In Conversation: Decolonial Activism and Islamophobia in France
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This is In Conversation from Network Reorient, in association with Reorient Journal and the Critical Muslim Studies Project. We aim to explore the post-Western, reconnect the Islamosphere. In this episode, Aymina Issa Das is in conversation with Maria Botelga on decolonial activism and Islamophobia in France.

Hello, assalamu alaikum. I am delighted to be joined by Hurriya Butejda, who is a decolonial activist and who'll be speaking to us on the Network Reorient podcast. First to introduce myself, I'm Dr Amina Issa Adas. I'm a lecturer in politics at De Montfort University in Leicester. I'm

I specialise in Islamophobia studies, particularly gendered Islamophobia, and I've recently published a book looking at Muslim women's political participation in France and Belgium. So quite appropriately, I'm delighted to be joined by Huria, who, as I mentioned, is a decolonial activist. She is born in Algeria, raised in France.

Her political activism takes a distinct anti-imperialist and anti-racist tone. She has published the book Whites, Jews and Us Towards a Politics of Revolutionary Love. Salam alaikum, Hoya. It's a pleasure to be joined by you.

So just to kind of get going, if you could introduce yourself for us to the listeners and particularly if you could describe the nature of your political activism in France. I'll try to. So as you introduced me, I'm a decolonial activist, which is something very new in France, decolonialism.

When I began in 2004, no one was de-colio at this time. So when I began activism, because I was not an activist before, when I began, it was in the context of 9/11. It was in the context of a strong Islamophobia in France. And it was in the context of the law, this law against Muslim women.

In May of 2004, I was in a collective which fought this law. We were with Muslim people, with Muslim activists and also with activists from the left, from the white left.

were not Islamophobic. This part of the left was a minority. It was a minority at this time. But we did a good job at this time. We tried to reveal, to emphasize the fact that this law was racist and it was sexist at the same time.

Well, I think that even if we were a minority in this context, our arguments were very strong and very powerful. And this is why we managed at this time to build other spaces, other political spaces in the basis of the work that had been done. Mm-hmm.

So as a point of contextualization, I'm sure a lot of our listeners will know about 9-11. And it has been a catalyst for many in terms of activism. I think it was perhaps a global awakening, but definitely we can chart Islamophobia before all of that. But what's specific about the French context in terms of the 2004, the Loistesi, which...

and I'd say that in quote marks, ostentatious symbols of faith. Could you perhaps describe a little that 2004 setting, what had led to all of that? What was the sentiment on the ground really in relation to the banning of ostentatious faith symbols in schools in France? You want to know more about the context? Yes, yeah, definitely.

the context before 9/11 or? Around the 2004 law. Yeah. You have to understand that in the 80s, the 90s and the early, how do you say, thousands? Early 2000s, yes. At this time it was, it was, it was a shame to be racist because at this time

there was the hegemony of what we call moral anti-racism. And moral anti-racism is the white anti-racism, the anti-racism of the white left. It means an anti-racism that is...

a chief anti-racist. I don't know if you understand what I mean. It means that those who were racist at this time was the far right, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and what we call Monsieur et Madame Dupont. It means people who are racist, only people who are racist. Some people are racist in France. But the other part of the political field was not racist.

And what we revealed at this time as activists is that racism is structural, is one of the states. And this is what was the new way of looking to racism. And as there was at this time the hegemony of moral anti-racism, it was important for the

the Islamophobes to invent a respectable racism. And this is what they did with the Islamophobia. The discourse, the official discourse was, we are not racist, we are not against Muslims, we are against the religion. It is a part of our history to be against Muslims.

against religions. So we are against Islam like we are against Christianity. So it was a way to be racist from a respectable point of view.

This is what you call respectable racism. Being Islamophobic is not a shame. Being anti-black, being anti-Arab was a shame. But being anti-Muslim, anti-Islam was not a shame. I think that definitely reveals some of the complexities but also the specificities of France. So this idea of being anti-religion comes from

the 1905 law around laïcité or secularism. I think it's almost unfair to translate laïcité to secularism because it contains so many more nuances and so much more history. There's work by people like Boussinesq, for example, that's a good insight into those complexities.

