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cover of episode The UK’s trade deal

The UK’s trade deal

2025/5/15
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Unhedged

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Alan Beattie
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Katie Martin
一名在《金融时报》工作的金融记者和评论员,专注于全球经济政策和市场趋势分析。
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Alan Beattie: 我认为没有人真正知道特朗普政府的贸易政策走向,包括制定政策的人。他们有各种不同的动机,但只有关税这一个工具,导致结果非常混乱。根本不存在一个宏伟的计划,任何声称了解他内心想法的人都是错误的,因为他自己也不清楚。目前的情况就像一个万花筒,互相反射着无意义的信息,但我们会尽力理清头绪。 Katie Martin: 我认为目前在贸易关税方面,很多人,包括我自己,都搞不清楚状况。关税时而生效,时而取消,各种协议不断涌现,整个局面一片混乱。为了让自己在这个问题上显得聪明而权威,我总是会去请教《金融时报》的贸易专家Alan Beattie,他能帮助大家理解贸易领域的复杂问题。

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The recent trade talks between the US and China resulted in a significant reduction in tariffs. While markets celebrated this as a positive development, some experts remain cautious, pointing out that tariffs remain high. The motivations behind the US's decision to reduce tariffs are complex and multifaceted.
  • Significant reduction in US tariffs on Chinese goods.
  • Tariffs still remain high despite the reduction.
  • Markets celebrated the deal, while some experts expressed caution.
  • Multiple and complex motivations behind the US decision.

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Pushkin. There's no shame in admitting these days that in relation to trade tariffs or frankly anything else in finance and economics, you have no idea what on earth is going on. The tariffs on imports to the US are on, then they're full fat, then they're off, then there's deals kicking around. It's a mess.

Now, when I want to sound clever and authoritative on this stuff, there's only one thing for it. I get up from my desk, walk along the corridor and pick the brains of Alan Beattie, the FT's very own massive trade nerd. I've been nerding out on this stuff since way before it was cool. Today on the show, guess what? We have Alan Beattie. Alan is a service. Listeners, he's going to tell us all what we need to know so that you too can at the very least pretend you understand what's going on.

This is Unhedged, the markets and finance podcast from the Financial Times and Pushkin. I'm Katie Martin, a markets economist here at FT Towers in London, where it's suddenly unbelievably cold again. What the hell?

Alan is here with me in the studio. Alan, welcome. Welcome back. You've done this before. You still came back. I have. I'd never been on it before and now I've been on it two times in three months. I'm now being stopped in the street, asked for autographs, all sorts of stuff. This is everything I always dreamed of. Now, I know what you're going to say.

You're going to say nobody knows anything, aren't you? That is my trademark saying. And let me just tell you why nobody knows anything. When I say nobody knows anything, it's just not people watching don't know anything. The people in charge don't know what they're doing either. Or at least they have a whole bunch of different...

motive. They have pretty much one instrument to do it with, which is tariffs, and the result is chaos. So there is no massive fundamental plan. Anyone who says fundamentally what he's doing is this, at heart what he's doing is this, it cannot be right because he doesn't really know either. So we've got like this kind of kaleidoscope hall of mirrors that just are reflecting nonsense back onto each other pretty much constantly, but we're going to try and make some sense of it. So

I'm going to propose we don't start at the beginning here because Mr Donald J Trump has been banging on about trade tariffs since the 1980s when even you and I were still quite small.

So let's start at the end, which is at the weekend in Geneva, the US and China held some trade talks that resulted in a massive drop in the level of tariffs on trade with China to the extent that you can. Tell us what is going on here. What did the US extract as a concession from China to take the tariffs down from China?

Was it 145-ish percent to 30-ish percent? It basically said, we all cut our tariffs, you cut yours. So, you know, China had retaliated. The US, I think, was a bit more scared by retaliation or the market reaction than it thought. And so they said, fine, you know, we all cut ours and you cut yours. So essentially, it returned it to the status quo before. So instead of being insanely, ludicrously high, they were merely insanely high. Right. Right.

That's an important thing to remember, right? So markets are celebrating this, like, pull back to 30-ish percent tariffs on China as if this is like, you know, party time. And, you know, like the boring, miserable people like me and you and also lots of fund managers are saying, OK, but 30 percent on China.

and a 10% baseline on the rest of the world and loads of other things here and there for steel and God knows what else, still leaves the US with the highest taxes on imports since the mid-40s, am I right? Depending on how you measure it, yes. I mean, certainly for a long, long time. Far be it for me to try and guess what the markets are thinking. If I could do that, I would have arrived to an ejet. But as far as I can tell, they're just sort of thinking the complete madness is gone. We're not going to have...

