What if Trump wins?
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You're listening to a podcast from the South China Morning Post. Wow, this is a nice crowd. In the U.S., the presidential primaries are well underway.

And the frontrunners for both the Democratic and Republican primaries are clear. On the Democratic Party side, it is incumbent President Joe Biden. And for the Republicans, former President Donald Trump. Over the past week, it's been sort of in a rocket. We've been launching like a rocket to the Republican nomination. From the bottom of my heart, thank you. Thank you. Thank you. You all are the reason why I'm president of the United States of America. You're the reason.

And you're the reason he'll make Donald Trump a loser again. What is unclear is how Trump's many legal issues may affect his chances, and how anger about U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza could cost Biden thousands of votes.

Another mystery is what Beijing thinks of the U.S. presidential elections. Xi Jinping is very difficult to read, but I can't imagine that Xi Jinping is thinking to himself that he would like to align with Trump. This is Inside China. I'm Brian Wood. Today, America marks Super Tuesday when voters in 15 states head to the ballots to cast their votes in party primary elections.

I'm joined by our U.S. Bureau Chief Robert Delaney on the line from Washington to discuss Trump, Biden, and their foreign policies. Robert, let me first start with this. Donald Trump and Joe Biden. China has experience dealing with both, but does Beijing have a preference over who it wants to see in the White House for another term?

Well, there actually isn't really a consensus on that because what you hear some people say is that there are folks in the top leadership in Beijing who really want a second Trump presidency only because Trump can really be such a chaos agent. The sort of instability that he often causes in terms of just shifts in frontiers

foreign policy or, you know, some people would say an utter lack of foreign policy is beneficial for China. The fact that Trump has been obviously very skeptical of Washington's traditional alliances is also very beneficial for Beijing. And then you hear that, well, there are also people in top leadership in Beijing that really prefer the stability that someone like Biden brings to

to the White House. America is back. America is back. Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy. So someone who really sort of hews to the orthodoxy of Washington's foreign policy,

the principles that they always kind of bring into international arena, whether it's in G7, whether it's in G20, which China is a part of, whether it is in the UN. So these positions aren't necessarily things that Beijing likes or that the Beijing leadership likes, but at least they can count on not liking it, if that makes any sense.

and they know kind of how to move with that. Now, if you ask the question a year ago, it might be a little bit different from now, of course, because you've got these economic problems that have really manifested themselves in China. Now, while the UK is struggling to get inflation under control, China's economy is suffering from the opposite, deflation. People and businesses are not spending, and the world's second largest economy is struggling to revive demand.

And so some people we're talking to are sort of venturing this guess that even though there are folks in both camps in the Beijing leadership, some who would prefer another Trump presidency, some would prefer to see Biden get reelected. You perhaps have fewer of them who want to see Trump only because, you know,

Trump has already threatened a few weeks ago, he already threatened to raise tariffs by 60 percent or possibly even more on as soon as he assumes his position in the Oval Office. Talking about 60 percent tariffs on Chinese goods. Is that in the cards? No, I would say maybe it's going to be more than that. So that obviously would would just exacerbate the economic problems that China is facing.

because obviously it depends so heavily on exports to the U.S. So, yeah, so I guess, you know, when we're talking about preferences in Beijing, does Beijing have a preference for one or the other? It's very hard to say. I haven't found anyone who will say definitively that they know who Beijing would prefer. So that's a very long-winded way of saying, I don't know, I'm afraid. Mm-hmm.

So let's be specific then about Trump. So even before Trump became president, he was very aggressive towards China back in 2010 when he was known as just a businessman. We still have the biggest economy in the world. We're still number one. But you know what? In 10 years, we will not be number one because we're allowing them to be number one.

When he was campaigning in 2016. Because we can't continue to allow China to rape our country. And that's what they're doing. It's the greatest theft in the history of the world. And then when he got elected, he launched a trade war on China. So what can we expect from Trump in regards to U.S.-China relations if he becomes president again?

