Frontline special - Ambassador John E Herbst (Extended)
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Welcome to the World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble, and I executive produce the podcast.

The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm James Hansen and today I'm delighted to be joined by Ambassador John E. Herbst, who served as US Ambassador to Ukraine between 2003 and 2006. He's now Senior Director of the Eurasia Centre at the Atlantic Council. Ambassador Herbst, welcome to Frontline. Thank you for having me.

I wanted to start by getting your reaction to Donald Trump's return to the White House. Do you think Trump is the man to get meaningful concessions from Vladimir Putin? I think that he has laid out a plan, first an objective to bring an end to Putin's aggression in Ukraine. He wants to do it very quickly. And he wants to do it by insisting that both Russia and Ukraine make compromises.

He's only been in office now for, what, two days? But in the post-election period, before he entered the White House, there's a great deal of information that's been released to the public about the elements of Trump's proposals. And if those elements are accurate, and I think they are, maybe not precise, exactly precise, but accurate in general, then we know he's asking Ukraine to compromise on two things, and he's asking Russia to compromise on two things.

I don't think Putin has any intention of compromising it. We can go into this in detail. And I don't think Trump is going to let him get away without compromising.

Well, let's go into what compromises Trump would want from Putin, because I think you're absolutely right. All the mood music would suggest Zelensky is far more prepared to talk about a potential peace deal. Vladimir Putin, publicly at least, saying no, no, he wants the complete capitulation of Ukraine. So what for Trump do you think would be a red line? What would he have to see from Putin? Well, the two elements that the Russians do not like

are first that to deter future Russian aggression after a deal is concluded whether it's an actual peace agreement or a ceasefire uh the U.S and our allies will provide Ukraine with a great deal of weapons to deter future aggression that's point one point two also to prevent a resumption of hostilities

The Trump ideas talk about a demilitarized zone between Russian and Ukrainian forces to be occupied by European troops. The Russians have dismissed these elements. They've said, yes, they're happy to negotiate. They're happy to compromise. They say that in a general way. But the specific things Trump's asked for, or rather that these proposals asked for, because, again, they're not official, the Russians have trashed. And I suppose they want the capitulation.

Of course. And these things would get in the way of that. Well, quite. And it's a case of what Ukraine would get in return for agreeing to a freezing of the front lines and potentially some guarantee around future security, membership of NATO. Who knows? If Vladimir Putin doesn't,

agree to come around the table and actually negotiate in good faith, though. Do you think Donald Trump would be prepared to do as his special envoy to Russia and Ukraine, General Kellogg has suggested, and then arm Ukraine to the teeth if Putin is not in the mood to negotiate? Well, that said something to that effect months ago. And, you know, he's been saying for months he can get a peace deal in 24 hours. He's now more realistically talking about 100 days or even six months, although even that's extremely quick.

It took two years to get the ceasefire that ended the Korean War, for example. Anyway, he's talked about arming Ukraine the way it's never been armed. The Russians are unwilling to compromise. And we've seen in the past several weeks, including at the confirmation hearings for Rubio and for Besant's Treasury Department, senior officials talking about economic sanctions on Russia. And I believe Trump just made remarks in the last 24 hours saying the same thing.

I think those plans for economic sanctions are sound. They're good. They can help move Putin in the right direction. But if Trump wants a quick deal, that's not nearly enough. Putin doesn't want to agree on terms because he thinks as long as there's not a peace deal, his troops will continue gobbling up more Ukrainian territory and his troops will take back Russian territory that the Ukrainians have controlled since August.

So in a sense, he needs an incentive to stop his war. And that incentive only comes if he begins to see his troops are no longer able to make additional gains on the battlefield. And for that, A, you need Trump to resume American aid to Ukraine. So Ukraine is not now hoarding ammunition, hoarding weaponry to have last longer.

