War on Terror
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Hello, everyone. Thomas Small with you again. In our last episode, we set the stage for the series by talking about the terrorist attacks of 9-11. Eamon Dean, my co-host, and I discussed what they meant for al-Qaeda, the jihadist group behind these attacks. We talked about why Eamon and others had felt compelled to join the jihad.

We also got some insight into these events as Ayman saw them while working as a double agent for MI6. We left off by leading into what followed 9-11, the war on terror, and what it was like for Ayman as al-Qaeda leaders became increasingly suspicious of its members. I remember, you know, someone entering into the kitchen, but I wasn't aware who he was. And then I realized, basically, that my other helpers in the kitchen left in a hurry.

Before I was going to turn around, distinctively, I felt the end of a pistol against my spine. The War on Terror has been going on for 18 years, but many people don't know the story well.

9/11 happens. Osama bin Laden, then safe and sound in Afghanistan, being protected by his Taliban allies, is suddenly met with a ferocious onslaught from the United States and its partners in the international coalition, which pounds the Taliban, topples their government in Kabul, and forces al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and everyone else to leave Afghanistan.

Some of them stay in Afpak, the mountainous region of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Some of them stay under house arrest in Iran. Many of them flee to their home countries throughout the Middle East, regroup, and begin slowly plotting attacks elsewhere. In Saudi Arabia, in Iraq, following the American invasion of that country, in Yemen, following the smashing of the Saudi cells,

And so it goes on and on and on. We'll try to unpack all of that for you. This is Conflicted. We're basically crying for help. On morning 11.

Amen. How are you today? Still alive. Oh, still alive. That's saying something since there's a fatwa on your head. Indeed. So, Amen.

People in the West often think that Islamist terrorism is primarily directed at the West and that the West are its primary victims. But as you know, as people in the know know, Islamist terrorism has been primarily directed at Islamic targets inside the Middle East, perhaps most explosively in 2003 when Al-Qaeda launched its long gestated ambition to overthrow the House of Saud and take control of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its oil wealth,

and the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. Eighteen years now since the launch of the war on terror, Ayman, what do you think? Has it been overall a success? Has it been worth it morally, strategically? Were we right to wage it? In my opinion, I think the war on terror was necessary, but the way it was executed was abysmal. To make an analogy here,

Imagine if there is a swamp, a huge swamp, and I'm talking here about the Middle East and beyond. What do swamps attract? Mosquitoes. And mosquitoes spread malaria. So the world powers, instead of draining the swamp, the swamp of injustice, corruption, lack of opportunities, alienation, you know, bad religious preaching and practice. So instead of draining that swamp, they were competing with each other on who will kill more mosquitoes.

So they just keep spraying the mosquitoes with antipests and all of that. They just keep killing and killing, but the swamp is there giving birth to more mosquitoes. But how can the Western powers drain that swamp? They don't rule the Middle East. What is needed is a global effort in order to introduce better governance and at the same time help the locals, both governments and people, find a way to drain that swamp.

Is it really a war at all? Do you think it's right to call the war on terror a war? What is a war, really? It's just a campaign. You know, you could fight a war in many different settings. I remember when we were trained, you know, in the jihadist camps, there were different kind of training for different kind of conflicts. So you have urban warfare, you know, so they train you to fight in the cities, you know,

Then there is mountain warfare, where you are trained to fight in the mountains. And then I remember in the Philippines, we were told about jungle warfare.

Also, basically, there were, you know, terror warfare, where you are trained to be a bomb maker. You are trained on assassinations in urban settings. You are trained in ambush, also in urban settings. You are trained in taking hostages, whether in planes or in cruise ships or in government buildings or hotels. So, of course, a war...

could take any shape and could take place in any environment. Sure, but most people, when they think of a war, they think of a clash between armies, of course, attached to a nation state or a collection of nation states. This war, the war on terror, is a bit different. Who are, in the ultimate sense, the combatants of this war? On the one side, you have, what, the United States? Mm-hmm.

That's a very simplistic way of looking at it. I would say that the war on terrorism is fought between nation states and those who want to bring down nation states. So we can't say that it's only the United States that is fighting the war on terrorism. I would say that Turkey was fighting a war against its own terrorists, whether they were Islamists or the Kurdish PKK.

The Spanish fought against the Basque separatists. The Colombians fought against the FARC in Colombia. And what is the common denominator between all of them? Is that they are what we call either paramilitary forces. They are not a legitimate military force. They are just paramilitaries. Or they are insurgents. Or they are what we would call non-state players, NSPs. Or some people call them non-state actors, NSAs. But...

Really, isn't it a war on Islamist terrorism? Really? I mean, the world didn't come together to fight terrorism until its Islamic form attacked New York in 2001. So it's really a war against Islamic terrorism. Why? What makes Islamist terror more threatening to the world?

There is a good reason for it. And that is the fact that in the case of FARC, ETA, the IRA, and many other separatists slash insurgents slash terrorists, is that these separatists

groups were fighting localized conflicts. In the case of Islamic-inspired terrorism, it's a transnational phenomenon. It is actually cross-border groups that are united together to bring down nation-states, not just only in the Muslim world, but beyond.

Islamic-inspired terrorism is one of the very, very, very few instances of history where a group is united around the identity of a faith that spans many, many continents and countries. And as a result, you end up in a situation where they're fighting against everyone, so everyone must fight against them. So I can imagine why left-wing radicals, for example, might be fighting against

against the nation state. The internationalist Marxist ideology has long fought against nation states since the 19th century. I can even understand why in the 21st century a kind of neoliberal globalist ideology would fight against the nation state or at least try to water it down. But the nation state clearly brings almost every blessing of the modern world from education to security to finance, you know, banking. Why do the Islamists hate the nation state?

The Islamists hate the nation-state because the nation-state is the biggest obstacle and hurdle in their path to establish Islamic caliphate.

Because, you see, this is a problem with modern-day Islamism, is that they believe that having a caliphate and a united Muslim nation is an obligation. And that couldn't have been further from the truth. What the hell is a caliphate? Okay, imagine the Catholic world united under the Pope, not only in a religious sense, but in a political, social, and economic, and military sense. Sort of as it was, say, in the 12th century.

Exactly. In Europe. Exactly. So imagine the Pope, but not just only with religious authority, but also with political, economic, military, and social authorities. Imagine that, and that is basically what a caliph is. But there is a problem. This concept of the caliphate and the absolute authority entrusted in the caliph was really only viable within the Muslim world for the first two centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

It was exercised, of course, the four caliphs after the Prophet, then the Umayyad dynasty, and then the first nine Abbasid caliphs. But after that, the Abbasid empire started to disintegrate. And when you say Abbasid, I mean, I think the listener needs to imagine almost the stereotypical period of Muslim glory that's even sort of mythologized in a movie like Aladdin, the classic image of

of the grand turbaned figure on the throne commanding armies across the world of noble warriors. That's the Abbasid Caliph. Very good description. The Muslim Empire of the 1001 Knights. Indeed. And for 1200 years after that, we never had that.

