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Frontline special - General Philip Breedlove

2025/1/19
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World in 10

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Philip Breedlove将军
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Philip Breedlove将军:我认为我们都希望停火协议对双方都有利,并且为乌克兰的未来发展铺平道路。如果停火协议意味着向俄罗斯的要求投降,那么没有人会想要那样。但如果我们能够达成公平的协议,并且让乌克兰走上可持续发展的道路,那么是的,我们都希望如此。在国际安全事务中,我们倾听一些故去之人的话,例如克劳塞维茨、孙子、约米尼。他们用不同的语言表达了同一个意思:敌人有发言权。因此,无论我们在西方阵营的意图是什么,或者美国总统的意图是什么,普京都有发言权,到目前为止,他一直态度强硬。我们获悉几周前他和特朗普总统谈过话,特朗普总统告诉他不要加剧或扩大这场战争。在那次谈话后的一个星期内,俄罗斯向库尔斯克引进了朝鲜军队,并连续三个晚上发动了战争中规模最大的三次导弹和火箭袭击。因此,普京已经明确表示,他掌控着俄罗斯,而不是其他人。我认为随着局势发展,他将很难对付。我认为普京必须读过特朗普的书。如果你读过或关注过《交易的艺术》第六章,特朗普一直在谈论在任何谈判开始时设定一个非常高的门槛,这样你就可以从这个门槛上进行谈判,并被视为一个良好而忠实的谈判者。这是一种释义,可能无法让学者信服,但对于普通读者来说,这基本上就是特朗普所说的。显然,普京现在正在设定一个不可能达到的目标。他设定了一个目标,说我唯一能接受的是完全投降,满足我所有的要求,然后我们再谈。因此,这在西方不应该被接受。我还想说,我听到的一种说法是,也许我们应该给予普京一切,以换取停火。大多数军事评论员会告诉你,俄罗斯比任何一方都更需要停火。他们的军队被打垮了。想想看,乌克兰已经占领了俄罗斯的一部分领土,而俄罗斯无法将他们赶走。他们不得不请求朝鲜来帮助他们将乌克兰人从俄罗斯的主权领土上清除出去。这就是普京现在面临的困境。我理解所有这些推理。我明白了。这里面有一些很好的想法,但乌克兰也正在为人员短缺而苦恼。现在可能不像俄罗斯那么严重,但乌克兰确实缺乏人员。他们孤军奋战。俄罗斯有许多国家为他们而战,车臣人、朝鲜人,所有这些人都在为他们而战。他们仍然缺乏人员。因此,双方都处于困境。所以我不想不同意你所说的。我只是说这枚硬币有两面。同样的动态正在伤害每个人。事实上,一些国际社会正在强烈要求乌克兰改变招募人员的标准和年龄,以增加其军队的规模。出于我们都能理解的原因,泽连斯基反对这样做。所以是的,这枚硬币有两面,而且它们都面临着一些问题。但我还是要告诉你,我们不应该把停火看作是从俄罗斯那里赢得的东西。俄罗斯迫切需要这场战争停止。他们的军队被打垮了,精疲力尽,领导层人手不足。他们仍然以对我们西方人来说难以想象的速度在损失。现在朝鲜也加入了这些可怕的损失中,加入了俄罗斯的行列。因此,这里有一些必须认识到的动态。我要第三次说这件事了,因为我希望有人真正理解我的意思。向俄罗斯投降以换取停火将是一个巨大的错误。在未来的任何和平谈判中,俄罗斯都必须做出让步。在我看来,您希望看到俄罗斯做出哪些现实的让步?俄罗斯无权决定乌克兰的北约愿望。乌克兰是一个主权国家。乌克兰将自行决定其对北约的愿望。这已经成为俄罗斯的一种模式。