Well, you could expect him to use the extent to which China relies on the U.S. market as leverage. He will lord that over Beijing as much as he can and as often as he can.

to do any number of things. He is, as you mentioned, his background as a businessman, he's always been one. Even when he was in the White House, he really thought in terms of transactions, business transactions. All he wanted to see when he assumed office and started the trade war was for the trade surplus that China has with the U.S. to vanish. And he thought that these tariffs would do it. I'm doing this to do the right thing for our country. We have been ripped off by China for a long time.

And it was very much a zero sum game with Trump. He will certainly bring this back. Right now, the tariffs are as much as 25%. But as I mentioned, he's now threatening tariffs of 60% or more. So that sort of gives you a heads up on the lengths that he is prepared to

to go to, to get what he wants when he engages with China. So let's talk interpersonal relationships that Trump boasts. So Trump has a pattern for praising authoritarian leaders, including China's President Xi Jinping. President Xi is a brilliant man. If you went all over Hollywood to look for somebody to play the role of President Xi, you couldn't find him. There's nobody like that.

The look, the brain, the whole thing. Does this mean Trump has a good relationship with Xi? Well, no, it does not mean that he has a good relationship with Xi. It means that he admires the amount of power that Xi has amassed. I mean, throughout Trump's presidency, he was constantly frustrated by those around him

who really put guardrails on him. You know, the ones who would say, no, no, no, you cannot just pull out of the NATO alliance

simply because you don't think that some of the NATO member countries are spending enough on defense. There are any number of policy decisions that he was rumored to have made that were sort of pushed back on by folks like John Bolton, his national security advisor, and folks who had been in the Republican Party for many years but were Republicans of the more traditional ilk. Yeah.

I mean, when it comes to Xi Jinping, we saw this very kind of schizophrenic approach to him, which I think also underscores the fact that he doesn't necessarily have a good relationship with Xi. He called Xi a great leader at one point. I believe those are the words.

He said at one point that he believed that Xi Jinping was doing a great job containing COVID-19, which turned out to not be the case. I know this. President Xi loves the people of China. He loves his country. And he's doing a very good job with a very, very tough situation. And then, of course, he would turn on, not so much Xi directly, but he would turn on the Chinese government directly.

Once he realized that his own comments or thoughts on Xi Jinping and COVID-19 were actually wrong, he would then attack China. And he would go as far as any of the most hawkish of U.S. lawmakers would go. He would go even beyond that. He would even use racial epithets. He started flinging around the term Kung Flu. It's a disease without question, has more names than any disease in history. I can name...

Kung flu, I can name 19 different versions of names. And he would always go back to this idea that China was taking advantage of the U.S. or has been taking advantage of the U.S. They are taking advantage of us, okay? I'll use a different set of words. They are taking advantage of us. It's cable, though, if you really want. I know, but it's not as good as the other word. You know what the other word is. You can get away with it. We are being taken advantage of.

Of course, Xi Jinping is very difficult to read, but I can't imagine that Xi Jinping is thinking to himself that he would like to align with Trump. You know, it really appears that Xi Jinping himself sees Trump as more of a useful idiot than as someone like Vladimir Putin or any other leaders that he would want to align himself with. Now, regardless of which candidate we're

wins, the biggest issues in U.S.-China relations are trade, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. What do we know about Trump's stance on Taiwan?

Well, just for a bit of a contrast, I would start with Biden and point out that Biden has been very inconsistent on what he's saying about Taiwan. I think it was three times that he said that the U.S. is committed to helping Taiwan defend itself, committed to come to the aid of Taiwan. China just tested a hypersonic missile. What will you do to keep up with them militarily? And can you vow to protect Taiwan?

Yes and yes. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that? Yes. You are? That's a commitment we made. To be clear, sir, U.S. forces, U.S. men and women, would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion? Yes. And that does not square at all with the policy of strategic ambiguity that the U.S. has pursued for decades with respect to Taiwan.

