. Good luck with the podcast. And Peter's absolutely right. The Dutch military donated the first, I checked this, and the Dutch military donated the first YPR 765s.

armoured infantry vehicles in May last year. So they almost certainly are the YPRs, although there's other kit there too now, as we know. Yeah, I think they are the Dutch version of the American kind of small APC that Phil was talking

was mentioning the 113. They're made by DAF and they can carry eight infantrymen. They've got a crew of three and they're very versatile. They're tracked vehicles. They're quite tough little vehicles and they're also quite

effectively armed with carrying a 25mm gun. Yeah, and they're going to be absolutely crucial, as we've mentioned before. I think the APCs are really the key to the counter-offensive because, of course, they can move infantry forward, protected from machine gun fire, shell fire, and it'll allow them, probably in conjunction with armour, we've got a question about tanks actually, so I'll wait to get to that before I

talk about armour too much, but probably in conjunction with armour in these combined arms brigades that we know have been preparing, all 12 of them. Now, a question here from Patrick Whittam, and he says, Patrick and Saul, I'm loving the podcast and wondering how the British public can help. Is there a sponsor, a drone type of GoFundMe arrangement or similar? He says he's been giving money to Ukrainian humanitarian appeals, but what

but was wondering if there is a route for the man in the street to support in a more directly useful way the Ukrainian military providing fuel or ration packs or whatever. Well, I don't know about any specifically British organizations which are organizing military aid to Ukraine, but there are lots of Ukrainian and international ones. And I'll just mention a few here.

we were talking to Melania a few weeks back, a few months back now, who worked for the Pretula Foundation organization, which is

both humanitarian aid and military aid to civilians and Ukrainian soldiers. And I'll just give you their website is prytula, P-R-Y-T-U-L-A, foundation.org. They're very reputable in a very well-administered outfit, and they will get your donation and put it to some good use. There's another one which I should mention, the Ukrainian Free University Foundation War Fund, which

which does the same thing. And their address is ufuf.org. That's the Ukrainian Free University Foundation War Fund. Yeah, and a couple to add to that. There's something called weapons2ukraine.com. Not quite sure how reputable that is, but it might be worth a little look.

you can donate more generally to the Humanitarian Appeal, as it seems Patrick's already done. And if you look on the website, donation.dec.org.uk forward slash Ukraine dash humanitarian dash appeal, bit of a long one there. And lastly, if you just want to give more generally, particularly to people affected by the war in Ukraine, I should flag up our guest next week. That's British artist and photographer Mark Neville, who recently set up a charity called PostCode,

Postcode Ukraine, a wonderful initiative. And its web address is www.postcodeukraine.com. Now, Richard Bilhorn in Charlotte, North Carolina,

is a regular listener, and he was asking for our thoughts on the updated Google images of Ukraine. If you get onto Google images now, you can actually see the terrain as it is post-war. And he gives the example of the Antonov International Airport. That's the one just outside Kiev, isn't it, I believe?

And he's asking, have we actually noticed this? You've been looking at this all, haven't you? What do you make of it? It's extraordinary. I mean, he sent a link to the Antonov Airport, which, as you say, Patrick, we discussed in episode one of the Battleground Ukraine podcast, because that's where Paul Kenyon went to as the attack by Russian airborne forces was actually happening. I mean, that's at Hostomel. And if you look at

the images on Google Earth now and anyone can go there and see them. It's absolutely extraordinary because you can see the craters. I mean, there was a big battle for Hostomel that went on for a number of days. And even after the Russians finally took possession of the airport, the initial airborne force was repulsed, but they eventually took possession of it when their main armoured column came through. It was hectic.

heavily shelled by the Ukrainians and was really a bit of a charnel house for the Russians until they finally withdrew, I think, towards the end of March, if I'm remembering rightly, Patrick. So if you want to get a kind of live view of the war as it's unfolding, you can see these pictures. Absolutely extraordinary. And no doubt you can look all across Ukraine to get a flavour of what's going on.