他们大喊大叫,说北约正在侵犯俄罗斯。我可以告诉你,在三年关于将北约成员国数量从28个增加的会议上,北约并没有四处争抢地将国家纳入北约。事实上,大多数时候,国家会得到很大的帮助,而且要经过数年甚至数十年,他们才能加入。波罗的海国家努力争取加入北约,许多国家长期以来都反对这样做。除了芬兰和瑞典几乎立即加入之外,最近加入北约的前俄罗斯控制国家的成员,他们都在争先恐后地加入北约。因此,这将是未来的一种动态。但我想说的重点是,有很多事情我不相信西方应该考虑。其中之一就是允许俄罗斯控制乌克兰的主权决策。因此,您是否认为,像保证乌克兰可以在未来几年加入北约或正在走上加入北约的道路这样的事情,将成为任何协议的先决条件?我可以改述一下你所说的话吗?承认我们已经对乌克兰做出的承诺。西方难道没有已经告诉乌克兰它将成为北约成员国吗?是的,是的。我想你可能需要看到更多具体的细节,说明这将发生的时间框架。但你可以理解,从乌克兰的角度来看,为什么他们会对此表示非常合理的怀疑,因为我们以前经历过这种情况。每个人都记得布达佩斯备忘录,我们已经看到对乌克兰做出的安全保证未能得到西方的履行。因此,乌克兰需要一些这方面的细节。你抢走了我的下一个谈话要点。我的意思是,我们确实以前经历过这种情况,我不是在这里指责。美国和英国确实有着特殊的关系。美国和英国都在布达佩斯备忘录中未能履行承诺。我会说我的国家比英国更甚,但事实是,有四个签署国。美国和英国是其中两个。我们总是,让我们慷慨一些。我们在布达佩斯备忘录中做出的保证方面表现不佳。最近几周我一直在思考的一个问题是,唐纳德·特朗普对乌克兰军事援助的怀疑是否与他普遍认为欧洲在国防开支方面长期以来依赖美国慷慨这一观点有关。他说得对。许多北约成员国没有履行其国防开支承诺。他上周发表讲话,称其应占GDP的5%。我认为这对大多数国家来说是不现实的。但他肯定是对的,他们需要增加国防开支,因为欧洲最容易受到俄罗斯扩张主义的威胁。因此,如果欧洲的北约成员国准备就其自身的国防开支做出更大胆的承诺,您是否认为这可能会改变特朗普对美国支持乌克兰的看法?我认为简单的答案是肯定的。我认为这是答案。我认为特朗普总统现在实际上很高兴,因为他在他第一届政府中如此努力地搅局,以至于北约在很大程度上已经转变了。我们取得了巨大进展,并且随着特朗普总统再次成为总统的可能性越来越大,这一进展也加快了,以实现当前的目标。因此,我认为,第六章,设定高目标,从目标进行谈判,我认为特朗普希望看到北约做得更多。如果每个人都使用相同的词语会更好。这不是关于国家向北约支付费用。他们不向北约支付费用。我们谈论的是第三条,投资于他们自己的军队。因此,是的,我认为关于欧洲投资的必要性和理由的进一步复兴非常清楚。好消息是,普京每天都在用他自发发动的这场非法、不道德、疯狂的战争来帮助北约认识到这一点。我认为这有助于北约看到发生了什么。您认为在任何潜在的和平谈判之前,普京处于多么微妙的境地?因为一方面,如果他不做出足够的让步,例如,我们已经从凯洛格将军那里听说,美国可能准备增加对乌克兰的军事援助。正如您所描述的那样,将军,俄罗斯及其伤亡率和供应问题,不一定能够承受这场战争持续更长时间。所以那里存在风险。但同样,如果他被认为向乌克兰和西方的许多要求让步,对他来说在国内不也存在政治风险吗?他将被视为未能实现他的目标,而他已经非常明确地表达了这些目标。那么,您认为他处于多么微妙的境地?嗯,对大约三个问题的答案是肯定的。最终的答案是,他处于微妙的境地,因为他必须从这场战争中脱颖而出,以展示他所做的投资的成果。请记住,俄罗斯人民仍然不知道乌克兰的伤亡人数。母亲们仍然被告知他们的儿子们会回家,但他们并没有回家。因此,如果您还记得在过去十年多的战争的第一部分中莫斯科母亲们的做法,如果您还记得的话,他面临着许多艰难的时刻,他试图策划这场战争,首先是从远东地区招募人员。