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From Carnegie, China, this is China in the World. Engaging leading scholars and former policymakers on China's foreign policy, evolving global role, and relations with Southeast Asia in particular. Brought to you by the East Asia-based Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Hi, welcome to this special five-episode series of the China and the World podcast from Carnegie China. We're looking at Southeast Asian perspectives on the People's Republic of China with Southeast Asian voices from Southeast Asia. My name is Ian Chong. I'm a non-resident scholar with Carnegie China and an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. In this episode, we are going to be taking a dive into Southeast Asia and Taiwan, a topic that does not come up quite as much as it really should.
Taiwan, given its position right to the north of the South China Sea and its fraught ties with Beijing, should be integral to this conversation. Joining me today are two really good friends of mine. Dr. Ratika Benawa is an adjunct research fellow at the School of Social Sciences at the University of Western Australia and a visiting scholar for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship. Her research interests include transnational democracy,
Taiwan's international relations, Taiwan-South East Asia relations, and foreign policy of non-state actors. She is currently working on her first monograph on Taiwan's use of informal diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Rati, would you like to say hi? Hi, hello. Thanks, Ian, for having me for this podcast. My pleasure. With us also is Julio S. Amador III, who I'll call July.
July has a distinguished career. He is currently Executive Director of the Philippine American Educational Foundation, which is the Fulbright Commission in the Philippines. He is Interim President of the Foundation for the National Interest and Founder and Trustee of the non-profit AXE Asia. He previously worked in the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines and served as Deputy Director General of the Foreign Policy Institute of the Philippines.
he works on national security and foreign affairs issues and is a regular on track one point five the two meetings he was a fulbright scholar and was with the east-west center in washington d c in fact we ran to each other not too long ago in taipei
Would you like to say hi? Hi, Ian, and to all the listeners of your podcast. It's good to run into you in Taipei. And of course, better to hear you say that I am your very good friend. So glad to be here. Well, of course. All right. So for today, as I had mentioned earlier, we normally don't talk about Taiwan and Southeast Asia in the same breath.
But if you think about the geography, Taiwan just sits to the north of the South China Sea. And of course, the South China Sea is very much smack in the middle of Southeast Asia.
So, I like to sort of start off by asking our two guests to sort of think about or to discuss what they think about how Taiwan and the PRC's relations, how does that affect Southeast Asia? Normally, we like to think about it as out of sight and out of mind. July, would you like to start? Funny that you asked.
I started with that description, Ian, because I think as far as many Southeast Asian countries are concerned, in my reading, most of them would prefer not to be drawn into this question, precisely because this is really something that I think for them is a difficult issue to deal with. I do remember my time when we were the ones writing all of these outlooks.
a decade or more ago and there's always a mention of cross-race relations as one of the major flashpoints uh in the same way that we always mention pandemics that's gonna be an you know an issue a security issue for southeast asia and we had a pandemic and i don't know if we're going for gold this time but really no this has been i think we have not been remissed
in warning countries and warning our nations about the potential dangers of the question. How about you, Rati? How do you think the cross-strait relations affect Southeast Asia? Well, thanks, Ian, for the question. I think Taiwan, well, if we look at Taiwan and Southeast Asia position, they are definitely sitting at the same, at the close proximity.
And Southeast Asia has always been Taiwan's target for their self-bound, self-going policies. But Taiwan has gained more attention lately among Southeast Asian countries, especially after the Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan in August 2022 and how Beijing reacted to that visit.
Right, as we can see for the first time in several years.
ASEAN finally issued a joint statement. The first time in several years, you know. Unfortunately, yes, but if you look at from the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995 to 1996, ASEAN did not publish or issue any statement. So the one in 2022 is definitely a significant move forward.
from Southeast Asian countries in responding to the Taiwan Strait tension. And also interesting that they offer, they advocated for the group's constructive role in facilitating dialogue, even though we do not know how are they going to proceed with the dialogue concerning their close relations, economic, particularly with China.
And interestingly, also, we can see that each Southeast Asian country has their own one China policy interpretation. Right. So the military exercises that had happened, that the PRC launched after Nancy Pelosi's visit, some of that came pretty close to some Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines. It was just north of your territorial sea. How did things look then, July? Yeah, that's the thing. So...