And that aim should include weapons, and weapons that will make sure that Putin cannot advance in Ukraine. Now, I don't think the Trump team has taken this into account yet. Certainly, they've given no public indication. But they've clearly indicated the Russians are being recalcitrant, and therefore they need to push up at least more economic sanctions. But again, if their aim is a

an endurable peace and that's explicitly what they're talking about any other piece is a joke would make trump look weak vis-a-vis putin he does not want that to happen um it has to include uh and the russians need to understand that there's a serious cost to continuing the aggression and economic sanctions are part of it but actual military aid is more important and work more quickly it doesn't have to be a grant gift it could be a loan

It can be paid for by someone else. It can be paid for by giving Ukraine full access to the $300 billion of Russian frozen state assets, which apparently the Trump team is considering. Any number of ways this can be done. And I suspect Trump will move in that direction because he's made clear he wants to end this war. He thinks he has the means to do it. And I agree with that. Biden had the means, but he was too weak to actually use them all. He was intimidated by Putin's nuclear bluster.

I'm not sure. I don't think Trump would be intimidated by that bluster, although there's some people in his camp who've already been intimidated, but not Trump himself. I wonder also, Ambassador, if Trump has already said,

maybe unintentionally helped Ukraine by making this pledge to drill, baby drill and to exploit U.S. domestic oil production. If he delivers on that and that leads to a drop in the global oil price, I mean, that could cripple the Russian economy, could it not? Well, Putin's economy is already, I wouldn't say it's on life support, but it's getting difficult circumstances.

So yes, what Trump is planning on doing, enhancing America's energy production, is very much in the interest of our people, our economy, but also our national security interests.

Biden's, I would say, clumsy handling of green policy was actually hurting us internationally as well as hurting the American worker. With that being said, I mean, it's interesting that you say that economic sanctions, certainly for the time being, are not going to be enough to force Putin to the negotiating table. Do you think the Trump administration has the stomach, certainly Donald Trump personally, to, for instance, ramp up the military aid in the meantime in order to force Putin to the negotiating table?

I follow what Trump and his team are doing very closely. They are not confiding in me, however. What I can tell you is that Trump for months has made his ability to end this aggression quickly a principle, one of the most important foreign policy objectives in a new Trump administration. And to do it in a way that does not sacrifice Ukraine to Russia, to Putin,

And if that's his intent and he's now put his prestige on the line, then he will begin to look at the means he needs to use to achieve that. At the moment, again, we're not hearing about this from his team, but if they're looking at this coldly, analyzing what Putin is up to, understanding his motivation, his strengths and his weaknesses, they'll see that

uh the logic of restoring American aid to Ukraine again it could be different it could be loans and also giving Ukraine the means to stop the Russians on the battlefield um Biden didn't quite go that far which was the real weakness of his policy although the aid amount he provided to Ukraine was enough it was just the unwillingness to send the more potent weapons

It's a criticism that a lot of people have made. Do you share this view that Biden and his administration gave Ukraine enough not to lose, but not enough to win? Yes, and I've been saying that since before the big invasion began. I organized a letter that we sent to the White House just was like on New Year's Eve of 2021 saying, you know, you've done some very good things here, but you haven't put any teeth into it.

And so we began to advocate then sending weapons. And we've been pushing, we were trying to persuade them ever since with only occasional and always way too late success.

Well, let's just unpack that and talk about, you know, what you would like to see even now provided to Ukraine, because whilst everyone's talking about these peace talks, it's still very much a hot war on the front lines. So if you had your way, what weapons and what military aid would you like to see the US and its European allies providing to Ukraine right now? I am not a former general, although I work closely with many former generals, including SAC URs, right, Supreme Allied Commanders of Europe. I don't have any doubt

Well, first, if we had given Ukraine by the spring of 2023 adequate numbers of attackums, the missiles that can fire 180 miles, they're not deep strikes into Russia, by the way, since they only fly 180 miles. If we've given lots of them, lots of F-16s, lots of Abrams tanks, although they may have been less important,

Ukraine's counteroffensive of 2023 would have been a notable success as opposed to a very, very modest success. I can't, that same package of equipment would not have the same impact today because the Russian position in Ukraine is much stronger. They now, of course, have North Korean troops fighting Ukrainians in Kursk. But I imagine there is some package of equipment that could produce a similar effect today.