We never had one single caliphate that encompassed the entire Muslim world. It's just disintegrated into clan-based or tribal-based or family-based kingdoms and fiefdoms and shaykhdoms. Sure, but that fact alone doesn't necessarily mean the Islamist thinkers would stop hearkening back to the period when the Muslim world was politically united. Indeed, but there is a problem, you see.

If you look at Islam as a whole, if we want to take the legalistic aspect of Islam, it splits into two parts. One part is عبادات, which means worship, and one part is معاملات, it means transactions. So the majority of the Muslim scholars and theologians

They placed caliphate not under a worship section of Islam, you know, that will make it obligatory. Actually, they put it under the transaction, you know, aspect of Islam under Mu'amalat. Which aren't obligatory. They aren't obligatory. They are just optional. I mean, whether you have a caliph or not is an optional thing.

At the end of the day, the fact that they say that the caliphate is an obligation, this is one of the biggest lies ever perpetrated on the Muslim people by Islamists in the 20th and 21st century. Nonetheless, these Islamists think for sure it is an obligation, and that is leading them to carry out the actions that they're carrying out. Now, what do they think will happen once this caliphate is over?

is re-established. Do they think a caliphate will usher in a period of glory and prosperity, or do they even care about that? Well, based on my experience and the fact I spent more than 24 years in the Islamist movement, you know, since I was nine,

I could tell you easily that we can bring in a thousand Islamists from different walks of life, whether they were violent Islamists, non-violent Islamists, progressive Islamists, regressive Islamists, bring them all together and ask them, "What is the ideal caliphate?" Give us an answer. Remember, there are a thousand Islamists. What we will get is ten thousand answers.

I haven't yet met two Islamists who agree what form this caliphate will take, what shape it will take, what will it be providing the people. Is it going to be encompassing only the Muslim world? Is it going to go beyond that? Are they going to fight a perpetual

you know, never-ending conflict against the rest of the world to subjugate the world into Islam. It reminds me of my time at SOAS here in London, which is a famously left-wing university, talking to, you know, student leftists of the radical type and how, you know, when you ask them really what do you think this grand proletarian revolution is going to result in, they could never really agree either.

And let's go back. So 9-11 happens. You're already in MI6. George Bush announces the war on terror. America invades Afghanistan. But let's move in and focus in on your own experience. At the beginning of the war on terror, as an MI6 double agent inside al-Qaeda, what were you given to do?

Well, of course, basically, before 9/11 and after 9/11, you know, my tasks differed sharply. Before 9/11, it was an exercise on building a matrix.

So understanding everything that we need to know about not just only Al-Qaeda but other jihadist groups who are affiliated to it and orbiting the center of Al-Qaeda. So before 9/11, I was supposed to know the locations of the camps, the leaders, the visitors.

The recruits, their nationalities, where they come from, their names, if we can get, their aliases, you know, recognize their pictures, make sure basically we make all these connections. Then we look into the network of safe houses, the bank accounts, the phone numbers, emails, whenever emails were available at the time. You're building up a comprehensive map of the terrorist entity before 9-11, after 9-11? After 9-11, it's all about looking at the cells.

Before 9-11, we had one group concentrated in one country with a network of openly visible camps. Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. So that was easy. That was easier. My task before 9-11 was easier, actually, than after 9-11.

Because the group was shattered. It's scattered to the wind. And now you're dealing with underground cells of terrorists in how many countries? Several. I mean, you know, we're talking here about Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar. We're talking about, of course, the UK, France, you know, and Pakistan, Iran. Then after that, Iraq, of course, and Syria. So the task was, you know, immense.

If you remember in the last podcast, I said basically that Abu Hafiz al-Masri, Bin Laden's deputy, who died just two months after 9-11 by a US drone, he said to me, stay in the UK, stay in London. We will get in touch with you when we need you. Of course, basically, I had to be guided by that. So if you remember, I told you that my phone was ringing just an hour after the attack. MI6 called you up. Indeed. Indeed.

And they told me to stay. And so over the next three weeks, I felt like I was in a war room because we were looking over satellite images of Afghan camps, the aerial photographs of the cities, of the villages, of the encampments, to pinpoint exactly the locations of weapon dams, storage facilities, the routes basically they will be taking, the best time basically to launch raids against them.

So it was all about discussing the military capabilities, how will they react in certain situations. So actually, I became one of those who helped in a military planning for a war, which wasn't my job description. But nonetheless, it shows you how fluid the situation could be. And at that point, did you think this war will be a cakewalk? Al-Qaeda is going to be destroyed in a matter of weeks, months. Did you know it would stretch on now that we're in the 18th year? Well...

I recall saying that the structure of the Taliban supported by Al-Qaeda would fall within three to six weeks. And they fell within six weeks. But I said, and after that, the war will start. The war on terror. Yes, because then...

the structure, the state, the proto-state they created in Afghanistan would collapse eventually because, you know, the might of the American firepower is just something that no nation-state on Earth, with the exception maybe of China and Russia, but no other nation-state on Earth could withstand.

So, therefore, the structure itself will fall. But then after that, they always say you can win the battle, but you can't win the war. So, you know, America's military might can topple states very quickly. But as we've seen, it can't actually destroy terrorism. Why is that? Okay.

Terrorism, at the end of the day, is a shadowy practice. It's a shadowy tactic in which you can have groups of individuals split into hundreds of cells, and they can operate in a network of safe houses, network of hidden valleys, cave networks even, and jungles or forests.

And urban settings. And therefore, how could you basically target these people when they have split into 100 different entities? They are not an army standing before you where you can annihilate them with bombs. The follow up question is why would you employ an army to fight that war then?

Well, the army is to make sure that these cells don't come together and form an army. So the idea is you need to have armed presence to prevent them from taking over the state apparatus again. Look at what happened. I mean, the Americans withdrew from Iraq in 2012. By 2014, ISIS took over. You know, when you are fighting against cells, you need the ultimate weapon against these cells, information.

And information and intelligence can only be gathered and obtained through three distinct channels. So you have the first one which we call reconnaissance. You know, you have aerial footage looking at the movement of people detecting the presence of weapons.

suspicious vehicles moving around, suspicious, you know, houses. You have lots of visitors who are all male, you know, wearing, you know, certain distinct, you know, items of clothing. And this reconnaissance, I imagine, is carried out under a certain fog of doubt. The person, you know, the intelligence officers...

carrying out reconnaissance. They see shadowy figures moving here and there, cars. They don't necessarily know that these people are terrorists or implicated in terrorism. They're just using hunches, gut instinct. How do they know to follow that car and not that car? Yeah, and this is one of the poorest forms of intelligence gathering. And there was a true case of both drones and Apache helicopters following certain individuals in Iraq.