We are the closest Southeast Asian country to Taiwan. By sheer geographic proximity, the Philippines has to be concerned about what's happening there. But the way I see it, there's no such thing
shall we say heightened perceptions in the Philippines about what's going to happen in Taiwan. I think a great part of it is because of our own problems with Beijing in the South China Sea, which for us is, of course, our more important strategic
issue. So I think that's one thing that should change with what's happening regardless of how we feel about what is going on. I think the Philippines has to be prepared one way or the other to
to respond to certain issues that will come about because of any potential disturbance, whether it's an invasion or whatever you might call it. The Philippines will be involved just because of our religion. Right. I mean, there's also the...
Current developments with the EDCA pre-positioning, part of the U.S.-Philippine Military Corporation. There's some pre-positioning of material. And also, curiously, there was in the news these supposedly very mature-looking PRC students enrolling in schools.
of the Philippines that are overlooking Taiwan. Can you shed some light on that? Yeah, of course. It was in the news that some universities in Cagayan province, which actually hosts an EDCA base, also has seen an influx of PRC students
citizens who are supposedly studying in one or two universities. I believe that there have been some security clarifications already about their stay, whether it's legitimate or not, I think we still need further investigation. But
What I worry about is the extent of what I call subnational subversion that's happening because you have seen the news, for example, a mayor, a dismissed mayor, she was recently dismissed, but she was elected despite the fact that her provenance is certainly questionable, to say the least. So,
We are not sure to what extent that we have the presence of PRC nationalists who have suddenly become Filipino citizens. I think they got their passports more than a lot of Filipinos, ahead of more Filipinos. So this actually is something that analysts and the government have to look into precisely because it is getting to be
It's getting to be dangerous. Right. And of course, with Rati from Indonesia and me being from Singapore, apparently the mayor and her entourage escaped to Singapore and then Indonesia.
So on this, Rati, I mean, one of the other things that comes up with the Taiwan relationship with Southeast Asia, if there's some sort of contingency or crisis, is that we've, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, you've got a lot of nationals in Taiwan, working in Taiwan. How does your society and how do your governments look at this issue of nationals in Taiwan if there's a crisis? It is pretty...
Pretty much the main concern of the Indonesian government if we talk about Taiwan contingency, because as we know that Indonesia has the most significant presence of migrant workers in Taiwan. Well, that was only migrant workers, but if you add with the students and also foreign spouses that
still have an Indonesian national or passports that the number could be even bigger than 350,000 that has always been stated in the news and among us. Protection diplomacy has been the most priority for the Indonesian government and also
I think we also need to look at that since 2014 to 2024, or definitely under the President Joko Widodo, protection diplomacy has been one of the key priorities for Indonesia foreign policy.
And according to the Indonesian MOFA, Taiwan hosts the third largest of Indonesia overseas after Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. So it is definitely in our strategic interest to protect our citizens in Taiwan. And MOFA has so far developed a policy to
engage Taiwan more diplomatically. For example, I can say that they sent diplomats to our office in Taipei
If you compare or look at the structure of our representative office in Taipei, it is not the same as our Southeast Asian counterparts like Philippines or Singapore, let's say. Your office in Taiwan are under the management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while for us it's under the management of the Ministry of Trade.
so that gives different role, different function, different structure. So then in order to enhance the
Texian diplomacy for our cities and MOVA finally set up their division, their own division and send their diplomats to Taiwan. I really hope that Indonesia can improve its diplomacy to Taiwan. And I think, as you can see, the recent detainment of Indonesian migrant visas who work at Taiwanese ships by Taiwan.
The China Coast Guard has been a testament to the importance of managing peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Not only for the US, I think, or Japan or Europe or Australia, but also for countries in Southeast Asia. So how are you going to escape if something happens? I hope there won't be something happen in Taipei. Well, I'm pretty much afraid with the typhoon and earthquake compared to the military or military conflict or escalation that Taipei-Cheng.
Happy Ayu July. I mean, we know that the Philippines also has a very big worker presence in Taiwan. Yeah, and that's why I think it's interesting as to why we have not come up with a sub-Asian or bilateral approach to it, considering that, look at the figures, Sati mentioned 350,000 Indonesians.
There are about 270,000 Vietnamese. We're not even counting, I think, those who are married. We're just looking at migrant workers, right? And about 200,000 Filipinos. And remember, Taipei is just two hours away from Manila.
