Vietnam’s Multialignment Strategy
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Welcome to the China in the World podcast, a series of discussions examining China's foreign policy and shifting engagement with the world. The China in the World podcast is brought to you by Carnegie China and hosted by me, Paul Hanley.

Welcome back to Carnegie China's China in the World podcast. For this episode, I'm delighted to welcome Huang Le Tu, a non-resident fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., CSIS,

to discuss some of her recent writings on Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the US and China, as well as other regional recent developments. Before I dive into the interview with Hoang, let me first introduce her background.

Wong, as I said, is a non-resident fellow at CSIS in Washington. She previously served as a senior analyst at the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, ASPE, and has been a member of the advisory board of the Griffith Asia Institute.

at Griffith University. Her research interests include Vietnam's defense and foreign policy, Southeast Asia's security, ASEAN regionalism, and China-Southeast Asian relations.

Dr. Lutu has over 15 years of experience working in academia and think tanks in Taiwan, the National Zhengzhi University, Singapore at ICS, Yusuf Ishak Institute, and in Australia at the Australian National University and ASPE. She's held short-term visiting fellowships at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur,

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, and the Korean Military Advisory Group in Seoul, among others. So quite a bit of experience. Been trying to get an interview with Hwang for quite some time, and I'm just delighted that we're able to do it today. Hwang's calling in from Australia. Hwang, thank you very much for joining us, and delighted that you're able to join on the China in the World podcast.

Thank you, Paul, for such a gracious introduction. I've been a fan of the podcast for some time, so I'm delighted to be on it with you.

Well, that's always great to hear. Thank you very much. And we're delighted that you're able to be a speaker in our series. And it's quite timely, of course, to have you on because your research, as I mentioned, include Vietnam, defense and foreign policy.

And the U.S. President Joe Biden was recently in Hanoi, September 10th, earlier this month, and he met with the Vietnamese general secretary. And the U.S. and Vietnam during that visit upgraded the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to one called a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

And along with that, they announced new technological people-to-people and business collaborations. The Biden administration also recently, subsequent to that visit, has announced an arms package for Vietnam that could potentially include a fleet of F-16s. So if we could, I'd like to just start to get your—be very interested to get your key takeaways from President Biden's visit to Hanoi and

And how significant do you think these developments are? And also in regard to the recent announcement of the arms package?

Thank you, Paul. Indeed, the recent visit of President Joe Biden to Vietnam I think can be categorized as really a historic one. And because of the upgrade of the relationship, I think it is going to be one of the more significant visits of the U.S. president to Vietnam. And I think it did mark

a new chapter, a new beginning in the bilateral relations, which I consider probably at their best so far, given the historical context of the two former foes, I think to be now considered as comprehensive strategic partners, which in Vietnamese

sort of strategic lexicon is the highest tier relationship. It's quite a significant milestone, I would say for a number of reasons. I think for a long time this has been, of course,

an aim for both countries to aim at. And this year marks actually the 10th anniversary of the comprehensive partnership between the two countries. So in Vietnamese, let me go back a little bit. In Vietnamese strategic lexicon, there are several tiers, comprehensive partnership being the first one and then strategic

and then comprehensive strategic partnership. So for US and Vietnam to sort of leapfrog from comprehensive partnership and really skipping strategic partnership into the higher tier of comprehensive strategic partnerships is quite

a leap and even before the announcement, a lot of people were skeptical if the two countries were ready to even upgrade to the strategic partnership. So I think for some it came as a little bit of surprise and a testimony that the relationship is going, the bilateral relationship is going into what's really good momentum.

And I think there's a lot of potential for the two countries to work together and therefore that kind of leapfrog forward. So while the name doesn't tell much to the regular audience and public because actually the definitions of those comprehensive or comprehensive

strategic partnerships can be very different and meaning different things for different partners. It is not really what is in the definition, but what can come out from it. So for me, I think that reflects a real leap forward for both Washington and Hanoi.

and the willingness for both to work together. There's a lot of scope and you mentioned one of them, which is defense and military aspects, but also technology and other really broad ranging areas where I think for Vietnam it's highly beneficial, but I think for US as well.