俄罗斯乌拉尔以东的部分地区,然后是在俄罗斯西部的农村地区,而不是城市地区,他拼命地试图避免那些中心地区,因为当他们开始意识到这场战争的可怕损失时,他的问题会变得更糟。他需要在这种情况开始发生之前取得胜利,因为人们不会接受实际上发生了什么以及俄罗斯在其国内叙事中掩盖了什么。您认为如果这场战争在六个月后仍然是一场热战,普京是否不可避免地必须再次考虑动员?嗯,一位著名的美国哲学家尤吉·贝拉说,预测的问题在于你必须知道未来。我不会去那里。我认为他的,让我们这样说吧。他的问题会越来越糟。他将不得不做些什么来增加更多的人力。目前看来,他似乎将“购买”或“支付”朝鲜人来为他作战。而且,你知道,朝鲜的领导人,他喜欢能够买卖和赚钱。所以我们将看看结果如何。但是普京能多久只使用朝鲜军队来增强自己的部队呢?因为这大概是一种有限的供应。这能持续多久?嗯,我认为他们有很多部队。我认为关键问题是普京如何支付费用?现在有很多猜测。是现金吗?是易货吗?还是俄罗斯向朝鲜提供导弹技术,这不仅可以支付费用,而且还会加剧西方在远东地区的问题,我们所有在那里的盟友都面临着朝鲜拥有强大导弹部队的问题,这对我们所有人来说都不是一件好事。为了向特朗普总统阐述为什么继续支持乌克兰很重要,您认为他的顾问,那些非常支持乌克兰的人,是否应该关注如果普京被认为在这场乌克兰战争中获胜,这将如何壮大中国。因为很多人说,唐纳德·特朗普的主要外交政策目标是遏制中国。您认为这种说法对他更有说服力吗?我认为有一种不同的说法,但让我先解决这个问题。我经常被问到,当我们开始谈论世界各地的政策时,你知道,我们对台湾有政策吗?我们对朝鲜和半岛停战有政策吗?我们对中国的政策是什么?我们对伊朗的政策是什么?我用同样的方式回答所有这些问题。大多数这些事情,你可以在谷歌上搜索到,你可以阅读相关的政策。“一国两制”,等等。我们有所有这些公开的政策。但我告诉人们,你的母亲在你年轻的时候告诉你什么?我相信,我的母亲告诉我的是,人们不会关心你说什么,他们会关心你做什么,并观察你做什么。因此,我们在世界各地都有所有这些书面和口头承诺。你可以在谷歌上搜索到。但所有那些人,朝鲜、中国、俄罗斯、伊朗,他们都在关注西方,特别是在关注美国正在做什么。我们的中国政策、我们的朝鲜政策、我们的伊朗政策都在乌克兰每天都在制定。西方的承诺值多少钱,美国的承诺值多少钱,都在乌克兰每天都在被书写。因此,我认为妈妈的建议即使在战略层面也以一种示范性的方式发挥作用。你说可能还有另一种说法,你可以用来让特朗普相信支持乌克兰的必要性。我认为很明显,特朗普总统非常渴望让我们的经济在世界范围内更好地协调一致,当然还有美国经济。我们依赖于一些人,因为我们依赖于他们,过去的政府一直受制于他们,并被他们吓倒。因此,我们需要拥有更多的自主权,我们需要拥有更强大的美国经济。我并不是说要以牺牲英国或其他国家为代价。我认为西方需要更加注意他们如何彼此相处。因为他们都必须处理这些不太合作的经济体。我认为如果我们帮助下一届政府的领导人了解乌克兰沦陷的经济影响有多么重要,一个再次落入俄罗斯控制之下、被掠夺、被破坏和管理不善的乌克兰等等,就像目前的俄罗斯经济一样。这将对西方的贸易和经济不利,也将对美国的贸易和经济不利。我认为,随着特朗普团队更好地理解这不仅仅是关于谁为欧洲的什么事情支付多少费用的争吵。我认为这是一种与即将上任的政府打交道的方式,因为他渴望让世界经济处于更好的地位。而且我认为他理解前参谋长联席会议主席马蒂·德普西曾经说过的话,当时他被问到,对我们美国军队的最大敌人是什么?马蒂·德普西非常聪明地说,他说美国赤字是美国军队的头号敌人。因此,我认为这一点。