So if you look at the situation, whether it's actually a natural disaster or military activity that happens, Manila is going to be destroyed.
important to our Southeast Asian neighbors in terms of just by sheer location alone, by the need to evacuate, for example, or the need to respond, Manila will play an important role. And I think it's time that there should be some unilateral discussions, not necessarily the whole ASEAN. But I think Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have the impetus to actually, should have the impetus to
to start talking about how to respond to a potential Taiwan crisis, even if we don't discuss that. There's a question, the humanitarian aspect of it, I think is already a big problem for a lot of Southeast Asian countries. And that, I think, should be worth the discussion because we have different tools, as Rati mentioned, in terms of how we approach Taiwan.
Taiwan. Yeah, and not to mention Thailand as well, because there are quite a few number of Thai workers and also undocumented migrant workers as well. So it can add up to one million Southeast Asian living in Taiwan. So it is really our task, actually ASEAN or these four Southeast Asian countries to take care of this issue.
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Go to carnegieendowment.org/china-reform-imperative for more information. I mean, just to add on, I mean, it's not just the migrant workers. Of course, the humanitarian aspect is clear and clearly important.
But, I mean, if you think about how dependent we are on the South China Sea for trade with Northeast Asia, if there's some sort of confrontation, blockade, quarantine, then our shipping, our air routes, and also if the different religions decide to really disrupt each other's communications, our submarine cables will be disrupted. So that means trade with China, Taiwan, China.
Korea, Japan, that will all be disrupted to say the least. And that can prove very expensive for Southeast Asia. So, I mean, in light of all this, you know, July, you started talking about, you know, maybe having some mini-lateral discussions. What do you think should be done? What kind of discussions, you know, what kind of direction should it be heading in, even if we don't know what the conclusions might be?
First of all, I think we need to have a serious discussion about the cross-strait issue, the Taiwan issue, however you call it. We don't even have a common name for how we want to deal with this problem, right? But it's clear that, as you mentioned, it will have an impact beyond the immediate shores of Taiwan. It will have an economic impact, it will have a trade impact, it will have a security and diplomatic impact on the region. Okay?
And our aversion to having serious discussions about this issue, as we have witnessed in the South China Sea and so forth, means that we are going to have problems moving forward. But I think the first step is to really have, you know, and if the countries that we mentioned are afraid of, you know, whatever it is that they're afraid of when it comes to this issue, you know,
I do think that seriously, someone should start having at least a track 1.5 discussion, having an overall support discussion on the potential, the real impact actually, because we're not talking about theoretical outcomes. There are going to be real outcomes and I think many are unprepared for the sheer magnitude of what's going to happen. The humanitarian crisis will be huge.
but also the other impacts in other areas that have often, I mean, maybe it's just that as an academic, I'm not updated on the latest studies, but just by observing the behavior of this region, I do not think we are actually preparing for potential crisis in this area.
I agree to points pointed by July, especially for the minilateral dialogue, that we don't have this sort of mechanism to discuss Taiwan issue in the region. Well, I understand that China will definitely reject that idea because any attempts to bring Taiwan issue or to internationalize Taiwan issue would be
would be a major drawbacks for any Southeast Asian countries, especially for their economic ties with China. However, I think there are still some options that we could do as Southeast Asian countries in dealing with the cross-strait tension. The first one, I think,
If we look at to our regional institution, ASEAN, currently we have the ASEAN Humanitarian Center. However, their role mainly focuses on the disaster management. So we need to enforce the role of the ASEAN Humanitarian Center in dealing with conflict management.
not only in Taiwan Strait, but also like in for the South China Sea disputes that where Philippines heavily involved in that area, in that conflict. The second one, I think it is the most crucial thing that we need to send a correct message to Taiwan, China, or even the US that whoever use military force and provokes to change the status quo should bear the responsibility.