We'll touch on other aspects of other factors that has led to this point, but I would say it's quite optimistic for me and I'm for one to be very happy to hear about this surprising upgrade.

Well, that's terrific. And I'm struck by some of the phrases that you use, a historic visit, new chapter in U.S.-Vietnam relations. And your description of the significance of the strategic lexicon and the term comprehensive strategic partnership is

is really illuminating and how they skipped over, went from comprehensive, should have gone to strategic, but went right to comprehensive strategic partnership. And this will give a framework for cooperation between the two sides that includes a number of domains. And that's a terrific way to start.

You know, you then in following President Biden's visit to Vietnam, you published a foreign affairs piece, which was quite good. I encourage our listeners to read that. And in the piece, you do mention that in your view, it is far too simplistic to assume Vietnam will choose to align with the U.S.,

And in this context, of course, we're thinking about China in the background. You note for one thing, Vietnam, although it reserves a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US, it also has a comprehensive strategic partnership with China and with other countries, Russia and South Korea. So what in your view distinguishes the one with the United States?

How then, you know, does Vietnam think about both the opportunities for the comprehensive strategic partnership with the U.S., but also, I think importantly, where do they see the risks that it might bring Vietnam, especially from a strategic, you know, context and its relationship with China? And how do you see the Vietnam, Vietnamese leadership kind of weighing these trade-offs?

Yes, so for a long time

Vietnam had sort of look behind its shoulder for a number of reasons, how and to what degree led that momentum, the good momentum with the United States with, you know, considering a potential reaction from Beijing. And you're right to say that China has been a factor in upgrading US-Vietnam relations. But I also say that it's both

accelerator for U.S.-Vietnam relations, as well as to a degree a hamper for that relationship to go too fast or too close or too soon because Vietnam has been

concern that they might be inviting an unwanted attention or even retaliation from Beijing should it go too fast and too soon with the United States. So it's both factor that both roles that China has been playing in this relationship. But at the same time, the whole

the whole philosophy of Vietnam's foreign policy is to have as many friends as possible, as few foes as possible. That's a new Vietnam foreign policy since the Doi Moi reforms, since 1980s. So Vietnam has been trying to be friends with both China

and US and of course other actors that you mentioned. So Vietnam has comprehensive strategic partnership with China

China and Russia, those are the very first partners that it has, and more recently expanded it to also South Korea and India and of course, United States now. So it's only a handful of those considered the closest partners. And of course, a wide range of other partners, strategic partners and comprehensive partners elsewhere around the globe. This is

way how Vietnam compensate for its lack of formal defense arrangements, defense alliance

of partnership. So it is expanding its diplomatic network to have many partners on different levels of closeness and different type of cooperation and work with everyone, but also stays away from any formal binding type of alliance that United States know, for example.

And in terms of US-China, as you framed that question, I think the aim for Hanoi is to have not only omnidirectional foreign policy as I described earlier, so be friends with everyone, but also equity

the equidistance between China and US. And for a long time, it's equidistance meaning more or less keeping same distance and same closeness and sort of balance the two, not subscribing to either blocks and not confronting either of the powers anyways.

Whether it is really the reality and whether it is the achievable goal, that's another discussion. But I argue in that foreign first article that upgrading the relationship

with the United States to comprehensive strategic partnership is a step towards that commitment to equidistance. Because for a longer time, Vietnam had much more that comprehensive strategic partnership with China in place and of course much more advanced different channels and different very complex network of relationship with China.