And they were almost certain that the movement was suspicious, the cars were suspicious, and then they looked at the individuals they thought that they were carrying something, you know, that resembles an AK-47. It turns out to be actually cameras. They were journalists. They were local journalists. And they were shot to pieces. Oh.

What's the second form? The second form is called signal intelligence. And in the intelligence circles, it's called SIGINT. SIGINT. Yes. All right. That is basically by intercepting phone calls, whether it's landlines or mobiles, by intercepting emails, by intercepting text messages, by intercepting Skype calls or any form of other apps you use.

as well as intercepting radio communication. This is what the NSA in the States and GCHQ in Britain are doing. Absolutely. Spot on. That's exactly, you know, what signal intelligence is. And that is extremely laborious because, you know, you're looking at 20 needles in a billion haystacks. Amazing. I mean, can you imagine how many phone calls are placed every day across the world? Oh, billions.

it is actually becoming more and more reliable form of intelligence gathering than it used to be in the past. Why? Because you are using algorithms. And ironically, algorithms was invented by Muslim scholars, al-khawarizmi, as you know. It's the AL at the front of the word. It gives it away. Indeed. Like alcohol, ironically enough. Indeed. So funny enough, Muslims gave the West the tools through which basically they can have fun, which is alcohol. Ah!

And, you know, basically algorithms so they can advance. So algorithms are very important in intelligence gathering because you can put something called trigger words. And I was one of those people from the beginning, you know, from 2001 onwards, basically, who created lists.

Of trigger words? Of trigger words. Well, give us an example of the words. You know, at that time, of course, basically, you know, it's useless to tell people, put Osama bin Laden, you know, basically, or put Mohammed Omar or the Taliban. Because no one would say these words if they knew what they were talking about. That's one. And two, basically, there were many.

millions of journalists and political commentators and ordinary people saying these words. In other words, basically, again, the haystack problem and the needle problem. So, you know, so therefore you have to go deeper to actually get phrases that only jihadists would be speaking about. So, for example, instead of like, you know, saying Osama bin Laden, we will say Sheikh Abu Abdullah.

So now that's very unique. So sheikh is the term that the jihadists use of Osama bin Laden because they respected him. Abu Abdullah is an Arabic. It's called a kunya. Yes. So the eldest son of Osama bin Laden is called Abdullah. So he's Abu Abdullah, the father of Abdullah, Sheikh Abu Abdullah. And only an intimate of Osama bin Laden would use such an expression. Indeed. So I remember that was my first contribution, the first trigger phrase was,

that went into signal intelligence apparatus, which is Shaykh Abu Abdullah. If anyone is using that basically on the phone or an email or a text, then, you know, basically that is a call or a person of interest.

It needs to be logged and investigated. And then we started on and on and again. So, for example, adding titles of books. So, for example, if someone were to use the book Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyah. Now, I'm not going to bother translating this, but basically this book is written by Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, who is one of the pillars of jihadist theology. Palestinian? He's a Palestinian, Jordanian, and...

And he's also a, you know, a comrade of Abu Qatada, you know, the famous cleric who was imprisoned here in the UK for a while before he was kicked out. If I put the book that he wrote about justifying fight against Saudi Arabia, that book was written in 1992. But in 2002, 10 years later, it started to be taken seriously and basically used as a recruitment tool to recruit people into Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and beyond.

So I remember I decided that, you know, I should include it in the list of trigger phrases. That was amazing. It was successful. It was successful. It resulted in some real intelligence. In a groundbreaking intelligence that led the Saudis, with the help of the British intelligence services, to actually track many inside the kingdom who were texting or emailing or calling and talking about this book, Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyah. You know, it's like, OK, when...

They are so careful on the phone, and I've listened to some of these phone calls. They were so careful on the phone to talk about weddings and, you know, honey selling and, you know, buying vegetables. It was all code. All codes, yeah. But then basically when the other party is asking, OK, how can I be sure that the contract is absolutely binding or good or decent or I'm going to be, it's all legit under Islamic rules. So they will say, read Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyah.

And that's it. This actually phrase triggers immediately that the call needed to be logged and then listened to and then they determine. People these days are particularly worried that SIGINT intelligence gathering contravenes rights to privacy, human rights. People are very uncomfortable with the idea that the government is constantly listening to all of our phone calls and scanning all of our emails. I suppose you think those people...

shouldn't worry, that if you're not a bad guy, you've got nothing to worry about? I can assure you and I can assure the listeners that 99.99% of the entire population wouldn't utter a trigger phrase.

A UK grandmother calling her grandchildren in America would not be talking about Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyah or Anwar Al-Awlaqi or one of his books or anything like that. But what about filmmakers and journalists like me working in this subject matter? If GCHQ could search my Google search for all the number of jihadists, even in the Arabic language, jihadist terms that I've searched for, I suppose I'm on a list somewhere. I mean, they know...

They know that I've gotten up to that and they scan all my emails?

Well, of course, the signal intelligence is so sophisticated these days that it actually shows a pattern of research. It analyzes your profile. It shows that basically that you are not a likely threat, that you are in the research business. Although basically there has been, I know personally the story of one of the academics in King's College.

you know, a UK national who was traveling to the US and he was banned from entering the country because of many Skype calls he had with ISIS members who were inside of Syria. For research purposes. For research purposes. But then it's a wholly different level that you are researching something and you are reading articles and you are watching videos. That's a different thing. But having phone calls...

And, you know, Skype calls with, you know, proper communication, basically, with... Non-terrorists. Non-terrorists. That's a different issue. Even if you're a researcher, you'll still be subject to restrictions. So that's the second kind, SIGINT. We've had reconnaissance SIGINT. Now, what's the third kind of intelligence gathering? Now, that is something, basically, that it was, you know, mostly my responsibility and responsibility of other people like me.

It's called human intelligence or humant. Humant. Humant. Humant. Yes. Humant. So human intelligence is the, as we call it basically, is the second oldest profession in human history. The first one basically, of course, is prostitution. But...

You know, and of course, basically, I find it extremely difficult. Like, you know, I describe spying and prostitution in the same sentence, but, you know, as the oldest professions that ever existed. But it's again the classic human spy. What sort of training did you receive in order to do this? I mean, you went from being a bomb maker for al-Qaeda to being a double agent.

quite quickly. So how did you learn the skills necessary to be an effective spy? Well, this is where it was, you know, at the beginning nerve wracking, because you see, when I defected, you know, and started working for the UK intelligence services, I was only 20.