Now, in this one respect, actually, Trump is actually sticking with strategic ambiguity because in a recent interview, when asked that question, he said something along the lines of he didn't want to show his hand. Should the U.S. help defend Taiwan if it means going to war with China? Well, I don't want to say it because if I'm in the position of president,

I don't want to say what I'm thinking. You know, I just if I if I answer that question, it would put me in a very bad negotiating position. Which was actually quite interesting. It was one of these rare instances where Trump is sort of following the established position of Washington when it comes to Taiwan. But I guess we could also look at it from another way. You know, a businessman, of course,

who's very transactional, does not want to show his hand. So it could be that that was more Trump speaking from his own inclination on these sorts of matters rather than the Washington establishment. But we also have to keep in mind that he also said recently, and this was around July last year, that...

that he was not happy about the fact that Taiwan had, and here he's referring to the semiconductor manufacturing industry. He criticized Taiwan for, quote, taking business away from us, end quote. But remember this, Taiwan took, smart, brilliant, they took our business away from

Basically what he's saying is that he's not happy that Taiwan has managed to create on the islands essentially an industry where the world's most advanced chips are manufactured.

And the U.S. no longer has, well, had long ago lost the status of being the premier manufacturer of the world's most advanced chips. So, again, this goes back to his instinct as a businessman who really sees things in zero-sum transactional terms.

We wouldn't be off base to say that he would use some kind of leverage on Taiwan to perhaps extract more technology out of them. I mean, obviously, TSMC is building a huge chip foundry in Arizona. It's bringing some of its leading technology there, but it's not bringing its most

advanced chip making technology there. So, you know, we could foresee a scenario in which, you know, assuming Trump was back in the White House, that he would start making demands of Taiwan to transfer more of its most advanced manufacturing technology over to the U.S.,

And, you know, again, business kind of trumps everything with him. Now, I know this podcast is called Inside China, but I have to widen the scope a bit. What has Biden's time in office been like for Asia partners? And if he won...

Would we expect these relationships to continue? I mean, Biden's administration has really been, in terms of the foreign policy, has really been characterized by both building new alliances, such as the AUKUS alliance. Now, the leaders of the US, Britain and Australia meeting in California have given details of a defence pact that will provide Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines.

President Biden said the AUKUS pact would boost security in the Indo-Pacific region for decades to come. The agreement comes in response to China's growing military strength and territorial claims. Biden has also launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which is very much an initiative to tie

the countries of Southeast Asia, that is China's closest neighbors, to more to the U.S. U.S. President Joe Biden has signed up a dozen countries to help challenge Chinese dominance in Asia. During a tour of the continent, he announced the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, saying it would help the country members to grow faster and fairer.

Now, there's a lot of debate about how effective this has been so far, especially because it doesn't actually have a market access or trade component.

But it does show how important it has been for the Biden administration to move away from this sort of direct confrontational approach with China, whereby Washington really tries to take measures to try to change Beijing's behavior and instead shore up alliances and shore up partnerships with other countries in China's orbit.

to get these countries more into the orbit of the U.S. So, you know, not only do we have AUKUS, not only do we have the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, we also have, there was a lot of work to strengthen the Quad partnership between, that's of course the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia. So early on in his administration, he convened the first

meeting of the heads of state of all Quad countries. It had been around in various levels of engagement for quite a few years, but Biden was the first one to really bring it to sort of the premier leader's level. Well, let me begin by saying I'm honored to welcome Prime Minister Morrison, Prime Minister Modi, Prime Minister Suga, and to the White House for the first in-person meeting of the Quad we've had.

Other initiatives that really show what defines the Biden administration is the way that it has worked hard to get the transatlantic alliances more cognizant of the perceived threats that China presents. So, friend-shoring, the idea that we need to move supply chains more among Washington's allies and to the greatest extent possible out of China.

he's pushed that. He's really put a lot of political capital behind that. And there's no reason to think that that would change in a second Biden term. So in contrast, during Trump's first year in office, he withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Many analysts saw this as Trump shifting Washington's attention away from the Asia-Pacific region. Is he keen to continue with that pivot?

I would sort of characterize that less as pivoting away from to or from anything. It's more Trump does not like these multilateral frameworks. Trump does not like multi-stakeholder international frameworks at all.