Upgrading the relationship with the United States is only serving the bigger goal and bigger

foreign policy philosophy of Vietnam. So I think it's not out of place in any way, by any means, it is actually fulfilling its foreign policy philosophy. - Yeah, yeah, this, I mean, this notion of wanting as many friends, not wanting to choose, you know, this is a similar approach we see other countries in Southeast Asia.

and elsewhere taking. I mean, here, of course, in Singapore, the Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong at the Shangri-La Dialogue talked about Singapore's approach, very similar, right? And Singapore clearly says, "Look, we wanna get along with China, we wanna get along with the US as well."

And, you know, Deputy Prime Minister Wong said our approach is not so much about passive non-alignment, but really about multi-engagement with all the players in the region so that the region will not be dominated by any single power. And there seem to be some similarities there in that thinking with Vietnam's approach as well. But, I mean, if you look at the China-Vietnam relationship, in your piece, you argue that Vietnam is more exposed to Beijing's assertiveness.

than any other country in the region, especially given the fact that Vietnam doesn't have a formal defense guarantees for many external partners. And so, and I saw during the visit of President Biden that there was some funny things going on with Vietnamese exports to China slowing down and there were certain things that indicate China was not particularly pleased and they were gonna let Vietnam know that.

And so how does Vietnam deal with this increased Chinese assertiveness with respect to Vietnam? And these demonstrations of frustration or disappointment on the Chinese side. And do you expect going forward, given the upgrade in the comprehensive strategic partnership with the U.S.,

Do you expect Vietnam will get more or less friction from China going forward? How do you see that? I think there has been expectations that there will be some sort of reaction from Beijing. You mentioned the slowdown exports of Vietnamese agriculture products that have been held up

at the Chinese border suddenly around the same time that President Biden's visit took place. There was also on the sea water cannons from the Chinese ships attacking Vietnamese

fishermen and the coast guards involved. And of course, you know, these kinds of activities happening on. I think Vietnamese expected or even anticipated some of the reaction and tried

very hard to communicate with China and having a lot of visits before President Biden's visit, as well as after, with different level of the Chinese administration to reassure that Vietnam is not going to be targeting or being harboring any hostile activities again.

against China with this upgrade of relationship with the United States. So the Vietnamese have put a lot of efforts to reassure that.

And also, I think in an attempt to sort of lay down a little bit of that announcement of upgrading to comprehensive strategic partnership with the US was that Vietnam flagged at the same time a potential upgrade with also with Australia, with Singapore,

for Indonesia, making it less of a special deal and less of an issue of US-China choice, but more of it expanding its proactive and multi-alignment foreign policy. So that was one way to sort of calm down Beijing, or at least that was seen so.

But you're right to say that this is a much more complex and long-ranging issue and challenges that Vietnam has vis-a-vis China. It's not going to be resolved by any upgrade with one or many countries, even no matter how powerful or no matter how committal.

This is a struggle that Vietnam has, I think, throughout its history and it's not going to go anywhere, anyway, anytime soon. That's just the nature of the asymmetric relationship and the nature of being the neighbor with China. Vietnam is in a very vulnerable position, more so than some of the Southeast Asian countries you mentioned, Singapore, because Vietnam has a very

Because Vietnam has claims in the South China Sea that contradicts Chinese claims as well. It shares land border with China. So things like trade or movement of goods or even people can happen at the land border. We had in the recent living memory a border war. So that's another vector of vulnerability.

And there is also another frontier, which is the shared Mekong River, where China is at the top of estuary and Vietnam is at the very end. So there are multiple sort of frontiers where Vietnam can feel the squeeze of China being the smaller neighbor. And of course, we've known that from the history of thousands of years of the two countries.