A question here from Bruce Mall, who says that earlier in the war, Russia accused the West of waging a proxy war in Ukraine. And he's speculating that once the counteroffensive begins, we'll probably hear much more of this accusation. He's asking, what's the difference between a proxy war versus the support the US and others are giving to Ukraine, i.e., is there any foundation there?

for this accusation. Well, it's a bit of a sort of vague term, isn't it? Proxy Warsaw. I mean, it's technically sort of when a major power

a conflict without getting directly involved. But there haven't been very many instances of that actually happening where you've had, you know, superpowers having proxy armies fighting out a war on their behalf. They've almost always sort of got involved one way or the other themselves. I mean, Vietnam is often cited as a case of a proxy war. But in that case, the Americans were initially anyway, or for a large chunk of the most sort of active period of the war, there themselves. I

I suppose something like the Sandinista conflict where the Contras were backed by the CIA against the Marxists. Sandinistas might qualify. But I think coming back to Ukraine, the idea that America actually sort of instigated this and wanted...

the Ukrainians to sort of fight their war for them. I don't think that there's any close examination at all. I don't think it really advances America's agenda in any way, as far as I can see. And for you to see it as a proxy war, you have to believe that Washington's intentions were malign.

from the beginning, which I'm sure you don't. No, exactly right. Okay, moving on. Rude from the Pacific Northwest is asking a question about tanks. I mentioned before we had a question. He talks about the T-62s have been brought to the Russian frontline forces over the winter, and now the T-55 is being brought out of storage. We've commented on that before. Since the Russians should know that Bakhmut is not the fulcrum of this war, don't these three facts, rarely attacking with armour, bringing in these aged tanks, and

focusing on infantry artillery attacks point to a lack of heavy kit. Infantry attacks will not break open a front, especially not when attacking fortified lines. Yes, possibly. But I think what's going on in Bakhmut, as we've already discussed, is that they're trying to grind down the Ukrainians. Actually, the opposite, of course, is happening there with artillery. They're all favourite. And in fact, it's long been a favourite of the Russians, but particularly in recent times.

So what about the Western tanks coming in? Rude suggests that since there are so few of them, wouldn't they be best used as a mobile reserve and decoy force? Keep some to hold ground one and use others to make a feint look more serious. Western tanks on the defensive with prepared positions with their great targeting ability, very effective cannons and heavy armor are very formidable.

Well, it's an interesting point, isn't it? I'm kind of imagining in my mind's eye, Patrick, that these armoured personnel carriers are going to be used in conjunction with tanks. But maybe Rude's got a point. I mean, we know that all armour is very vulnerable now. We don't know how vulnerable the Western battle tanks will be because, frankly, they haven't been

in this sort of conflict before, and very few have been lost on the battlefield, but haven't really come up against a serious enemy and sophisticated anti-tank weapons. Whether the Russians possess them is another matter, but it is an interesting point, and it may be that actually they're not going to be risking these very precious main battle tanks right at the front of the counter-offensive. Yeah, I think that's right. I mean, they are a precious resource, and I think they will be husbanding that resource

very, very carefully. They also have a psychological effect in both directions. One is, you know, clearly they would be feared by the Russians, but the propaganda effect of a loss or several losses of these Western tanks will be quite considerable as well. So I think they'll be using them very sparingly and thinking long and hard about what they're going to, they want to achieve with them.

Yeah. OK, moving on. We've got an interesting question from Adrian Tasker. He says, gents, enjoying the pod, I'd be interested to hear your thoughts about this year's parade. And presumably he means the May Day parade in Moscow. Is hardware being taken from the front line to support the parade? Will it be scaled back compared to previous years? Will there be crowds allowed to attend a potential assassination threat? And would this be a time to launch a counteroffensive?

with all the top brass looking elsewhere? Well, it's a series of really good questions. And, you know, I'm beginning to suspect that it may be cancelled this year and the attack on the Kremlin may just tip the balance in that sense. And there is also a suggestion, Patrick, that the counteroffensive might coincide with the May Day parade as a, you know, as a,

as one in the eye to the Kremlin. What do you think? Yeah, these dates do loom large in the kind of national identities of both Russia and Ukraine. So that is a definite possibility. But, you know, given the success of this drone getting through to the Kremlin, I would have thought that the security risks are very, very high now for the parade and that it may indeed be at least scaled down in order to take account of that, which again is hardly a sort of demonstration of being in control by the Kremlin, is it? It will send a very, very

powerful negative signal, which cannot be disguised to the Russian people. Okay, we've got a question from Martin Whittingham. He's from Belper, United Kingdom. I read that the leak of US documents revealed that Serbia was secretly supporting Ukraine that

He's right. That's exactly what those documents said. And he adds that a recent report from the BBC covered the pro-Russian or perhaps more correctly, anti-Western stance of many Serbs, principally a legacy, as he puts it, from NATO's 1999 bombing campaign. So if the leaks are true, what is Serbia's motivation for helping Ukraine? Patrick, what do you think?