He prefers to be able to deal with other countries on a one-on-one basis so that, again, he can lord over them the size and the importance of the U.S. market so that he can sort of get his way, so that he can extract as much as possible in the way of concessions, whether they're market access concessions, whether they are means by which...

The U.S. would either be able to erase a trade deficit that it has or to further build on any surpluses that it might have. And you also have to remember that it was one of the things that brought Trump to power in the first place was his disdain for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the greatest danger yet.

The TPP, as it's known, would be the death blow for American manufacturing.

Again, because he really framed that as yet another sort of international agreement that's put together by the elites of Washington and which only benefits shareholders of international companies and, of course, to the detriment of American workers. It would give up all of our economic leverage to an international commission that would put the interests of foreign countries above our own.

Some of which is actually true. And that's why that message resonated so effectively when he was running the first time around in 2016. And that message was so powerful, actually, that...

the Biden administration has really not been able to, even though there have been suggestions, not only among Democrats, but also among some Republicans saying that, hey, you know, if we can get the U.S. back into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which of course is now called the CPTPP, the Comprehensive and

I'm not going to go through the whole line, but the whole name. But anyway, even though there are many foreign policy folks in Washington to say that, hey, if the U.S. could just be part of this alliance, which, by the way, China is not part of,

Then the U.S. has an outsized voice in determining how the economic relationship and how trade flows and the terms of trade flows are conducted. But, you know, again, Trump sort of rode to the White House with this very isolationist mindset. It's a mindset that really cast a lot of doubt and suspicion and really disillusioned.

you know, outright anger about multilateral trade frameworks, multilateral anything frameworks, you know, in the international sphere. So do you think this applies to a partnership like ASEAN with Trump? If I remember correctly, he only attended one ASEAN meeting during his first term. So does this outlook still apply to ASEAN?

Absolutely. Yes, it applies to ASEAN also. I mean, with Trump, he doesn't really see hierarchies in terms of which regional grouping is more important. For him, it's just he

He will just sort of turn his sights on whatever region it is, whatever grouping it is. He'll turn his sights on it and decide how can the U.S. get a better deal out of this group? How can the U.S. get a better deal out of this region? And, you know, in the way he thinks, again, everything is transactional zero sum.

And so it doesn't matter if it's ASEAN, it doesn't matter if it's Europe, it doesn't matter if it's in the economic sphere, i.e. APEC, for example, or if it's in the national defense spheres, in NATO. He just wants to look at dollars and cents, and he makes a determination himself that

as to whether or not the U.S. is benefiting from this. And if he thinks that it's not, or if he thinks that the U.S. can be doing better out of the relationship or better outside of the relationship, he will go ahead and do it. He knows no boundaries. I mean, if anything...

Trump has sort of learned that playing outside of the boundaries of traditional norms of U.S. governance works better for him. And of course, a lot of his base will say, see, that's America first. He's all about America first. My foreign policy will always put the interests of the American people and American security above all else. Has to be first. Has to be.

That will be the foundation of every single decision that I will make. The problem is that this is always in Trump's own determination. And so he might look at the relationship that the U.S. has with South Korea, for example, and he might look at the trade surplus that South Korea has with the U.S. and say, obviously, we're getting this is not a relationship that's to the benefit of the U.S. We need to break it. We need to shake it up.

until the South Koreans are buying more from us than we are from them. The new U.S.-Korea agreement includes significant improvements to reduce our trade deficit and to expand opportunities to export American products to South Korea.

In other words, we are now going to start sending products to South Korea. And, you know, it completely dismisses the idea that a healthy relationship, a very friendly relationship with South Korea does serve U.S. interests in terms of the way that it's part of an alliance that will restrain

I want to focus your attention now to the South China Sea and territorial disputes, specifically China's claim to most of the region. So how do Trump's views differ from Biden's?

Well, I think the problem is we're talking about views, right? And I think the term views suggests that Trump has some sort of very well thought out strategy on these issues. Let's rewind all the way to 2017.