administration that's actually trying to decouple the US from China right because you know if you have and part of these ideas are sort of embedded in different people so you have Peter Navarro who's that in the White House the out-and-out trade warrior he really thinks that the US should not run deficits for stop he really thinks if necessary the US should not be trading with China for stop

So I presume what's happened, and I agree with you, it's kind of remarkable how optimistic people are given where we are, is that they think, OK, we're now just in a different regime. We're now in a regime of trying to manage trade, of trying to protect particular sectors in the economy. We're not in a completely mad system of trying to break the world economy apart. Right. What do you think motivated, again,

As you say, the Trump administration seems to have a million different motivations at once. Not all of them make sense on the same piece of paper. But what do you think motivated him to...

take this massive step back against China? I suspect it was just there was a big hole where the imports should come. There were going to be empty shelves. The ships just weren't coming across the Pacific. The markets don't like this anyway. And of course, earlier on, the fact that he stepped back from the huge tariffs he announced on April the 2nd and stepped back a week later was to do with the markets. So although people say Trump 2 is different from Trump 1, he's not obsessively looking at the markets. He's prepared to absorb some pain.

I think something in his judgment was actually cutting Americans off

from their stuff, even though he was talking about, you know, all the children have to go down to two dolls and so forth. Yeah, five pencils each, kids. Five pencils and two dolls. I think at some level he just thought that's actually not sustainable. I need to move back. Yeah. So he is very clearly in deal-making mode, right? Because this isn't the only deal that he struck. He also struck a deal with the UK. I use the term deal-making

Fairly loosely. When I was literally the day that this came out, this is true, I was sitting in a law firm in London with this guy and I said, what's the legal status of this deal? And he was sort of sitting at a conference table and there was this little screwed up napkin on the table. He just pointed at the napkin and said, this, this is the legal status of the deal. So the deal with the UK literally says on the first page of the legal docs,

This is not a legally binding deal. So, yeah, you know, as so often with Donald Trump, a lot of what he's doing with tariffs is not legal anyway. It's supposed to be done through Congress. He's just asserting things. He's using all sorts of emergency powers and so on. And so this has no legal binding status whatsoever. But then a lot of what he does doesn't have much of a legal status either. So the deal with the UK, again, deal in little bunny ear speech marks,

Seems to have been pulled together extremely quickly. I'm not sure who it was that was reporting that Keir Starmer, UK Prime Minister, didn't know that a deal was coming until the night before when he was at a football match or something like that.

They really cobbled this thing together at high speed. And I'm not clear why. Are you clear why? No, I think as I understand it, again, this is from other people's reporting. Trump himself just said, I feel like doing a deal today. And so then it got done. And obviously, if Trump is in a deal making mode, you move extremely quickly before he changes his mind. So I think that explains the speed at which it got done and the fact that it concentrated really only on a small number of things.

So the deal means, so the 10% baseline applies to all countries at all times. There is no moving below that point, right? That's what they say at the moment, yes. I mean, you know, other countries are not happy with that. But that's what they have fundamentally said that we're not going to negotiate over that. But what the UK got is lower rates on cars and steel. Yes, so these are separate tariffs.

They're called Section 232 after the pass of the US tax code, US law. And they were special sectoral things designed, obviously, to protect the US steel and car section. They've been in there a long time. Now, the UK is not a massive steel exporter, but it is a steel exporter and steel is politically very important. It's not a huge car exporter. Only, I think, about a fifth of its cars go to the US. However...

Jaguar Land Rover is one of them. That's big and symbolic. Very British. Very British. I was actually up in Coventry where traditionally these things are made recently and you forget the extent to which this is a car city and these are just... Yep. Even though it's not owned by a British company anymore. So that was really what they were kind of very narrowly focused on for PR as much as overall economic impact and that's what they got. As I was saying at the top of this discussion, you're a big trade nerd.

So where does this fit into broader trade negotiations? It looks like Trump is bobbing around looking for deals.

Yeah, I mean, this was basically an escape. This was basically an escape. Get out, you know, presumably try and exploit the fact that Trump is relatively well disposed to the UK. The UK doesn't have a big surplus with the US. He's been invited to meet with King Charles and he likes that. So quickly get in first, get your deal and get out. For the UK, though...