一个理解这些经济体如何与一个国家的实力联系在一起,以及我们如何必须解决这个问题的特朗普政府。我认为这是与即将上任的政府开始良好对话的一种方式。当然,目前关于潜在的和平谈判有很多讨论。很容易忘记这样一个事实,即这仍然是一场非常活跃的战争,我们可能距离任何和平谈判的发生还有几个月的时间。因此,在此期间,您还想看到乌克兰的西方盟友为乌克兰做些什么?我像坏掉的唱片一样。你可能可以看看你上次的节目,你会记得这些话。我们需要赋予乌克兰增加这场战争中俄罗斯成本的能力。我首先要推荐的是改变西方的政策,让乌克兰可以使用西方武器袭击俄罗斯。俄罗斯现在在乌克兰周围享有巨大的安全空间,因为我们在西方在很大程度上,现在政策中存在裂痕,但在很大程度上,我们不允许乌克兰向俄罗斯开火。我们允许俄罗斯每周数百次,有时每晚70到80次向乌克兰开火。我们允许俄罗斯从全球各点使用来自伊朗、中国和其他国家装备的武器开火。俄罗斯没有限制。尽管开火吧。打击乌克兰。但我们不允许乌克兰还击。这项政策必须改变。您为什么认为西方领导人仍然没有这样做呢?我听到他们对升级的犹豫,但普京的升级威胁已被证明是虚张声势,不是吗?我的意思是,我们现在的情况是,乌克兰实际上已经入侵了俄罗斯的一部分领土,而我们并没有从普京那里得到一些荒谬的报复。所以这肯定已经被证明是一个完全的虚张声势。嗯,我完全同意你的想法。我只是要补充一点,到目前为止,我们在西方一直完全被俄罗斯吓倒了。我不确定你是否听说过“反射性控制”这个词。这是你应该做一些研究的事情,然后让我们进行一次全新的对话。但俄罗斯的宣传,俄罗斯的言语战争是俄罗斯对西方最成功的武器和运动,因为我们被吓倒了。总的来说,西方领导人没有勇气也没有智力能力去考虑一个失败的俄罗斯。他们就是不去那里。因为他们担心你刚才谈到的问题。因此,他们被吓倒了。俄罗斯的反射性控制运动在限制西方反应方面对他们非常有效。他们被允许做任何事情,我们在布查看到的可怕的事情,我们在马里乌波尔看到的可怕的事情,所有这些事情。俄罗斯在这场战争中所做的一切可怕的事情。我们只是继续前进,就像,等等,我们不是,你知道,我们不能去那里,因为我们害怕这场战争升级。所以我们必须克服这一点。我们必须克服基于俄罗斯反射性控制的僵化反应。我提到了库尔斯克发生的事情,不仅仅是从8月开始,甚至在最近一周左右,乌克兰在那里加大了攻势。您认为他们这样做是对的吗?您是否认为这是他们为潜在的和平谈判奠定基础的一部分?这是一个巨大的决定。有些人会称之为赌博。我不这么认为。顿巴斯的攻势正在继续进行,乌克兰并没有向那里投入更多兵力,而是对库尔斯克发动了袭击。我相信这是一个杰作。这将绝对改变即将到来的任何和平谈判的动态。我认为这就是为什么普京正在向库尔斯克投入一切,包括垃圾桶和厨房水槽,试图在任何和平谈判之前纠正这种情况。所以这只是我的意见。你知道,我只是一个有意见的人。我认为这个策略,这种方法会影响未来的谈判。我认为你相信谁,我不知道你相信谁。但我现在正在阅读的人,他们不是那些与政治立场有关的人,而只是战争分析家,他们说俄罗斯在顿巴斯的攻势几乎已经停止。有很多这样的报道。因此,如果情况如此,并且这种情况停止了,而乌克兰仍然驻扎在库尔斯克,那么看来这是乌克兰做出的一个高明的决定。最后,将军,您对2025年对乌克兰意味着什么持乐观态度吗?不,我是一个现实主义者。我认为在这件事尘埃落定之前,还有很多艰难的时刻。我最担心的是,谈判桌上的那些人会设定一些条件,这些条件会让乌克兰在他们的道路上变得残废。我之前说过,停火并不是西方的胜利。俄罗斯迫切需要停火。我们需要睁大眼睛参加这些谈判,看看俄罗斯必须放弃什么。如果我们要求乌克兰放弃土地,俄罗斯也必须放弃土地。这些谈判必须从西方和乌克兰实力的立场出发,以便谈判结果反映出双方都为未来的和平做出了贡献,而不是俄罗斯一方的投降。