But you talked about Jean-Marie Le Pen, Le Pen senior. We have the Le Pen dynasty in France of the far right that used to be Front National, now is Rassemblement National. It's not limited, I would say, that this respectable racism in France isn't limited to the far right end of the political spectrum.

Would you say that in France, the idea of respectable racism has also infiltrated the left and the liberal end of the political spectrum? I think respectable racism is mostly in the left, not in the right, because in the far right, they assume to be racist. It's not a problem for them to be anti-Muslim or anti-Arab or anti-Black. But the left, it's not something usual.

It's not something new. So they had to invent something to be racist, respectively. So I think that it concerns mostly the left. In France, definitely. I think you see this liberal left wing Islamophobia that tries to pass itself off.

as acceptable. Would you say there are also undercurrents of the sort of colonial mentalities that come out here, sort of saviour complexes?

that also then have that intersectional gendered element as well as racial and the racialization of Muslims that it encompasses. Is there a coloniality aspect to it all? This is why we called ourselves indigenous of the republic. There is a continuum, a colonial continuum in France. Yes, there is the Basque,

And there is the presence, and the colonial presence. It's not only a question of past, this is an era to see that. Of course, there is the colonial imaginary, there is the colonial reflex.

And there is the present. And the present is very important because I think that France is still a colonial country. In another way, but it is still a colonial country. So that's apparent when we think about France-Afrique, for example. Does it persist with predominantly Muslim countries as well as

or is it limited in certain ways? I didn't understand the question. So the coloniality, is it across all former colonial countries that France occupied, or is it something that's restricted to certain spaces? It's not restricted. For example, we can take the example of Turkey. Turkey is not a colonial country.

It was not colonized by France. But the relationship between the French state and the Turkish people in France is colonial. It's not direct, it's not... We can... It means that the colonial relationship of the state is general. It is applicated to everyone and one without one.

Definitely, that's really interesting. So you mentioned your activism and how you were motivated by the 2004 Noor, but also the growing climate of Islamophobia in France and more generally. Did you encounter particular obstacles to your engagement in France? Yes. When we...

decided to organize ourselves independently from the left and with a decolonial project we had a lot of obstacles, a lot of obstacles because we were seen as competitors to the left.

We were seen as people having another agenda, a competitive agenda, something that is going to be competitive with the notion of class struggle because we put forward the notion of race struggle.

For us, it's combinated, of course. I think there is a class struggle, of course, and there is also a race struggle inside the popular classes. Okay? So for us, it's completely combinated. But it was not seen like that in the white left. It was seen as a rank fight. So was it almost like the white left

felt they had a monopoly on the issues? And perhaps was there a lack of understanding of that intersectionality of socioeconomic disadvantage with racialized disadvantage in France at the time? Yes, definitely. They don't understand at all how the discriminations are productive. They don't have any idea about that.

15 years ago. Now, at the beginning, when we began in 2005, just after the law, when we launched the call of the indigenous of the Republic, in France, no one was talking about the notion of whiteness, for example. Whiteness didn't exist at all at this time. Now,

everyone can talk about this notion. And it was due to our fights, our struggle. It was due to our theoretical work and our political work, yes. So now there is a better understanding of what race is. A better understanding. I'm not saying that they understand what race means. I am just saying that there is a better understanding.

And that's interesting in the French context, which some of our listeners may not be familiar with. We have this notion of, I guess it's best described as colorblindness, whereby, and I use quotation marks here again, because that is layered with multiple problems, but there is a distinct distinction.

position against recording ethnic difference in France, against recording religious difference. It is this idea that it doesn't exist. And I think that then produces a

You're talking about Black Lives Matter? Yes.

Yeah, there is an echo about, but yeah, there is an echo, there is influences, of course, but all the same time in France, the mass media, even the left, they say that this is, the question of race in France is an importation from the US. So we are just copying, we are just imitating.

the Americans because in France there is no question of race and it's just crazy to think that but this is what the ideology of universalism or Le Piteux. Definitely and I guess that kind of brings us on to recent developments in France around

Around these sorts of issues, we think about Macron's comments recently about Islamism.

and the murder of Samuel Petty, and the call for the dissolution of numerous civil society organizations in France, hysteria again around halal products. How has that played out? Could you perhaps give a bit of a background of recent weeks and the current developments in France? I think that the barrel is a craziness. I think that this hysteria, I think it's true,

can be understood by the fact that France is in crisis, and France is in decline. And I think that's a civilization or culture or a country that is used to dominate. It's very difficult for France, that is a dominating country, to face its own decline.