There is a school of thought that the UK should not be holding any sorts of discussions with this administration. Firstly, because agreements are not really necessarily worth the paper they're written on. But also, shouldn't we have linked arms with our friends and neighbours in the EU rather than...

taking whatever agreement it is from the US. Are we being bad global citizens by signing this thing? I'm afraid so. The thing that is worrying, that worried a lot of people, is the UK, in return for this, gave actually not some massive concessions

on access to the UK market for beef and ethanol. It caused everyone in Britain to look at each other and go, what do we do with ethanol? What's ethanol? What's it for? So I don't think that was, you know, ethanol is quite a big deal in the US because it's a big industry and so on. But I don't think that had very much resonance in the UK at all. The point here is that it gave these things unilaterally and it gave access to the US that it hadn't given to everyone else in the World Trade Organization. That...

violates the principle that's known as most favored nation where you have to treat everybody equally. And, you know, supposedly the only exception to that is if you sign a full preferential trade deal which covers substantially all the trade, quote unquote. And this was clearly not that. In fact, it wasn't any kind of binding trade deal at all. So there was a sense that the UK had sort of let the side down. If the US is able to bully countries into giving them non-most favored nation access, then

then the whole system falls apart. I mean, what the defenders of the deal will tell you is like, come on, it wasn't very big. It's not that important. One or two countries have sort of done something quite similar in the past. You know, the UK is a relatively small trader. This by and of itself is not going to pull the global trading system apart. Yeah, yeah. The other thing is that the messaging is a bit difficult, a bit different from one side to the other, right? So the US is talking about how the UK has agreed to open up its borders

food markets to US produce. And the UK is saying, we're still not going to eat your chlorinated chicken, guys. So there's a bit of...

The two sides don't quite match up, right? Yes, indeed. But it depends who's going to get hold of this from the US point of view. So the aforementioned Peter Navarro, who apparently had nothing to do with this deal, came out the next day and started talking about chemical washed chicken. By the way, I'm conditioned to call it chemical washed chicken. If you call it chlorine washed, you get people on the phone from the US Trade Representative's office painfully explaining to me that they actually use something called parasitic acid, which is basically vinegar, etc., etc.,

Yum, I love pericetic acid. Sounds great.

I look forward very much to getting their phone calls and emails. So the issue here is who do you let run U.S. trade policy? If it's, you know, the American Farm Bureau, who are very aggressive export-oriented farmers, then yes, they'll make a big deal about it. If they're prepared to let that go and focus on other things, then you don't. And the thing about the U.K. deal is it's just open because there's no legal basis to it anyway. It's open. I mean, the other, you know, thing in it which is entirely open is they vaguely agreed that they're going to gang up on China.

But it doesn't really say how they're going to gang up on China. And China's not happy about that, right? China is very much not happy about that. China has very publicly said, we do not like this part of the deal. Now, again, whether the US actually tries to balance the UK into doing that, what the point is at which the UK says we can't go that far, who knows? But this is all left open because it's such an open deal.

You are not making me less confused, Alan Beattie, but tell me. So we've got this China agreement. We've got the UK agreement. What does that tell us about what the talks are likely to look like between the US and the EU? Because the EU are like...

Super ninjas at trade talks. They massively know what they're doing with trade. So the US is coming up against a kind of army of mega nerds who have put even you into the shade. What's this going to look like? What on earth can the EU offer as a concession to the US to come up with some sort of agreement? So this is probably going to be one of the longer lasting ones, not least because the EU...

He's digging his heels in and saying, on principle, we don't agree with this. We don't agree with that. They're saying we're not going to accept there being the 10% baseline tariff that we discussed before. And the EU way of things, they use transparency as a weapon. So they've got this massive list of US things they're going to retaliate against and they show they're going to retaliate for. You know, there are a ton of things they could do. I mean, they could drop their food rules as well, right, and accept parasitic acid-washed technologies.

But they're emphatically not going to because there would be a massive crisis. I literally can't see parasitic washed chicken flying. No, it's just I can't imagine marketing it. It would be quite hard. What's the French for? Now, what they could do, what they've done in the past, and this is also what China have done to the US, is make a bunch of

basically bogus promises we're going to buy US exports and they say we'll buy this and we'll buy that and they're hoping that will buy him off but part of the EU thing is when they start to retaliate they need to get all the member states on side and it's a slow iterative process so you won't quite know how much

stomach they have for the fight and for escalating until it starts. I just think it's going to be interesting to see the incredibly methodical, serious trade talk pro-Europeans in a room with whoever it is that the US puts forward. Maybe it's Peter Nabarro, maybe it's Scott Besson, the Treasury Secretary, who knows? Indeed, and if there's any weakness that EU has, I think it's that they're assuming they're dealing with a more rational interlocutor. I mean, one thing I know that EU people have said is,

They've assembled this list of retaliation and it's done the traditional way people do retaliation, which is you choose products which are going to hurt politically. And in the US, that means you go after particular products from particular states. They always used to go after bourbon because that was Kentucky, because that was Mitch McConnell who was Senate.