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ACAST powers the world's best podcasts. Here's a show that we recommend. We all have bad days and sometimes bad weeks and maybe even bad years. But the good news is we don't have to figure out life all alone. I'm comedian Chris Duffy, host of Ted's How to Be a Better Human podcast.

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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm James Hansen and today we're talking about the latest on the war in Ukraine and we're delighted to be joined by General Finip Breedlove, a highly decorated four-star general who served for 39 years. He was Commander of US European Command as well as Supreme Allied Commander Europe

of NATO Allied Command Operations, General Breedlove. It's always a pleasure. Welcome back to Frontline. It's good to be back. Now, first of all, we can't ignore the fact that we're recording this less than a week until Donald Trump's second inauguration as president. I suppose the million-dollar question at the moment is how the Trump administration will

will approach the war in Ukraine. A lot of people have seized on his previous comments that he can deliver some kind of peace agreement. He once famously said, in a day, I think most people agree that's not realistic. But do you think...

It is realistic that the Trump administration will be able to produce some kind of ceasefire agreement in its first few months. Well, I think we all hope so, as long as that ceasefire agreement is favorable to both parties.

If the ceasefire agreement amounts to a capitulation to Russian demands, then no one wants that. But if we can get to something that is equitable and sets Ukraine on a path into the future that is sustainable, yes, we all want that. And I just have to interject as well, you know, that...

In the business of international security affairs, we listen to some of the old dead guys and what they say, the Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini. And they essentially say in their three different languages in different ways that the enemy gets a vote. And so no matter what we on the Western side of the equation intend or what the U.S. president intends,

Mr. Putin gets a vote, and so far he's been pretty adamant. We were told that he and President Trump talked some weeks ago, and President Trump told him not to accelerate or expand this war. Within the week after that conversation, Russia introduced North Korean troops into Kursk,

And Russia launched three of the largest missile and rocket attacks of the entire war, three nights in a row there. And so Mr. Putin has made it pretty clear that, that, uh, he, uh,

is in charge of Russia and no one else. And I think that he is going to be tough to deal with as this moves forward. I suppose that is one of the big questions. What will Putin demand? And is his current position just a negotiating tactic or will he be prepared to compromise? Because

Russian presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev gave an interview to the Russian media only yesterday in which he said the Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion, specifically dissolution of the current government of Ukraine, demilitarization of Ukraine and a permanent ban

ban on Ukraine ever joining NATO. Now, it seems to me that is a non-starter if you're Vladimir Zelensky. Do you think that is just a negotiating tactic or do you think Putin actually genuinely would be prepared to compromise on one of or all of those? Well, I think Mr. Putin must have read Mr. Trump's book.

If you read or have paid attention to The Art of the Deal in Chapter 6, Mr. Trump talks all the time about set an incredibly high bar at the beginning of any negotiation so that you can negotiate back from it and be seen as a good and faithful negotiator.

And that's a paraphrase that probably wouldn't wash for scholars, but for the casual reader, that's essentially what Mr. Trump says. Clearly, Mr. Putin is setting the bar at an impossible place now. He is setting the bar saying the only thing I will accept is complete capitulation, meeting all of my demands, and then we'll talk. And so that should not wash with the West.

I would also say, say that one of the arguments I've heard out there is that, well, maybe we should give Mr. Putin everything in order to get a cessation and hostilities. What most military commentators will tell you is Russia needs a cessation and hostilities worse than anybody. Their army is beaten up. Think about this. A portion of Russia has been, uh,

taken over by Ukraine and Russia can't dislodge them. They have to ask North Korea to come help them to clear Ukrainians out of sovereign Russian lands. That's how bad it is for Mr. Putin right now. Well, that's a really good point. And I wanted to put to you, General, that the argument that some people make

that actually now is not the time to hold peace talks, because let's say towards the end of 2025, the conditions for peace talks would be maybe much more favourable to Ukraine. Now, clearly, everyone wants this war to end as quickly as possible. You know, far too many lives have been lost on all sides.

But given the state of the Russian economy, given the Russian casualty rates, given, as you say, Ukraine occupied parts of Kursk Oblast and are making new offensive operations in the last week or so, maybe now is not the time to be having any peace negotiations. And Ukraine would be better served by having them towards the end of the year. Well, I understand all that reasoning. I get it. And there is some good thinking there, but also Ukraine.

is hurting for manpower. Maybe not as badly as Russia right now, but Ukraine is hurting for manpower. They're standing alone. Russia has multiple nations standing

Chechens, North Koreans, all of these people fighting for them. And they're still hurting for manpower. And so both sides are in a tough spot. So I don't want to disagree with what you suggested. But I'm just saying that there's two sides to this coin. And the same dynamic is hurting everybody.

And in fact, some of the international community are screaming for Ukraine to change who and at what age they bring people into their military in order to increase the size of the drawing base.

for their military. And for reasons we all understand, Mr. Zelensky is opposed to that. So yeah, this coin has got both two sides to it and they both are facing some of those problems. But I would tell you that we should not, we should not look at a cessation of hostilities as winning something from the Russians. The Russians desperately need

for this war to stop. Their military has been beaten up. They're worn out. They're thin at the leadership positions. They are still losing at a rate that is unthinkable to us in the West.

on this front line. And now the North Koreans are joining us in those horrendous, joining Russia in those horrendous losses. So there are dynamics here that have to be recognized. And I'm going to say it now for the third time, because I hope somebody actually understands what I'm saying. Capitulation to Russia to get a cessation and hostilities would be a enormous mistake.