I think dialogue mechanism not only within ASEAN about cross-strait relation but also maybe track to dialogue with Taiwan. We could definitely resurrect several dialogue like ASEAN-East ISIS dialogue.
that has been on and off for several years, that might be one option where we can have a few from our Taiwanese counterpart. And maybe trying to include Taiwan in several regional dialogue that we have in the region, because, you know, even if we look at Shangri-La dialogue, Taiwan was excluded, but then
Taiwan is the main issue of the main agenda of the dialogue. So it is quite bizarre, actually, to exclude Taiwan. Yeah, I mean, I do agree that all avenues should be explored. But I do believe that some countries have unilateral interests in Taiwan and the issues surrounding it that don't have to be discussed in ASEAN, precisely because
China already possesses a veto in some of the ASEAN activities. And some of these will really need unilateral decisions that will not be hampered by a regional organization that is difficult to convene on some issues. So I think that we can pursue both.
all tracks without having to sacrifice the integrity of each track. In the case of the Philippines, we do have to consider alliance with the United States, our relationship with Japan, now that we have a Pacific-Pacific agreement, of course, and that we
But I do want to turn back to Rati as well for one moment because of something that Indonesian leaders had previously said, right?
they said that if there's a Taiwan Strait crisis, they would close the archipelagic waters to all belligerents so that there'll be no more flow of fossil fuels and everybody have to stop fighting. What do you think of that position? I mean, it's been laid out there in public. Really? When did they make that statement? Maybe a couple of years ago, if I'm not wrong. Well, that would be...
difficult task to do, I believe, given that our strategic location as well in the sea lanes and also with the oil and gas transport along the Strait of Malacca, well, Singapore and Malaysia will definitely be
I don't know whether Singapore and Malaysia will agree with Indonesia because it will definitely impact another littoral state, which is Singapore and Malaysia. So that
would be another question as well. And you know, with our new capital city that is very close to the Natuna areas, Natuna Islands, that would cause another issue again because definitely anything happens, occurs in the Taiwan Strait or even in the South China Seas, for example, would have a direct impact to our
a new capital city. Right, so just playing on this idea of a crisis, I mean, I suppose if there's some major contingency, the US will probably be asking for access through the airspace or the seas of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. And of course, this is, I mean, the fact that I'm saying it now, it's not a secret, right?
Beijing knows this as well. They will probably put a lot of pressure on these various governments. They may decide to activate their citizens or people who are sympathetic to their position within these societies.
How do you both sort of see this potentially playing out? I think just the practical reality that we do have the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Force Agreement, and then the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement means that the Philippines, you know, is on this issue, the Philippines has a little less wiggle room than the Philippines.
might want that doesn't mean of course that we want to be pushed again into another conflict that we you know we are not we do not want to be a party to i do not think there's a strong sentiment about about them out there um i think we've seen some surveys i have run a survey about this and taiwan is definitely not the top issue for the philippines it is the west philippines
And to that extent, I think it's also because of the sense, since over our historical relations in the US, the Philippines has always been fighting for
U.S. wars, whether it's getting invaded because of the fact that we are a U.S. colony and we've been in Afghanistan and before that in Vietnam and Korea. I think there's no doubt about Filipino courage here, but there's also, I think, it's really just a question of practicality. Given what happened in 2012 in Scarborough, where when Bush comes to show, our ally did not, you know,
stand up for us. And I think that is still remembered by a lot of people in the security community. So in this sense, the issue in Taiwan has to contend with the reality that for the Philippines, we do not want to be a second tier priority for the U.S. What U.S. support in our main strategic issue will have a bearing in the major decisions that are going to be made by our decision makers. And it's up to the U.S. actually to work with the Philippines on this matter.
Well, if we talk about the U.S., for Southeast Asian countries, the U.S. is still preferred security and defense partner in the region. And this has not changed, but the extent to which countries could benefit from the U.S. presence in the Taiwan Strait is still questionable. It is very clear that the U.S. is still prefered security and defense partner in the region.
the Indonesian government interest over Taiwan is to repatriate their citizens or evacuate their citizens if wars happen across the Taiwan Strait. And of course, we also have workers in Hong Kong, right? We also have our citizens in China. So maybe we will evacuate them together with our citizens in Taiwan. So that would need negotiation, bargaining with China.