So, can you imagine, by the age of 20, I was already, you know, a qualified bomb maker for Al-Qaeda and was one of their operatives. But here is a problem. Now I need to be a spy against them. I'm going to be spying against them. And actually for the next eight years, although I didn't know that, I thought basically it will be a year or two and that's it.

So the first worry I had, which is how do I now maintain this double life? How do I maintain the veneer of jihadism? And beneath that, you know, is really someone who not just only despise them, but actually want to dismantle what they are building.

So the first training that MI5 and MI6 would give you is that be yourself. That's the first thing. No one should notice a change about you. You know, just forget yourself.

that life is changing around you, that you're changing your mind, you need to play that down so much to really repress it because no one should notice that you're changing, not only from your own words and use of terminology and phrases, but also from your facial expressions.

It's easy enough to tell someone, be yourself. But I mean, how can you? How could you not give the game away? I feel that if I went back into an infamous terrorist organization, having agreed to spy against them for their enemy, I would have been sweating bullets the whole time, shaking, looking down, looking nervous. How did you do it? Well, I remember when I first was told I would be going back to Afghanistan. And of course, basically, I will have to meet my fellow jihadists here in London.

I sat down with several operatives from both MI5 and MI6, and what they were telling me was so interesting and so reassuring. They were saying, look, you are already a spy and an operative. It's just you don't know it. You know, Ayman, they sent you on missions before. Al-Qahidah sent you on missions. Yes? Yes. I said yes.

Okay, and these missions included traveling into sometimes hostile countries, you know, like the UAE or Oman or Kuwait. And even when you enter into Pakistan in a Pakistani airport, when you leave a Pakistani airport,

You know, you're always alert. You know, that you don't want to bring suspicion to yourself. You want to basically just pass through without being detected. Did they train you for that? I said, yes. They gave me counter-interrogation and counter-surveillance courses, you know, in order to fool immigration officials, custom officials, border officials. You know, that was, you know, normal. It came with the territory. They said, exactly.

Use what they gave you. They already gave you the tools. Just use what they gave you against them. That's all you need to do. Imagine them as if they were border agents, you know, custom officials, immigration officers. Imagine them to be the same people that you need to avoid violence.

finding the truth about you. And that assuaged your worries? That made you confident that you could do this? They told me if you were able to fool Pakistani immigration and border officials, you can easily fool them. I know. So they made it sound easy. In fact, it wasn't. But they made it sound easy. And this reassuring tone was extremely important. Remember,

you know, British intelligence operatives, they are actually foremost trained psychologists. I mean, they are trained in psychology. They are trained in

handling assets like me. So reassurance is one of the most important things. And also, basically, knowing your asset, knowing the talents of your asset. If your asset was already trained by the target organization, then that's even better. When you see a show like Homeland or watch a James Bond film, to what extent does that come near the truth? It

It's as far from the truth as it could be, because first of all, spying is basically, you know, a long periods of boredom punctuated by some exciting times. But the exciting times is when information come to you.

And you discover, you make discoveries. But these discoveries are not made through, you know, car races and chases and adrenaline rush, you know, running after people and, you know, breaking into high security vaults. No, it's really all about meeting people in restaurants, in hotels. As a spy, you spend more time in restaurants, hotels,

Mosques, you know, university campuses. This is what spying is about, networking. And, you know, also there is always this myth that the intelligence service officials are cool, cold, calculating. No, they are just average human beings who watch The Simpsons and, you know, support football clubs and go for holidays with their families. And, you know, they are just civil servants.

Except basically they do something exciting and they keep it in secret. But in reality, they are human beings. And by the way, people who are genuinely good, decent, chosen for their high quality education and their love and devotion for their country and fellow countrymen.

So the idea that they are sinister, evil people who are planning plots and then smearing Muslims, you know, this is just nonsense. So you became a double agent three years before 9-11. But after 9-11, you were still a double agent. How did al-Qaeda change in response to the war on terror? There were difficulties, you know, facing us after 9-11 because first,

We, you know, had Al-Qaeda scattered to the wind.

over so many countries, many of them returned to Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, to Qatar, to Kuwait, to Europe, to Turkey, and to Iraq. And, you know, it means that Afghanistan and Pakistan are no longer basically the ground where I was going there for spying. And my cover as a businessman, gone. Because, you know, the people basically that I did business with within Al-Qaeda,

are gone. You know, some are in Guantanamo, some are dead, and some are in Iran. I can't have access to them.

And that is basically where I was worried, the services were worried, and so... That you were no longer useful. Indeed. This is a moment, basically, where I was transferred from human to SIGINT, you know, to help with the signal intelligence, you know, based on my experience, you know, from October 2001 until February of 2002. These four months were really SIGINT because I was waiting for someone from Al-Qaeda to get in touch.

When they got in touch, what happened? Well, an operative in Fama Qaeda who I knew for many, many years. And he said basically that we need you because of your past training with Abu Khabab as a bomb maker. Because by this point, four months after 9-11, many of their top bomb makers, their top fighters, their top thinkers have been killed or captured. They actually need talent like you. Indeed. Indeed.

So, you know, that was obviously the delightful news that, you know, the British intelligence services were waiting for. So I was told, OK, we have to assess, you know, first of all, the validity of this. So we will just send you, you know, into Bahrain just for two weeks to look into things and then come back. So when I went to Bahrain for two weeks, I realized that

that one, Al-Qaeda is building a capability to start a war in Saudi Arabia. This was as early as February and March of 2002, almost a year before the real start of the campaign against Saudi Arabia, more than a year. A lot of people actually don't realize that there was this Al-Qaeda uprising and war within Saudi Arabia against the kingdom. Indeed, and they were actually even scouting targets that are both American and British.

So, of course, basically, this was extremely important for the safety and security of American and British expats in Saudi Arabia. But what really interests me is the psychology of the al-Qaeda members at the time. I mean...

What were their spirits like? Were they shaken by what had happened in Afghanistan after the American invasion? I was struck by the resilience of their morale and their spirits. Despite what seemed to be a massive defeat for the Al-Qaeda and Taliban apparatus in Afghanistan,

What kept their spirits high? They believe it is part of a greater conflict. This is just basically the opening in a battle. This is just basically the first skirmish. So there they were living in the age of prophecy. The prophecies were coming true. Indeed. So for them, look.

It's just a skirmish, you know, but the plan will go ahead regardless. And we are going to topple the regime in Saudi Arabia. The Americans are going to invade Iraq. It's all going according to plan, according to what they believed. This episode is brought to you by Shopify. Whether you're selling a little or a lot.