Well, Serbia and Russia, despite the fact they're not that close geographically, have much in common otherwise. They're both Orthodox. They're both Slav nations. And they have a similar mindset, I would say, based on a conviction that everyone's out to get them. It's a slightly sort of paranoid way of looking at the world. And if you look back at history, Serbia has always been a loyal ally of Russia and vice versa.

I remember back in my reporting days being in the former Yugoslavia, I think it was in Bosnia, when the Russian peacekeepers arrived and being very surprised to see these crowds of very enthusiastic villagers out on the street holding out bread in one hand and salt in the other. This is traditional greeting, bread and salt. It's saying, we are your friends. They were there actually, of course, as peacekeepers during the Balkan conflict under the UN flag.

So Serbia has always supported Russia and vice versa. I mean, think back to the First World War when Russia went to the aid of Serbia against Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. And that, you know, essentially was the trigger for the First World War because Germany and Austria then declared, Austria-Hungary then declared war on Russia and away we went.

Of course, you know, the Belgrade bombing by NATO just sort of cemented that alliance. But I think that link is very hard to break. Of course, at the same time, Serbia is trying to join the EU and we're encouraging them in a way by pouring quite a lot of aid money into the place. Nonetheless, they've basically their entire energy supplies are owned by Gazprom. I think the state energy company Gazprom.

sold a controlling share to Gazprom some time ago and they're buying lots of Russian kits. So they're facing both ways as Hungary as well. So it's a sort of thing you see in that region. Historically, it's always been the case that if you're stuck in geographically in the middle of

of Europe, you have to keep all your options open. Okay, another question from this time from Priscilla Watkins. She's the one who notes that we haven't had that many questions from women in the past, but we have had a few more this time. And she's asking about sabotage. And basically, the

question is really are there Russians prepared to commit sabotage themselves and she gives the example of something we've already discussed actually on the news and that is the the overnight incidents of sabotage earlier this week within the Russian Federation in particular in Bryansk

Well, my take on this, Priscilla, actually, is I don't think this is Russians. I think this is probably Ukrainians heading across the border. I mean, it's relatively close to Ukraine. I might be wrong, but there haven't been that many examples of sabotage. It would be nice to think that it was and that there will be more. There have been one or two, actually, but I suspect this is more likely to be Ukrainian forces.

Yes. Priscilla also asks whether there's a sort of parallel with the French resistance. And she's speculating that perhaps we're talking about a similar kind of process beginning inside Russia today.

I'd be quite skeptical about that. I think when you see the size of the state repression apparatus, it would be very, very hard, I think, to organize in any significant way. We've seen a few things like attacks on recruiting offices, but they're, I think, likely to be independent initiatives.

But in going back to the French situation, it took years and years and years. Really, from the beginning of the occupation in June 1944, nothing very much happened that had any impact on the German military machine there until the summer of 1944. So a full four years before they were able to organize themselves. So I think if it is happening, it's going to be a long, long process. Okay.

Okay, Oliver Hugh Jones wants to know why we haven't heard more about thermobaric weapons. And I think we're quite glad, Patrick, aren't we? We haven't heard. These are these horrendous weapons known as vacuum bombs that have been used in the past, I think in Syria, chiefly against civilians. So they're really not the sort of thing you want to see on the battlefield or anywhere else. Although apparently, Oliver kind of suggests why haven't we heard about them? Well,

We have heard about them because as early as February the 28th, 2022, that's just a few days after the initial mass invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States confirmed that Russia had used a vacuum bomb, a thermobaric weapon, and that it had killed 70 soldiers as part of its initial invasion. So they have been used. I suppose the

Better question is why have more of them not been used? And I can't really answer that. I mean, it seems that there's almost nothing bar a nuclear weapon that Putin's prepared to use. Although, of course, we haven't seen chemical weapons being used either. So do you think this is he's a little bit cautious about using these sort of weapons because of the possible US response, Patrick?

Yeah, I think that even though the rhetoric is very extreme, I think in reality, they do, Russians do recognize that there are red lines. And you mentioned chemical weapons, that is a very clear one. People have a horror of chemical weapons, and that translates into kind of political reaction, outraged political reaction, which is perhaps disproportionate with what the weapons actually doing is killing people in the same way as every other weapon.

weapon does. So I think there is a recognition in the Kremlin that there are certain things that you don't want to do unless you really feel you have to. And that may be one of them. Right. That's all we have time for. Thanks again for joining us on this momentous episode in the sense that news was breaking while we were actually recording it, that alleged assassination attempt

of Putin and do join us of course next Wednesday for another big interview and the following Friday when we'll be recapping the latest news and answering listeners questions goodbye