Okay, in 2017 North Korea was lobbying missiles, they were conducting nuclear tests. The most powerful military act by Kim Jong-un ever. The president calling it a major nuclear test. This time involving what they say is a hydrogen bomb that could be mounted onto an ICBM more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped by the US in World War II. This was Trump's first year in office.

And all of the people around him, like in the National Security Council, even Trump's own ambassador to the U.N., Nikki Haley, who he's running against in the primaries,

would say we are not negotiating with North Korea until there was this term, CVID. And no, that's not COVID. It's complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization, CVID. It was always whenever anyone asked the question, OK, well, what would it take for you to start negotiations with the North Koreans to get them to back away from their nuclear program?

And it was always this, you know, his people, his administration would say absolutely no negotiation, nothing until we see complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the North Korean regime. And then, you know, Trump, as we as we mentioned earlier in this podcast, has a real affinity for these authoritarians who who have amassed huge amounts of power. So there was like some flip of a switch. They started exchanging insults at each other. Rocket man.

is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. From Kim Jong-un, a first message in English, vowing to make President Trump, quote, pay dearly, calling him a mentally deranged dotard. But the more you tuned into it, the more you think, these are just sort of the two biggest bullies in the schoolyard kind of taunting each other, but almost like in a way that they understand each other. And then next thing you know, Trump is arranging a summit with Kim Jong-un.

There's Kim Jong-un right there, live on your screen right now, walking into position. Obviously, he is alone, unintended. Coming in, here comes the president of the United States. And just like that, history has been made. And so, you know, that's a very kind of long-winded way of saying that.

When it comes to strategic issues, whether it's in the Korean Peninsula or whether it's the South China Sea, Trump is not going to look at it from the standpoint of a very long game or any kind of very detailed strategy. It's just whatever in the moment he feels necessary.

could make him look stronger, whatever in the moment could make him look more powerful is what he will do. And we don't know. We just we just don't know what we will do. Whereas in the case of the Biden administration, there was really a lot of work done to, for example, turn the relationship with the Philippines around so that the U.S.,

Navy could get access to these ports in the Philippines, which is a very important part of that region militarily and really in some ways does give an advantage to the U.S. in that region. There's also a lot of initiative on the part of the Biden administration to reengage with the island Pacific nations.

And whereas I think Trump would look at nations in the South Pacific and really just wonder shrug and think, why are we interested at all in this? Because there's no money in it. Whereas Biden kind of thinks more strategically. And so I think that's the difference that you would see if it's a second Biden administration, you're going to see a continuation of efforts to

to sort of shore up relations with all of the countries, with all the nations in that region. With Trump, it could just change from day to day. You never know. Okay, so I want to be specific then about the relationship with Japan and South Korea. So Biden, during his time in office, served as a mediator between those two countries. He built up the trilateral cooperation, as you've mentioned.

Will Trump continue those efforts or will this kind of back and forth relationship with North Korea, this kind of frenemies relationship he carved out, does that affect the trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea? I think Trump could not care less about the trilateral relationship between

because, again, going back to this idea that he wants to deal with each country on a bilateral basis. Again, multilateral frameworks are not good because that dilutes his power.

And also we have to remember that Trump has a tendency to want to undo anything that his predecessor has done. I mean, he spent almost the entirety of the, well, at least the first two years of Trump's time in office was spent trying to overturn Obamacare as it's known. Obamacare is a disaster. The Democrats are up and they're saying, oh, they're putting up signs like it's wonderful.

It's a disaster. And even though he didn't have a replacement plan for it, he became obsessed with trying to get rid of it because it was something that was done by his predecessor.

And so this trilateral construct that Biden managed to put together, you know, will just be another one in a long string of things that Trump will look at as nothing other than, oh, well, this is a thing that was set up by Biden. And of course, we all know Biden was this, that and the other thing. So we want nothing to do with this anymore.