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But I'm still confused as well. I would have thought following the defeat in Afghanistan that more of the recruits to al-Qaeda would have left the organization as you did. Why did you leave in 1998? What made you different? Why did so few of your comrades leave?

There are two factors here. First of all, I did not leave because the group lost. They were in the ascendance, actually. I left the group when it was in the ascendance. That's sort of true, but you've told me that after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, when Bill Clinton shot some Patriot missiles, I think. Cruise missiles. Shot some cruise missiles into the camps in Afghanistan. I believe you were standing outside one of the camps that was attacked, maybe even killed.

in the middle of the night? Did you tell me that? No, I didn't say that. I said, like, I went to the bathroom, which was, you know, basically, you know, the toilet facilities were almost half a kilometer away from the camp. Like outhouses. Yeah, because why? Half a kilometer. They really make you work for it, these terrorists. Of course. And half a kilometer, why? Because basically there is a river, there is running water, and so that's why. I see. Old-fashioned. Indeed. It was very old-fashioned in a toilet facility. And,

So you wake up in the middle of the night, you have the facilities, you walk half of a kilometer, there you are doing your business when boom, Bill Clinton lobs a missile at your camp. Well, there were dozens of missiles and at the same time, I remember I was on my way back to the camp when the attack happened and

And I remember by the end of the night, basically, there were three dead, 13 wounded in our camp. So you're telling me that despite that, you felt that this organization is in the ascendancy? You must have thought, oh, we're finished. Oh, no, because the reason why there was a low death toll

that night is because we evacuated the camp already to a nearby location. How did you know Bill Clinton was going to attack you? Oh, we didn't need to, basically. We already knew that after the East Africa embassy attacks, there could be airstrikes or anything like that. We didn't know it was going to be cruise missiles.

But we knew basically some retaliation will happen. And so therefore, basically, we were outside of the camp rather than in it. So there you are. You're in the organization. They've just launched their biggest first daring attack. They're in the ascendancy. And yet you begin to wobble. And within a few months, you decided to leave. What happened? Well, actually, I decided to leave almost within a week after the attacks on East African American embassies.

You know, the reality is that I couldn't be part of a group that decided to launch war against civilians in Africa, you know, over a war between them and America. I mean, it just doesn't make sense. And at the same time, the fact that the death toll was just way beyond what I could stomach.

and it's against civilians who had no business whatsoever in the war that we're fighting. But you knew you were in a terrorist group. You know what terrorist groups do. Okay. When I joined Al-Qaeda, I was under the impression that whatever attacks that were going to be launched against the Americans...

It will be according to the same pattern of Al-Ulayya bombings in 1995, which killed seven American military personnel. This is in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, the first bombing that al-Qaeda carried out. Indeed. And the second one, which al-Qaeda never carried out, but it was basically a similar line, which is the attack against the 19 American pilots in

who were, you know, carrying the no-fly zone or enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq. So there were U.S. Air Force pilots. It was a military target. This was in Khobar, in my hometown, basically, in 1996. It's called the Khobar Tower bombings in 1996. Indeed.

That, you know, you see against the backdrop of these, you know, attacks that I joined Al-Qaeda, I thought it's going to be a war to attack American army. Military targets. Personnel in the Arabian Peninsula, not Iraq.

you know, American diplomatic missions in heavily populated areas in Africa. But al-Qaeda thought they were attacking the CIA headquarters for that part of the world. And in fact, they were attacking those headquarters because they were located in those embassies, were they not? Indeed, they were. But you see, this is a

problem. It was in East Africa. So nothing to do with the, you know, vision of liberating Saudi Arabia, as bin Laden was putting it. You know, what does Kenya or Tanzania had anything to do with Saudi Arabia? That's the first thing that came to through my mind. The second thing is that 224 innocent Africans were killed in order to get at 12 American diplomats.

And it didn't take you long to realize this is not an organization I want to be in. No, because you see, if it was, you know, an attack against an American military barracks in Saudi, you know, I would have understood. And actually, basically, I would have cheered and supported at the time because that was my mentality. I would have still, you know, drank the Kool-Aid and decided basically that this is exactly, you know, what we should be doing. However...

You know, the attacks in East Africa and the fact that it was done by someone I knew very well, a friend of mine from Saudi Arabia, the fact that it happened on African soil taking the lives of so many people, 220 plus dead, 5,000 people wounded, 150 of them blinded for life because of the so many shrapnels that were embedded within the device, and it was a huge device. So how do I reconcile that?

And the fact that they gave themselves justification that we are allowed under a long, ancient fatwa that we can... Yeah, what is this justification? Why would they think it was okay to kill so many civilians? Because there is a fatwa from 800 years ago.

800 years ago. Indeed. All right. That says that... It's like Magna Carta sort of period, around the time Magna Carta is... I suppose English law is also based on a fatwa from 800 years ago. But all right. What's this fatwa? It's called the Tataros Fatwa, which means the human shield fatwa. And the human shield fatwa...

is a fatwa that in its essence or how Al-Qaeda interpret it is that if the enemy is located within a heavily populated area with civilians you can attack and if civilians die then it's up to God to sort them but you need

to do your duty and eliminate the enemy. Where did this fatwa come from? What's the context of this fatwa? Exactly. That's what I asked Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir. He's a sheikh and he is the... An Al-Qaeda sheikh. Indeed. I asked him. I said, I mean, look, it's not like I'm doubting or anything, but please, can you put my heart at peace? I want to know how can we justify killing so many people who just were there at the wrong time, at the wrong place,

So how do we justify killing them? What did he say? He said to me, well, we have this fatwa, the terrorist fatwa, you can go and look it up, but it allows us to do that. So I decided I would go and look for it. So, you know, within a week I was in Al-Qaeda's safe house in Kabul, the headquarters in Kabul, and they have a huge library there. And

And there is a book called The Comprehensive Works of Ibn Taymiyyah. It's a 37-volume book. The famous Ibn Taymiyyah. Indeed. A 13th century scholar considered the grandfather of fundamentalist legal jurisprudence in Islam. So, you know, it took me a while to find the fatwa, but the fatwa was there. And it's true. It's basically called the Human Shield Fatwa based on the earlier fatwas from 800 years ago. And there...

The context shocked me. What was it?

The context was that the Mongols were invading the Muslim city-states of Central Asia. The Mongols, so we're talking Genghis Khan, Kyrgyz, you know, Genghis Khan, what was his, Kublai Khan, this era of history, the sweeping hordes from Central Asia burning all before them. Indeed. So what their practice was, was whenever they sacked a Muslim city, they would tear

take a few thousand of the inhabitants, the civilian inhabitants of that city, and they make them push the siege towers to the walls of the next city they want to sack. So captured civilians from one city are pushing the siege towers to the next city, which puts the Muslims in the next city in a quandary. Do we fire upon the siege towers? We'll kill our fellow Muslims. Indeed. Do we shoot them? Do we kill them?