But the point of the current policymaker is to be able to still work with China and live with China despite the patterns of coercion that are not likely to go away, to be honest, and work out as much as possible avenues of dialogue and communication to mitigate any potential

spikes of coercion because they're not going away. As I mentioned, they are only spiking from time to time. And where I think Vietnam can negotiate and leverage is the severity of that coercion. So I don't think as much as Vietnamese authorities and government is trying, they are not able to completely, you know,

say Vietnam from Chinese coercion, they only can mitigate and sort of influence the scope and severity of those coercions. - Yeah, no, it's fascinating. And the US-China intensifying competition,

you know, will increasingly, I think, be more complex for Vietnam to manage all aspects of it. You wrote a piece for foreign, another piece for Foreign Affairs in May,

where you had a really interesting point. Whereas there's a lot of focus on US-China, enhanced competitive dynamics, Carnegie China, we look at that very closely in the work that we do. And of course, the focus is always on the risks that it brings countries in the region of those intensifying competitive dynamics. But you pointed out in your May piece of Foreign Affairs that in fact,

the intensifying competition between the US and China will also bring potential benefits to countries in the region. And you talked about supply chain decoupling, which will divert trade and investment to other places in Southeast Asia. But give us a sense of your argument here in terms of what some of the key benefits, because most people focus really on what the risks are to countries in the region.

That's right. Indeed, I mean, in the main popular narrative, Southeast Asian countries keep repeating that they don't want to be victims to the Great Power Competition. And I'm sure it's very, very pronounced being from Singapore because Singapore is one of the most vocal about that.

And indeed, you know, if you look at the Cold War history, for example, Southeast Asia did play a great deal of role in that period and Vietnam being sort of battlefield.

for the great power competition then. And certainly this is not something that any country in the region want a repetition of. They don't want to be again collateral damage or become another battlefield for this time of great power competition, should it escalate into conflict.

And they've since the end of Cold War, most of countries tried and to a different degree successfully became the marketplace, right? Including Vietnam. So I don't think there is any desire to come back to being battlefield. They still want to be the marketplace rather than battlefield in between the great powers. But

As you mentioned, there are benefits from the Great Power Competition for the smaller countries in the region because both China and US are trying to gain influence and support from the region.

not only from Southeast Asia but broader. But Southeast Asia is special because it carries also a number of functions, including convening the ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

regional architecture. So their voice is being heard very well and amplified thanks to the ASEAN platforms. So while their main narrative is that they don't want to make

make choice between US and China and they don't want to fall victims. I think many of them also are finding ways to benefit from the competition from increased attention from both US and China. Now, the

The trade or tariff war between US and China has generated some opportunities for the regional countries, including relocations of some corporations and businesses outside from China. And Southeast Asia has been the first and the primary relocation market for most of those businesses.

And it happens to be that Vietnam has been on a more popular list of those companies because of proximity and because of the number of factors that the country and population and market presents, including the labor force, the labor force affordability, but they're also well educated and trained and just proximity to China. So in that way, that's one of example

how regional countries benefited from the increased competition between US and China. And I think the trend will continue, especially as whether US and China decouple or de-risk, the tendency of companies and businesses leaving China will continue to take place. And I think Southeast Asians, at least some of them more so than others,

are trying to position themselves as viable alternatives to the Chinese market. - Let me just ask a follow on question there. You've talked about ASEAN as a block, the 10 Southeast Asian countries, soon to be 11. You've written in Foreign Affairs piece that during the Cold War, Southeast Asia was poor.

weak, newly independent. But today, ASEAN states are largely middle income and can be influential. You've talked about the risks and the potential benefits of U.S.-China increasing competitive dynamics. But is there a role that ASEAN can play, in your view, to potentially influence, maybe help

the U.S. and China put their relationship on better footing. Is there a role for ASEAN in that, or is that a bridge too far? Some people are beginning to ask that question more and more, and I'd just be interested in your view of a role that ASEAN might be able to play in helping the U.S. and China find a better footing and to ensure that

this increased strategic competition and confrontation doesn't spill over into, you know, greater confrontation or worse yet conflict? Is there a role for ASEAN to play in that? I think that's certainly an aspired role for ASEAN and there is scope for that.

just like you mentioned, ASEAN and Southeast Asia are very different than they were during the Cold War and have much more diplomatic agency. Their economies are of course more substantial and continue to be so in the coming decades. In fact,

Post COVID estimations by the IMF and global financial institutions do point out that Asia Pacific and specifically Southeast Asia will continue to play as a growth engine for the broader Indo-Pacific region.