And I think this is the most important point to understand. There is now, nowadays, there is competition between the former colonial countries, the US, France, Great Britain, and there is now China, there is Iran. So first of all, they are not alone to dominate the world. They are competitors and very big competitors, first of all. And the second thing is that

in the same time, this decline means that people, white people who are used to dominate, they're not going to dominate anymore. They're going to lose all their privileges because this is the world we are living here. We are living in a very, in a crisis of capitalism, a big crisis of capitalism. So I think that's

In this new political field, France doesn't have the possibility to understand what happens to this country. You understand what I mean? So the idea that France can't deal with its own decline,

And I think we see a lot of elements of this French protectionism, linguistically, the kind of hostility towards Anglo-Saxon terminology even, but also in what you mentioned about race, the idea that race is a US import, without having that sense of introspection.

to see that it's potentially that it is in fact a very real issue within France and that there are numerous tensions simmering under the surface that look set to come to the fore so one of the things that sort of struck me was the call for the dissolution of

often Muslim-led and Muslim-centered civil society organizations. So we have things like the Counter Islamophobia Collective in France or Baraka City. And for me, that struck me as being in contradiction

with the 1901 law guaranteeing the freedom of association in France. What were your thoughts around all of this? The thought that the idea that a minister could call for the dissolution of groups like this? The question is, what is my opinion on this? I think it's quite easy to understand. I think that the French government, the power has to find who is guilty of the crisis. Who is guilty?

There is terrorism. There are two options. Muslims are guilty or the French state is guilty. The French state can be guilty because he's making war in the Middle East or after that.

So this is the first option, this is a way of understanding what happens, this is a way of understanding terrorism, this is my way of understanding terrorism, but it is not shared here in France because no one wants to face this huge question of who is guilty for terrorism. So when there is an act of terrorism in France, it's important for the state to retain innocence.

So when he says we are going to do the dissolution of CCIF or Baraka City, it's a way to say they are guilty of innocence. This is it. Nothing else. So the anger of the people, of the French opinion, is towards...

Muslims and not towards the States. And as you know, there was here two years ago, a big movement, the Yellow Vests. Yes. A huge movement. And it was violence, was violent against the States. And the power was frightened by this kind of revolution. So how can we solve this?

this equation how can it solve itself how can you how can you uh not say it itself it's important that this anger of the white people because the the yellow best were whites white poor people so it's important that this opinion

This class, because this is a class, it's important that the state, it's important for the state that the anger is redirected to the Muslims, to the non-whites. So it's much easier. Yes, yeah, it's much easier to find these scapegoats.

And I guess the figure of the Muslim in France has always been the scapegoat. We look during the colonial period and the time in which the new migrant populations were framed in their ethnic identity. So the time where they've been racialized as Muslims and seen as this kind of monolith, this one homogenous block, it's always been the convenient scapegoat.

it that the what I find contradictory here is that movements such as the gilets jaunes but also the right and the movements led the social movements led by Muslims they are actually very French the idea of revolution the idea of questioning the state is that not a quintessentially French concept

revolution, yeah, there is, there are several friends. Well, there are not white friends, friends. There are several that the, there is the, the, we can have a class analysis. There are and the, the, the, the, the, the working classes. The late, no, the proletarians, yes.

So not only are there the racialized people, there are the white people, there are several friends. So of course, as in Great Britain, there are contradictions. Definitely, definitely. I see this as...

And yet another example of French contradiction, the idea that you'd shut down civil society organizations, but then simultaneously we see the scapegoating of marginalized community, whether that be socioeconomically marginalized communities or ethnically, religiously marginalized communities. It's that. In France, when even if they...

They legitimate themselves by the French revolution. And even if they say we are like the French revolutionaries, we are doing a revolution, they are not seen as revolutionaries.

they are seen as people making problems. And this, I think, really reflects the double standards that exist in France. One, in terms of political organizing, both conventional and non-conventional forms, but also around the implementation of laws. And I think we spoke about this at the beginning, this idea of the headscarf law, the school headscarf law, which it commonly became known as.