So that's what the fatwa is about. The fatwa is about life and death situation, that if the enemy is advancing on you using, you know, prisoners, your fellow Muslim prisoners as human shields, are you allowed to kill them in order to save yourself? And the fatwas that came from across the Muslim world to the defenders of these cities was yes.

You can kill them because they are already dead anyway. If you don't, the Mongols will kill them. And you thought this doesn't bear much relation to what's going on in the East African embassy bombings. No, of course not. I mean, I didn't see the American embassy in Nairobi, for example, pushing the siege towers towards Mecca and Medina. No.

There was no life and death situation that necessitated, you know, killing so many civilians in order to kill 12 American diplomats. So I would have guessed there would have been a mass exodus at the time of recruits like yourself. Why were there so few? What makes you different?

From the other recruits. What made me different was two things. First, a good moral compass, you know, that I think was instilled by my mother. That's the first thing. The second thing, I was always a knowingly inquisitive and independent thinker. So I just never allowed anyone to think on my behalf. It sounds like a strange mentality for someone who joined a, you know, let's call a spade a spade, a totalitarian cult. Yeah.

Well, indeed, I grew up in a totalitarian society, you know, Saudi Arabia. I believed in religious totalitarianism and authoritarianism. I believed in the concept of the caliphate as the best system that will save us, you know, from the tyranny of other global powers. I, you know, didn't join

straight away I ended up first going to defend Muslims in Bosnia. So it didn't feel to me as if I was joining a terror organization and the context through which I joined was to liberate an occupied land by the Americans and to liberate ourselves from the encroachment, cultural, military and economic encroachment of the Americans.

It's only that what happened in East Africa woke me up to the fact that all these noble aims were just...

So you have this inquisitiveness which leads you to leave al-Qaeda, and this distinguishes you from most recruits to al-Qaeda. And I think it's interesting in the war on terror era, what is the average al-Qaeda recruit like and what is motivating him not only to join the organization but to stay? Put us in the heads of the average al-Qaeda recruit, and I think it's safe to say you're an above average al-Qaeda recruit.

al-Qaeda recruit at that time? You know, it is important for the listener to understand that groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are highly hierarchical and actually stratified. There are, you know, like the Hindu caste system, you know, first you have the, you know, big priests and the Brahmins, you know, and then below that you have the warriors and below that you have the, you know, the business classes and the traders and then below that you have the

you know, the untouchables. So I'm interested at the bottom there of Al-Qaeda. Who's on the bottom? Who are the untouchables? The expendables, really, because they might be asked to strap a bomb to themselves. Indeed. So what we have here is

is that at the very bottom of Al-Qaeda or ISIS hierarchy are the foot soldiers, the expendables as you call them. And sometimes I used to call them the idiots. So these are the ones who came for a variety of reasons to join. So there isn't a particular average there, but they are divided into three distinct categories.

First, you have the criminal class, people who basically were graduates of prisons because, you see, prisons were always a fertile ground for recruitment as far as Al-Qaeda and ISIS were concerned. Why is that? Because in prison, you have people who exhibit three traits. The first one is that they want redemption.

You know, they feel bad about everything they've done. Stealing, thieving, raping, murdering. Drug dealing, you know, being members of gangs, you know, domestic violence, all of that. So they feel guilty about everything they've done. They want a way out. They want a redemption. And so they are too lazy to become pious. But if I go to prison and say, look, I can...

All you have to do is...

All you have to do is just join us, fight for us, and if you die in the process, you are going to heaven with all of your sins forgiven totally, completely, according to the scripture. It's a very tempting offer. Absolutely, because imagine, a life of crime can all be wiped out in an instant if you actually die for this cause, for jihad. That's why they say jihad and martyrdom, or jihad and shahada, are the shortest path to heaven.

Add to this the fact that the second trait they exhibit, we're talking here about the criminal class, is that they have repressed inner sadism and violence and psychopathic tendencies. Which landed them in prison in the first place. Indeed. So if you tell them that you can liberate the inner psychopath, the inner sadist, the inner violence within you, but you will direct it towards the enemies. It's a liberation technique.

of all of these dark forces that you are not going to be punished for. In fact, you will be rewarded because that's exactly where you need to direct them, at the enemy. So a guilty conscience, repressed sadism, and third? And the third is empowerment. You see, prison is the ultimate humiliation for an individual. So you come to them and you say, not only...

I will give you one-way express ticket to heaven. Not only I will liberate your inner sadist, violent psychopath, I will also empower you because today you are under their boots. Tomorrow they will be under yours. So a guilty conscience, repressed sadism, and humiliated pride. This is the recipe for making a jihadist out of a criminal.

What are the other two classes of recruits to the underclass of al-Qaeda? After that, you have the working class aspirational dreamers. So people basically who came from either a poor background, you know, they want to make a

something out of themselves. People basically who feel so much the injustice of this world on them, on their families. They see basically that the alienation, the disenfranchisement. So these people who come from the slums, whether they are the slums of Baghdad, the slums of Damascus, the refugee camps of the Palestinians in Lebanon or Jordan, uh,

You know, these are the people who come because they feel that they have been trodden on. So, again, empowerment is such an important... A burning sense of injustice. Exactly. A burning sense of injustice. Okay, that kind of... I think that really does... would make sense to people. That's in a way...

The idea we have of a terrorist as a freedom fighter. These are the freedom fighter brand terrorists. They're fighting for their families. They're fighting for the underdog, for the oppressed. And the third kind? And the third kind basically are what we call the middle class revolutionary dreamers.

who come, they would have had some education, some background. These are the Saudis, the Gulf Arabs in general, the more wealthy, more affluent, more educated. Yeah. So these people, some of them make up the third part of the bottom of the pile, let's put it this way, because they are not exactly very bright, but nonetheless, they came from an affluent background. So they are... They're from the idiotic bourgeoisie. Exactly. Exactly.

Because this is what we used to say, basically, that there are really two classes within jihad, basically. I mean, you have the bourgeoisie jihadists and you have the proletariat jihadists. So you have the foot soldiers, but also you have those who came from an affluent background. If you remember, basically, there were many affluent people from Europe who went to join the international brigade in the Spanish Civil War. So they are the same way. You know, university students, you know, people basically who have experience.

This aspiration of joining a global revolution against the globalization and the new world order led by the Americans. Idealists. I suppose it's these people who are particularly inflamed by the ideology of jihadism because they're slightly more intellectual. They get trapped in a way in the perfection of ideological thinking, the sort of clockwork thinking of a perfect ideology. Indeed. Indeed.