So certainly some economies in the region will be more influential and more powerful in the coming decades, Indonesia being one of the example, but the growth trajectory of Vietnam and others are also relatively positive.

Now, whether that economic potential will transfer and to what degree will transfer into a strategic actorness and a strategic agency is another question. Certainly they have more diplomatic agency than before during the Cold War with ASEAN platform in place now. Like because they are able to bring

all powers, all access in the region together to the table with ASEAN-led or ASEAN-centered architecture, they serve as a convening power and they serve a platform for countries and powers to meet and have a dialogue. This is not something that was in place during the Cold War, right?

And last year we saw an example of that happening as Indonesia chaired G20 and wanted to play that honest broker role and wanted to provide countries a platform to meet. So for example, at the sideline of the G20 meeting in Bali that Indonesia hosted, there was a breaking of ice between China and the US.

and President Xi Jinping with President Joe Biden met first time since Biden assumed the office. And similarly, Indonesia's summit facilitated

Australian Prime Minister António Balbenici to meet with Xi Jinping, first time of the two countries' heads of state meeting in years. So that's the assume and that's a spiral, you know, whether those meetings lead to really de-escalation and have a long-term effect, it's another story. But at least

This is what Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a tool to it aspire to play, to be in a neutral place where big powers, small powers can meet and even providing

the dialogue space for countries that are either in conflict or not speaking with each other. And Russia was another example of that. So that's certainly a role that ASEAN wants to play, whether and to what degree is successful.

- Here's another story. And Indonesia being chair G20 last year was like an exceptional case because also Indonesia is the biggest country in Southeast Asia and had that gravitas. Whereas for example, if the chairmanship or the leadership

falls into the smaller country with less diplomatic agency, that wouldn't necessarily be the case. And another challenge to that is whether countries' big powers are willing to come to the table that ASEAN serves. For example, President Joe Biden chose not to attend

ASEAN-related summit and sent Vice President Kamala Harris instead when he went to Vietnam to upgrade the bilateral relations. So, you know, there's a question whether big powers are still willing to take part in that multilateral table settings that ASEAN wants to be host of. Yeah. No, those are great points, Juan, around ASEAN's

potential role in the region with regard to U.S.-China, whether or not that can be fulfilled is, as you say, another question. I know we're coming up on time here, and I want to ask just one more question about the U.S. and then one more question about China, if I could. On the U.S., I'd just be interested in your perspective on

the U.S. approach to the region under President Biden, which is much different, I would argue, than we saw certainly under President Trump. How, in your view, does Vietnam, the broader region, view the U.S. approach to the region today, this free and open Indo-Pacific strategy? And I hear concerns with regard to ASEAN centrality. We've been talking about ASEAN. And so,

I've heard some assert that the Quad, other aspects of the U.S. approach to the Indo-Pacific could erode ASEAN centrality and wanted to get your view on whether or not you agree with that. So my research is actually on narratives.

and strategic role that narratives play. And what I found out is that there are certain popular narratives that are not necessarily always entirely

accurate with what is on the ground if you look beyond just the popular talking points or the popular narratives. For example, I conducted a survey, an anonymous survey throughout 10 South Asian countries on their perception of the Quad. And that survey proved quite, you know,

surprising and contrary findings to that popular narrative that Quad could be overshadowing or challenging ASEAN centrality. My findings prove that most of countries did not see that Quad could either challenge or overshadow ASEAN. And in fact, they were hopeful that Quad will complement and do things that ASEAN is not able to do.

So this is an example of looking at how narratives in the region may skew the perceptions of US role as well as initiatives that include US in the broader Pacific.