The idea that the state has forgotten the basis of secularism, the idea that one religious community at the time, the Catholic community, shouldn't become too powerful, that it has become weaponized as a combative tool against the marginalized communities, in this case, the Muslim communities.

There's a disconnect between the philosophy at which they arrived at this point of implementing secularism in law, and then the idea that it could be used as a means of targeting people who are not representatives of the state, who are merely citizens. And this double standard of application of law, this double standard of application of liberté that, you know, is in the French motto, the French republican motto,

philosophy, I think that there's always that double standard we see coming out when we consider Muslims. Of course, there is a double standard, but actually, the first law of 1905 changed. It's not the same.

I don't think that we can talk about laïcité in 1905 the same way as la laïcité in 2005. We can talk about, I don't know the word in English, trahison, betrayal. Because the law of 2004 introduced the idea that people should be mutual. And in the tradition,

The state had to be neutral and now people, Muslims, has to be neutral. I think that it is a fascist understanding of the law. When you introduce this new idea, it means that you can't hide, you have ideas. You can't have a conscience, you can't have an opinion.

You can't have a space because you have to be neutral. What does it mean? A human being being neutral. What does it mean?

Nothing! This is only fascist. It's nonsensical, isn't it? This is a real betrayal of the law of 1905. This is another law! Something new! So now we have a new law. This is something that impose to human beings to be neutral. And actually the tension

comes from the fact that we are human beings and we are not neutral. It's impossible. So the contradiction of the states, of the people who are laic, who are radical laicists, is that the courts oblige us actually in everyday life to be neutral. So there is here a big conflict. How can they neutralize us?

I think when we think really about this question, we can go very far because when you can't neutralize someone but you want to, but you still want to neutralize it, what is the end of the story? What is the end? Surely there's no end in sight. Is there? Yeah.

Yeah, there's no, to me, there's no solution. But then I think it comes down to exactly, there are no options, there are no solutions. We can't go anywhere. 100% I think that that's incredibly true that there is a betrayal of the initial ideas, there is entirely new legal systems that happen to have been given the same names.

as those were employed initially in 1905. There's a distinct step away, a significant step away from all of that. But I think you touch on a really important point that humans, by their very nature, we can never appear neutral. There are things about our identity, whether we like it or not, that are apparent. And I think there's a lack of willingness to accept that.

I've often heard people say that in France to get by, to succeed, to be successful, you must be more royal than the king. It is the only way and it really reflects the sort of normative assimilationist tendencies in France that one must erase all elements of their difference and the hybridity of their own identities

to ever have a chance of being accepted. But then I think simultaneously, for me, I have these discussions mentally with myself about secularism, about the law, the legislative framework in France, about political debates and discourse. But then I come back to thinking, well, does it even matter? Would Muslims still be the scapegoats in France, regardless of the framework that's employed?

I didn't understand. So would Muslims still always be targeted regardless of what legal devices are employed? I'm sorry, I don't understand. So will Muslims always be the scapegoats regardless of anything in France? As long as there is not...

a reverse, a transformation of the relationship of power. If we are not able to organize as Muslims, as non-whites, and if we are not able to convince the progressive left to join our struggle and to formalize, to build what we call a decolonial majority, if we are not able to do that,

we are still going to be the victims. And it's the same in the US. It's the same in Germany. It's the same in Portugal. It's the same in Great Britain. It's true everywhere. It's a question of relationship of power. Are we able to do politics?

Is there that sort of unity among, or is there signs of that ever emerging? This sort of unity among the left, among the non-white communities in France? There is an evolution. As I told you, 16 years ago, no one could even talk about whiteness, for example.

Now we talk about decoloniality, we talk about whiteness, we talk about organizing ourselves independently, we talk about political racism, we talk about structural racism. Now this is something that is generalized in the left, let's say. So there is a positive evolution. But in the same time, the far right is speedier than us.