And then above these classes you have people who have a better education in theology.

Engineering, medicine. Indeed, engineering, medicine. And I remember... Chemistry. Absolutely. And I remember, you know, when these people used to come, we used to celebrate a lot. So basically, if someone who comes with a degree in theology or a degree in chemistry or a degree in engineering, especially, you know, I remember in Afghanistan, we had...

had a celebration when someone who is an engineer in water sanitization came. So of course, basically, these are very important skills. Doctors are always celebrated when they come, and so they form the upper class of jihadism. These people are very important. They are not easily disposed of. You just don't send your doctors to the front line all the time to get killed. You try to preserve them as much as possible, even though they insist on fighting because they came for the jihad.

So you indulge them a little bit, but you do not throw them into the thick of battle or you chose them to become suicide bombers. No. So you weren't put on the front lines. I did go to the front lines because sometimes basically what they do whenever they feel that they need to test your resolve and see if you're a coward. So they will put you in the front line.

So I remember one of Al-Qaeda's leaders, he said, oh, by the way, Abdel Abbas, we need to send you to the front line because we are doing the rotation. Everyone, regardless, must do the rotation. And years later, I was joking about it, that I fought against UK assets and the other side of the front line, which is the Northern Alliance. But nonetheless, I was sent to the front line.

And I remember basically, you know, there during a routine patrol, you know, in our pickup in a military car, we came under ambush. And the person next to me, an Egyptian, you know, man in his 50s who was a UK citizen, was shot in the head, you know, in the pickup in the back. And we were just speeding because we were under ambush. We were speeding back and two other people were wounded. Oh, my God. And his corpse was there the whole time.

The whole time I was actually holding, you know, his neck and his head and basically the blood was seeping from his head where the bullet came into my palm and then into the rest of my sleeve. Were you horrified? Were you terrified? Or does the adrenaline just take over? No, I was actually sad because I liked him. You know, I liked him so much. Uh,

because he was in his 50s, he was a fatherly figure, he was quiet, humorous. He was one of those extremely intellectual people, and he was a good bomb maker also. So it shows you they spared no one sometime when they feel that there is a need for rotation. This is a recurring theme with you, that in fact, like when Khalid Al-Hajj, your friend that you told us last time, when he died, you felt sad. This sense of sadness at the waste of life, sadness.

It goes to show really that these recruits that we've been discussing, either the criminals or the lower class recruits or the middle class recruits, they are human beings. Indeed. They have been brainwashed into an idiotic ideology. But in your day-to-day encounters with them, they were nice people. They were friendly people. You felt a bond with them. Indeed, because...

You know, no matter what, you know, let's say like, you know, if one of the listeners is thinking, basically, are these really nice people? Well, of course they are nice people to each other, because again, we come back to the fact that their psychopathic and violent tendencies are directed towards a defined enemy. So what is left there towards their comrades is nothing but, you know, really sweet, you know, camaraderie, you know,

which they exhibit towards others. So basically they have managed to direct their rage, anger, and violence towards a defined enemy, which left their better characteristics to be directed towards their fellow jihadists. If only they knew then you were actually an enemy in their midst. Well, they didn't know. Thank God for that. If they had found out, what would they have done to you? What threat were you living under? The threat of immediate execution? Yes.

You know, in the 33 months I used to go and come into Afghanistan and into the camps, during that time from 1999 until 2001, five members of Al-Qaeda were apprehended and given trials and then executed for being spies inside the organization. Two were accused of working for the Jordanian intelligence services and three were accused of being spies for the Egyptian intelligence services.

So, of course, you know, I never attended any of the executions because I did not want to envision my head, you know, being the one, you know, basically falling to the ground after a swift, sharp sword strike. How close were you personally ever to being found out, to being executed by al-Qaeda? There are, there was a practice, especially in the run-up to 9-11, where at some point they would do random checks, and I didn't know about this.

Remember I told you about the rotation for the frontline? Yeah. When we are in the camps or in the headquarters or anywhere, we have something called the rotation for the services. And that includes not just only guard duty, but kitchen duty.

So, whenever I'm in the kitchen, basically, you know, this is a cause of celebration for my fellow Al-Qaeda members because I always used to love cooking, you know, fries. You know, fries were something important. French fries. French fries, yeah. So, they love it. Freedom fries, I think they were called at the time. Yeah, I mean, but that was after 9-11. I mean, basically, because, you know, of stupid American… I beg your pardon? Okay, sorry, sorry. There's nothing stupid about us at all. We've never done anything stupid, Eamon. It's fine.

If only. So I was in the kitchen and, you know, I was basically just, you know, cutting the potatoes into, you know, fries shapes. And I remember, you know, someone entering into the kitchen, but I wasn't aware who he was.

And then I realized, basically, that some movement happening in the kitchen that my other, you know, helpers in the kitchen left in a hurry. And so I was thinking, before I was going to turn around, distinctively, I felt the end of a pistol against my spine, you know. And so I heard, you know, a rather familiar voice, someone I knew, saying, Abu al-Abbas, you have to come with me quietly. We know who you are.

We know who you work for. It's over. It's done. Resistance is futile. Oh my god. So, and I remember I just looked around like this and I say, do you know that it is explicitly forbidden to point a gun, even if it's empty, against another brother? Take, you know, put it down. Put your gun down now. And I remember he looked at me shocked a little bit. I said to him, put it down. I'm not going to tolerate this joke.

So I pretended it was a joke. And trust me, inside of my heart, my heart was beating not inside my chest, but inside my neck. This is how I felt it. The pulse was so strong. But I had to survive. I had to really convince him that I thought it was a joke. Because then you knew that he might think that you had no idea what he was talking about. Yeah. So I told him I'm not writing this joke.

So he said, it's not a joke. And I said, look, don't try to save yourself. I'm going to report you now to everyone here. So take it down. Take the gun down. So...

It was just a random check? It was a random. No one had any idea that you actually were a double agent? No. How did you keep your cool, Eamon? I would have peed my pants. LAUGHTER

You know, by then, it was 2001, and I have been in jihad since 1994, so seven years of being in different war zones, man. You know, this is how you keep your calm. Let's go back to when you left al-Qaeda. Why did you choose to join MI6? Well, when I left al-Qaeda, and I was on my way to Qatar at that time, under the pretext of medical attention, which was true,

I needed medical attention for my liver, which was suffering from, you know, the...

The after effects of typhoid and malaria striking me at the same time. You know, that was a very merciless period. I lost half of my weight and almost died. Sounds like a very effective diet. Indeed, yes. Malaria and typhoid, good for your health. Anyway, so I remember when I arrived in Qatar, my mission, or at least what I thought was my mission, was to...