And I would rely on my colleagues who have at one time had four and three stars on their shoulders to provide the exact kit necessary to do that. And we have to make that a priority. And the Biden team, because of Putin's constant nuclear threats, which shook them in ways that American statespeople should not be shaken, they refused to do that. At this point, again, Trump and his team have not come to the recognition

that in order to be successful, they have to make sure that Ukraine is stopping further Russian gains. When they come to that conclusion, they may make the right decision and restore the package of assistance and then the weapons. But I would simply make one more point. Again, attack them or not, despite the way the newspapers talk about them, deep strikes into Russia, right? A country that's 9,000 miles from east to west, if you go 180 miles into it, that's not getting very deep into Russia.

We have weapons we could give, which are of the same vintage as attack. I mean, they go back to 80s or even late 1970s technology. We have the Tomahawks, which can fly 1,000, even 2,000 miles. If I were in charge of the policy, I would tell the Russians, you know, if your engagement in Ukraine, if your aggression in Ukraine is still going on in six months, we're going to start giving Ukraine attack. I mean, not attack, I mean Tomahawks.

Trump may not want to go that far. But just the announcement of a resumed American military aid, including attack, including F-16s, would be a thunderbolt in the Kremlin, where they're hoping that Putin is going to be able to persuade Trump to allow Russia to achieve its aims in Ukraine. And that's a very interesting suggestion. Yeah.

Yeah. And and I mean, even though, you know, Trump is often portrayed as being less naturally sympathetic to Ukraine than Biden was, Biden did everything with a note of caution. Trump has shown himself throughout his career to be a man who is prepared to take bold decisions. So potentially Tomahawks aren't completely out of the question under the Trump administration. Well, Trump Trump actually shook the Russians. He surprised and shook the Russians during his first term.

when he acted on his red line in Syria. He had said if Assad uses chemical weapons against Syrian civilians, he, Trump, will strike hard. Assad did. And using tomahawks, he destroyed a major portion of the Syrian Air Force. I remember I was watching very closely. The Russians were just astonished and not happy about it. And then, of course, Trump was decisive.

when he took out Soleimani, the head of Iranian intelligence. The Russians weren't surprised then because they had seen what happened before. But, you know, it's worth noting that Biden, just as he was timid vis-a-vis Russian aggression in Ukraine, he was timid vis-a-vis Iranian aggression in the Middle East. And in both cases, he said, I don't want this war to escalate, not recognizing that American weakness only encourages our enemies to escalate.

Trump doesn't have that flaw. And do you think that fear of escalation that has been there really since the start of the full scale invasion, that has been shown to be a bluff by Putin? Is that your view, Ambassador? The Ukrainians, NATO, countries which joined NATO, talking now, of course, about Finland and Sweden, all passed multiple Kremlin red lines, which did not lead to one mushroom cloud in the sky.

So Putin realized that his bluff with nukes was always useful at slowing us down from taking decisions that we should have taken earlier. You know, obviously, obviously, when you're in a confrontation with a nuclear power, you have to take seriously the possibility of nuclear escalation. But of course, the United States has had substantial experience with nuclear diplomacy, facing a more dangerous foe than Putin's Russia, meaning the Soviet Union.

during the Berlin crisis in 61, the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later. And not once during those crises did the President of the United States or his National Security Advisor or Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State ever say, we can't do X publicly, because the Russians may go nuclear, the Soviets may go nuclear. So that's a very weak book.

And, you know, the former senior officials in the Biden administration are simply saying, oh, they were prudent and people who talked about ignoring these threats are just being rash. But those of us who advocated stronger measures were paying very close attention to what the Russians were doing and saying. And we knew that they did not have a death instinct, right, because there was no danger in threatening nuclear use.

there was extraordinary danger in actually using nuclear weapons. What other options do you think the White House should keep on the table? I mean, what about a NATO-enforced no-fly zone over Ukraine? I have no doubt Vladimir Putin wouldn't like that, but should Donald Trump keep that on the table? I don't think that the Trump team is thinking about this. And while I would welcome it, I try to offer ideas that I think have a chance of working.