Russia has to have concessions in any peace talks in the future. And in your view, General, what concessions that are realistic would you like to see from Russia? Well, Russia doesn't get to dictate the NATO aspirations of Ukraine. Ukraine is a sovereign nation. Ukraine will make its own decisions about aspirations for NATO.

This has been a pattern with Russia. They scream about NATO encroaching on Russia. May I just tell you, having sat in three years of the meetings about increasing the number from 28, NATO is not out there clawing to bring nations into NATO. In fact, most of the time nations get a big hand

And years, if not decades, go by before they can get in. The Baltic nations fought hard to get into NATO, and many opposed it for a long time. And the latest accessions, with the exception of Finland and Sweden, which were nearly immediate, the latest accessions of former Russian leaders

controlled nations, they were all screaming to get into NATO. And so this is a dynamic that the future will hold. But the point I want to make is,

There are lots of things that I do not believe the West should consider. And one of them is allowing Russia to control the sovereign decisions of Ukraine. So do you think, therefore, that something like a guarantee that Ukraine will

can either join NATO in the next few years or is on a path to membership of NATO, something around that is going to be a prerequisite of any agreement. May I just sort of rephrase what you said? Acknowledging a promise we've already made to Ukraine.

Hasn't the West already told Ukraine it will become a member of NATO? It has. It has. And I suppose you need to see some more concrete detail as to what is the timeframe for that happening. But you can understand from a Ukrainian perspective why they would be very rightly sceptical of that, because we've been here before. Everyone remembers the Budapest memorandum and we've seen security guarantees that have been made to Ukraine that the West has failed to

to meet. So Ukraine will need some detail on this. You just stole my next talking point. I mean, we have exactly been here before and I'm not being accusatory here. The US and UK do have a special relationship. The US and UK both

both have fallen down in their promises in the Budapest memorandum. I would say my nation more than the UK, but the fact of the matter is there were four signatories. The US and the UK were two of them. And we have always,

Let's be generous. We have underperformed in our assurances made in the Budapest memorandum. Something I have thought a lot about in recent weeks is whether part of Donald Trump's scepticism about military aid for Ukraine is linked to his general view that for too long, Europe has been freeloading off American largesse when it comes to defence spending. And he is right to say that.

that many NATO members have not been meeting their defence spending commitments. He gave a speech last week in which he said it should be 5% of GDP. I think that's unrealistic for most countries. But he's certainly right, they need to increase the amount they're spending on defence because Europe is most at risk from Russian expansionism. So if NATO members in Europe were prepared to make

bolder commitments around their own defense spending, do you think that might change the way Trump views American support for Ukraine? I think the easy answer is yes. And I think it is the answer. I think that President Trump now actually is happy about the fact that he stirred the pot so hard in his first administration that

NATO has come around in a large degree. We have made huge progress and that progress has accelerated as it became clear that President Trump could be the president again towards meeting the current set of goals. And so I think that, you know, Chapter 6, set the bar high, negotiate from the bar,

I think that Mr. Trump wants to see NATO do more. And it would be good if everybody used the same set of words. This is not about countries paying NATO. They don't pay NATO. It's Article III investing in their own military is what we're talking about. And so, yes, I think that a firmness

further renaissance about the need and the reasoning for European investment is very clear. And the good news is Mr. Putin is helping that every day with this illegal, immoral, insane war that he cranked up on his own volition. I think that that is helping NATO to see that

What's going on? How delicate a position do you think Vladimir Putin is in ahead of any potential peace talks? Because on the one hand, if he doesn't make enough concessions, we've heard from, for example, General Kellogg that the US may be prepared to ramp up military aid for Ukraine. And as you described, General, Russia, with its casualty rate and its supply issues, can't necessarily afford for this war to drag on much longer. So there's a risk there.

But equally, if he is seen to give in to too many demands from Ukraine and the West, is there not a political risk for him at home? He will be seen to have failed on his objectives, which he's been very clear about. So how delicate a position do you think he's in?

Well, the answer to about three of those questions is yes. And the final answer is he is in a delicate position because he has to come out of this showing something for the investments that he's made. And remember that the Russian people still don't know the casualty rates of Ukraine. Mothers are still being told their sons are coming home and they are not.