So, yeah, I wouldn't hold out a lot of hope for that trilateral framework to continue under a Trump administration. Then how about bilateral relationship with India? Do Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi get along? They do get along insofar as, again, going back to the common theme of this discussion, Modi has probably been the most

authoritarian leader of India in generations. And so that would nudge Trump into, let's just say it would make him much more inclined to strengthen the bilateral relationship with India. And I think the possibility of that is also strengthened by the fact that most of those in his party are extremely

suspicious of China, are outwardly hostile towards China. So being that India is a bit of a foil, I think Trump is smart enough to recognize that, that sort of liking Xi Jinping is more complicated for him than liking Narendra Modi. So, you know, I think in that respect, there's a very good chance that a second Trump administration would be very friendly with Modi. America loves India.

America respects India and America will always be faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people. However, you know, that would still, you know, we have to be careful because that would still depend on the extent to which

Modi would be opening his markets to the U.S. Of course, India has a very protected market. And, you know, that's something that Trump would zero in on. So the question really becomes, to what extent does Modi decide that he is going to open his country's markets more to U.S. companies?

And to what extent will he want to improve the trade relationship that he has with the U.S. in order to really shore up ties and really solidify ties with Trump? So, you know, if he was willing to do that, we could foresee a very strong bilateral relationship between Washington and Delhi. What about ongoing wars around the world, like the Russia-Ukraine war? How might a Trump presidency change the dynamics in that conflict?

The one point to make about that is just, I mean, Trump has been so obvious in his reluctance to support Ukraine, either rhetorically or in any other way. Can you say if you want Ukraine or Russia to win this war? I want everybody to stop dying. They're dying. Russians and Ukrainians. I want them to stop dying. And I'll have that done. I'll have that done in 24 hours. I'll have it done. You need the...

Whereas, you know, he famously dismissed his own intelligence officials when they tried to tell him that Russia tried to interfere in the election that brought him into the White House. He just stood right next to Vladimir Putin and said, "I trust this guy." My people came to me, Dan Coats came to me and some others. They said they think it's Russia. I have President Putin. He just said it's not Russia.

I will say this. I don't see any reason why it would be. What does that mean? You know, Trump and a second Trump presidency. What does that mean for that conflict? We don't know when that's going to end. We also know that despite what China says about not being aligned with either side, you know, it's pretty clear that the Beijing Moscow relationship has become a lot closer. And I don't think Trump would do anything about I don't think he would do anything to stop that.

only because, as we said a number of times on this call, he has this tremendous amount of respect for leaders like Xi Jinping and like Vladimir Putin who have amassed so much power and doesn't really seem to respond at all to these appeals for democracy and human rights and respect for sovereignty. So as you've highlighted during our conversation, Trump in his first term had renounced globalism and embarked on an isolationist approach to foreign policy.

Can we expect the same from him if he gets a second term or have his views and strategies changed over the years? No, not only can we expect that to continue, but it would be, you know, it would be that times two or three.

Because Trump himself, as we've mentioned before, is transactional. It's all about business. It's all about how much more can he get out of the person or the entity or the organization that he in that moment is negotiating with. He is always about deals.

You know, if there's multilateral frameworks, things like the WTO, things like the UN, Trump absolutely does not like them because then Trump becomes one among a number of leaders. He does not want to be in that position. He wants to be in a position where he is looking across a negotiating table at one other entity, whether it's a world leader, whether it's an organization, whatever.

And he wants to extract more out of whoever he's dealing with. He considers that to be very much this sort of so-called America first policy, which really resonates with his base. And it is completely transactional. You extract as much as you can possibly from whoever it is you're dealing with and pay no mind to other factors that may be involved.

such as the extent to which the person you're dealing with may be in a position to help you at a later time, he doesn't see any of that. He doesn't see the values that are involved. He only sees transactions. And again, that's what makes him determined to deal with everything in foreign policy on a bilateral basis. And that makes him very hostile to any kind of multilateral frameworks.

That was Robert Delaney. You can find the latest updates on the U.S. election campaign and more analysis on U.S.-China relations at scmp.com. I'm Brian Wood. Thanks for listening.

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