Never let the ideal be an enemy of the good. So since I don't think that's flyable, so to speak, with Trump folks, at least right now, I see no reason to offer that as a policy recommendation. Now, six weeks from now, three months from now, if Putin is still being obstinate and negotiations haven't started, maybe the Trump team will begin to think even more boldly.

about this in that case a proposal like that could make perfect sense you know continued uh Kremlin obstinacy could also persuade Trump to take another look at the idea of Ukraine joining NATO many things may prove to be possible for stronger American policy for putting a revanchist Russia in a cage

They may be possible as the new administration realizes just how dangerous they are to our interests.

But right now, these things are not on the table. There's no reason to get into any detail. We hope you're enjoying today's episode of Frontline. Don't forget, you can also now listen to Frontline in podcast form. Just search for The World in 10 from wherever you get your podcasts, where you can also hear daily analysis of the biggest stories relating to war and defence. And we'll put a link to The World in 10 in the description below. From your experience, Ambassador, if you had to frame an argument about

for Donald Trump about why continued American support for Ukraine is in his interest as a president. How would you frame that argument? Because a lot of observers think that Trump has never quite understood in the way that certain other world leaders have the imperative of supporting Ukraine. Well, we have yet to see Donald Trump say, um,

Putin and Russia are putting at risk major American interests. I think there are people in his policy team who understand, who believe, understand that, believe that. Trump has thought in terms of deals that strengthen America, deals that weaken our adversaries. Now, it's an interesting thing that I believe for the first time in connection with American policy in the Arctic,

Trump identified Russia as an American adversary. I may be mistaken. Maybe he said this before, but I was unaware of that. But, you know, he's talking about our adversary ships in the Arctic Ocean, referring to the Chinese and the Russians. So maybe he is in the process of coming to understand that if Russia is able to win in Ukraine, that's a danger to critical American interests in Europe. What I just said, I think, is certainly true.

And I think Trump may come to that.

But at the moment, I'm not sure that he's there. Yesterday, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping had a phone call. By all accounts, they re-emphasized their desire to cooperate on everything from foreign policy to energy to the economy. How worried are you, Ambassador, about what appears to be a deepening alliance between Moscow and Beijing? This is clearly an alliance based upon their desire to

to greatly weaken the United States. That's what this is all about. And of course, that partnership, it's really not an alliance, but it is certainly a partnership, is bolstered by their junior partners, North Korea and Iran. And they are working globally against American interests. China's support for Russia has been critical in this war.

A, because they are supporting the Russian economy in the face of the sanctions we imposed now three years ago. And that support has been essential for the Russian economy. And of course, the Russian economy is essential for their war effort. Although China has been unwilling to directly challenge the sanctions, and, you know, for example, to send weapons to Russia in a way that we all can see, but still they're providing critical support.

I believe that Xi, no less than Putin, was unhappy with the fact that Russia did not take Ukraine in a week or two, that the Ukrainians have made Russia pay a major cost for their aggression. And I think while the West response, the American response to the Russian big invasion was not as strong as it should have been, both Putin and Xi were surprised, unhappily, that it was as strong as it was.

And again, I mean, I always refer to the Biden team's policy as adequate because they did prevent a Russian victory, just not bold and maybe not sustainable over time. But we can try. The Biden team tried to split Russia and Ukraine. That failed. You now hear talk about the Trump team trying to go to China to get them to tell Putin to stop the hostilities. I don't think the Chinese will deliver that message.

They may, because they see a Putin that succeeds in Ukraine, as a Putin has dealt a major blow to American interest, American power and American prestige, which of course is China's objective. And, you know, you have some very short-sighted people in the Trump administration, not his major national security team, but others who've argued that we should not worry about Ukraine, we have to worry about Taiwan.

And they don't understand, despite what the Japanese, the South Korean, and the Taiwanese leaders have said, that if you want to deter Xi on Taiwan, make sure Putin loses in Ukraine. That's another reason why it's vital for President Trump that Putin lose in Ukraine. But again, I think the policy is heading in the right direction.