Get the medical treatment necessary and then tell Al-Qaeda that, oh, my passport has been confiscated, you know, by the Qatari authorities. I'm banned from traveling. I can't come back. Well, see you in another life. Goodbye. And then enroll into a university, study history, graduate, become a history teacher. That was a plan. And what a naive plan it was.

You land in Qatar. Yes. And the Qataris apprehend you. Indeed. The story was that I land there and so happen I land during a time when the Qataris had their own internal investigation about suspicious phone calls in the coming out of Pakistan into Qatar from the phone of a well-known operative, Abu Zubaydah. So I...

So I remember when I landed there, I was just picked up in order to clarify why was I using Abu Zubaydah's phone and if I know him and if I know him, what is the nature of my relationship with him?

So I remember the Qatari intelligence service officers, you know, all of them were sitting in a very menacing, in a way, behind a long desk, you know, and I'm alone in a chair, you know, and they were looking at me menacing. And I was looking at them basically almost about to burst laughing because their facial expressions were so fake.

And I could tell that they were trying to be menacing, but in reality, they are all just cuddly, nice people in their daily lives. Gulf Arabs have that problem, don't they? Indeed, yes. They're menacing, but they're such cuddly, nice people. Indeed. You yourself are one of these people. Exactly. So I just look at them and I think, guys, I mean, your facial expressions are just so fake.

But nonetheless, you know, they're looking at me menacingly and they were saying, look, we know who you are and we need you to tell the truth and assist us in our inquiry. Otherwise, basically, you know, we could exhibit another, you know, awful nature of ours with you.

So I was looking at them. Okay, Mattol, tell me, what is the inquiry? They said, do you deny that you made a phone call from Abu Zubaydah's phone to one of your friends here in Qatar? Oh, no, I made that phone call, all right. Really, did you? Yeah, I did. So you don't deny it? Why would I deny it?

Yeah, but it's Abu Zubaydah's phone. You don't want to distance yourself from Abu Zubaydah. I said, well, you asked me for the truth and I'm telling the truth. So why can't you just accept it? And yes, I did use Abu Zubaydah's phone to call my friend in Qatar. I mean, I needed medical attention.

And, you know, I was almost dying a year earlier, you know, and so I couldn't go to a phone box or a phone booth or any other, you know, service so I can call my friends from there. So Abu Zubaydah gave me his phone and told me to make the phone call. What did they say next? So they said, and so basically it was all about medical attention. But why were you in Abu Zubaydah's, you know, safe house?

in the first place, and why would he trust you with your phone, with his phone to begin with? I said, well, I'm a member of Al-Qaeda.

And, you know, basically, of course, Abu Zubaydah is one of the facilitators for our organization. Easiest interrogation ever. You cracked under pressure immediately. Oh, there was no pressure to begin with. Actually, you know, on the plane when I was actually flying from Peshawar and landing in Doha. You'd already decided to leave al-Qaeda anyway. Not only that. Actually, in my own heart, I started reciting the renunciation of my allegiance al-Qaeda. You know, basically, you say, oh, Lord.

The allegiance I gave to Osama bin Laden and to Al-Qaeda, I declare to you that it is null and void, and I take it back. How do you say that in Arabic? You say, you know, you say, I renounce my allegiance to Al-Qaeda, O Lord of the Worlds. And to Osama bin Laden. So I renounce that allegiance on the plane leaving Pakistan. So you say, I'm in Al-Qaeda. And what do they say next?

And, you know, they look at me and they say basically, you know, OK, one minute, just, you know, are we missing something here? Why are you so candid here? And then I told them what happened after East Africa, what I found out all the way to the fact that I was renouncing my bay'ah, my allegiance on the plane landing in Doha.

And that's, I remember, when they just looked at each other and, you know, they started whispering into each other's ears and coming together and huddling together. And then after that, basically, they decided to switch on all the lights, you know, within the room, you know, basically feeling relaxed. You know, they came to me one after another, shaking my hand, you know, patting me on the shoulder and saying, well done. How did you get into MI6?

The fact is that after the Qataris were able to check all of the facts I gave them, they told me that, look, we would love to facilitate your dream of becoming a history teacher and living with us here in Qatar. But the problem is Doha is a city of 250,000 people. It's like a small suburb of London. So you'll be running into your friends every day for the rest of your life. And that is something that we do not think is a good idea.

You know, if you want to have a normal life in which basically you can be protected, we think that you need to immigrate and leave, you know, to work with one of three countries and work for their intelligence agencies just only for six months debriefing. That's it. The U.S.

France or Britain. Yeah. Why did you choose Britain? OK. As far as the Americans were concerned, and I'm sorry, Tom, but the memory of your cruise missiles in a landing over our heads, you know, just in a few months earlier. On your way back from the bathroom. Indeed. Where not exactly, you know, encouraging me to go and work with those who just...

months earlier, pressed the button to kill me. So I thought, okay, not Americans. So as far as the French were concerned, first, I don't like their language. I don't like their manner. I don't like the way they behave. They're arrogant. They're aloof. And that's the best things about them, actually. I didn't go even to the worst things. Now I understand why you joined MI6. Okay, so...

So I decided, you know, that, you know, since my grandfather, you know, fought for the British actually in Iraq in the battles of Al-Amara, Al-Qud, and Baghdad, and was actually a major, an official major in the British Army. In the First World War. In the First World War. He fought against the Ottomans alongside the British. And so I thought that there is some affinity there.

with the British Foreign Office and the intelligence services. And so I decided that, and at least I was familiar with London. I've been there before. So I decided to go with familiarity and affinity. That actually what made up my mind. So you were a double agent working with MI6 for eight years. Indeed. And in that time, the War on Terror was launched. Yes.

and went through many different vicissitudes. Where, in your opinion, did the war on terror go wrong? What were the biggest mistakes that were made? The first mistake, the biggest mistake, the mother of all mistakes, was Iraq. Invading Iraq in 2003. Indeed.

That was absolutely not necessary whatsoever. There was no immediate danger. Saddam Hussein, in fact, was the last standing pillar of Arab secular nationalism. He was a big hurdle against Al-Qaeda and also against Iran and their brand of Shia political and militant Islam. So, you know, taking Saddam down was the dumbest thing

strategic mistake that Bush and Blair ever done and that what revived the fortunes of Al-Qaeda and global jihad.

The Iraq War. Well, that's what we're going to talk about in the next episode, Eamon. And I'm sure the listener will be looking forward to hearing your idiosyncratic views on what remains to this day the great seeping wound of modern Middle Eastern history. Indeed.

This episode of Conflicted was produced by Jake Warren and Sandra Ferrari. Original music by Matt Huxley. If you want to hear more of Conflicted, make sure you search for us on Apple Podcasts or wherever you download yours.