And so if you remember the moms in Moscow sort of approach during the last first part of this 10 year plus long war. If you remember that, he faced a lot of tough time and he's tried to engineer this war to first take men from the Far Eastern territories.

Parts of Russia, east of the Urals, and then in the rural, not urban areas of the western part of Russia, he's desperately trying to avoid those centers where when they start realizing the horrific losses of this war.

His problem will get harder. He needs a victory before that begins to hit because people are not going to accept what has actually happened and what Russia is covering up inside its own narrative inside its country. Do you think if this is still a hot war in six months time, it is inevitable that Putin will have to look again at mobilization? Uh,

A famous American philosopher called Yogi Berra said the problem about predictions are you have to know the future. I'm not going to go there. I think that his, let's just leave it at this. His problems are going to get worse and worse and worse.

And he's going to have to do something to raise more manpower. Currently, it looks like he's going to sort of, quote unquote, buy or pay for North Koreans to come over and fight his fight. And, you know, the leader in the north of Korea is he he likes to be able to to buy or sell and make money.

And so we'll see how that works out. But how long can Putin get away with just using North Korean troops to bolster his own forces? Because presumably that is a finite supply. How long can that last? Well, I think they've got a lot of forces.

And I think the big deal is how does Putin pay for it? There's a lot of speculation now. Is it cash? Is it barter for other things? Is it Russia providing missile technology to North Korea, which not only can pay for things, but exacerbates the West's problem in the Far East and all our allies there are

the problems of a capable missile force in North Korea, that's not something that will be helpful to all of us. In terms of framing an argument to President Trump about why continued support for Ukraine matters, do you think his advisers, those who are

very supportive of Ukraine, should focus on how it would embolden China were Putin to be seen to get a win out of the war in Ukraine. Because a lot of people say actually Donald Trump's primary foreign policy objective is to contain China. Do you think that's the language that would be more persuasive to him? I think there's a different language, but let me address that one first. I'm asked often,

When we start talking about policies around the world, you know, do we have a policy for Taiwan? Do we have a policy vis-a-vis North Korea and the armistice on the peninsula? Do we have a policy towards China? Do we have a policy towards Iran?

And I answer it all the same way. Most of these things, you can Google them and you can read the policy. One country, two systems, you know, blah, blah. We have all these policies that are out there.

But I tell people, what did your mother tell you when you were a young man or a young woman? Your mother would tell you, I'm sure, what mine told me. And that is, people are not going to care what you say. They're going to care what you do and watch what you do. So we have all these written and audible commitments around the world that are out there. You can Google it.

But all of those people, North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, they are watching what the West and watching specifically what the United States is doing. Our China policy, our North Korea policy, our Iran policy are all

All being written every day in Ukraine. What the West's commitments are worth and what the United States' commitments are worth are being written every day in Ukraine.

So I think Mom's advice plays out even at the geostrategic level in a demonstrative way. And you said that there's a different language maybe that you might use to convince Trump of the need. I think it's clear that President Trump is very keen to get

We're economies better aligned in the world, certainly the United States economy. We are dependent on some people out there that because we are dependent on them, past administrations have been beholding to them and deterred by them.

And so we need to have more autonomy and we need to have more strength in the American economy. And I don't say that at the cost to, say, for instance, the UK or others. I think that the West needs to be more cognizant of how they deal with each other.

because they all have to deal with these other less cooperative economies. And I think that if we were to help

leaders in the next administration to understand what's important about the economical impact of a fallen Ukraine, a Ukraine that comes once again under the control of Russia and is raped and pillaged and poorly managed and et cetera, et cetera, like the current Ukraine.

uh, um, economy of Russia. Um, this is, this would be bad for Western, uh, trade and economy, and it would be bad for U S trade and economy. I think as, uh, the Trump team better understands that this is more than a squabble about who's paying what for what in, in Europe.

I think that that's a way to approach the Trump administration because he is keen to get economics in a better position in this world.

And I think he understands what Marty Dempsey, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs once said when he was asked, what is the greatest enemy to our U.S. military force? Marty Dempsey said very smartly, he said the U.S. deficit is the number one enemy to the U.S. military force. And so I think that that.

An administration, a Trump administration that understands how these economies are linked to the strength of a nation and how we have to get after that. I think that's a way to start a good conversation with the upcoming administration. And of course, there is so much discussion at the moment about potential peace talks.

It's easy to forget the fact that this is still very much a live war and we may be several months away from any peace talks happening. So in that meantime, what more would you like to see Ukraine's Western allies doing to support Ukraine? I'm a broken record. You could probably look at your last show and you'll remember these words. We need to give Ukraine the ability to increase the cost on Russia in this war.