- Speedia? - Yes, Speedia. Speedia, Speedia, yes. Because the forces that are organized today are in favor of the right, not of the left. And I think this is an evolution, a general evolution in the whole Europe. I always agree that this wave of populism and also the normalization of populism

is a broader European phenomenon, but I think we could go even further than that. It's a Western phenomenon if we look at the US, even in places like Australia, for example. But then even you could go one step further and we look at places in the global south, like India and China, that are part of this phenomenon. And also, I think there's a tendency now to

and you see it a lot on online platforms, but also opinion pieces, etc., are people from the Global South, such as supporters of the BJP in India, coming forward to celebrate the actions and the comments of Macron recently. So I think that you're completely right. It's part of a broader problem and the globalisation of Islamophobia, I think, is

I guess on that note, as someone who works on counter narratives to racism, as someone who's interested in sort of pushing forward the anti-racist project, do you think, I mean, what's the future for France? What are the potentials for countering this Islamophobia in France? Are there any best practices going on that we might learn from France? I think we are...

maybe, I don't know, 8 or 10% of the population? It's a lot. So I think that no one has interest in the civil war. So I don't know if you noticed that in France during the two weeks, two weeks ago,

the assassination of Samuel Paty was a big emotion and it was very instrumentalized by the state and the media but the attacks of Nice didn't have the same impact I think that the state and the media decided

to make the tension go to reduce or to lower because they went too far. The tension was so high that it became dangerous for everyone.

I think that to a certain point, the government understands that it has to be reasonable because we are 10% of the population. And it's true that inside this population, there are people who can do these attacks and the climate can push them to do these attacks. So they understand that they don't have, they have not to, how do you say, jouer avec le feu.

To play with fire. Play with fire. And what in the same time we have a lot of resistance. We have organizations, we have people who are fighting not only among the racialized people but also among the intellectuals, among the left, among people who knows that Macron is a crazy man.

So potentially that's what we can learn from the French situation. But I think it's interesting you touched on the way in which, I mean, the abhorrent murder of Samuel Paty was sensationalised. It was instrumentalised in part. I also noticed, I guess that then reflects the way in which the French media, like other medias, is a sort of mouthpiece for the promotion of,

or the silencing of certain messages. And I think we saw that silencing in France. At the same time, soon after the murder of Samuel Paty, we saw Muslim women being attacked in Paris, two of whom were stabbed. But there was very limited coverage on all of this. Or at the same time as Nice, there was the...

that orchestrated an attack in Avignon. And we see this silencing or promoting by the media and also political figures in their political rhetoric and discourse. We see these tools coming out. But I think, yes, in terms of what we can learn from France today,

that there is a sizable Muslim population, there is a sizable anti-Islamophobic population, hopefully, as well. And one would hope that this presents a resistance to the increasing demonization and marginalization of Muslims. Yeah, but we have to understand something else, is that the Muslim population is the labor population. And it's a need to the French patrouilleur,

The bosses, employers, big companies. Yes. They rely on us. Yes. To everyday life. So they need us. So this is something that we have to take into account. We are

the labour arts, a big labour class. So they need us for everyday life and we saw that during the Covid crisis. And I think that's interesting, you can perhaps draw parallels in the UK, I think

Whilst the French Muslim population is largely comprises a lot of the labor force in France and essentially holds a lot of power there as well. You know, the withdrawal or the withholding of labor can have consequences.

significant impacts on a country and its economy. In the UK, during the first wave of COVID, there was a highlighting of the fact that the National Health Service is largely made up by non-native individuals and a large number of them are Muslims. Yeah.

But then sadly, soon after that, we saw reports coming out that Muslims in the NHS, the National Health Service in the UK, still continue to face the constant barrage of Islamophobia, both from their colleagues, but also the individuals who they were treating. So on the one hand, it's important to highlight what we as Muslims do, but at the same time, it doesn't always...

take away from the the constant islamophobia that that's often faced i'm just saying that we have to take this into account definitely definitely it reminds me of the uh i think it's a poem by suhamim and zorkan um this is not a humanizing poem um around in which she talks about um

The idea that we need to normalize Muslimness and humanize Muslimness. Well, this isn't exactly what we need to do. It's the individual who's making those demands that needs to check their own humanity. So I think there's some interesting parallels and comparisons that we could make there.

Thank you so much for your time today. It's been such a pleasure talking with you. I've learned a great deal. And hopefully the listeners have enjoyed this too. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Bye-bye. Thank you for the invitation. Bye.

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