Your question about the views on the Indo-Pacific, I think in the beginning when the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy was articulated, it introduced a lot of confusion. And that was the main finding of all studies that most countries didn't know what it is, whether it's a strategy, it's a concept, or what did it really bring. By now, throughout the pandemic,

Trump administration, but now also Biden administration, that strategy has been elaborated, perfected and filling in the gaps and with concrete examples and initiatives. So I think that confusion is fading away. Whether it is widely accepted, I think to the degree, yes, but not entirely very,

in terms of pronouncement, the countries will not go and say they're supportive of it or not. They just, I think, learn to live with it and to a degree accept it being used in practice. I think

My own assessment is that there is a great corrective from Biden administration as opposed to the Trump administration, especially in terms of narrative and how they present US role in the region and more globally. And that's, I think, a welcome corrective. It's less confrontational, it's less divisive, and it's more

addressing the concerns and the needs of the region is less about America or America

It's about the US playing a role with partners in the region. But at the same time, there is also, I think there's less of a difference than we would have expected from the beginning, because there's a lot of continuity, right? Free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is one example of that.

But also I think there is a growing tendency or growing, I think there is an undeniable tendency that US prefers to work with partners and allies that are willing to work with it rather than wasting time on the multilateral meetings that leads to nowhere and serve no one's particular interests.

the US government tends to spend more time on mini-laterals or trilaterals, bilaterals that are

are more in line with its interests and its partners' interests. So perhaps the absence of President Biden at the ASEAN Multilateral Summit is an example of that. And he chose to be upgrading bilateral relations with Vietnam instead, rather than spending time at the inconclusive

multilateral, wider multilateral fora. So that would be one conclusion that perhaps the region is growing from the current administration.

But I think this is an evolving story and one positive, undeniable positive thing is that the current administration is listening to the concerns and needs of the region by adjusting the narrative.

adjusting the rhetoric, but also investing in the initiatives that respond to the regional needs, particularly in the development needs, be them either public health initiatives under the quadrilateral partnerships, whether related to COVID responses, but also other initiatives that have more of developmental

and economic aspect, including, for example, the economic, inter-Pacific economic partnership initiatives. They probably, of course, they will be criticized, they probably that is not enough, but at least we see the responsiveness and willingness to address those gaps.

- Yeah, no, I agree with that. And I had just written down when you talked about the differences and the continuity with the Biden administration, I just jotted down quickly and you ticked off all of them. I think there's a big difference in the way they're dealing with allies and partners in the Biden administration. I wrote down they're listening more and I'm glad to hear you say that as well. I wrote down positive and affirmative agendas, especially in the Quad.

that reflect needs of regional partners. And then my last point that I wrote down was quite strong on security, less so on the economic and trade, and they probably need to balance that out better. That's just some of my views, but your perspectives were very similar to mine. So I found that very interesting. Last question. That's quite reassuring. It's just last question on China. And

China has announced these three new initiatives, Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. And this is an effort by China to bring its experience, the experience that China has had in solving and their concepts and their approaches to solving global security and development challenges

and promoting increased cultural and people-to-people exchanges between China and the region and beyond. And I wanted to get your sense of

how you think Vietnam looks at these initiatives? Will they, you know, is it a positive, you know, perspective? Will they, will this, you know, be effective in increasing China's soft power in Vietnam and throughout the region? How are these viewed in the region? Because, you know, as you note, I mean, there's a lot of narratives built in these. And in a sense, they're,

is a bit of a battle of these narratives between the U.S. and China. You see that played out at the Shangri-La Dialogue when the U.S. defense minister gets up and speaks one day and

Defense Secretary gets up, speaks one day, and then the next day, the Chinese Defense Minister gets up, and there's just narratives that are directly sort of in contrast to the other. And I think you see a lot of that in these Chinese initiatives, putting forward alternative narratives for the region to consider. But how does, in your view, Vietnam look at these, both the positive and the negative?