So this is the danger, right? We're negotiating with a country that makes hostage diplomacy part of its toolkit. And that's the reason why I think we really need to discuss these things in a robust manner, whether it's a track 2 or a track 1.5, because Rati has pointed out the issue. We do have, I think many of us have citizens in these countries. And if something happens, we have seen how China behaves.
in these instances. When we talk about the US being the preferred security partner, we've all in various ways benefited from an order that is relatively stable and predictable. And hence, I think that's why there's the preferred security partner thing. However, there's a lot of interest in getting economic opportunity with the PRC. And I think
That tension, right, between your sort of longer term and your more immediate term kinds of interests, you know, I'm wondering if you guys have any thoughts about what would be good ways to at least begin addressing this tension or... I think at the end of the day, as I mentioned earlier, states in this region have unilateral interest in what's going to happen in their cost rates. Yeah.
And how they approach that, whether it's through a multilateral approach, a unilateral approach, or bilateral approaches, of course, will depend on where they assess their interests can be most protected. Of course, nobody can begrudge each other if they think that the best way is on these routes that I mentioned. But again, I think it's important really to consider that our unilateral interests are not necessarily the same.
For some ASEAN countries, whether there's a trade blockade or whatnot that's going to happen, that might not necessarily affect them. But for other countries in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, what happens in Taiwan will reverberate and affect even their domestic trade.
concerns. So I do think that when all of these unilateral interests start to merge, we'll see that there are some common things that we want. But I think the most important really is whether we do it through an ASEAN-induced forum or unilateral or independent track to. I fully agree with Cathy. We need to actually sit down, particularly with our Taiwanese colleagues,
Of course, that doesn't mean that we should not talk to China. I think we should. Peace, of course, is still our number one priority. But I think it is quite clear moving forward that everyone...
is thinking about potential crisis happening. Right, absolutely. I mean, sometimes we downplay the world time, but they are, I think, the fifth or sixth largest trading partner for most of Southeast Asia. They are like the sixth largest investor and they are clearly important in terms of supply chains, in terms of semiconductors and some of the technology transfers. But let me
I turn to you, Rati. How about you? How do you think we should even begin having this conversation? I would use the case of Indonesia. It has started to think Taiwan issue more seriously after 2014.
when we set up our foreign policy priorities and one of them is protecting our citizens. The MOVA has regularly, for example, carried on focus group discussion, discussing about the developments
Taiwan, let's say, after the election of Lai Ching-te, for example, they arrange a focus group discussion and see the political security and foreign affairs impact of Taiwan's election. We need to keep that conversation going, right? And I hope that
each country in Southeast Asia could also start the same thing, right? To start thinking about either contingency plan or respond to the development across the Taiwan Strait. That must start from each individual country. And also let's let we bring other actors as well, like the US, as we mentioned before, Japan, South Korea, Australia, on how
Could they have, about their perspective on Taiwan issue? Because really, Taiwan issue is not an isolated case, like only between China, Taiwan and the US. I very much agree with Rati and I'm glad that, you know, at least Indonesia started the discussions on this. I think that can be a good model for the Philippines as well because...
I'm also actually concerned about the level of discourse that we're having. Actually, the absence of any discourse is worrying because, as I mentioned, we are going to be in the front lines of this, whether it's a humanitarian issue or a strategic or security issue.
issued. Right, so I guess one of the things that we can sort of thought in here is maybe to take a leaf out of Beijing's book, right? So when they were trying to broker the deal among Palestinian groups for reconciliation, they said, well, it's ultimately up to the Palestinians themselves, but they can do with some international support. That was sort of my paraphrasing of their words. So, you know, maybe that's a possibility. I mean, I guess the takeaway from this evening really is that
For Southeast Asia, there's no running away from some major Taiwan contingency just because of geography. We're just here. There's nowhere we can go. And I suppose for many Southeast Asian states and governments, they talk about not choosing sides, not wanting to be party to any sort of major crisis. But I think there is something to be said about taking a side for stability. There is something to be said about taking a side for peace.
not about the sort of partiality over any resolution over the Taiwan Strait crisis, but I think the stability and the peace of the area is important to all of us. Thank you both very much. Thank you very much, Ian. Thank you, July. Thank you, Ian. Thank you, Letty.
Views expressed are those of the host and guest panelists, and not necessarily those of Carnegie China or the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Subscribe to the China in the World podcast on popular podcast platforms such as iTunes, Stitcher, or wherever you listen to podcasts. Learn more about Carnegie China at carnegiechina.org. Tim Martin is our audio engineer and producer, with help from Hewan Park and Wanyi Du.