I see. Right? For a long time. And I think this time they said they're going to go after soybeans because that's Mike Johnson, who's from Louisiana, and soybeans from Louisiana. The problem with this, I think, is I'm not sure Trump really cares what anyone in Congress thinks. He's making trade policy from the hip.

using these emergency powers and completely ignoring anything that anyone from Congress says. On his nice new plane from Qatar. On his nice new plane. So is he really going to sit there going, oh no, the soybean farmers of Louisiana are slightly angry. I had better stop my trade war. It's just that seems to me slightly improbable. So I'm not convinced the EU is on the right track if it's trying to use the old playbook on that.

One last thing is at the moment, unless I'm very much mistaken, the Liberation Day tariffs on those famous flip chart type things on the Rose Garden, they are just paused, right? They're not cancelled. They're paused. What happens at the end of that pause period? Does anybody know?

So, you know, they'll pause for 90 days. The idea was that all of these deals will be done by then. So here's a 90-day period to get all of these deals done. If they get to the end of 90 days and some of them are not done, then obviously the US has a choice about whether it's going to snap back and put the so-called reciprocal, and I won't call them so-called reciprocal, tariffs back. From what we were saying before about the markets, it would assume that the markets aren't,

expecting the US to do that or they would be a lot more upset than they are. So, you know, it remains to be seen what gets done between now and then. If I had to guess, I would say there will be a whole string of deals of different kinds. Some of them will be meetings of equals or close equals like the EU and US. Some will be, you know, a much smaller, weaker partner trying to escape like the UK. And one thing that's

appears not to be the case unfortunately is you don't appear to see a bunch of countries banding together and saying we're going to negotiate collectively that's not happening well so listeners I don't necessarily think we've got you to the point where you fully understand what's going on but I think we have got you to the point where you understand why no one else knows what's going on either so that is the sort of service you get from the Unhedged podcast you are welcome

We will be back in a sec with Longshot. If this government spending in defense goes towards things like R&D that have dual use civilian purposes, you could get spillovers that actually end up enhancing productivity in Europe and so have a more long lasting impact on growth.

To learn more about the intersection of national security and global trade, subscribe to PGM's The Outthinking Investor in your favorite podcast app.

All righty, now it's time for Long Short, that part of the show where we go long, a thing we love, or short, a thing we hate. Alan, you remembered to bring a long short. What you got? I did. I'm going to go long supply chains because there's a lot of talk about, oh, during COVID, supply chains all screwed up. Everything was a mess. It didn't really work, which I kind of think is unfair. What actually happened was there was a big drop off in trade and then a massive surge back in trade in durables.

And the West Coast ports in the US were completely overwhelmed. They were handling record amounts of cargo, but they were totally overwhelmed. And that's where you got that congestion from. You know, when that died down, then the world trading system reasserted itself.

Supply chains reorganized themselves, but they didn't collapse. We didn't have the end of globalization. And so, you know, we've now got this huge shortage of stuff coming across the Pacific because of the tariffs. So the ports are empty, but I'm pretty sure once it starts, if and when it starts coming again...

The supply chains will be okay handling it and things will be fine. Well, not fine, but it won't be the end of globalization. Alan Beatty, never challenge the supremacy of globalization in front of Alan Beatty because he will take you down. I am long rain dancers.

Alan, I'm sure you have noticed, along with farmers, growers, gardeners and cyclists, it is just not raining in the UK at the moment. It just totally hasn't for years. It's just not raining. No. I cut the grass the other day and then it just, it was brown within two days. It looked like a sort of the African surrounding. It was, you know. My garden is crying out for a good soaking. Apparently, story in the FT today, driest start to any year in decades.

Running 29% below long-term averages in England and Wales. What the hell? Is this some sort of like Russian space mirrors pointing the rain clouds away from us or something? I don't know, but use it quickly because you're bound on using hosepipes. It's clearly going to come in, isn't it? Yes. Well, I've got my water butts and I cannot lie. I believe you. I believe you.

American listeners, I have an editor shouting into my ear right now saying, what the hell is a water butt? Apparently you don't call them that. But it's like when you have the gutters on your house drain the rainwater off of your roof and into a big container. We call them butts. It just occurred to me why Americans wouldn't call them water butts. Yes, me too. LAUGHTER

All right, listeners, we are going to be back in your ears on Tuesday. In the meantime, make sure you stock up on your non-chlorinated chicken and lovely ethanol infused beverages. We will be back then.

Unhedged is produced by Jake Harper and edited by Brian Erstadt. Our executive producer is Jacob Goldstein. We had additional help from Topher Forges. Cheryl Brumley is the FT's global head of audio. Special thanks to Laura Clark, Alistair Mackey, Greta Cohn and Natalie Sadler. FT Premium subscribers can get the Unhedged newsletter for free. A 30-day free trial is available to everyone else. Just go to ft.com slash unhedged offer. I'm Katie Martin. Thanks for listening.