Yes, so like you, I also am very interested in the narratives and the role that the narratives battle in this great power competition plays. And again, when looking at

the initiatives that come from China, the regional responses of popular narratives are more, certainly more restrained. You wouldn't see as much opinions or criticism towards whatever China proposed, whether it's global security initiatives or development or civilization or belt and road in previous

So there wouldn't be much of responses, criticism or opinions really expressed like it was, for example, in the case of the Quad, the free and open in the Pacific and so on. But that's already a really good data point, isn't it, from the region?

In general, I think the responses will be very restrained. Nobody will come out and say this is a bad idea or this is suspicious.

this is not good in any way. So I don't think we can expect this kind of popular narrative criticism towards any of the initiatives that comes from China. Can I just ask you, why different sort of ways of responding to a U.S. initiative versus a China? Because as you say, the U.S. initiative, there's kind of a free-for-all in sort of commenting on it, criticizing it,

complimenting it across the board. You hear a lot of voices coming out of Southeast Asia, a lot of perspectives, but you suggest that there's a different way in responding to China's initiatives. What do you account for that?

Yes, isn't it interesting? I think there is different roles that the narratives play towards the relationship with each power. China is very sensitive to any criticism or any even opinion expressed. And I think learning from experience, the Southeast Asian countries

are very restrained in any way that can be seen as offending or contradicting or criticizing China. I think that's that certain concern about any form of retaliation, diplomatic pressure that they can have by having such a narrative out there. And I think that is learned from experience. So it's not...

it's not just imaginary. China is very vocal and very straight to the point with the regional partners that they want or what they want or what they don't want to hear out publicly. For example, even before

with the South China Sea issues, it was very explicit that China didn't want it to raise on the regional forum and wanted to maintain only a bilateral issue with the individual climate countries. So that's already sort of

pattern of habit, behavioral pattern that it was conditioned with dealing with China. With the US, and again, this is my own observation, with the US, I think there are different ways to interpret that. One, obviously, there isn't that direct retaliation expected from the US and in fact,

especially with Singapore and other countries, the US wanted to hear different views and take it on board as a certain feedback. So it might have started as a way to give feedback and advice,

to the US government, what are the regional potential views. But it also is a way of channeling influence from Southeast Asian region to the US. And we saw that corrected with

in the previous question that that criticism can be taken on board and can help corrective, to be corrective in U.S. narratives of building policies towards the region. For example, the narrative of, you know, as in centrality has helped in building in a new narrative under

the Biden administration of recognizing in each at least the official speeches that you know free and open Indo-Pacific always pays respect to ASEAN centrality. So it's a way of influencing U.S. policy towards the region. At least that's how I see it.

Back to your question about the initiatives from China, I think there is a certain level of restraint, but also there is a lingering distrust what they can mean and that what can, especially for example, when it comes to the global security initiatives.

It is true that they are equally confusing because if you look at the, for example, the survey that Institute of Civilization Studies Yusuf Ishak Institute does,

It shows that almost as many respondents don't have a clue what the Global Security Initiative is as they don't have confidence in it or they have confidence in it. So it's sort of 30% more or less doesn't have a clue what that means.

or less than 30% would be confident in it and probably more than that 40 something percent would be confident

have no confidence in it. Now within this group of ASEAN, of course, Vietnam stands out and is probably the least trusting to the global security initiative with 66% of the Vietnamese respondents have no confidence in it and only 11% have confidence in it. So Vietnam usually stands out in those kinds of surveys.

I think it is also led by historical experience and the real experience in the place. And you can't have too much confidence in the global security initiative, which claims to be working for the broader security and peace and win-win situation for the region, while

while it has built militarized artificial islands around in the South China Sea. So they're just incompatible with what narratives is presenting and what is happening on the ground in the real life. - Yeah, sorry, go ahead.

Yeah, so I think all of those initiatives, whether it's global security initiative or global development or even the civilization initiative, I think the narrative of what they present to be offering, it's really hard to dispute with. Maybe the global...

civilization initiative is probably more controversial in terms of how it promotes Asian values back.