And the first thing I would recommend is a change of Western policy whereby Ukraine can use Western weapons to strike into Russia. Russia now enjoys this huge place of safety all around Ukraine because we in the West are

To a large degree, there are fractures in the policy now, but to a large degree, we do not allow Ukraine to fire into Russia. We allow Russia to fire into Ukraine hundreds of times every week, sometimes 70, 80 times a night. We allow Russia to fire in and fire in and fire in from all points along the globe using kit from Iran, China, everybody else.

There's no restrictions on Russia. Have at it. Pound Ukraine. But we don't allow Ukraine to return fire. And that policy has to change. And why do you think it is, General, that Western leaders still have not

done that. I hear the hesitation they have about escalation, but Putin's threats of escalation have been proved to be a bluff, have they not? I mean, we now have a situation where Ukraine has literally invaded part of Russia and we have not had some ridiculous retaliation from Putin. So surely that's been shown to be a complete bluff. Well, I couldn't agree with your line of thought more. I would just interject to say that

that we in the West to this point have been completely deterred by Russia. I'm not sure if you've ever heard the term reflexive control. It's something that you should do a little research on and then let's have a whole new conversation.

But Russia's propaganda, Russia's war of words is the most successful weapon and campaign that Russia has had with the West because we are deterred. In large, Western leaders do not have the moral courage nor the intellectual capability to consider a defeated Russia. They just won't go there.

Because they are worried about what you just talked about. And so they are deterred. The reflexive control campaign of Russia is working magnificent for them in its ability to limit Western response. Where they are allowed to do anything, the horrendous things we've seen in Bucha, the horrendous things we've seen in Mariupol, all of these things.

Just horrid things that Russia does in this war. We just move on from it and like, wait a minute, we're not, you know, we can't go there because we're afraid of this war escalating. And so we have to get past that.

We have to get past the frozen response based on Russian reflexive control. And I mentioned what's been happening in Kursk, not just since August, but even in the last week or so, Ukraine ramping up offensive operations there. Do you think they're right to do that? And do you see that as part of them laying the groundwork ahead of potential peace talks? It was a huge decision. Some people would call it a gamble. I don't call it that.

that the offensive in Donbass was continuing apace, and rather than throwing more force at that, Ukraine mounted an attack into Kursk. I happen to believe that it was a masterstroke. It will absolutely change the dynamic of any peace talks coming up.

And I think that's why Mr. Putin is throwing everything, including the trash can and the kitchen sink at Kursk to try to rectify that before any peace talks. So that's just my opinion. I, you know, I'm just another person with an opinion. I think that this, this gambit, this approach will affect future negotiations.

And I think that who you believe, I don't know who you believe. But people I am reading now that are not the people who are tied to political positions, but just analysts of the war, they are saying that the Russian offensive in Donbass is nearly ground to a halt. Lots of reporting along those lines. And so if that's the case and that comes to a halt,

and Ukraine is still sitting in Kursk, then it appears that this was a masterful decision by Ukraine. And just finally, General, are you an optimist for what 2025 will mean for Ukraine? No, I'm a realist. And I think that there's a lot of hard times to come yet before this all plays out. And I fear the most that people at the negotiating table

set conditions that will leave a crippled Ukraine in their path. I said it before, a cessation of hostilities is not a win for the West. Russia desperately needs a cessation in hostilities. And we need to go into these negotiations wide-eyed about what Russia must give up

If we ask Ukraine to give up land, Russia has to give up land. These negotiations need to be done from a position of Western and Ukraine strength so that the results at the table reflect both sides contributing to the future peace, not Russia.

capitulation by one side. General Breedlove, we always appreciate your insights and your expertise. Thank you so much for joining us once again on Frontline. Thank you. ACAST powers the world's best podcasts. Here's a show that we recommend. We all have bad days and sometimes bad weeks and maybe even bad years. But the good news is we don't have to figure out life all alone. I'm comedian Chris Duffy, host of Ted's How to Be a Better Human podcast.

And our show is about the little ways that you can improve your life, actual practical tips that you can put into place that will make your day-to-day better. Whether it is setting boundaries at work or rethinking how you clean your house, each episode has conversations with experts who share tips on how to navigate life's ups and downs. Find How to Be a Better Human wherever you're listening to this. ACAST helps creators launch, grow, and monetize their podcasts everywhere. ACAST.com.