And I think we may see more decisive steps as President Trump realizes that Putin is working directly against American interests and President Trump's interests and President Trump's historic reputation.

Is there anything in your view that Trump could do to kind of pressure China to in turn pressure Russia? I mean, I'm wondering, for example, we've heard Donald Trump in the last 24 hours talk about his plans to impose tariffs on Chinese imports up to 10%. If he made...

Potentially, Xi Jinping conferring a message to Putin to come to the negotiating table, a prerequisite for maybe a slightly less punitive tariff regime. Could that be a factor? Could that be on the table? Well, I have certain views as to how different foreign actors will behave. I'm not always right. So I can understand the new team making that approach to China. And I could see

China playing along to a certain extent, meaning encouraging such ideas, seeing what they can get for it. And, you know, the Chinese have been very good for decades in managing American and Western expectations vis-a-vis North Korea. And, you know, saying, oh, yes, we'll talk to Pyongyang about this and that.

But those who follow China's foreign policy closely know that nothing ever came of those Chinese efforts to moderate North Korean behavior. So I think we'd see a very similar kabuki theater to mix up my Oriental partners, or not so much partners, playing the game with Trump for a little while. Oh, yes, we'll give this a try, having no real intention of taking the necessary steps to

that might force Putin to reconsider, meaning cutting back, you know, purchases of Russian oil and gas, ending the flow of dual-use technology. I don't think the Chinese would actually do that. But they may play along. But it would not, they would not take the necessary steps. They didn't do it on North Korea. I don't think that would prove to be successful. Let's put it that way. They could try, sure. But understand this too would take more and more time.

for the initiative. I mean, they could start tomorrow, but if they're giving it two months to play out, well, that's two months where you're not going to have any deal. Because you have to get Putin to negotiate first. And once that happens, you'll start to... The Russians historically are masters at delaying diplomacy because they don't want the negotiations in question to go anywhere while other things are happening. And Trump's talking about, he just told Kellogg, take care of this in three months.

I wish General Kellogg Godspeed, but the chances of that happening are not great. And they're only possible if our policy is decisive, energetic, and consistent.

Well, on the issue of timings, just finally, Ambassador, you mentioned Donald Trump and his team now coming out and saying they want this solved by April in the first hundred days of the administration. I note your scepticism on that. Do you think we will get any deal by the end of this year? Never say never. Start with that. All right. Let me give you one circumstance which could lead to a deal faster than I anticipate.

Again, the Russian economy is going through some really difficult times. And you have some creditable economists who claim the Russian economy is going to create this calendar year. Some even saying earlier than the end of this calendar year. Others are saying next year. I've never accepted the IMF statistics that the Russian economy grew by 3% last year. Those are based upon Russian economic statistics. Like their Soviet predecessors, those statistics are not to be trusted.

So conceivably, if that were to happen, that might force Putin to actually negotiate. But assuming that does not happen, I believe that's the safer assumption. The only way you get a deal this calendar year, so we're talking about, what, 10 months from now, 10 and a half months, 11 and a half months from now, is if Putin relatively soon, let's say relatively, let's define relatively soon as four to six weeks later,

begin to see that, well, maybe he's not going to be able to make any real significant military gains going forward. And that only happens if we bring the boom down on him. And you can start that with economic sanctions.

but it really has to be military steps on the ground. Again, a restarting of American supplies so Ukraine does not have to hoard its weapons to have something for four months from now if there's no additional American military support this year, and weapons systems that will make a clear difference on the ground straight away. This would be consistent with some things Trump has said rhetorically months ago.

But, you know, making that point rhetorically is very different from making the concrete decision once you have the power to do so. I'm not pessimistic that Trump would not make that decision, but I think there has to be some sort of learning process.

before he moves in that direction. Ambassador Johnny Herbst, we really appreciate your time and your insights and your analysis. Thank you for joining us. My pleasure. Thank you. Thank you for watching today's episode of Frontline. For early access to our videos, member-only Q&As and live streams, then sign up for a membership via the link in the description. And for the latest news and breaking stories, listen to Times Radio and follow us at thetimes.com. ♪

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