But in general, what they present to be is for at least greater good or harmony, it's hard to dispute with that, but how it is implemented or what China represents with or without those initiatives is another story. And I think neither of the narrative are going to be able to

to neglect or deny the reality that is happening right next door to them. Yeah, so in a sense, it's more important what China does versus what it writes in a document. Yeah, that's right.

You mentioned the BRI, and so my very final question, and that's obviously a big piece of China. It's a concrete initiative of China's global development initiative. We are, as you know, coming up on the 10th anniversary of China's BRI, and they're going to have the third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October, next month.

Just final question, just give a little bit of our listeners a sense of how Vietnam has viewed the Belt and Road, where it has benefited from it and where it sees potentially some downsides. What concerns did it have?

I think again with the Belt and Road Initiative, it's not something that Vietnam will openly oppose or give a pass on if there are infrastructure opportunities there. But it will scrutinize and will double screen any of this with additional national security concerns.

And Vietnam, in comparative terms to other South East Asian countries, has not been really a great beneficiary of the Belt and Road Initiative, at least neither on the pledge side nor in real terms, not compared to Indonesia or even the Philippines under Duterte and other countries.

Vietnam's projects have been limited partially because of that lingering distrust and concerns of what would that mean for the fiscal and national security considerations.

But of course, Vietnam is not entirely free from or doesn't have the liberty of completely discarding all the initiatives that comes under the Belt and Road Initiative. For example, in the biddings of infrastructure projects,

projects, the affordability of the Chinese projects will always be an asset, even though the country would opt for, for example, if it could for other providers, including Japanese and European ones, the affordability

factor is a strong one for any developing countries and that includes Vietnam as well, given their pressing and desperate even needs for infrastructure projects, whether construction roads and trains or even electricity grid and batteries. So there's a huge array of needs in the region.

and not many to fill in in a way that China is willing to in terms of affordability but also speed even though oftentimes the projects are running late and they blow out of the proportion in terms of the cost much more double or triple from the time they get into the bidding but there's a

there is a gap if you look a little bit deeper, there's a gap between local authorities and how those projects, infrastructure projects in particular, get in the place with the broader national security concerns. So there is a little bit of gap in there and that's where oftentimes the Chinese projects become successful in the local communities, in the local context.

So having said that, while Vietnam is more aware of potential security concerns that come with Belt and Road Initiative projects, it is not also completely free from the attractiveness of it.

Yeah, that makes sense. Quang, we have covered a lot of ground and it's been a real tour de force by you, starting with President Biden's visit to Vietnam, U.S.-China competitive dynamics.

China's approach, US approach. We've covered ASEAN, we've covered an awful lot. You and I have been trying to schedule this for a long time. I can say it was worth the wait. Thank you very much. And we look forward to involving you as much as we can in Carnegie China initiatives as we build out our efforts in the region. In fact, your interest in narratives really struck me.

One of our non-resident scholars out of the University of Malaya where you've visited, Niao Chaoping, just wrote a piece that talked about Malaysia's perspectives on these narratives between the U.S. and China and these competitive dynamics.

Another non-resident scholar for Carnegie China, Ian Chong, is finishing up a piece that takes the same question from a Singapore perspective. And we can certainly use a Vietnamese perspective, and I'll talk with you offline about

who might do that. Certainly, if you're interested, you'd be at top of the list. But a lot of the issues that you covered, Carnegie China is hoping to cover going forward as we build out our presence in the region. And so hope to keep you involved in everything that we're doing. Thank you very much for joining today.

Thank you, Paul. It's been really fascinating discussion and I'm a big fan of your work and Carnegie's multiple outputs and it's very in-depth and always very enlightening. So I'm very pleased to be a part of your podcast series as well.

Thank you, Huang. And thanks to our listeners for joining. Look forward to talking to you on the next episode of the China in the World podcast. Thank you for listening to the China in the World podcast. For more episodes and research, please go to carnegiechina.org. This episode was produced by Nathaniel Schur. The music was composed by Spencer Barnett.